THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that the memorandum was | V.-C. S. CROOK v. CORPORATION OF SEAFORD. equivalent to a declaration of trust, and that Dr. Morris was Agreement for Lease by a Corporation for 300 years-Pants formance by Lessee-Action of Ejectment by Lessors-Spej formance. entitled to the bond. Solicitors: Raven & Bradley; Tucker & Lake, M. R. In re ESTATES INVESTMENT COMPANY. July 28. MCNEILL'S CASE. Company― Winding-up--Contributory-Fraudulent ProspectusRepudiation of Shares. The Estates Investment Company was registered under the Companies Act, 1862, on the 15th of April, 1865. Early in May the company issued a prospectus which has since been shewn to contain misrepresentations. On the 15th of May, McNeill applied for twenty-five shares on the faith of this prospectus, and duly paid a deposit on such application. On the 23rd of May he received notice that an allotment of the shares had been made to him. On the 30th of May a call, payable on the allotment, became due, but McNeill never paid it, and shortly afterwards he went to the office and informed the secretary that he repudiated the shares on the ground of the misrepresentations in the prospectus; and this repudiation he repeated at a public meeting of the shareholders on the 18th of July. The company never took any steps to enforce payment of the call, but they retained his name on the register of shareholders, and it remained thereon when the company was ordered to be wound up in March, 1867, and he was placed on the list of contributories. He now applied to have his name removed. Jessel, Q.C., and Everitt, in support of the application. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Higgins, for the official liquidator. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that both McNeill and the company were bound by McNeill's repudiation of the shares, and that it was not necessary for him to take any steps to have his name removed from the list of shareholders while the company was a going concern; and, consequently, that his name must now be removed from the list of contributories. Solicitors: Batt & Sons; 1. Harris. Bill for specific performance. The corporation of Seaford and the plaintiff were the owner lands at that place. In January, 1860, the corporation, as sh by the minutes of a general court, agreed to let to the ph the frontage of "West Gun Field," with the flat part of the b opposite (to be stumped out at the expense of the plaint the coach-road between was to be preserved at its width part of the "West Laine" at the back of the field was t stumped out at the expense of the plaintiff, and he was to b a terrace in front of his field at his own expense. The poration was to grant a lease for 300 years to the plaint 10s. a year, he paying all costs. Certain members of corporation were appointed a committee to arrange with: plaintiff about the stumping. The terms were accepted by plaintiff. The plaintiff and the committee met to stump ot corporation land, and the plaintiff afterwards did it, and er erected a sea-wall and completed the terrace at a great ene into possession and paid rent to the corporation. The pl and no objection was made by the corporation. In July the plaintiff received a notice to quit, and deliver up the fr land which he held as tenant, on the ground that he hai : adhered to the terms of agreement; and, after a long er spondence between the solicitors of the parties, the plant October, 1869, was sued in ejectment in the county court. bill was, in November, 1869, filed for the above purpose, an an injunction. The defence was, that the plaintiff had inc within the land stumped more land than he was entitled to. Dickinson, Q.C. (Pontifex with him), for the plaintif stating the facts, was stopped. conceived; it is founded upon an imperfect contract; the p Greene, Q.C., and Waller, for the defendants:-The bill is tiff has included property which was intended for the publi and having regard to the lapse of time, and that the suit corporation property, he cannot have specific performance. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR declared that the plaintiff was e to a decree for specific performance of the agreement of Ja 1860, and ordered the defendants to execute a lease of the which had been in the plaintiff's occupation since that timeSolicitors: Geo. Brown; Palmer, Palmer, & Bull, agents to pay the costs of the suit. Gell & Woolley, Lewes, Sussex. The marquis being owner in fee of the Donnington Park estate, contracted to sell it to Mr. Charles Abney Hastings, reserving to himself a life estate without impeachment of waste. After this contract was entered into, but before it was completed, V.-C. S. the marquis cut down some ornamental timber on the estate. Mr. Charles Abney Hastings now brought in a claim against the marquis' estate for damages in respect of such waste, and the chief clerk, being of opinion that no damage to the reversion was proved, dismissed the claim. The question was now brought before the Court on adjourned summons. Chapman Barber, and Dauney, for the claimant, contended that the question was not whether damage had been done to the reversion, but whether the reversioner was entitled to have the timber preserved as being ornamental. Sir R. Baggallay, Q.C., Jessel, Q.C., Charles Hall, and Pemberton, for the parties to the suit, were not called upon. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said, that if Mr. Hastings had applied for an injunction he would have been entitled to have the timber preserved; but he chose to take no step during the lifetime of the marquis, and now claimed damages. That being Fo, the question was whether he had suffered any damage, and His Lordship being of opinion that he had not, dismissed the summons. Solicitors: Austen, De Gex, & Harding; Barlow, Bowling, & Williams; Blake & Harris, Jaya In re PATENT FILE COMPANY. In re BIRMINGHAM BANKING COMPANY. Winding-up-Mortgage by Directors to their Bankers to g Antecedent Debt. The Patent File Company, Limited, was indebted to the mingham Banking Company and to other creditors, and rep further accommodation, but the banking company refused to a it without security, and thereupon the directors of the Pater!! Company mortgaged all the property of the company banking company to secure the amount due. The Paten: Company was afterwards ordered to be wound up. Dickinson, Q.C., and A. Smith, for the banking company. Hardy, Q.C., and Waller, for the Patent File Company's mons to set the transaction aside, submitted that the direc a limited company could not, unless they were authorized so by the deed of settlement, give a security upon the prop of the company for an existing or antecedent debt. The direc were mere agents of the company to do those things which deed of settlement authorized them to do, and, therefore, act in giving this mortgage was void. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said he did not entertain any d this being the case of traders borrowing from their bankers, the directors had authority to enter into the mortgage, and there- | pure personal estate, the same principle must apply to the fore the summons of the Patent File Company must be dis- codicil. missed. Solicitors: Dale & Stretton, agents for Wragge & Evans, Birmingham; Janes Crowdy, agent for Ryland & Martineau, Birmingham. V-C. S. HARES V. LEA. July 23. Plaint in County Court-Transfer of Cause by County Court Judge to Superior Court-Order by County Court Judge directing the Plaintiffs to pay Costs discharged. The plaintiffs filed their plaint in the county court to recover 1601, and interest from the estate of James Lea, deceased. There was no allegation in the plaint that the testator's estate did not exceed 5007. in value, and the evidence of the defendant proved that it exceeded that amount, and when the cause came on to be heard the county court judge ordered the cause to be transferred to the superior court, and that the plaintiffs should pay to the defendant 25l. 9s. for his costs of suit. Phear, for the plaintiffs, now moved that so much of the order as directed them to pay such costs should be discharged. Horsey opposed, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction, and that there could be no appeal in reference to costs only. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that the county court judge had made a mistake, and discharged so much of the order as ordered the plaintiffs to pay costs, without prejudice to any order that might be made thereafter. Solicitors: Pownall, Son, Cross, & Knott, agents for Lucas, Wem, Salop; II. G. Field. Wickens, for the Attorney-General. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that Lord Hardwicke had decided that where there were two methods of giving effect to a gift, one lawful and the other unlawful, the gift was good. The principle of that decision governed this case, and there must be a declaration that the gift was well given; that the executors bring in a list of the charities they intended to benefit; and that the costs of all parties be paid, as between solicitor and client, out of the Solicitors for the plaintiff and next of kin : Bell & Newman. Solicitors for the Attorney-General: Raven & Bradley. FIELDEN v. HORNBY. V.-C. S. asked that a sum of 9227. 18s. 9d., 3 per Cent. Annuities, now THE VICE-CHANCELLOR directed an immediate sale of the stock, and the proceeds of the sale to be paid on or after the 11th of August, 1870, to the petitioner or to his legal personal representative. Solicitors for petitioner: Pritchard & Englefield. Similar orders were made by the Vice-Chancellor in In re Procter on the 18th of March, 1870; and by Vice-Chancellor Bacon in In re Hay on the 9th of July, 1870. V.-C. M. July 22. In re LAND And Sea TeleGRAPH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. under Companies Act, 1862, Rules 2, 53. Evritt Allenby, by his will, dated the 30th of July, 1866, after giving certain legacies to friends and relatives, gave out of such part of his personal estate as might by law be bequeathed for Practice-Winding-up-Advertisement of Petition-General Order charitable purposes, to certain charitable institutions named, different legacies. He then gave the residue among relatives named in the will. By a codicil to his will, dated the 25th of July, 1868, he gave the residue to the plaintiffs upon trust to get in and realise the same, and to divide the proceeds in such parts, shares, and proportions, and in such manner and form, and amongst any hospitals or other charitable institutions situate in London or elsewhere in England as they in their sole and uncontrollable discretion should think proper. The testator died on the 26th of July, 1868, and his will was duly proved by his executors, who subsequently filed this bill to administer his estate. The usual decree was made on the 17th of March, 1869, and on the 16th of July, 1870, the chief clerk made his certificate, by which he found that part of the testator's personal estate consisted of railway debentures, value between 60007, and 70007. Karslake, Q.C., and Dickins, for the plaintiffs, contended that as there were several charities which were exempted from the operation of the mortmain laws, the gift of the whole residue was valid. Greene, Q.C., and Nalder, for the heir-at-law. Hughes, Q.C., and Hemming, for a residuary legatee, submitted that, upon the authority of the cases, it was not sufficient to shew that by a circuitous process you might evade the law. The burden of proof lay on those who sought to establish the gift to shew that the testator intended that thing to be done. That was not pretended here, and it was submitted that the impure personal estate was inapplicable to the gift. E. Riddell, for one of the next of kin, submitted that, as the testator in the will directed the gift to charities to be paid out of This was a petition for the winding up of the above-named company, which was presented on the 1st, and directed to be heard on the 15th, of July. The petition was advertised in two London daily morning newspapers more than seven clear days before the 15th, and was advertised in the London Gazette on the 8th of July. A second petition, by two directors, for the winding up of the company was presented on the 8th, directed to be heard on the 22nd, and advertised on the 15th, of July. The hearing of the first petition having stood over, the two petitions now came on to be heard together. Glasse, Q.C., and Streeten, for the first petitioner. Cotton, Q.C., and Kekewich, for the second petitioners, objected to an order being made on the first petition, on the ground that it had not been advertised in the Gazette for seven clear days before the day appointed for the hearing, as required by the 2nd rule of the General Order under the Companies Act, 1862; and they contended, that the power by the 53rd rule given to the judge of dispensing with advertisements did not apply to the advertisement of petitions under the 2nd rule. Higgins, for a shareholder supporting the first petition, referred to an unreported case, in which the Master of the Rolls had made a winding-up order on a petition which had not been advertised for seven clear days in any newspaper. Cole, Q.C., for another shareholder, in support of the first petition. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that if the question had been res integra he should have been clearly of opinion that the Court had power under the 53rd rule to dispense with the advertisement required by the 2nd rule, and he should certainly follow the | Traherne should die in the lifetime of her husband (which decision of the Master of the Rolls to that effect. In the present happened), as she should by will or codicil appoint, and in case, the petition having been advertised for more than seven default of such appointment, and so far as any such appointment clear days in two daily papers, which were more likely to be read than the Gazette, and for six clear days in the Gazette, he should exercise the power given to him by the 53rd rule and overrule the objection. should not extend, for such person or persons as at her death would have become entitled to her personal estate under the Statute of Distributions, if she had died unmarried and intestate The settlement contained a covenant by Mr. and Mrs. Trahere to settle any after-acquired property above the value of 100 reciting that by the settlement "the several sums of money and securities for the same therein particularly mentioned, and con stituting the trust funds thereunder, were assigned by her to the trustees" upon the trusts aforesaid; "and that she had not exercised such power of appointment, and was desirous of so July 26. doing; appointed that the trustees should, from and after her Construction of Will-Legatees who shall be Dead leaving Issue-decease, in case she should die in the lifetime of her husband, Solicitor for the first petitioner: Darley. Solicitors for the respondents: J. Perkins; J. R. Bailey. V.-C. M. In re JENKS' TRUSTS. Substitution for Parents. Henry Jenks, by his will, dated the 3rd of February, 1851, devised and bequeathed his real and personal estate to trustees upon trust to pay the interest, dividends, and annual proceeds to his two sisters and to the survivor for their lives; and after the death of the survivor he directed his property to be sold, and declared the trusts thereof as follows: "And in the next place to divide the surplus of the moneys remaining in their hands among my nephews and nieces as shall be living at the time of my decease. And it is my will, that in case any of my nephews and nieces shall be dead, or die leaving issue, then I direct my said trustees to pay over unto such issue the share or shares of my said nephew or niece so dying as aforesaid in equal shares." The testator died in March, 1854, and the survivor of his two sisters died in May, 1866. There were twenty-three nephews and nieces of the testator, of whom six died in his lifetime without leaving issue; two died before the date of the will leaving issue; one died after the date of the will, and before the death of the testator, leaving issue; three died after his death, and before the death of the surviving tenant for life, leaving issue; and three died after the death of the testator, without issue. The eight remaining nephews and nieces were still living. Cole, Q.C., Ince, and Buchanan, for the representatives of the nephews and nieces who died before the date of the will leaving issue, contended that the fund was divisible into seventeen parts, and their clients were entitled to two-seventeenths of the property. Pearson, Q.C., Fischer, and Cookson, for other parties, contended that the three nephews and nieces who died in the lifetime of the testator were not entitled to shares in the property, and the fund was divisible into fourteen parts. Stallard, for the trustees. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR considered that this case was governed by that of In re Potter's Trust (Law Rep. 8 Eq. 52), and was, in fact, a stronger case; that the testator evidently intended that all his nephews and nieces who might have issue, irrespective of the time of their death, were to share; so that the three who died before him, including the two who died before the will itself, leaving issue, were entitled to share in the fund. The words "shall be dead leaving issue" included all those who were already dead, irrespective of the time at which they died. The fund would, therefore, be divided into seventeen shares. Solicitors: Doyle & Edwards; White & Sons. stand possessed of the said trust funds thereunder, and over which she had power of appointment or disposition by that Ler will," in trust for her husband absolutely. large amount of after-acquired property, which became subject Mrs. Traherne died on the 27th of May, 1869. There was a to the covenant in the settlement. Mr. Traherne claimed the whole of the property, both that particularly mentioned in the settlement and that afterwards acquired. The plaintiff, as th sole next of kin of Mrs. Traherne living at her death, claimed the after-acquired property, as not effectually appointed by the wall Morgan, Q.C., and H. R. Young, for the plaintiff. Glasse, Q.C., and Freeling, for Mr. Traherne, were not called V.-C. M. with remainders over, but the petitioners and others had no The question was, whether the costs of the petitions were par able by the corporation. Cotton, Q.C., and Kekewich, Joshua Williams, Q.C., and Court. . for the petitioners. Glasse, Q.C., and C. Hall, for other parties entitled to a shar of the fund. 1 expensive process of paying it out of court; but he was bound by the authorities to hold that the corporation could not be made to pay the costs. He hoped that the matter would be taken before the Court of Appeal, and that that Court would see its way to reversing the decisions to which he had referred. Solicitors: Singleton & Tuttershall; Ewbank & Partington; Burges; Chester & Urquhart. his account by the testatrix. Her executors having received a sum of 18331. as part of the personal estate of the testatrix, the amount was paid by them into court, and the question now raised was, whether that sum was applicable to the payment of the before-mentioned judgment debts, or whether it ought to be distributed among the legatees and their representatives. Cotton, Q.C., and Kekewich, for the legatees of the personal estate, contended that the bond debts of the testatrix were charged primarily upon the moiety of the real estate devised to July 27. the McCarty family, to the exoneration of the personal estate. It was admitted on both sides that the Streffi moiety was not liable. Pearson, Q.C., and Wright, for the persons entitled to the McCarty moiety of the real estate, contended that the personal estate was primarily liable to pay the bond debts. There was no distinct exoneration of the personal estate, and all the testatrix intended was, that if it should be necessary to resort to the real estate, then that the moiety given to the McCarty family should be charged instead of the Streffi moiety. Co-sureties-Sureties by separate Instruments. In September, 1866, A. Crux, as principal, and T. Crux and W. Burke, as sureties, executed a bond to the Protection Loan Company to secure the repayment of certain sums of money by quarterly instalments, one of the conditions being, that if any instalment was unpaid, or if either of the obligors should compound with his creditors, the whole of the money would become due immediately; and the sureties covenanted with the company that they should not be released from the bond by any arrangement between the principal and the company for extension or alteration of time of payment or for additional security. In August, 1866, T. Crux compounded with his creditors, and subsequently A. Crux neglected to pay one of the instalments due. The plaintiff then consented to become a surety for A. Crux, and signed an undertaking to pay the company the whole amount due by instalments. A. Crux shortly afterwards became bankrupt, and the company proceeded against the plaintiff and recovered the whole amount due under the bond. The plaintiff then filed his bill to compel the remaining surety, W. Burke, to repay him a moiety of the money so recovered by the company from the plaintiff. Cotton, Q.C., Everitt, and W. C. Harvey, for the plaintiff. Glasse, Q.C., and Robinson, for the defendant Burke, contended hat the plaintiff had by his undertaking with the company become liable for the whole amount due, and the relationship of co-sureties did not exist between him and the defendant. Woodhouse, for another defendant. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the relationship of co-surety between the plaintiff and Burke had been established, and decreed hat the latter should repay to the plaintiff the moiety of the mount recovered, with costs. Solicitors: Algernon Wells & Sykes; James, Curtis, & James; Wickens. Charge of Debts on Real Estate-Exoneration of Personalty. This was a special case stated for the opinion of the Court. Lydia Faulkner, by her will, made in 1836, gave certain estates n trust for the separate use of her daughters, Isabella McCarty and Mary Streffi, for their lives, as tenants in common; and after the decease of Isabella McCarty she gave one moiety in trust for two sons of Mrs. McCarty for life, with limitations in favour of their first and other sons, and in case of the death of either of them without issue, then in trust for other members of the McCarty family. The second moiety, after the death of Mrs. Streffi, was given to her children and other members of the Streffi family. The testatrix then directed various legacies to be aid, and she gave the residue of her property to the daughters of Isabella McCarty. By a codicil to her will the testatrix, after reciting that she ad become surety in four different bonds for her son-in-law, ustin McCarty, to the amount of 3976., directed that in case he same should not be discharged by her son-in-law, that sum, with all interest due thereon, should be exclusively and in the rst instance borne by and paid out of the rents, issues, and rofits of the moiety of her real estates devised to her daughter, Irs. McCarty, and her sons, her intention being that the other oiety devised to Mrs. Streffi and her family should be exempt -om payment of the said debt. Justin McCarty died without repaying the money advanced on THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said the scheme of the will evidently was to give one moiety of the real estate to the McCarty family and the other moiety to the Streffi family, and that she intended these debts to be paid out of the moiety given to the McCarty family. The proviso that the bond debts were to be paid exclusively out of the real estate was an express direction that it was to be in exoneration of the personal estate. He should decide, therefore, that so far as the McCarty moiety of the real estate was sufficient the bond debts were to be paid out of that estate. Solicitors: Freshfields; R. M. & F. Lowe. By the will of Richard Ferrier a share of the proceeds of the sale of his real and personal estate was given to each of his children, with a proviso that the share of each daughter should be held by the trustees, in default of children, upon trust for all and every, or any one or more exclusively, of the others of the brothers and sisters, in such parts, shares, and proportions, and in such manner in all respects as such daughter should by will or codicil nominate, direct, or appoint, give or bequeath the same, and in default of appointment upon certain trusts over. The testator died in 1868, leaving five children, three sons and two daughters. Mary, one of the daughters, by her will gave, devised, and bequeathed all and every her real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, and of which she had any power to appoint or dispose of by will to her two brothers, Richard and Edward, upon trust to sell and stand possessed of the proceeds upon trust by, with, and out of the said moneys respectively to pay and satisfy her just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and all expenses incident to the trusts thereby created, and to invest the surplus upon trust for her brothers and sisters. By a codicil she revoked the trusts in her will declared in favour of her brothers and sisters, and directed the trustees to stand possessed of the moneys to arise from the sale and conversion of her real and personal estate upon trust to set apart 1000. and invest the same and pay the income to her sister for life, and upon further trust to pay 500l. to her brother Richard, and to divide the residue equally between her three brothers. Mary Ferrier died in March, 1869, a spinster, without leaving any real estate, and the value of her property beyond that to which she was entitled under her father's will did not amount to 100. Her debts, and funeral and testamentary expenses, were under 5007. The only questions argued were, whether the will was an exercise of the particular power to appoint amongst brothers and sisters, and which were the trustees to carry out the trusts of the appointed funds. Ince, for those interested in contending that the will operated | motion on behalf of the plaintiff by a new next friend, that al as an appointment, cited Cowx v. Foster (1 J. & H. 30). Sargant, contrà, cited Clogstoun v. Walcott (13 Sim. 523), which was in direct opposition to the later authority. North, for the trustees. further proceedings in the suit should be stayed, and that the original next friend, George Kenrick, should pay all the costs of the suit. In the taxation of the new next friend's costs G Kenrick, on the 3rd of March, 1870, carried in objections to THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said he should have been disposed to several items, on the allegation that Mr. Smith, the solicitor follow the later of the two conflicting authorities, but he preferred on the record of the new next friend, merely allowed his deciding the case upon principle. It might at first be supposed name to be used, and that Messrs. Hooke & Street, the d that the testatrix intended to subject all the property to the fendant's solicitors, in fact, acted for the new next friend payment of her debts, but by the well-known principle, reddendo A copy of the objections was delivered to Hooke & Street, singula singulis, she might be understood to mean that her debts but not to Smith. On the 11th of March, Kenrick took out should be paid out of property strictly her own, and the rest of a warrant to proceed with the objections, but did not serve the property to pass to those who were objects of the power. On it upon anybody. On the 26th of March, Hooke & Street inprinciple, therefore, he thought the power was well exercised, formed Kenrick's solicitors, by letter, that the bill of costs had and he was relieved of all difficulty by the case of Cowx v. Foster, been left for the taxing master's certificate, and that, if Kenrick though he regretted that Clogstoun v. Walcott did not appear to intended to proceed with his objections, he must obtain s have been cited in that case. His Honour also held, upon the appointment at once. On the 29th of March, Kenrick having authority of Cowx v. Foster, that the trustees of Mary Ferrier's taken no further steps, the taxing master signed the certificate, will were the proper persons to carry out the trusts of the allowing the items which had been objected to, and it was filed appointed fund. on the same day. Solicitors: Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland; Norris, Allen, & Carter. V.-C. M. In re BABER'S TRUSTS. July 28Assignment for Benefit of Creditors-Creditors to execute within Six Months-Acquiescence by Creditors who had not signed. By an indenture dated the 30th of January, 1851, H. F. Baber conveyed certain reversionary property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, in consideration of their covenanting not to arrest or take proceedings against him for the recovery of their debts for the space of three years; and the deed contained a declaration that such of the creditors of H. F. Baber as should not execute it within six months should be excluded from any benefit under the deed. H. F. Baber died some time in the year 1869, and a portion of the property comprised in the deed was subsequently realised, and there were now sufficient funds in the hands of the trustees to pay a dividend to those creditors who were entitled to receive the same. The petitioner, W. Dowdeswell, was one of the creditors of H. F. Baber; but although he had acquiesced in the deed, and had abstained from taking proceedings against the debtor on the faith of being entitled to the benefit of the deed, he had never executed it, and the trustees on this ground declined to pay him the sum which would otherwise have been due to him, without the sanction of the Court. The trustees then paid the money, amounting to 750l. 3s. 101., into court, and this petition was presented by W. Dowdeswell for the payment of that sum to him. The petitioner alleged that he had never seen the deed of 1851, and was not aware of the necessity of executing it within six months; but he submitted that Mr. Baber had had the benefit of the deed as against him by his abstaining from taking proceedings for the recovery of his debt. Glasse, Q.C., and Lawson, in support of the petition. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held, that upon the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in Spottiswoode v. Stockdale (G. Coop. 102), the petitioner, by reason of his acquiescence in the deed, had established his title to the benefit of it, and was therefore entitled to the dividend which had been paid into court by the trustees. Solicitors: Redpath & Holdsworth; Burton, Yeates, & Hart. Kenrick now applied by summons, which was adjourned int Court at the request of the respondents, to be allowed to proceed with his objections, notwithstanding the certificate. Cotton, Q.C., and Bradford, for the applicant, contended, that appointment before the certificate was signed, from having nis he ought not to be precluded by a mere slip in not obtaining a objections considered by the taxing master. Glasse, Q.C., and Dauney, for Smith, and Hooke & Street, contended, that the applicant had had ample opportunity of pr ceeding with his objections before the certificate was signed, and that the certificate was final and conclusive. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that the Court in exercise of its general jurisdiction over the proceedings of its officers had power to direct the taxing master to consider the objections, notwithstanding the filing of the certificate. The applicant ought to be allowed to have his objections considered, and it must be referred to the taxing master to review his certificate upon the objections The costs of the application must be reserved. Solicitors for the applicant: Rooks, Kenrick, & Harston. V.-C. M. PEARSE V. BROOKE. July 31 In 1848 an arrangement was made for the compromise of this suit, one of the terms of which was that Dobinson, one of the defendants, should pay 7001. to the plaintiff Pearse. Dobinsər solicitors paid Pearse 200%., and gave an undertaking to pay the remaining 5007. upon the order giving effect to the compromise being obtained. Pearse attempted to repudiate the comprom but an order confirming it was made in 1852. In July, 15 pursuance of an order made on the application of the plainti the balance of the 7001. was paid by Dobinson's solicitors court, and was carried to the account of " Moneys unappropriata! in aid of Compromise." In 1865 Pearse instituted a suit Pearse v. Dobinson to set aside the compromise of Pearse v. Bro and in 1869 the bill in Pearse v. Dobinson was dismissed, wit costs. H.W. Bull, one of the defendants in Pearse v. Dobinson, having taken out a fi. fa. for 256l., the amount of his taxed costs, which a return of nulla bona had been made, now presented a petition for payment of the 2567. and the costs of the petiti out of the fund standing in Pearse v. Brooke to the account Moneys unappropriated in aid of Compromise." Pearse had been served with the petition, but did not appe Glasse, Q.C., and Owen, for the petitioner, contended, that th fund in court belonged to Pearse, and was applicable to the par ment of the costs which he had been ordered to pay; and t the petitioner, being the only defendant who had perfected title by taking out a fi. fa., was entitled to payment. 3 |