1000, which he had partially fulfilled during his life. The administratrix was advised that the Statute of Frauds would, if insisted on, be an answer to the claim to have such promise enforced. The estate, which was estimated at 15,000l. clear, was given by the will to the wife during her life or widowhood, with remainder to the children of the testator living at the death or second marriage of the widow, or to the issue of such children as should have died before that time. The administratrix and the children were willing that the balance of the 1000l. should be paid. Maidlow and Fischer appeared for the respective parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion that it was the duty of the administratrix not to set up the statute, but to pay the balance. consent in Court. The Court was asked in this case to make an order for the payment of a small sum of money, arising from the proceeds of real estate, to several married women who were entitled thereto, without any deed of acknowledgment, and without taking their Everitt, and E. Ford, for the married women, cited In re Clarke's Estate (13 W. R. 401), in which a sum of less than 50%. had been paid to a married woman without her appearance in Court, and without a deed of acknowledgment. There were several ladies here, each of whom would be entitled to less than 50%., and there would be great convenience in following that decision, as they were all resident in the country. C. Browne and Carey, Anderson, Q.C., and Whitehorne, Pearson, Q.C., and Davey, and H. A. Giffurd, for other parties. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said as the sum was so small he would, under the circumstances, follow the case cited, which seemed to be the last reported on the subject, and it would evidently be a great convenience to the parties. Solicitors: H. W. Cattlin; Marshall Turner. V.-C. J. April 21. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. WEST HARTLEPOOL IMPROVEMENT COMMISSIONERS. Improvement Commissioners-Application of Moneys arising from Rates-Costs of Promotion of Bill in Parliament-Injunction. Information at relation of three ratepayers of a district defined by "The West Hartlepool Improvement Act, 1854," and comprising the town of West Hartlepool, and township of Stranton, Durham, against the West Hartlepool Commissioners and W. W. Brunton, their clerk and solicitor, stating that by the above Act the Commissioners were empowered to" do all acts, matters, and things for promoting the health, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the said town and township, within the limits of this Act, as they may deem or consider necessary, and for that purpose may exercise all the powers vested in them by this Act and the Acts incorporated herewith," amongst which were the Companies Clauses Act, and the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, or parts thereof; that the Commissioners had brought a bill into Parliament, which had been, and was intended to be, opposed, for extending the limits of the district, and that the relators had ascertained that the Commissioners had applied certain moneys, part of the rates levied by them, in part payment of the costs already incurred by them in the promotion of the said bill; and charging that they intended to expend further moneys out of the said rates in the promotion of the bill. The information prayed that they might be restrained from so doing. Kay, Q.C., and Bagshawe, for the informant. Solicitor and Client-Indemnity of Plaintiff by his SolicitorDeath of Plaintiff-Petition to revive. The original bill was filed on the 18th of June, 1866, by John Taylor Fielden, on behalf of himself and all others the holders of deferred preference and ordinary shares in the company, against the company and four of the directors, named Hayne, Sir J. Campbell, Smith, and Ayres, for the purpose of restraining the issue of certificates of dividend to guaranteed preference shareholders, and the payment of such dividend. The bill was filed by Montague Richard Leverson, as plaintiff's solicitor. In July, 1866, the injunction was moved for, and ordered to stand to the hearing; in November, the defendants answered; and in December, Leverson absconded. The plaintiff was then introduced to Benjamin William Jones, a solicitor, and on the 11th of January, 1867, obtained leave to change his solicitor by appointing Jones in the place of Leverson. On the 27th of February the bill was amended by making one Strawbridge a defendant, and on the 30th of May the defendants Strawbridge and Ayres were attached on the allegation that they had not answered, the plaintiff's solicitor erroneously supposing that the time for answering had expired, whereas in truth it had a fortnight longer to run. On the following day the attachments were discharged with costs, and on the 7th of June actions for false imprisonment against Fielden and Jones were commenced by Strawbridge and Ayres. These actions were stayed on application to the Court, and a summons was taken out to assess damages in Chambers, returnable on the 3rd of August. On the 23rd of September, 1867, Jones addressed and privately handed to Fielden a letter entituled in the suit, and thus worded: "You having given your consent to be plaintiff in this suit at the request of divers other shareholders, I undertake to hold you harmless from all costs on either side. You will hold this letter as private and confidential, unless any necessity should arise for its use." On the 20th of November, 1868, Vice-Chancellor Giffard awarded the two defendants 251. each, and the costs of the inquiry, to be paid by Fielden and Jones. He also directed that Fielden and Jones should pay the costs as between solicitor and client of some very long examinations of Strawbridge and Ayres before the examiner; and an appeal from this order was refused with costs. The suit was proceeded with; but on the 13th of March, 1869, the plaintiff died, and his will was, on the 10th of May, proved by his brother and sole executor, Henry Wm. Fielden, the assets being sworn under 207. In November, H. W. Fielden communicated to Ayres the fact that ho held the indemnity; and this petition was presented by the defendants, praying that H. W. Fielden might be ordered to revive the suit, and that Jones might be ordered to pay the taxed costs of the appeal motion remaining unpaid; and that if default should be made in obtaining and serving the order of revivor, the costs of the petitioners in the suit might be taxed as between solicitor and client, and Jones ordered to pay the same. Kay, Q.C., and Locock Webb, for the defendants. Eddis, Q.C., and E. C. Willis, for Jones. A. Thomson, for H. W. Fielden. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said that no doubt the solicitor had put himself in peril of having to pay all the costs by the letter which he had written; and if he had been the instigator of the April 25. Bund, in support of the application. THE CHIEF JUDGE granted the application, observing, that as it would be open to the trustees to question the accuracy of any of the proofs offered, no injury could arise to any party interested. Solicitors: Mathews & Mathews; Linklaters, Hackwood, & Addison. Common Law. Ex. BROOMFIELD v. SOUTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY. April 26. Declaration on a policy of insurance for 10007. upon the bottomry bond which formed the subject of decision in Stephens v. Broomfield (Law Rep. 2 P. C. 516), averring that the ship was wholly lost, that in consequence thereof the master necessarily sold the ship, and that the proceeds amounted to a sum less than the amount of the bond, and claiming a sum in proportion to the sum of 10007. Demurrer. Manager Salary measured by Amount of Profits Salary-Interest on Arrears not allowed. Defendant, an owner of ironworks, in June, 1858, engaged the plaintiff to act as his manager, and verbally agreed to give him 7 per cent. of the profits of the business, to be made up to 5007. Sir George Honyman, Q.C. (Watkin Williams with him), in in any year in which the share of profits should be less than that support of the demurrer, contended, that the loss being only consum. In 1864 defendant agreed to sell the ironworks to a com-structively total, the condition of defeasance of the bond never pany. Defendant paid the plaintiff at the rate of 5007. a year happened, and that therefore the policy being on a bottomry from 1856 to 1864, but nothing beyond until the 13th of Sep-bond, nothing became due on it. tember, 1864, when he gave him a cheque for a further sum of 554. Plaintiff claimed more to be due to him at the rate of 7 per cent. on the profits, and filed the bill in 1865 for specific performance, an account, and payment. The Chief Clerk found 4407. 2s. to be due to the plaintiff on the 31st of December, 1859, and 4051. 17s. 6d. on the 31st of December, 1861, leaving a balance (after deducting the 554.) due to the plaintiff of 2917. 19s. 6d. Plaintiff further claimed interest at 5 per cent. on the two items so found by the Chief Clerk from the times when they were so found due. Debts proved under a Liquidation by Arrangement are admissible in Proceedings under a Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 125. This was an application by the petitioning creditors, J. S. Hopkins and A. H. Hopkins, that the proofs of debts and proxies delivered to the said A. H. Hopkins, as the chairman at the meetings of creditors held under a petition for liquidation by arrangement filed by the debtors, might be considered as forming part of the proceedings under the bankruptcy. It appeared that the debtors had on the 12th of February presented a petition for liquidation by arrangement under s. 125, and at the general meeting the creditors, who had sent in proofs of their debts in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, resolved that proceedings should be instituted in bankruptcy: and by an affidavit in support of the application it was proved that great expense would be incurred in making fresh affidavits as to their debts and obtaining fresh proxies. Mellish, Q.C. (James, QC., and Cohen with him), contended, that the words in the condition of the bond, "or in case of the loss of the ship [on payment by the owners of] such an average as by custom shall have become due on the salvage," referred to a case in which the loss was not an absolute total loss, but a salvage remained the proceeds of which were paid over to the bondholder, and that the sum realised by sale having, under the decision of the Privy Council, been paid to him, the condition of defeasance had happened. THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB.), held that they could not give the bond the meaning contended for by the plaintiffs, and gave judgment for the defendants. Attorneys for plaintiff: Westall & Roberts. Attorneys for defendant: Thomas & Hollams. Party to Contract-Principal and Agent-Broker. Action for the non-acceptance of cotton, tried at Guildhall, before the Lord Chief Baron. A verdict was obtained by the plaintiff for 1748., leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that the plaintiff only acted as agent, and was no party to the contract. 1869, sold cotton to the defendant, and signed a bought note in The plaintiff was a cotton broker, and on the 20th of August, the following form:-"I have this day sold you on account of Messrs. Timmis, of Manchester, . . . 100 bales Omrawattie cotton .. (signed), E. Fairlie, broker." A rule having been obtained accordingly. Pollock, Q.C. (Barnard, with him), shewed cause. THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Pigott, and Cleasby BB.), made the rule absolute, holding that the reason which applied to auctioneers and others having an interest in the contract, or a lien on the price, failed, and that a broker with a disclosed principal was not, without express words, a party to the contracts made by him. Attorneys for plaintiff: Walker & Sons. Attorneys for defendant: Phillips & Willicombe. TABLE OF CASES. Equity. ANDERSON, Ex parte. In re ANDERSON (Court of Bankruptcy- V. C. J. PAGE 110 113 116 M. R. 114 111 113 116 M. R. 114 PAGE 115 TELEGRAPH CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE COMPANY, In re Common Law. ALLEN v. CARTER (Bankrupt-Composition Deed-Omission to 118 . C. P. 121 ALLEN, APP.; GEDDES, TOWN-CLERK OF WARRINGTON, RESP. C. P. 122 BRITON LIFE ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Ex parte In re ACCI- MACHENRY V. DAVIES (Married Woman-Liability of Separate -Set-off) M. R. 114 STEELE, In re (Solicitor and Client-Taxation-Retainer of Costs by Solicitor-6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, 8 41). M. R. 114 STEVENSON V. MARRIOTT (Practice-Administration Suit-Claim— Assets in hands of Claimant-Claim not heard until Assets paid into Court) M. R. 112 TEAGUE'S SETTLEMENT, In re (Power by Settlement to surviving Wife of appointing amongst Children of the Marriage-Execution in favour of a married Daughter during her Life for her Separate Use, without Power of Anticipation-Restraint upon Alienation held void) 121 119 Q. B. 120 P. & M. 122 MEAD v. SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (Railway Company C. P. 120 have gone first to the Chief Judge. The case was different froz Court of Bankruptcy-Jurisdiction-Injunction-Sale-Property April 2 In re LONDON AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK. Matthew Anderson, the bankrupt in this case, had expended large sums of money in the purchase of pictures, and ultimately his affairs became embarrassed. He summoned a meeting of his creditors, and a valuation was made of his property, and it was then proposed that all the pictures and other property of the debtor should be assigned to his nephew, Mr. Charles King Anderson, in consideration of the payment by him of a sum of money sufficient to pay to the creditors of M. Anderson a composition of 6s. 8d. in the pound. An assignment was accordingly executed on the 18th of December, 1869. The money was paid by Mr. C. K. Anderson and the pictures were handed over to him. The majority in number of the creditors of M. Anderson assented to the arrangement, and received their composition. The two largest creditors, however, alleged that the assignment L. J. GIFFARD. to C. K. Anderson was fraudulent, and at an undervalue, and they refused to receive their composition. In consequence of their opposition Mr. M. Anderson, on the 24th of December, 1869, presented a petition in the Newcastle Bankruptcy Court for an adjudication of bankruptcy against himself, and he was the same day adjudicated a bankrupt. The proceedings in the bankruptcy were afterwards, by an order of the Lord Chancellor, made under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, transferred to the County Court at Walsall. Mr. C. K. Anderson removed the pictures to London, and deposited them with Messrs. Christie & Manson for sale, and they advertised them for sale. The assignee under the bankruptcy knew of the proposed sale, but did not for some time interfere to prevent it. Ultimately, on the 11th of March, 1870, he obtained, ex parte, from the registrar of the County Court, an order for an injunction to restrain the intended sale by Messrs. Christie & Manson. On the granting this injunction the assignee was required to enter into an undertaking to "abide by any order the Court may make as to payment (out of the moneys received or to be hereafter received by him in this matter) of damages in case the Court shall be hereafter of opinion that C. K. Anderson has sustained any loss by reason of this order which the assignee ought to pay out of such moneys." From this order C. K. Anderson appealed. Roxburgh, Q.C., and Bagley, for the appellant, contended, that there was no jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act to grant this injunction against a person outside the bankruptcy. At any rate, if there was such a power, it only applied in bankruptcies originating after the Act of 1869 came into operation. The injunction ought not to have been granted ex parte, and if granted, the undertaking as to damages ought to have been unqualified in form. De Gex, Q.C., and Reed, for the assignee, contended, that the Act of 1869 gave ample jurisdiction to make the order appealed from. They also objected that as that order was made under the Act of 1869, the appeal ought to have been brought in the first instance to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. This objection was not insisted on, as the Court suggested that it would save expense to have the matter disposed of at once. THE LORD JUSTICE CIFFARD thought that the appeal ought to This was an appeal from an order made by Vice-Chancellor Stuart in Chambers, in the liquidation of the London and Meiterranean Bank, under the following circumstances :--Previons to the winding up of the London and Mediterraneau Bank t bank accepted three bills of exchange for the respective amoms of 17007., 14751., and 543l., which were drawn to the order of and indorsed by a person named Brusewitz. The bank was subsequently wound up voluntarily, and four liquidators we appointed. The bills became due after the commencement the winding-up, and Brusewitz, for whose accommodation t bills had been drawn, agreed with the liquidators that thị should give him renewed bills for the same amounts, which là would get discounted, and so provide them with funds to met the original bills. One of the liquidators, accordingly, accepte fresh bills, which Brusewitz got discounted by Overend, Gurney & Co., and the money was paid by him into the bank as agra The liquidators of Overend, Gurney, & Co. now claimed to prov for the amount of the bills against the estate of the bank, i the Vice-Chancellor refused to admit the claim on the grouri that the acceptance of the bills had been by one only of t liquidators, contrary to the provisions of the 133rd section of the Companies Act, 1862, and was, therefore, not binding on từ bank. The liquidators of Overend, Gurney, & Co. appealed. Cotton, Q.C., and Ferrers, for the appellants, contended that, although the acceptance of the bills was not binding on the bank, the money went to pay liabilities of the bank, and the liquidators had sanctioned the transaction. Hardy, Q.C., and Higgins, for the respondents. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD held that the transaction wr between Overend, Gurney, & Co. and Brusewitz, and there w no privity between Overend, Gurney, & Co. and the bank; thenfore, as the acceptances were void, there was no foundation for the present claim. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. Solicitors: Maynard & Co.; Lewis, Munns, & Co. In re ACCIDENTAL AND MARINE INSURANCE CORPORATION. Greene, Q.C., and Holl, for the appellants. the costs, as well as damages for infringement of the patent. The costs were taxed at 12,216., the plaintiff waiving the claim for damages. During the progress of the suit Goodier had assigned all his property for the benefit of his creditors, and immediately after the suit was concluded he was adjudicated bankrupt on his own petition. His assets were about 53., and the costs in the charge the Chief Judge refused it on the ground that the banksuit were the only important debt. When he applied for his disrupt had contracted the debt due for costs without reasonable frivolous and vexatious litigation. The bankrupt appealed. expectation of payment, and also that he had been guilty of Little, Q.C., and North, for the appellant. De dier, Q.C., and Bagley, for the opposing creditors. costs was not one which arose from contract, and was not thereTHE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD was of opinion that the debt for fore within the 159th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861; and that the bankrupt's opposition to the plaintiff's claim in the suit was not frivolous or vexatious. He therefore reversed the order of the Chief Judge, and granted the bankrupt an unconditional Bankruptcy-Trader-debtor Summons-Leave to issue Summons. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD said that this was the first time L. J. GIFFARD. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. L. J. GIFFARD. On the 18th of March, 1870, a trader-debtor summons was taken out by E. L. Price against J. T. Taylor for an alleged debt of 1137. 10s. On the 5th of April, 1870, Taylor appeared, and made an affidavit that he was not indebted in the sum claimed. He then produced a deed of assignment for the benefit of his creditors, which had been duly assented to and registered before the issuing of the trader-debtor summons. The Registrar thereupon made an order to the following effect:-" It appearing that April 30. J. T. Taylor has executed a deed of assignment, which has been registered pursuant to the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, and that the leave of the Court, in pursuance of the 198th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, has not been obtained to issue such summons, it is ordered that the summons be dismissed, and that E. L. Price pay the costs of the summons." In re ANGLO-ROMANO WATER COMPANY. This was a motion by way of appeal from a decision of the Sir R. Baggallay, Q. C., and Langley, for the appeal motion. Rolls. Solicitors: Mercer & Mercer; Flux, Argles, & Rawlins. I. J. GIFFARD. Ex parte GOODIER. In re GOODIER. Price appealed from this order. The Roxburgh, Q.C, and Kisch, for the appellant, contended that no leave was necessary to issue a trader debtor-summons. 198th section only referred to executions, not to the commencement of proceedings. Price had, in fact, commenced an action at law to try the validity of the creditors' deed, which he disputed. De Gex, Q.C., for Taylor. THE LORD JUSTICE GIFFARD said that as it appeared on the order that the reason for dismissing the summons was, that leave May 2. had not been obtained, the order could not stand. The 198th section did not prevent a creditor from issuing a writ in an action Bankruptcy-Contracting Debts without Expectation of Payment-at law, and a trader-debtor summons was on the same footing. Frivolous and Vexatious Litigation. The proper order would be to discharge the present order, and In re INTERNATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY. This was an appeal from an order of the Chief Judge refusing an order of discharge to the bankrupt, J. Goodier. The bankrupt was the defendant in a suit of Bovill v. Goodier, which was filed to restrain him from infringing the plaintiff's patent, and to L. J. GIFFARD. obtain an account and payment of the profits made by the infringement. Issues were directed by the Master of the Rolls to be tried at law to ascertain the validity of the patent. The bankrupt was successful in the first trial, but the plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was granted, and the bankrupt was then unsuccessful. He then, in his turn, moved for a new trial, which was refused by the Master of the Rolls, and this decision was affirmed on appeal by the Lord Chancellor. The suit was then disposed of by the Master of the Rolls, who ordered the defendant to pay all May 3. Representative. Policy of Assurance-Charge-Priority-Creditors' Cotton, Q.C., and Everitt, for the appellant. Glasse, Q.C., and Higgins, for the official liquidator, were not called upon. |