from time to time. Section 29 makes it an offence if the parent omit to procure the child to be vaccinated according to the requirements of section 16. Section 31 enacts that if any officer appointed to enforce the provisions of the Act shall give information to a justice of the peace that he has reason to believe that any child under the age of 14 years has not been successfully vaccinated, and that he has given notice to the parent to procure its being vaccinated, and that the notice has been disregarded, the justice may summon such parent to appear with the child before him at a certain time and place, and upon the appearance, if the justice shall find, after such examination as he shall deem necessary, that the child has not been vaccinated . . . he may if he see fit make an order directing such child to be vaccinated within a certain time, and if at the expiration of such time the child shall not have been so vaccinated . . . the person upon whom such order shall be made shall be proceeded against summarily, and unless he can shew some reasonable ground for his omission to carry the order into effect, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 20s. Section 34 provides that in any prosecution for neglect to procure the vaccination of a child... if the defendant produce the certificate in the form contained in Schedule B., it shall be a sufficient defence, except when the time specified therein for the postponement of the vaccination shall have expired before the time when the information shall have been laid.

The appellant received notice under s. 31 to have his child vaccinated, and the justices made an order for its vaccination; the order was not complied with; information was laid, and the appellant was convicted, and a penalty imposed. The child, however, was still not vaccinated. A second order was made, which was also disobeyed, and the appellant was again summoned before the justices, when he produced a certificate in the form given in Schedule B., that the child was in an unfit state for vaccination, and contended that the justices were bound to accept such certificate as proof that the child was then unfit to be vaccinated. Notwithstanding the justices again convicted.

The questions for the Court were: 1, whether the appellant could be twice convicted for the same offence; 2, whether the production of the certificate was a defence.

Graham, for the appellant.

Sir J. D. Coleridge, S.G. (Archibald with him), for the respondent.

THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor and Hannen, JJ.) held that the words of s. 31 were general, and that the intention of the Legislature was not that the penalty should be imposed on a person once for all, but that it should be imposed toties quoties, so long as disobedience continued; and that the certificate was only a bar to proceedings under s. 29, and not to proceedings under s. 31.

Attorneys for appellant: Thomas & Hollams, for Conquest & Stimson, Bedford.

Attorney for respondent: Solicitor to the Treasury.

Q. B.

Jan. 15. THE TRUSTEES OF THE BRIGHTON, CUCKFIELD, AND WEST GRINSTEAD TURNPIKE ROADS, APPS.; THE SURVEYORS OF HIGHWAYS OF THE PARISH OF PRESTON, RESPS. Turnpike Road-Deficiency of Trust Fund-Rate in Aid— Apportionment-4 & 5 Vict. c. 59.

An information by the clerk to the appellants was exhibited before the justices of Sussex under 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59, stating that the funds of the appellants' trust were insufficient for the repairs of the turnpike road within the respondents' parish, and praying for such order in the premises as to them should seem fit.

Under 17 & 18 Vict. c. xxxvii. s. 25, 850l. was authorized to be expended in the repair of the roads in the appellants' trust, which sum was insufficient, the estimated cost of such repairs being 13507., out of which the cost of repairing that portion of the road within the parish of Preston was 1427. 13s. 2d.

The appellants apportioned the said sum of 8501. to the severa parishes within their trust according to the mileage of road i each parish, and they applied to the respondents to pay to them out of the highway rates the difference between the estimated cost of the repairs of the road within the respondents' paris and the sum which they had under the above-mentioned mileage principle appropriated to such repairs.

The traffic on that portion of the road which lay within the parish of Preston was greater, and the cost of repairs was larger: in proportion, than in any other parish within the appellants! trust.

The respondents contended that the appellants ought to have appropriated the sum of 8501. in proportion to the wear and tear of the roads in each parish.

Under the mileage principle, the proportion of the 850. to be spent in the respondents' parish was 271. 4s. 8d., leaving a sum of 115. to be contributed by them, and the appellants applied to the justices to order such sum to be paid by the respondents. The justices were of opinion that, as the estimated cost of the repairs of all the roads within the trust was 13501., of which 850!. was the sum to be contributed under the Local Act, and the excess of 5007. under 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59, the two sums of 8507. and 500'. should be apportioned between the several parishes upon one principle-that, namely, of wear and tear, and not that of mere mileage and as 891. would be the share of the 8501, to which the respondents' parish would be entitled on this principle, they ordered the respondents to pay out of the highway rates the sum of 531.

BUTTEN AND ANOTHER v. BUTTERWORTH AND OTHERS.

Bankruptcy Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 134)-Deed of Composition under s. 192-Fraudulent Preference of one Creditor after the requisite Number of Assents.

To an action by a non-assenting creditor on a bill of exchange, the declaration having been delivered on the 20th of January, 1869, the defendants, on the 2nd of February, pleaded a deed of composition under section 192 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, dated the 13th of January, and registered on the 1st of February, whereby they agreed to pay a composition of 6s. in the pound by certain instalments, to be secured by promissory notes, the first instalment to be payable within one month after the registration of the deed. The plaintiffs replied that the assent and approval of the majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors of the defendants, or some one or more of such creditors, was obtained and procured by the fraud of the defendants or their agents.

After

The deed contained a release, and was assented to in writing by the requisite number and value of creditors and debts. these assents had been given, another creditor (one Jaques) was induced, by a relative of the defendants' giving him the 6s. in the pound in cash, and a further sum of 1507., to assent also; but there was no evidence that this was done with the knowledge of the defendants. More than one month after the registration of the deed, three promissory notes were sent by post to the plaintiffs, who handed them to their attorney, and proceeded with the action. A verdict having been taken for the plaintiffs:

THE COURT made absolute a rule to enter a nonsuit, on the ground that, the deed being already perfect by the assents of the required number of creditors, the fact of the assent of Jaques

SMITH V. LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Railway Company-Negligence-Fire from the Railway communicating to Property near the Line.

The defendants' servants cut the grass and trimmed the hedges on the banks of the railway, and placed the cuttings in heaps. These heaps became ignited by sparks from a passing engine, and being, in consequence of the length of time they had been exposed (about fourteen days), and the extreme heat and dryness of the weather, very inflammable, the company's servants were unable to extinguish the fire, and it passed through the hedge, over a stubble field, and an intervening public road, and communicated to a cottage about 200 yards from the line, and destroyed the plaintiff's furniture therein. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff:

Upon a rule to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the defendants, on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on their part which ought to have been submitted to the jury: BOVILL, C.J., and KEATING, J., held that there was some evidence which the judge could not have withheld. BRETT, J., was of the contrary opinion.

Rule discharged.

T. H. Cole, Q.C., and M. Bere, Q.C., for the plaintiff. Kingdon, Q.C., Lopes, Q.C., and Murch, for the defendants. Attorneys for plaintiff: Sole, Turner, & Turner, agents for W. C. Lacey, Wareham.

Attorney for defendants: Lewis Crombie.

Arbitration-Arbitrator's Decision on an Interlocutory Matter. Upon an appeal from a decision of this Court, the Exchequer Chamber desired to have a fact which was imperfectly stated in the case agreed upon between the parties to be re-stated. The fact to be ascertained was whether the indorsement on the bills

of exchange sued on took place in Paris or in London. The counsel being unable to agree, it was referred to Mr. Prentice, Q.C., to decide the point. The parties attended before him, and, the plaintiff offering himself as a witness, it was objected that he was not competent, by reason of his peculiar tenets, to be sworn. The plaintiff submitted that, before he could be objected to as incompetent, it was incumbent on the party objecting to prove his incompetency on the voir dire.

Being pressed, the plaintiff (who did not refuse to take the oath) admitted that he did not believe in the Deity or in a future state of rewards and punishments; and he claimed the benefit of the 4th section of the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, which enacts that, "if any person called to give evidence in any court of justice, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such person shall, if the presiding judge is satis ied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effect on his conscience, make the following prom se and declaration:-'I solemnly promise and declare that the evidence given by me to the Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;' and any person who, having made such promise and declaration, shall wilfully and corruptly give false evidence, shall be liable to be indicted, tried, and convicted for perjury, as if he had taken an oath."

Mr. Prentice, conceiving that this enactment did not enable him, sitting as an arbitrator, to receive the declaration of Mr. Bradlaugh, rejected his evidence.

The submission having been made a rule of Court, the plaintiff (after an unsuccessful application to Brett, J., at chambers) now moved for a rule directing the arbitrator to receive his evidence. The 9 & 10 Wm. 3, c. 32, s. 1; the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 32, s. 41; the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), s. 20; the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 16, and the cases of Metcalf v. Parry (3 Dowl. 94) and Nicholls v. Warne (2 D. & L. 549), were

referred to.

THE COURT held that they were precluded from entertaining the application by the general principle that the parties to a reference, having chosen their own tribunal, are bound by the decision of the arbitrator as well on matters of law as on matters of fact; and the rule was refused. Mr. Bradlaugh in person.

Ex.

Jan. 11.

WIGHT v. HITCHCOCK AND ANOTHER. Patent-Construction-Infringement by Buying and Selling. Action for infringement of a patent.

The plaintiff's patent was for the invention of a process for plaiting fabrics by means of a "reciprocating knife," but it was described in the specification as used in combination with a sewing machine, by means of which the fabric, as it was plaited, was fixed in its place by stitches. The claim also contained a reference to the sewing machine. Orr took the plaintiff's invention so far as concerned the use of the reciprocating knife, but did not use the knife in combination with a sewing machine, and did not produce a result entirely similar in form to that indicated in the plaintiff's patent; and for the process so varied (with some other slight variations) he took out a patent. Articles manufactured according to Orr's patent were bought and sold by the defendants in the way of trade, but the defendants were not aware at the time of so buying and selling that there was an infringement, or that the plaintiff had any patent.

Objections were taken to the validity of the patent on the construction of the specification and claims.

The jury found for the plaintiff on the question of novelty and infringement, leave being reserved to the defendants to move to enter the verdict for them.

A rule having been obtained accordingly, on the ground that there was no evidence of infringement, and that the patent was bad:

Grove, Q.C., Webster, Q.C., and Aston shewed cause.
Manisty, Q.C., and Macrory supported the rule.

charged the rule, holding that the combination of the use of the THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, Channell, and Pigott, BB.) disknife with the sewing machine was no part of the plaintiff's patent; that the patent was a good patent for the peculiar mode of plaiting or crimping fabrics described in the plaintiff's specification-namely, by means of a reciprocating knife, and not for the form of the product; and that there had been an infringement of the patent by the defendants in buying and selling articles manufactured by Orr's process.

Ex.

Attorney for plaintiff: J. H. Johnson. Attorney for defendants: J. N. Mason.

Jan. 12.

HEUGH AND ANOTHER v. LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Carriers-Refusal of Goods by Consignee-Involuntary Bailee. Action brought by the consignors of goods by the defendants' line from Manchester to London, to recover damages from the defendants for delivering the goods to a person who obtained the delivery by fraud after the goods had been forwarded to the consignees' address and there refused. The goods were sent by the plaintiffs upon an order purporting to come from the Southwark