122. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure Sale.-The right of a mortgagee to confirmation of a sale under his mortgage is not affected by the pendency of a separate action by the mortgagor against the purchasers, to which the mortgagee was not made a party, to set aside the sale.-SOUTHERN MUTUAL BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N OF ATLANTA, GA., V. RYAN, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 195.

123. MORTGAGES-Reformation- Mutual Mistake.-A pre-existing debt is sufficient consideration for a mortgage to entitle the mortgagee to a correction of a mutual mistake therein, as against the mortgagor and a subsequent purchaser with notice.-CITIZENS' NAT. BANK OF ATTICA V. JULY, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 259.

124. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Election for Issuance of Bonds.-A city charter provided that bonds for a city market shall not be issued "unless the qualified electors of said city, voting in their respective wards, shall have authorized the issuing of said bonds by a majority of their votes cast at any regular election, or at a special election called for the purpose;" and a provision subsequently added to such charter that no debt should be incurred by the city for an electric plant unless authorized by the qualified electors of said city "voting thereon" shows a legislative intent to provide a different rule in each case: Held that, where a proposition for issuance of market bonds was placed on a general election ticket, a majority of all votes cast at the general election controls, and not a majority of those cast on the bonding proposition.STEBBINS V. JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT OF GRAND RAPIDS, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 594.

125. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Health-Filling Low Lots.-Act 1830, amending the charter of the city of Charleston, authorizing the city to fill up low lots, declared to be public nuisances by the board of health, and to recover the cost from the landowner if it does not exceed one-half the value of the lot, is ajvalid exercise of the police power; the general assembly having the right to delegate such power to the city authorities.-CITY COUNCIL OF CHARLESTON V. WERNER, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 207.

126. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Improvements. -The provisions of Rev. St. 1894, § 4288 et seq., authoriz ing city councils to improve streets and contract for the work to be let to the best bidder after advertising, the cost of such improvement to be ultimately assessed against abutting property, must be strictly followed, and the letting of a contract containing provisions materially more favorable to the contractor than the requirements under which the bids were invited and received destroys the benefit of the competition intended to be realized by the statute. Such contract is illegal, and its performance may be enjoined.-WICKWIRE V. CITY OF ELKHART, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 216.

127. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Paving-Con. tract.-A provision in a paving contract requiring the contractor to keep the pavement in good repair for five years, except repairs due to cutting through the pavement for laying pipes, etc., renders the assessment therefor against the property owners invalid, the charter of the city requiring the expenses of repairing streets to be paid from the ward fund.-BOYD V. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 603. 128. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE Assessments.Where the board of trustees of a mutual benefit asso

ciation, when less than a quorum was present, after official notice of the death of members, ordered as sessments, the irregularity, if any, was cured by the approval of the minutes of such meeting at a subsequent meeting, when a quorum was present.-WOLF v. MICHIGAN MASONIC MUT. BEN. ASS'N, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 576.

129. NATIONAL BANKS-Insolvency-Assessment.-The complaint, in an action by the receiver of an insolvent national bank to enforce an assessment on the shareholders, made by the comptroller of the treasury, need not aver that there was a necessity therefor, or that the comptroller determined that there was such necessity though the law provides that the comptroller may enforce the individual liability of the stockholders, if necessary to pay the debts of the bank. It is enough that the complaint alleges that the comptroller made the assessment and directed its enforcement.O'CONNOR V. WITHERBY, Cal., 44 Pac. Rep. 237.

130. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Bona Fide Purchasers. -A writing by which a debtor gives his creditor the option of selecting from all notes belonging to the debtor in the hands of his pledgee which shall remain after payment of the amount for which they were hypothecated such paper as the creditor is willing to take in payment of his claim does not make the creditor a purchaser "in the usual course of business" of any particular note in the pledgee's hands.-BURNHAM V. MER. EXCH. BANK, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 510.

131. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Forged Renewals.A bank, which holds a note made by two persons as principal and surety, in accepting, in good faith, at maturity, a renewal note to which the name of the surety was forged by the principal, is not bound to know the handwriting of the surety, and is, hence, not guilty of negligence, entitling the surety to a dis. charge from liability on the original note, in failing to compare the surety's signatures on the two notes, respectively, with reference to ascertaining the genuinemess of that on the renewal note.-LYNDONVILLE NAT. BANK V. FLETCHER, Vt., 34 Atl. Rep. 38.

132. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Consideration. -A note without other consideration than the transfer, by delivery, of a certificate of the register of the United States land office, to the effect that the person to whom it was issued had taken the preliminary steps towards entering as a homestead the land described therein, which land had, before the making of such note, been abandoned by such entryman before he was entitled to a final certificate or patent therefor, is invalid for want of consideration. -MCCOLLUM V. EDMONDS, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 501.

133. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Notes Liability of Trustee.-Unsubscribed stock of a bank was issued to T, its president as trustee for the bank, and a note was given by the president, payable to the bank, signed, "T, Trustee for Bank." The proceeds from any of such stock, when sold, as well as all dividends there on, were credited to the bank. The note was renewed each six months the amount of the new note being reduced according to the amount received from the sale of such stock: Held, that on the insolvency of the bank, T was not personally liable on the note to the receiver appointed for the bank.-NEPTUNE V. PAXTON, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 276.

134. NEW TRIAL-Newly-discovered Evidence.-Be fore a new trial should be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, due diligence prior to the trial in respect to such evidence must be shown; and to this end it is not sufficient for the moving party to merely allege that he used due diligence, but he must show the facts, so that the court can see whether there was due negligence.-LUKENS V. GARRETT, Kan., 44 Pac. Rep. 23.

135. NEGOTIABLE NOTE-Agreement to Pay Taxes.-A promissory note containing a stipulation to "pay all taxes assessed against the real estate and the mortgagee's interest therein, described in the mortgage

given to secure this note, until it is paid," is not nego. tiable.-WALKER V. THOMPSON, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep.

584.

136. OFFICE AND OFFICERS Civil Liability.-An at torney for persons having claims against the govern. ment on account of a readjustment of their salaries as postmasters, has no right of action against the postmaster general because, in sending drafts to the claimants on account of their claims, he informed them that no attorney's services were necessary to the presenta. tion of such a claim, that congress desired all the proceeds to reach the person really entitled thereto, and that the claims were sustained or rejected according to the evidence furnished by the records of the department.-SPALDING V. VILAS, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 631. 137. PARTITION - Judgment.-A judgment ordering partition according to the will of testator, and directing the commissioners to charge the shares of certain of the parties with the sums expressly laid upon them by the will, is not void as conditional, because it further directs that, if the sums so charged shall be paid before the commissioner acts, the shares should be relieved of the charges.-SIMMONS V. JONES, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 114.

138. PARTITION Limitations.-While the 15-years statute is the proper one to be pleaded in an action for partition, yet a plea of the 20-years statute in such action is also good.-WAYMIRE V. WAYMIRE, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 267.

139. PARTNERSHIP.-Evidence that two farmers, purchasing a threshing machine, paid for the same with their joint and several notes, secured by a chattel mortgage on the machine purchased, and jointly took possession of and used the machine in threshing grain for others, will not support a finding that the threshing machine was partnership property, nor that a copartnership relation existed between the farmers. Such evidence warrants, rather, the conclusion that the farmers were joint owners, or tenants in common of the machine.-STATE BANK OF LUSHTON V. O. S. KELLEY CO., Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 619.

140. PARTNERSHIP-Evidence.-A statement to plaintiff, by one not a party to the suit, that he was not a partner of the parties, is incompetent to bind defendant, who was not present when the statement was made.-WIGGIN V. FINE, Mont., 44 Pac. Rep. 75.

141. PLEDGE-Sale of Pledged Property.-A pledgee, in selling the pledged property on default, is bound to use reasonable diligence to obtain its full value, and this duty includes the fixing of a reasonable time and place of sale.-GUINZBURG V. H. W. DOWNS CO., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 194.

142. PLEDGE When Title Passes.-Where goods which the consignee had agreed to pledge as security for a bona fide debt were delivered to a carrier for transportation to the pledgee, under a bill of lading expressly naming him as consignee, there was a valid delivery of the pledge, which, in the absence of fraud, passed title, as against an attachment levied on the goods in transit.-TOMS V. WHITMORE, Wyo., 44 Pac. Rep. 56.

143. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Agency.-Merely holding out a person as agent does not estop the alleged principal from denying such person's authority to contract in his behalf, unless the representations were made under such circumstances that the principal should have expected that they would be relied upon, and unless they were actually relied upon in good faith, to the injury of an innocent party.-CLARK V. DILLMAN, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 570.

144. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT Authority to Employ Subagent.-An agent who, in good faith and with the consent of his principal, selects a suitable person as subagent, is not liable to the principal for the acts of such subagent.-DAVIS V. KING, Conn., 34 Atl. Rep. 107. 145. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

Authority to Receive Payment.-The fact that one acted as agent for a mort. gagee in taking a mortgage, and in receiving interest

payments on coupon interest notes, did not authorize the mortgagor to pay the principal to him, where the mortgagee himself kept possession of the securities, and did not surrender the several interest coupons till he received the money from the agent.-WESTERN SECURITY CO. v. DOUGLASS, Wash., 44 Pac. Rev. 257.

146. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY Liability of Surety.Sureties on an official bond securing the faithful performance of the duty of an officer holding an office the term of which is fixed are not liable for any default of the principal beyond the term under which the bond is given, and provisions of law authorizing officers to hold over until their successors are appointed and qualified can only extend the liability of sureties for such reasonable time as, with due diligence, would enable his successor to be appointed and qualified.BOARD OF ADMR'S OF INSANE ASYLUM OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA V. MCKOWEN, La., 19 South. Rep. 553.

149. PUBLIC LANDS Riparian Rights.-Land under navigable waters passes by a private grant only when so expressly provided for by the sovereign authority, and there is no presumption that there has been any act of the government which could have the effect of passing away its title.-ROSBOROUGH V. PICTON, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 791.

150. QUO WARRANTO-Forfeiture of Franchise.-On application by the attorney-general for leave to bring proceedings to forfeit the franchise of a city water company for failure to keep an account of the cost of the construction of its plant, so as to enable the city to exercise its option to purchase the plant, as required by the city ordinance granting the company the fran chise, the acts of the city should be considered în determining whether the right to bring such a proceeding has been waived.-STATE V. JANESVILLE WATERPOWER CO., Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 512.

151. RAILROAD AID BONDS-Validity.-A power given by a municipal charter granted by the State of Indiana in 1847 to take stock in any chartered company for making roads to said city" authorized a subscription to the capital stock of a railroad company building to the city.-CITY OF EVANSVILLE V. DENNETT, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 613.

152. RAILROAD COMPANIES Accident at CrossingNegligence. The driver of a vehicle, who, at the signal of the street flagman, which, by Birmingham City Code, § 465, is an assurance that the railroad track may be crossed in safety, goes upon the track without stopping his team in order to look and listen, is not chargeable with negligence.-ALABAMA, G. S. R. Co. V. ANDERSON, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 516.

153. RAILROAD COMPANY - Crossings - Contributory Negligence.-Where plaintiff, who approached a railway crossing along a highway which ran parallel with the railway track, and from which the approaching train was visible at the distance of 800 feet from any point on the highway within 200 feet of the crossing, failed to look for the train at any time before attempt. ing to cross the track, as a matter of law, he cannot recover for injuries received in a collision, though the defendant railway company failed to give the signal of its approach required by statute.-MILLER V. TERRE HAUTE & I. R. Co., Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 257.

154. RAILROAD COMPANY-Evidence.-In an action for the death of a railway employee, alleged to have been due to the faulty construction of the railroad, an en

156. RAILROAD COMPANY Operation in City Ordinance.-Municipal consent is requisite to enable any railroad company, whether incorporated by special act of assembly or under the general railroad laws, to enter upon and occupy the public highway of the city, unless its charter contains authority therefor in express terms or by necessary implication.-CITY OF PHILADELPHIA V. RIVER FRONT R. Co., Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 60.

157. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads-Contribu. tory Negligence.-Defendant requested the court to charge that, if defendant's employee was negligent, yet if plaintiff's employee was likewise negligent, and such negligence directly contributed to the injuries, the verdict should be for defendant, unless "defendant's employee in charge of the car became aware of the negligence of plaintiff s servant in time to have avoided injuring the team, by the exercise of proper care:" Held, that it was error to modify such instruction by inserting, after the words "plaintiff's servant," the words "or might have become aware thereof by the exercise of reasonable care."-JOHNSON V. STEWART, Ark., 31 S. W. Rep. 890.

158. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads-Contributory Negligence.-A person about to cross the track of a street railway at a street crossing is bound to exercise care proportioned to the danger to be avoided, and the consequences which might result from want of it, conforming in amount and degree to the particular circumstances surrounding him; but it is only ordinary care which is required-that which might reasonably be expected of persons of ordinary prudence. Ordinary care does not require him to anticipate negli gence on the part of those operating the railway. And while he should use his faculties for his own protection, it is not negligence per se for him to omit to look in both directions for the approach of a car. Whether it is or not negligence depends upon the circumstances.-CINCINNATI ST. RY. Co. v. SNELL, Ohio, 43 N. E. Rep. 207.

-

159. RAILROADS-Consolidation - Filing Articles of Agreement.-Under Acts 1891, p. 84, §§ 1, 2, providing that the secretary of State shall charge certain fees for filing and recording an agreement of railroad companies to consolidate, and providing that he shall "neither file nor record any of the articles "nless all the fees for filing are first paid," the payment of the fees is a condition precedent.-STATE V. CHICAGO & E. I. R. Co., Ind., 43 N.'E. Rep. 226.

160. RECEIVERS-Appointment.-Gen. St. § 1313, providing, on application by one partner for the appointment of a receiver for the firm, that the court "shall forthwith appoint a day for the hearing upon the same, and shall make such order relative to notice of such application and hearing to the other partners as may be deemed proper; said hearing to be at least six days from the service of such order of notice," does not prevent the court, with the consent of all the parties, from appointing a receiver immediately on application.-LONGSTAFF V. HURD, Conn., 34 Atl. Rep. 91. 161. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-Injunction.-To settle the rights of contending factions of an unincorporated church to the use of the church property, injunction will lie at the instance of the faction entitled to the

property to restrain trespasses by the other faction thereon.-FULBRIGHT V. HIGGINBOTHAM, Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 875.

162. REPLEVIN-Dismissal.-A plaintiff, in an action of replevin, who has obtained possession of the property under the writ, cannot be permitted, without the consent of the defendant, to dismiss the action. When a plaintiff in replevin, who has obtained the property, fails in his proof, or fails to prosecute the action, the defendant is entitled to judgment, and a trial of his right of property or possession, for the purpose of establishing his damages. -GARBER V. PALMER, BLANCHARD & Co., Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 656.

163. REPLEVIN-Fraud.-In replevin for a stock of goods, which defendant agreed to exchange with plaintiff for land, where the jury find that the trade was not induced by fraud on plaintiff's part, and also that the stock of goods was delivered to plaintiff according to contract, defendant cannot claim that he was injured by a refusal to charge that one may refuse performance of a contract which he thinks was induced by fraud.-GLASS V. RAUWOLF, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 55.

164. SALE-Breach by Vendee.-A vendor cannot recover for breach of a contract to purchase horses where he was unable to make delivery on the contract date because the horses were in possession of a third person, who claimed an interest therein and refused to surrender possession of them.-DAVIS V. GILLIAM, Wash., 44 Pac. Rep. 119.

165. SALE BY BROKER-Custom-Evidence -In an action for goods sold through brokers, testimony that, when a broker makes a sale, each party receives a memorandum from the brokers, but that neither party receives any writing from the other, is not admissible to prove the contract.-E. GODDARD & SONS V. GARNER, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 513.

166. SALE-Construction of Contract.-A sale of stock in a corporation, together with the seller's interest in all manufactured goods "on hand in the factory of said company," did not affect his right to hold manufactured goods which were then in his own store, and which had been transferred or pledged to him for money advanced, under a valid agreement with the corporation to carry on its business.-NOVELTY PAPER BOX & SUPPLY CO. V. STONE, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 600.

167. SALE-Rescission.-Where the purchaser of goods used no artifice nor made any misrepresentations either as to his habits or financial condition, the fact that his liabilities exceeded his assets at the time of the purchase, or that he was a man of reckless habits, will not justify the seller in setting aside the sale, and in replevying the goods from one to whom they were transferred for the benefit of certain preferred creditors.-SWEET V. CAMPBELL, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 236. 168. SALE-Rescission.-In a trial of the right of property between vendors claiming the goods sold for the fraud of the vendee and attaching creditors of the vendee, it was error to charge that the refusal of the vendors to surrender a note executed by the vendee for the price would not be an affirmance, where it was not clear whether the note was retained as indemnity for the goods disposed of by the vendee, or whether, in retaining it, the vendees intended to affirm the sale. -RABY V. SWEETZER, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 779.

169. SALE-Rescission for Fraud.-Where the vendee had sold part of the goods procured by fraud, the vendor, by claiming the part remaining in possession of the vendee, and receiving from the vendee's purchaser the price of the goods he received, disaffirmed the sale -RABY V. FRANK, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 777.

170. SALES-Manufacture from Sample-Title. -In the sale of articles to be manufactured, the title to the articles passes, if manufactured in accordance with the contract, immediately upon receipt thereof by the buyer.-JOHNSON V. HIBBARD, Oreg., 44 Pac. Rep. 287.

171. TAXATION-Exemptions. - Statutory exemptions from taxation will not be extended by judicial con

struction to property other than that expressly designated.-THURSTON COUNTY V. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF HOUSE OF PROVIDENCE, Wash., 44 Pac. Rep. 252.

172. TAXATION - Exemptions - Church Property. Gen. St. § 3823, provides that any church or ecclesiastical society may hold, exempt from taxation, personal property, consisting of bonds, mortgages or funds invested, to an amount not exceeding $10,000, etc.: Held, that the investment of the funds of such church or society in productive real estate does not render it exempt from taxation.-FIRST UNITARIAN SOC. OF HARTFORD V. TOWN of HartfoRD, Conn., 34 Atl. Rep. 89. 173. TAXATION Payment of Taxes Recovery. Where a threatened sale of land for alleged delinquent taxes will create a cloud on title, the owner may, on payment of the amount under protest, recover the same.-MONTGOMERY V. COWLITZ COUNTY, Wash., 44 Pac. Rep. 259.

174. TAXATION- Void Taxes - Injunction. - A complaint to have an order increasing the assessed value of property a specific amount declared void, and to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed thereon, need not allege payment or tender of any taxes.-YOCUM V. FIRST NAT. BANK OF BRAZIL, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 231.

175. TAX SALE-Mandamus.-19 St. at Large, p. 863, § 2, requires the sheriff to sell land for taxes, and to make title to the purchaser on his compliance with his bid, and to pay any surplus from the proceeds to the delinquent taxpayer: Held, that where the sheriff makes a sale, and enters the purchaser's name in the book of sales, mandamus will lie to compel him to make a deed, on his refusal to do so after the purchaser offers to comply with his bid, etc.; and this though the sheriff, after the sale, and before such refusal, receives from a mortgagee the taxes due on the land.— STATE V. LANCASTER, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 198.

176. TRIAL - Document in Evidence.-A trial court should never permit a document introduced in evidence to be withdrawn, unless the party so withdrawing it, at the time, leaves with the reporter a conced. edly correct copy of the document withdrawn; and the furnishing of such copy should be made a condition precedent for leave to withdraw the original document.- MCFARLAND V. WEST SIDE IMP. Co., Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 637.

177. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Landlord's Lien.-A conversion of goods on which a landlord has the statutory lien for rent provided for by Code, § 3069, by one who has notice of such lien, gives the landlord a right of action against the wrongdoer for the damage sustained.-COUCH V. DAVIDSON, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 507. 178. TRUST DEED-Foreclosure-Parties.-In a suit to foreclose a deed of trust given to secure the bonds of a corporation, the trustee is not a necessary party.HAMMOND V. TARVER, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 729.

179. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Purchase Money Limitations.-Since an action at law may be maintained by a vendor to recover from a purchaser on an implied promise to pay the purchase money, an action to enforce such promise in equity is governed, as to limitations, by Code, § 2762, providing that whenever there is concurrent jurisdiction the provisions limiting a time for such action at law shall apply to all suits for the same cause in equity.-WASHINGTON V. SORIA, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 485.

150. VENUE-Undue Influence.-Plaintiff is entitled to a change of venue on an application which alleges that defendant has undue influence over the judge, and over the inhabitants of the county, and that knowledge of such facts first came to plaintiff on the day of filing his reply, and which was made as soon as such knowl edge was acquired, and on the day on which the cause was set for hearing, and was filed in the presence of defendant and his attorney, and immediately thereafter delivered to such attorney with the file mark thereon, though formal notice of filing (Rev. St. § 2262), was not given.-DOUGLASS V. WHITE, Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 867.

181. WATER RIGHTS Ice.-The lessee of a mill with water power and rights of flowage appurtenant thereto, not being a riparian proprietor upon the mill pond, cannot sue for the removal of ice therefrom, his right of flowage or water power not being lessened thereby. -REYSEN V. ROATE, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 599.

182. WATERS-Riparian Rights-Irrigation.-A riparian owner may pump water from a stream for irrigation purposes, provided he takes no more than his proportionate share, the method of diversion being immaterial.-CHARNOCK V. HIGUERRA, Cal., 44 Pac.

Rep. 171.

183. WATERS-Surface Water Obstruction.-A railroad company whose line of road runs through low lands, subject to overflow from streams, cannot be held liable for damages because of the obstruction which its embankment opposes to the drainage of the flood and surface waters, where no streams are obstructed, and it is not shown that its road is improperly. constructed for railroad purposes, such obstruction being an incident to the use of its property, for which it paid in obtaining its right of way.-YAZoo & M. V. R. Co. v. DAVIS, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 487.

184. WILL-Attestation-Witness.-The signing of the name of a witness to the execution of a will by another, at the request of the witness, and in her presence and that of the testatrix, is a sufficient attestation; the witness, though able to write, being temporarily so far incapacitated that she wrote with difficulty, and was in the habit of using an amanuensis.-IN RE Crawford's WILL, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 70.

185. WILL-Construction.-Testimony as to the intention of a testatrix to remove the situs of her property from one State to another, or of her belief as to the division that would be made of her property under the will in case of the death of a beneficiary, no such contingency being provided for in the will, is inadmissible in an action for construction of her will.-CLARKE V. CLARKE, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 202.

186. WILL-Executory Devise.-A limitation over, after an estate in fee conditional, may be supported as an executory devise, provided such limitation be not void for remoteness.-SELMAN V. ROBERTSON, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 187.

187. WILL

Personal Effects.-Testator bequeathed to claimant "all my jewelry, wearing apparel, and personal effects, except such of the same as are herein otherwise disposed of." He also made several specific bequests of effects of the nature of jewelry and wearing apparel, but nowhere specifically disposed of articles of furniture: Held, that the phrase "personal effects," in the bequest to claimant, did not include personal property in testator's house, such as furni ture and pictures.-IN RE LIPPINCOTT'S ESTATE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 58.

188. WILLS Interpretation Legatees.-Testator gave his residuary estate to the "children" of certain deceased brothers and sisters, to be divided equally between them, the will reciting that it was testa. tor's intention to give to each one of said children an equal portion, and that the children "now reside" in a certain place: Held, that the descendants of children dying after the date of the will took the portion their decedent would have received.-JONES V. HUNT, Tenn., 34 S. W. Rep. 693.

189. WITNESS-Transactions with Decedent.-Code, § 400 (providing that no party to an action or proceeding, nor any person who has a legal or quitable interest which may be affected by the event, shall be examined as a witness as to a transaction between the witness and a person then deceased, against an executor, when such examination or the judgment in such action or proceeding can in any way affect the Interest of the witness), does not render one of two executors, who is a defendant, but who has no interest except in his representative capacity, incompetent as a witness for the plaintiff.-DEVEREUX v. MCCRADY, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 77.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 22, 1896.

CORRECTION.

In our issue of May 15th (last issue) the head notes of notes of recent decisions on Garnishment of Receiver on page 408 and Landlord and Tenant on page 411 became transposed. The decision on subject of Garnishment of Receiver had a head note on the subject of

Landlord and Tenant and the decision on subject of Landlord and Tenant had a head note on the subject of Garnishment of Receiver.

The vexatious question as to the citizenship of corporations for the purpose of jurisdiction by federal courts has come squarely before the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James, 16 S. C. Rep. 621. Mr. Justice Shiras, who read the opinion of the court, wisely refrained from attempting to reconcile all the expressions used in the many apparently conflicting decisions on the subject, beginning with Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57, and ending with Nashua & L. R. Corp. v. Boston & L. R. Corp., 136 U. S. 356, but contented himself with the deduction of the following propositions from them, viz.: 1st, that it is conclusively presumed that a State corporation suing or sued

in a United States Circuit Court is composed

of citizens of the State which created it, and hence it is deemed to come within the constitutional provision conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts "in controversies between citizens of different States;" 2d, that a railroad corporation organized under the laws of one State, when authorized so to do by the consent of the State which created it, may accept authority from another State to extend its railroad into such State, and receive a grant of powers to own and control, by lease o. purchase, railroads therein, and may subject itself to such regulations as may be prescribed by the second State, such legislation on the part of two or more States not being, in the absence of inhibitory legislation by congress, within the constitutional prohibition of agreements or contracts beVol. 42-No. 21.

tween States; 3d, that such corporations may be treated by each of the States whose legislative grants they accept as domestic corporations; 4th, the presumption that a corporation is composed of citizens of a State which created it accompanies it when it does business in another State, and it may sue or be sued in the federal courts in such other State as a citizen of the State of its original creation; 5th, that a corporation of one State which is authorized by the law of another State to do business therein, and is endowed for local purposes with all the powers and privileges of a domestic corporation, is not deemed to be composed of citizens of the second State in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in a suit against it by a citizen of the State of its original creation; 6th, that Act Ark. 1889, providing that every railroad corporation of any other State which had leased or purchased any railroad in Arkansas should file a certified copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, and should thereupon become a corporation of Arkansas, did not create an Arkansas corporation out of a foreign railroad corporation, in such a sense as to make it a citizen of Arkansas, within the meaning of the federal constitution, so as to subject it, as such, to a suit in the federal circuit court by a citizen of the State of its origin. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.

Our readers will perhaps recall that when the notorious Durrant murder trial was pend

ing in the criminal court of San Francisco,

one of the local theaters undertook to produce a play, the scenes, incidents and characters in which bore a striking resemblance to the facts of the defendant's case as established at the preliminary examination. Upon the application of the defendant who claimed that the production of the play, during the progress of his trial would be an interference with the administration of justice and deprive him of a fair and impartial trial, the court made an order directing the manager of the theater, who was advertising the production of the play, to desist and refrain from giving any public performance of the same and to cease from advertising it. On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court of California has annulled that order. The case is Dailey v. Superior Court, 44 Pac. Rep. 458.