care and diligence should know, that the premises are dangerous, it is his duty to make them safe before he leases, or inform the tenant of their condition; and if he does not, he must respond, to any person not in fault, for damages caused by such condition of the premises, whether tenant or third person. Nor does this holding imply, as counsel suggests, that the tenant is thereby entirely relieved from the duty of proper diligence on his part, and that the landlord is virtually made guardian for the tenant. The obligation of the tenant to exercise proper diligence was properly stated by the trial judge, and there is nothing in the ruling of this court that can legitimately bear the construction given to it by counsel to relieve the tenant of such care. The contention in the Sternberg case is, mainly, that, being a boarder, she was the guest of the tenant, and not a third person in the eye of the law. It suffices to say, upon this point, without noting other considerations, that the evidence shows that the house was let to be used as a boarding house, and recommended by the landlord for that purpose. If it was unsafe for that purpose, which is a quasi public purpose, and defendant knew it, or could by reasonable care and diligence have known it, he should respond in damages to any person injured on the premises. The boarder is there as much by invitation of the landlord as of the tenant. She is there, not strictly as a guest, but as a third person, legitimately on the premises on business, for the purpose for which they were let. The rule is that, if the landlord is guilty of delictum or negligence, he is liable; otherwise, not. And in this view of the case, the tenant and his boarder stand upon the same footing, the contract being out of the way. The tenant may have more extensive rights if she expressly contracts for safe premises, and is assured of their safety; and, on the other hand, her rights may be restricted if she is guilty of negli gence in ascertaining for herself the condition of the premises when she rented them, or took them knowing them to be unsafe. The rule, as laid down by this court, imposes reasonable care and good faith on both landlord and tenant, in the absence of a contract to make the premises safe, or a warranty of their condition; and keeping this rule in view, the tenant and his boarder are entitled to as much protection against the landlord as is the stranger passing along the street, or occupying adjoining premises. It cannot be the law that the owner of an hotel which is in an unsafe condition, known to him to be so, or by reasonable care and diligence he could know, can lease it to a tenant, who exercises reasonable care and diligence, and does not discover the danger, and then escape liability to either the keeper of the hotel, or his family or servants, or the persons who enter the hotel for its accommodation. What the hotel keeper's liabil ity may be at the same time is not a question now before us. While many of the cases cited in the opin ion are cases where the liability was held to exist as to third persons, there is no difference between third persons and the tenant and his servants, the matter of contract and negligence of tenant being out of the way, as is said in Cowen v. Sunderland (Mass.), 14 N. E. Rep. 117. There is an exception to the gen. eral rule of caveat emptor, as between lessor and lessee, "arising from the duty which the lessor owes the lessee. This duty does not originate directly from the contract, but from the relation of the parties, and is imposed by law." We quote from Wood on Landlord and Tenant (page 855): "Where there are defects in the premises, not open to ordinary observation, of the existence of which the landlord knows, or ought to know, which are dangerous to the person of the tenant, it is his duty to disclose them to the tenant; and if he fails to do so, and the tenant is injured thereby, the landlord is responsible for all the damages that ensue to the tenant therefrom." Again (page 869), the same author says: "But, when the premises at the time when they are leased, are in so defective a condition as to be per se a nuisance, especially when they are leased for a quasi public use, the landlord is responsible for injuries resulting either to the tenant or third persons lawfully upon the premises therefrom." The rule laid down by this court, and (as we think) sustained by authority and reason, is that, in the absence of a contract to repair, or warranty of condition, both the landlord and tenant must use reasonable care and diligence. If the tenant neglect such reasonable care and diligence to ascertain the condition of the premises, or knowing their condition, assumed the risk, then he cannot recover against the landlord. On the other hand, if the landlord neglect to use reasonable care and diligence in ascertaining whether his premises are safe, or if he actually know they are unsafe, and conceals or misrepresents their condition, then he is liable, the tenant being in no fault. It is not upon the ground of an insurer or warrantor of condition under his lease contract, but on the ground of the obligation implied by law not to expose the tenant or the public to danger which he knows, or in good faith should know, and which the tenant does not know, and cannot ascertain by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. The cases are numerous which use the expressions, laid down in the opin ion in this case, that the landlord is liable, not only for actual knowledge, but also for reasonable care and diligence in obtaining such knowledge-not only when he knows, but when he ought to know, of the defects by using ordinary care and diligence. As using this expression, we cite, among others, Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381, 29 N. E. Rep. 591; State v. Boyce, 73 Md. 469, 21 Atl. Rep. 322; Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. St. 111; Coke v. Gutkese, 44 Am. Rep. 499. In the late case of Lindsey v. Leighton, 150 Mass. 288, 22 N. E. Rep. 901, it was held that it was not necessary to show that the owner had actual knowledge of the defects. His duty was that of due care, and ignorance of the defect was no defense, in the absence of such care. In Moynihan v. Allyn, 162 Mass. 272, 38 N. E. Rep. 497, it was held that it was the duty of the landlord to inform the tenant of any hidden defects, which could not be discovered by reasonable diligence on his part, and of which the defendant ought, for his proper protection, to be informed; citing quite a number of other Massachusetts cases. Mr. Pingrey says, in section 592 of his work on Real Estate: "Of course, if there is a conceded defect which renders the premises dangerous, which the tenant cannot dis cover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, of which the landlord has or ought to have knowledge, it is the landlord's duty to disclose it, and he is liable for an injury which results from his concealment of it." In section 594 the same author says: "It is held that the obligation and liability is the same to the tenant's guest and to his servants, and the landlord is liable unless it appears that he did not know, or by reasonable care and diligence could not have known, of the unsafe condition of the premises when he leased them." Under the principle we have attempted to lay down, the landlord's liability, leaving the contract of lease out of view, is the same to the tenant as to his servant, or his guest, or his customer, or his wife or child, or to the stranger passing along the streets or on the premises for any legitimate purpose. The only case cited by counsel apparently holding a doctrine contrary to that laid down by this court is that of Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393. This case is also reported in 50 Am. Dec. 782, and referred to as a peculiar case, and, as we think, very justly criticised, as placing the party injured in a very anomalous posi tion. The case is clearly out of line with the current of authority. It may be remarked, however, that in that case the court said: "Whether the noxious structures existed at the time the lessees entered into possession of the storeroom does not appear." As illustrative of the application of the rule we have laid down, we cite the following, among other cases, showing when the rule is applied, and as to what persons held applicable: In Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28, a longshoreman in the service of the tenant sued the owner, and recovered. In Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. St. 387, a servant of the tenant sued the owner, and recovered. In Carson v. Godley, supra, a customer of the tenant sued the owner, and recovered. In Ceser v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 229, the owner was held liable to the child of the tenant. In Coke v. Gutkese, supra, the owner was held liable for injuries sustained by a child of the tenant. In Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381, 29 N. E. Rep. 591, three cases were tried together, and the owner was held liable for an injury to the child and wife of the tenant. In Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, three cases were tried together, and the owner was held liable for injuries to the tenant's children. In State v. Boyce, 73 Md. 469, 21 Atl. Rep. 322, the owner was held liable for injuries to the servant of the tenant. In Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477, the owner was held liable for an injury to the wife of the tenant. In Nugent v. Railroad Co., 80 Me. 62, 12 Atl. Rep. 797, the owner was held liable to persons rightfully on the premises. In Nelson v. Brewing Co., 2 C. P. Div. 311, the right of the servant of the tenant to sue was recognized. In Moynihan v. Allyn, 162 Mass. 272, 38 N. E. Rep. 497, the right of the child of the tenant to sue was recognized. And Mr. Pingrey, in his work on Real Property, expressly states that there is no distinction in the rule as to the liability of the owner to the tenant or to the tenant's guest, or to the tenant's servant. In each instance he says the rule is the same. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT PROMISSORY NOTE-ALTERATION BY PAYEE.-It is held by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Newman v. King, that the date borne by a promissory note is a material part thereof; and if the payee, without the knowledge or consent of the maker, alter its date after the note has been delivered to him, such act renders the instrument void even in the hands of an inno cent indorsee for value. After stating the general propositions as to the effect of alteration of a note, the court says: The defendant in error contends that, although the date which a promissory note bears may be a material matter, yet that as the note in controversy, according to the intention of all the parties to it, should have been dated June 23d instead of June 22, 1890, an alteration made by the payee honestly and in good faith after its delivery to him, that merely caused the instrument to express the date intended, even if done without the knowledge or consent of the makers, would not render the note void. This contention finds support from reputable authorities. In Decker v. Franz, 7 Bush (Ky.), 273, a promissory note had been dated in 1868, and the payee altered the date to 1869 by changing the figure "8" to "9" without the knowledge or consent of the maker. The court maintained the validity of the note on the ground that in its altered condition it conformed to the intention of the parties. The same doctrine is maintained in Mississippi. McRoven v. Crisler, Admr., 53 Miss. 542; in Maine, Hervey v. Hervey, 15 Me. 357. In the latter case, however, great weight was given to the fact that the maker knew of the mistake, while the other parties did not, and the court seemed to be of opinion that his attempt to avail himself of the alteration as a defense constituted a fraud upon the plaintiff. Ib. 359; Clute v. Small, 17 Wend. 238; Brown v. Jewell, 2 N. H. 543. Other cases, cited as sustaining this doctrine, do not support it to the extent claimed for them. Thus, in Johnson v. Johnson's Estate, 66 Mich. 525, which was an action to charge the estate of the principal maker of a promissory note for the debt evidenced thereby, a note had been given on October 23, 1876, for the balance due on an account stated between the parties, but by mistake was dated October 23, 1875. The trial court found that the payee honestly, and with no fraudulent intent, changed the "5" to a "6." This was done without the knowledge or consent of the makers. Afterwards the principal made two pay. ments on the note, upon which circumstance some stress was placed by the court, although it does not appear that he knew of the alteration when the pay. ments were made. The wife of Johnson had signed the note as surety. The court seemed to be of opinion that the alteration changed the contract and discharged the wife, for the court said "the fact that Mrs. Johnson was not bound by the note would not discharge her husband for whom she signed as surety." The claim was allowed against the estate of the prin cipal. The reasoning of the court is not very clearly set forth, but sufficient appears to show that the decision was quite as much due to the theory that the original consideration, the account stated, would sup. port the claim as to any other principle; the court saying: "And furthermore the account stated, which was the foundation of the note, would form a new basis of indebtedness." In some cases the alteration was sustained on the ground that it was made by an agent of the maker, or drawer, before delivery. Brett v. Pecard, Ryan & Moody, N. P. 37; Van Brant and Slaight v. Eoff, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 51. In other cases the note or bill of exchange was held valid, notwithstanding the insertion of a word without the knowledge of the maker or drawer, upon the ground that the word inserted was implied by the contents of the instrument. The question raised by the instructions given and refused, relate solely to the effect to be given to a promissory note, after its date has been altered by the payee without the knowledge or consent of the maker. The question is one of public policy. Doubtless, all minds will concur in the proposition that after a written instrument has been altered in a material matter, it no longer retains its identity; it is in fact a new contract, and imposes obligations and secures rights different from those it imposed or secured at its origin. Nor will any reasonable mind contend that one of the parties to a written instrument may alter it without the consent of the others so that it will ex press anything not intended by the parties. The contention is, however, that it may be altered by one party alone without the knowledge or consent of the others, if, in its altered condition, it conforms to the intention of the parties, and the alteration was honestly made; and that, that being true, it may be enforced in its altered condition. The reasoning is that, as, in its changed condition, it expresses the intention of the parties, no injury has been done by the alteration. That, no doubt, is true in every case of an alteration in so far as it concerns the parties affected by it. If, in its altered state, it requires the obligor to do the particular thing he agreed to do, no personal wrong has been inflicted on him. In this view of the matter the number and extent of the alterations are immaterial, for however great and numerous they may happen to be, the instrument in its changed condition requires the obligor to do just what he promised, and therefore, in good conscience, ought to do. The question, however, does not rest solely upon this aspect of the matter. Regard should be had to the policy of maintaining the integrity of written instruments; particularly those whose character or nature is such that their possession and custody belong to one party only. Promissory notes are of this class. This policy, we think, denies to the custodian of a written instrument, to whose possession its nature necessarily confides it, the power to alter its terms in any material matter whatever, in order that it may conform to his notion of what the parties intended when it was executed. LANDLORD AND TENANT-DANGEROUS PREMISES.-The Supreme Court of Tennessee, on rehearing in the case of Hines v. Wilcox, 34 S. W. Rep. 420, affirming the original opinion 33 S. W. Rep. 914, hold that a landlord is liable to his tenant, and also to a boarder of his tenant, for injuries resulting from a defect in the premises, which were leased for a boarding house, of which the landlord, by the exercise of reasonable care, might have known at the time the premises were leased, and which was unknown to both the tenant and the boarder, and could not have been known by the exercise of reasonable care. The following is from the opinion of the court: The appellants' counsel concedes that it would be a contempt of the court appointing him to interfere with a receiver's possession of property pertaining to his trust, and received by him in that capacity, and that an actual levy on property, or attachment of the same, could not be made without leave of the court which appointed him. This concession is fatal to the plaintiff's contention in support of the garnishment of the receiver; for, if the process of garnishment should be effectively prosecuted, it would necessarily result in depriving the receiver of the property rightfully in his possession, without the leave of the court appointing him, in order to satisfy the plaintiffs' demand. The claim that the garnishee action is not against the receiver in his official, but in his personal capacity, though affecting the title and right of possession of such property, is an evasion of the difficulty, and cannot be maintained. Whether the action affects him in his official capacity, and not the mere manner or style in which he is named in the process, is the true test. The question is not one of mere form, but of substance, and whether the receiver, in his official capacity and rights, is to be affected by the action. High, Rec. §§ 256, 257. The rule is otherwise where the receiver takes possession or holds property which does not pertain to his office, and where he is a mere trespasser (Beach, Rec. § 660); or where he is sued to recover damages as for a tort, and there is no attempt to interfere with the actual possession of the property which he holds under the order of the court appointing him. Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74; Wood v. Crocker, Id. 345. The better opinion seems to be that the privilege of the receiver is not personal, but pertains to his trust, and exists for the protection of the rights of those whom he represents, and that, where the prosecution of the action would affect or interfere with the control of the property rightfully in his custody, he cannot waive it without the consent of the court. Otherwise, the protection which the court interposes against unwarranted interference with its own officers, and depredations upon the estate in its charge and custody, would be broken down, and confusing and embarrassing questions in its adminis tration would ensue. Beach, Rec. § 653. There are, however, authorities which hold that the receiver may waive the objection. The possession of the receiver is the possession of the court appointing him, and the property in his hands as such is not subject to attachment, nor is he subject to garnishment on account of it, or funds in his hands or subject to his control in that capacity. Where a receiver has been properly appointed of the property and effects of a partnership, he cannot be garnished in an action brought by a creditor of the firm or upon a judgment recovered therein; as a judgment upon the garnishment, if recognized and enforced, would divest and defeat the previously acquired jurisdiction of the court in the equitable action to administer and apply to proper purposes the property and effects of the partnership. The author. ities to this effect are too numerous and decisive to admit of question or doubt. High, Rec. §§ 151, 164; Beach, Rec. § 228, and cases cited; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1145, and cases in note; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 Ill. 287, 2 N. E. Rep. 172; Book Co. v. De Golyer, 115 Mass. 67; Com. v. Hide & Leather Ins. Co., 119 Mass. 155; Holmes v. McDowell, 15 Hun, 585. In the case last cited, the action was to administer and distribute the assets of an insolvent partnership equally among its creditors, and to adjust its affairs, and a receiver was appointed by stipulation. Subsequently, and during the pendency of the action, certain creditors of the partnership recovered judgments against the firm upon which supplemental proceedings were instituted, in which the same person was appointed re ceiver as in the partnership action, and such creditors applied in the latter action to have the receiver directed to pay their debts in full; but it was held that the judgments they had recovered, and the proceedings under them, gave them no priority over the other creditors of the firm, and their application was denied. In that case the court held that the owners of the partnership property had, by their voluntary act, placed it in the hands of the court for equal distribution, and that the court had assumed jurisdiction over it for that purpose; that it had not yet made its order of distribution, but, by the appointment of its receiver, it had assured all persons interested that it would make that order in due time, and, until it settled the terms thereof, it would hold it for that purpose; and that the property, or fund from its sale, was in the hands of the court, and any one interested might quicken its action by proper application, and that the court held the property in trust for the benefit of those who might be entitled to it, and that all might be properly protected; that the property, when once in the hands of the court, was pledged and dedi. cated to the objects of the proceeding, and in it others became interested, who had a right to invoke the action of the court that had thus assumed control over it; and that the creditors of the firm were the cestuis que trustent of the court, and could not be defrauded, unless the court should lend itself to the fraud. This decision was affirmed in 76 N. Y. 596, on the ground stated in the prevailing opinion. This view is supported by Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489; Law v. Ford, 2 Paige, 310; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315. CRIMINAL LAW LARCENY BRINGING STOLEN PROPERTY FROM A FOREIGN COUNTRY. -In State v. Morrill, 33 Atl. Rep. 1070, decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont, it was held that one who steals property in an other country and brings it into Vermont is guilty of larceny in Vermont, on the principle that the legal possession of the property remains in the true owner, the taking having been felonious and that every aspiration is a fresh taking. The court said in part: For a hundred years our courts have held the common law to be that one who steals property in another country, and brings it into this State, is guilty of larceny here. The same is true of one who steals in another of the United States and brings the prop. erty here. The first reported case in respect of stealing in Canada is State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650, decided in 1839. It was there said that the rule had been too long settled, and recognized by too long and uniform a course of practice and decision, to be changed except by legislative action. That was 57 years ago. The rule has not been changed by legislative action, although the attention of the legislature was then specifically directed to the matter, and hence it is fair to infer that the legislature has been satisfied with the rule. If it was too late then for the court to change the rule, it is certainly too late now. Nor can it be changed except for reasons that would equally call for its abrogation in cases of property stolen in another State of the Union and brought here, for the States are as independent of one another in respect of their jurisdiction as they are of foreign countries. Two States-Massachusetts and Ohio-have attempted to distinguish between the thief who brings therein property stolen by him in another State and the thief who does the like with property stolen by him in another country; convicting the one and acquitting the other. Com. v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434; Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166. But we think that no such distinction can be made, and that both cases stand on precisely the same ground. We could not, therefore, abrogate the rule as to one without abrogating it as to both, which we are by no means prepared to do. We are satisfied with the rule as matter of policy, as was the court in State v. Bartlett; for our law should not be such as to induce thieves to come here with their plunder. We are satisfied with it on principle, for every asportation is a fresh trespass and a fresh taking, and so, as matter of law, you have a felonious taking and carrying away in this State, since the pos session as well as the title of the property is deemed to continue in the owner, notwithstanding the original taking, as that was felonious. It is upon the precise ground that in England one who steals goods in one country and carries them into another may be indicted for larceny in the latter, though he can be indicted for robbery only in the country where the force or putting in fear was. It is true, they do not extend the rule to cases where the property was stolen abroad; and the principle of the rule is logically capable of such extension, and it, in effect, receives such extension in this country when a thief is convicted of larceny in one State for bringing in goods that he stole in another State, which the States very generally do, though some do not. On this ground it is that one who steals my goods from one who had stolen them may be indicted as having stolen them from me. Ohio denies the principle altogether, and says that a mere change of place by the thief while he continues in the uninterrupted and exclusive possession of the stolen property does not constitute a new taking, either in law or in fact, and yet she convicts of larceny the thief who brings goods into the State that he stole in another State, but upon what ground is not obvious. Larceny of the same goods by the same person may be committed any number of times; and this offense, like every other, is punishable in the jurisdiction in which it is committed. We cannot punish for offenses against a foreign law, but only for offenses against our law. But a man cannot bar prosecution for a criminal act here on the ground that he committed a like act elsewhere. A man can neither be punished nor escape punishment here because he stole the same goods in another State or country. 1 Bish. Cr. Law, 7th ed., sec. 137. This question is so fully discussed in the cases, and the reason for the different holdings so fully stated, that further discussion here is unnecessary. We may say, however, that Maine holds with us in the question here involved. State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181. COVENANTS IN LEASE. Sec. 1. Definition-How Created. Sec. 3. Same-Express and Implied Covenants. Sec. 6. Same-Implied Covenant of Lessee. Sec. 8. Same-Real and Personal Covenants. Sec. 10. Same-Covenants Running with Part of Sec. 11. Same-What Covenants Run with the Land. the lease is undersealed or not. No particular form of words is necessary to create a covenant. Whatever shows the intention of the parties to bind themselves to the performance of a stipulation may be deemed a covenant, without regard to the form of expression.3 Sec. 2. Kinds of Covenants.-The only kind of covenants in which we are interested in this connection are express and implied, personal and real. Covenants are inserted in leases for the purpose of limiting or otherwise defining the rights and duties of the parties; but if no express agreement in this respect is contained in the lease, the rights and obligations of the parties are regulated by law. As thus distinguished, covenants are either express or implied, that is, are either covenants in deed or in law. Sec. 3. Same-Express and Implied Covenants.— The covenants of a lease of lands are either to be found fully set forth in the instrument of lease, or to be implied from the terms used therein, and for that reason such covenants are known as express and implied covenants. As with conditions, any covenants agreed upon between the parties, which do not contravene the law, may be inserted in a lease, entirely changing the common law rights and liabilities of the parties. Sec. 4. Same-Implied Covenants of Lessor.There are certain covenants in a lease incident to the relation of lessor and lessee, and for that reason are implied in law, and may be exacted in 2 In Hayne v. Commings, 16 C. B. N. S. 421, 111 Eng. C. L. 420, it is said that the words "covenant" and "condition," when used in an agreement, do not necessarily mean an agreement under seal or a coudition, in the strict legal sense of the word, but may, in order to effectuate the intention of the parties, be construed to mean "contract" or "stipulation." This, of course, has no reference to the common law form of the action to be used in the enforcement of the covenant in a lease. The action of covenant would lay only in the case of an agreement under seal signed and sealed by the covenantor. See Hinsdale v. Humphrey, 15 Conn. 431; Pike v. Brown, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 133; Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510; Gale v. Nixon, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 445; Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. St. 329; Johnson v. Mussey, 45 Vt. 419. See article by author: Essay on "Action of Covenant" in 4 Am. & Eug. Ency. of L. 463, 570. 3 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 341, 352. See Savage v. Mason, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 500, 505; Trill v. Eastman, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 121, 124; Gardiner v. Horson, 15 Mass. 504; Jackson ex d. Wood v. Swart, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 85; Trutt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. St. 339; Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436; Great Northern R. Co. v. Harrison, 12 C. B. (3 J. Scott) 576, 609, 74 Eng. C. L. 575, 607; Williams v. Burrell, 1 C. B. (1 Man. G. & S.) 402, 429, 50 Eng. C. L. 401, 427; Courtney v. Taylor, 6 Man. & G. 851, 46 Eng. C. L. 850; Wolveridge v. Steward, 3 Moo. & S. 561, 30 Eng. C. L. 521. 4 See Hamilton v. Wright, 28 Mo. 199; Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 64 Am. Dec. 538; Tone v. Brace, 8 Pa ge Ch. (N. Y.) 597; Ross v. Dysart, 35 Pa. St. Bishop St. Albans v. Batters. ley, L. R. 3 Q. B. D v. 539, 28 Moak Eng. Rep. 314; Williams v. Burrell, 1 C. B. (1 Man. G. & S.) 402, 409, 50 Eng. C. L. 401, 429; Surplice v. Fansworth, 7 Man. & Gr. 576, 49 Eng. C. L. 574. dependently of express stipulation. Implied covenants are such as arise by construction from the use of certain words or form of expression. The covenants usually implied on the part of the grantor are that he has a title and therefore a right to make the lease, and that, in consideration of the rent to be paid him, the lessee shall not be disturbed in the possession by the lessor or those claiming under him, during the term of the lease. The American doctrine differs materially from that held in England on this point, which is, that "he who lets agrees to give possession, and if he fails to do so the lessee may recover damages against him and is not driven to bring ejectment." This doctrine, however, is followed in Alabama. In King v. Reynolds, the court says: "We hold that where there is a contract of lease and no stipulations to the contrary, there is an implied covenant on the part of the lessor that when the time comes for the lessee to take possession under the lease according to the terms of the contract, the premises shall be open to his entry. In other words, there shall be no impediment to his taking possession. But this implied covenant or agreement does not extend beyond that time. If, after the time the lessee is entitled to have the possession according to the terms of the contract, a strange person take possession and holds, that is a wrong done to the lessee, for which the lessor is in no way responsible. And this is the rule whether the trespass is committed before or after the lessee obtains actual possession. The lessor's covenant extends no farther than to guaranty he had authority to make the lease, and that the premises will be open for occupancy when the contract gives the lessee the right to enter."8 There is no implied covenant on the part of the lessor as to the condition of the premises demised, or that they are fit for any particular purpose, or that they shall remain in the condition in which they are when taken throughout the term for which they are demised; 10 and if the premises are leased for a particular purpose there is no implied covenant that they are suitable for that purpose. In the letting of a fur 5 Clark v. Clark, 49 Cal. 586; Bennet v. Womack, 7 Barn. & C. 627, 14 Eng. C. L. 283; Hodgkinson v. Crowe, L. R. 10 Chan. App. 622, 14 Moak Eng. Rep. 823; Wilkins v. Fry, 2 Swant. 249. 6 Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440, 15 Eng. C. L. 660. 7 67 Ala. 229. 8 The courts cite, as following the English rule, L'Hussier v. Zallee, 24 Mo. 13; Hughes v. Wood, 50 Mo. ; Field v. Herrick, 14 Ill. App. 181. 9 Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316; Foster v. Peyser, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 243; Dutton v. Gerrich, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 89; O'Brien v. Cappell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 497; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 313; Cleves v. Willoughby, 7 Hilt. (N. Y.) 83; Mayer v. Moller, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 491; Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. St. 293; Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. St. 111; Scheppi v. Gindele (Pa.), 14 W. N. C. 31. 10 Branger v. Maciet, 30 Cal. 624; Welles v. Casiles, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 223; Robbins v. Mount, 4 Robt. (N. Y.) 553, 33 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 241; Moore v. Webber, 71 Pa. St. 429; Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. St. 293. 11 Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 36; Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 |