with.-NORTHWESTERN NAT. INS. Co. v. MIZE, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 670.

65. JOINT WRONGDOERS-Action Over for Indemnity. -In an action against the District of Columbia for injuries caused by the want of a cover on a gas box placed by a gas company in the sidewalk, there was no evidence of actual notice to the District of the absence of a cover, though there was evidence that the box had been uncovered for some time: Held, that a verdict against the District determined that the defect had existed so long as to impute negligence to those whose duty it was to keep the box in repair, and hence a judgment on such verdict established negligence on the part of the company, which was conclusive in a subsequent suit over against it by the District.-WASHINGTON GASLIGHT Co. V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 564.

66. JUDGMENT OF SISTER STATE-Impeachment.-The only grounds upon which the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction can be disregarded in another State are-First, where the adjudging tribunal had no jurisdiction over the person against whom judgment was pronounced, or over the subject-matter of the liti gation; and, second, where the adjudication of the foreign tribunal has been obtained by fraud.-FAIRCHILD V. FAIRCHILD, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 10.

67. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A judgment in an action for damages for the construction by a railroad company of a permanent drain, whereby water is thrown across the land of another, is a bar to an action for damages subsequently accruing (no material change being made in the drain) by the washing away of the soil.-INTERNATIONAL & G. N. RY. Co. v. GIESELMAN, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 658.

68. JUDGMENT-Vacation.-The court cannot, after the term at which a default judgment was rendered in an action where service was by attachment of property, vacate the judgment on a showing that the prop. erty attached was not the property of the defendant.SOULARD V. VACUUM OIL Co., Ala., 19 South. Rep. 414. 69. JUDICIAL SALE-Money in Hands of Officer.-A purchaser at a judicial sale, who allows a cash pay. ment made by him on the property to remain in the hands of the officer selling after the sale has been set aside, does so at his own risk, and he is not entitled to be credited with the amount on a subsequent purchase of the property when resold by another officer.-HEAD V. MOORE, Tenn., 34 S. W. Rep. 518.

70. LIMITATIONS-Libel-Statements in Judicial Proceedings. A cause of action for libel, founded upon publications made in the course of judicial proceedings, does not accrue until the final determination, in favor of the party libeled, of the proceedings in which the publication is made, and the statute of limitations accordingly does not begin until then to run against such cause of action.-MASTERSON V. BROWN, U. S. C. C. of App., 72 Fed. Rep. 136.

71. LIFE INSURANCE-Notice of Forfeiture.-In an action on a life policy on the joint lives of plaintiff and his wife, containing a provision that no forfeiture should be declared for non-payment of premium, unless a notice in writing should have been mailed by defendant to plaintiff, it was error to admit, over objec tion, evidence of such notice and forfeiture, where they had not been affirmatively alleged by defendant, though plaintiff had alleged, and defendant, by both general and special denials, denied that the policy was in force at the date of the death of plaintiff's wife, and that plaintiff and his wife had complied with the terms of the policy as to the payment of premiums.-MULLEN V. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 605.

72. MARRIED WOMEN-Mortgage of Separate Estate.Under the Act of 1887, providing that a mortgage by a married woman of her separate estate shall be a charge thereon whenever an intention to that effect is declared in the mortgage, no such intention need appear in the instrument, if it was in fact executed for the benefit of her separate estate.-RIGBY V. LOGAN, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 56.

73. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injuries-Defective Machinery. In an action by a servant for personal in juries caused by defective machinery, a complaint alleging that the defect had existed for a long time, and that the master had negligently failed to remedy the same, and negligently permitted the machinery to be operated in the defective condition, sufficiently alleges negligence on the part of the master.-CONRAD V. GRAY, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 398.

74. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury-Contributory Neg ligence.-A railroad brakeman who, in his contract of employment, stated that he had had three years' experience in that capacity, and knew it was dangerous to climb up the side of a box car by the ladder while the train was moving, was killed while attempting, without any urgent necessity therefor, to climb up a ladder whose grab iron he knew was defective, and which it was part of his special duty to examine: Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence, and there could be no recovery.-CLYDE V. RICHMOND & D. R. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., 72 Fed. Rep. 123. 75. MASTER AND SERVANT-Vice-principal. Negli gence.-A railroad engineer, with authority to direct a brakeman to put on the brake, is, as to such brakeman, a vice-principal, within Act March 10, 1891, providing that "all persons engaged in the service of any railway corporation who are intrusted by such corporation with the authority to direct any other employee are vice-principals of such corporation, and not fellow. servants with such employee."-TEXAS CENT. RY. Co. V. FRAZIER, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 664.

76. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Failure to Register Contract.Failure of a contractor to register the contract as required by statute to fix his mechanic's lien will not defeat the lien, where the owner had the original contract (of which no copy existed) in his possession, and refused on demand to surrender it for registry.-PARKS V. TIPPIE, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 676.

77. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Homestead.-A claim of homestead cannot be asserted against a mechanic's or ma terial-man's lien.-MCANALLY V. HAWKINS LUMBER Co., Ala., 19 South. Rep. 417.

78. MORTGAGE-Defective Title-Mistake of Law.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage securing the price of land other than that mortgaged, defendants may be granted relief on the ground that the vendor, though her deed recited that she owned, and it professed to convey a fee-simple title, and both parties acted under the erroneous legal conclusion that she had such title. had in fact only a life estate in the property.-WILSON V. OTT, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 23.

79. MORTGAGE OF CORPORATION PROPERTY-Lien.— Under Code, § 1255 (Acts 1879), disabling corporations from conveying their property, by mortgage, freed from liability on a judgment obtained against such corporations "for labor performed, for material furnished, or torts committed by such corporations, their agents or employees," liens for labor performed or material furnished after making the mortgage are superior thereto.-POCAHONTAS COAL CO. V. HENDERSON ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO., N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 22.

80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liquor License-Ordinance.-A conviction for the violation of an ordinance against the sale of intoxicating liquor by a retail liquor dealer on Sunday, which operates as a revocation of the license of the liquor dealer, is void, and the ordi. nance which confers upon the conviction such an operation is also void, as not being within the chartered powers of the common council to enact.-STATE V. MAYOR OF CITY OF RAHWAY, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 5. 81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Privilege Tax on Trades. An ordinance imposing a license tax on all dealing in second-hand clothing does not violate Const. art. 5, § 3, requiring such taxes to be uniform between those belonging to the same class.-ROSENBAUM V. CITY OF NEWBERN, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 1.

-

82. NEGLIGENCE-Defective Manhole.-Where plaintiff was injured by the tilting of the cover of a manhole

VOL. 42

maintained by defendant in the sidewalk in front of his premises, the fact that an independent contractor, who delivered coal to defendant, negligently failed to replace the cover properly, will not relieve defendant from liability, if the negligent construction of the cover directly contributed to plaintiff's injury.-BENJAMIN V. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. Co., Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 590.

83. NEGLIGENCE-Examiner of Title.-A right of action for negligence in the examination of a title accrues at the time the examination is made and reported, and not when damages result therefrom.SCHADE V. GEHNER, Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 576.

84. NEGLIGENCE-Gas Companies.-A gas company is bound to use reasonable care in the inspection of its pipes, and in repairing leaks therein, after notice, whether caused by its own negligence or not.-PINE BLUFF WATER & LIGHT CO. v. SCHNEIDER, Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 547.

85. NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT-Injuries to Third Persons-Evidence.-In an action for injuries from being run into by a horse and buggy negligently driven by defendant's servant, a refusal to allow the servant to testify whether he willfully ran into plaintiff was proper, where the only allegation in the petition on that issue was an argumentative one that the injuries could not have been inflicted save through "the gross mismanagement and carelessness, amounting to criminal neglect," of the servant; especially where plaintiff, in open court, disclaimed that the petition claimed that the servant acted willfully.-TAYLOR V. SCHERPE & KOKEN ARCHITECTURAL IRON CO., Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 591.

86. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Extension of Note.The payment and acceptance of interest on a past due note for a specified period beyond the date of its maturity, and the indorsement thereof on the note by the payee, are only prima facie evidence of a contract to extend payment, and will not discharge the surety, if it appears that no such extension was in fact agreed to by the payee.-MADDOX V. LEWIS, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 647.

87. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Liability of Indorser.Where defendant, payee of a note, indorses it for a certain amount, he cannot be held liable for attorney's fees, provided for in the note, in addition to the amount indorsed.-COLE V. TUCK, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 377.

88. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Alteration.-To add a name to a note as a joint maker thereof, without the knowledge and consent of the original maker of the note, after it has been transferred, is a material alteration thereof, and discharges the original maker from liability thereon.-FORD V. FIRST NAT. BANK OF CAMERON, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 684.

89. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Sealed Note.-Though a note under seal is executed in blank as to the payee's name, if the maker, after such name is inserted, acknowledges the note as his, he will be liable thereon. -WESTER V. BAILEY, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 9.

90. PARTITION.-The right of a tenant in common to partition is a matter of right, and is unaffected by the fact that a sale, the land being incapable of equitable partition otherwise, would not be to the best interest of all the owners.-CATES V. JOHNSON, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 416.

91. PAYMENT - Notice of Assignment.-The maker of a bond payable to F is charged with notice that it had become the property of N, where, on making a payment, he is given a receipt signed "F," per an agent, reciting receipt of the money "for N."-NATIONAL FERTILIZER Co. V. THOMASON, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 415. 92. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT — Purchase of Lands.-One purchasing lands through an agent is affected by the previously acquired knowledge of the agent in respect to matters affecting the title, if the agent had that knowledge in his mind when he made the purchase. Where it is sought, therefore, to bind the principal by

405

his agent's knowledge, it is competent to adduce evidence tending to show previous knowledge by the agent, but the party is bound to follow this up by evidence tending to show that the agent had it in mind at the time.-BROWN V. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO., U. S. C. C. of App., 72 Fed. Rep. 76.

93. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT Unauthorized Act of Agent.-In an action on a note, where defendant pleaded that, while the note was in the hands of plaintiff's agent, he turned over to the agent a smaller note of a third person, which was accepted by the agent as part payment of the one in suit, and it was shown that plaintiff had the smaller note, which was at the time of trial in the hands of her attorney for collection, it was error to exclude evidence thereof on proof alone that the agent had no authority to accept the note as payment; the action of plaintiff in retain. ing the note after the filing of the answer tending to show a ratification of its aeceptance by the agent, if received by him as alleged.-CAMPBELL V. JENKINS, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 673.

Service on Corporation.

94. PROCESS-Summons Under Sand. & H. Dig. § 5669, providing that service of summons on a domestic corporation may be on one of the chief officers, and, in case of their absence, on one of the other officers or an agent, the return on a summons showing service on an agent of the corperation does not show good service on the corporation, it not béing stated therein that none of its chief officers were to be found in the county.-ARKANSAS COAL, GAS, FIRECLAY & MANUFACTURING CO. V. HALEY, Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 545.

95. RAILROAD COMPANIES - Accident on Track-Negligence. In an action for personal injuries it appeared that defendant's train was standing on a switch track, and blocked a public crossing; that plaintiff went to the head of the train, crossed over, and was walking back between the main and switch track to the crossing; that he did not look back to see whether a train was approaching on the main track, and that, as he stepped upon it, he was struck by a train; that the track was clear, and that the train might have been seen by plaintiff had he looked back: Held, that plaintiff was chargeable with negligence.-MARTIN V. LITTLE ROCK & FT. S. RY. Co., Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 545. 96. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street-railway CompaniesNegligence.-Recovery for injury to one who tries, by hurrying, to cross a street-car track ahead of an approaching car, and is struck by it before he can get across, is barred by reason of his contributory negli gence, though the motorman may be negligent in not stopping the car after he is seen.-WATSON V. MOUND ST. RY. CO., Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 573.

97. REPLEVIN Undivided Interest in Crops.-Replevin will not lie by a mortgagee to recover, from a cotenant of the mortgagor in possession of a crop raised on shares, the undivided interest of the mort. gagor therein, subject to the mortgage.-MOSELY V. CHEATHAM, Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 543.

98. SALE - Breach of Warranty.-Where an executed contract of sale of corporate stock contained a war. ranty on the part of the seller, and also a clause in the nature of a defeasance, of the benefit of which the buyer might avail himself at his option, his waiver of such privilege did not deprive the buyer of his right to recover on such warranty.-BLACKNALL V. RowLAND, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 1.

99. SALE-Right to Rescind Waiver. Where goods were sold under an agreement that one-half of the price was to be paid on delivery and the balance at four months, the vendors, by accepting the first installment two months after delivery, waived their right to reclaim the goods, and the title thereto thereupon vested in the vendee.-CRAWFORD V. SPRAGGINS, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 372.

100. SALES-Bona Fide Purchaser.-A bona fide pur. chaser of attached property from the attachment plaintiff, who secured possession thereof after the at

tachment, under an agreement with other attaching creditors of the owner, cannot hold the same as against the officer levying the attachment.-JETTON V. TOBEY, Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 531.

101. STATUTE - Time of Taking Effect.-Const. 1876, art. 3, § 39, provides that no law shall take effect or go into force "until 90 days after the adjournment" of the session at which it was enacted, etc.: Held, that the words "until 90 days after the adjournment" mean until a period of 90 days shall have elapsed after the adjournment.-HALBERT V. SAN SABA SPRINGS LAND & LIVE-STOCK ASS'N, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 639.

102. TAX TITLES.-A tax title is good though Laws 1895, ch. 119, § 51, declaring that no land shall be sold for taxes unless the taxpayer has not sufficient personal property to pay the same, situated in the county where the tax is due, was not complied with.-STANLY V. BAIRD, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 12.

103. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-Failure to Deliver Telegram.-A telegraph company through whose failure to deliver a message plaintiff was prevented from visiting his dying stepfather, between whom and himself the relations were tender and affectionate, is not responsible in damages for the injury occasioned by such failure, unless shown to have had notice of the tender and affectionate relations existing between such parties. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. GARRETT, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 649.

104. TRUST FOR MARRIED WOMAN-Power of Disposition. The words "for the separate and sole use," or equivalent language, qualifying the estate of a trustee for a married woman, must be construed as manifesting the intent on the part of the grantor to limit her right of alienation to the mode and manner expressly provided in the instrument by which the estate is created.-KIRBY V. BOYETTE, N. Car., 24 8. E. Rep. 18.

105. UNLAWFUL DETAINER-Defenses.-A tenant cannot defend an action by his landlord, before a justice of the peace, for unlawful detainer, by setting up the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the landlord prior to the date of the lease, and an attornment by the tenant to the purchaser at the sale; since Code, § 3389, forbids the merits of the title to be inquired into in such suits.-DAVIS V. POU, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 363.

106. USURY-Note Bearing Illegal Interest.-A pro. vision in a note for the purchase of property, that af ter maturity it shall bear interest at 10 per cent., renders it usurious, such interest being for the forbearance of the debt after its maturity, and no action can be maintained thereon.-BANG V. PHELPS & BIGELOW WINDMILL Co., Tenn., 34 S. W. Rep. 516.

107. USURY Note Verbal Agreement. - A verbal agreement, entered into at the time a note was executed, that a usurious rate of interest shall be paid thereon, renders the note usurious.-ROE V. KISER, Ark., 34 S. W. Rep. 534.

108. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Interpretation of Contract. Where one purchases land at an agreed price, and assumes the payment of $4,000 subscribed by the grantor in aid of the extension of a railroad, but because of the abandonment of such extension before completion he is rendered liable only for a part of the subscription, he is not liable for the balance to the grantor.-MILLER V. BARLER, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 601.

109. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Specific Performance. -Where a vendor asks the specific performance of an executory contract to buy land, and an issue is made as to title, the burden rests upon him to show that the title offered is a marketable one, and he cannot recover without such proof, unless the only defects are incumbrances that can be satisfied from the purchase money due, in which case the decree may protect the interests of the purchaser by such requirement.-UPTON V. MAURICE, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 642.

110. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Subrogation to Vendor's Lien. Where it was agreed between a vendor, the vendee, and intervener that the debt for the price should be satisfied by a cash payment, a reconveyance

of one-third of the land, and a further payment within a fixed time of a stated sum by the vendee, and that intervener should advance the cash payment for the vendee, and have a lien therefor on the remaining twothirds, intervener, after the cash payment had been made, and a deed to one-third and payment of the additional sum had been tendered by the vendee within the time fixed, was subrogated to the lien of the vendor on the remainder.-JOHNSON V. PORTWOOD, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 596.

111. VENDOR AND VENDEE - Land Certificate-Presumption of Delivery.-Whether the presumption of delivery of a transfer of a land certificate, arising from the fact that the transfer is an ancient instrument, and was witnessed by two witnesses, is overcome by the fact that after its date the certificate on which it was indorsed was in the possession of another than the transferee, who claimed ownership, located and sold the land, his vendee taking possession and paying taxes thereon, is for the jury.-HUFF v. CRAWFORD, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 607.

112. WILL-Exercise of Power.-A devise to the testator's wife of all his property, to be disposed of by her among his children as she may think best, vested a life estate in her, with power to divide the land between his children as she thought best.-DEGMAN V. DEGMAN, Ky., 34 S. W. Rep. 523.

Requisites.-Under a

113. WILL-Holographic Will statute requiring, in regard to a holographic will, that it shall be found among the valuable papers or effects of testator, or shall have been lodged in the hands of any person for safe-keeping, a letter from a decedent stating his desire, in case of his death, that certain land shall go to the person to whom the letter is addressed, who was authorized to collect debts due testator and retain the money until testator's return, may be valid as a holographic will, though the addressee was not directed in the letter to preserve it as the testator's will.-ALSTON V. DAVIS, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 15.

114. WILL-"Living Children."-Where a testator devised a life estate to his son, with remainder to the son's "living children," without specifically restricting it to children living at the date of the will or of the testator's death, all the children living when the son died, took equally.-INGE V. JONES, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 435.

110. WILLS - Ambiguous Provisions.-Testator devised to his son the residue of his estate, "and to his care the protection and support of my daughter C during her natural life." Such residue was the larger part of testator's estate, and his will showed that it was not his intention to disinherit any one of his children. Such daughter was frail both in body and mind, and unfit to manage property: Held, that the support of such daughter was made a charge on such residue, and that it was not testator's intention simply to enjoin or such son a moral obligation to support the daughter.-BANK OF FLORENCE V. GREGG, S. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 64.

116. WILLS-Devise to Wife.-Under the devise, "I give to my beloved wife all my property of every description, to keep and hold together, for her use and the use of my children, after my just debts are paid," the devisee holds the estate as trustee for her own use and the use of the children, without power to sell or convey any estate.-CRUDUP v. HOLDING, N. Car., 24 S. Е. Вер. 7.

117. WRONGful GarnishMENT-Evidence.-In an action for wrongfully suing out a writ of garnishment it was improper to permit defendant to testify that at the time the garnishment action was commenced he be lieved that process of garnishment was necessary to obtain satisfaction of his debt, that he was not influ enced either by malice or vexatious spirit in having the garnishment issued, and that he could not see how he damaged plaintiff to the extent claimed or to any extent. - MOBILE FURNITURE COMMISSION CO v. LITTLE, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 443.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 15, 1896.

The novel question of a wife's right to recover damages for the unlawful dissection of her husband's body before burial arose for the first time in Larson v. Chase decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and commented on in 34 Cent. L. J. 43. The same question has recently come before the Supreme Court of New York in Foley v. Phelps, 37 N. Y. Supp. 471. In both cases it was very properly held that the wife could recover. The only difficulty in such cases is in determining the nature of the right that has been infringed. In an old Indiana case there is a dictum by one of the judges, that corpses are property in the strict sense of the common law. Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 14 Ind. 134. In Pierce v. Proprietors, etc., 10 R. I. 227, it was denominated a quasi property right. In Foley v. Phelps, supra, the court following substantially the doctrine of Larson v. Chase declared that a surviving wife is entitled to the possession of the body of her deceased husband in the same condition as when death occurred for the purposes of giving it proper care and burial. As the Harvard Law Review in commending the decision well says that "even if so clearly defined a legal right did not exist, the courts would probably have no trouble in supporting an action of this sort on some broader ground. It is one of those instances where failure of justice would involve such a shock to every feeling of decency and propriety that the law positively must disclose a principle to cover it. The development in recent times of such rights as the right to privacy shows that the common law is ever ready to expand in response to demands of that nature." A seemingly contra rule has been laid down in a case where the deceased died suddenly and an autopsy was performed by a physician at the establishment of undertakers to which the remains had been conveyed, in order to enable the physician to give the certificate as to cause of death required by law. Cook v. Walley (Col.), 27 Pac. Rep. 950.

In 1894 the legislature of Indiana passed an act which is a copy of the Civil Rights Bill, Vol. 42-No. 20.

enacted by congress, entitling all persons equally to the enjoyment of the "accommodation, advantages, facilities of inns," etc., and making any person denying them liable in damages. This act has recently been applied by the appellate court of that State in the case of Fruchey v. Eagleson, 43 N. E. Rep. 146. It appeared from the facts in that case that the students of the Wabash College Football team had made arrangements to entertain the Indiana University Football team, of which the plaintiff, a college student, was a member, and the members of the Indiana Football team assented to the arrangement. A representative of the entertaining team applied at the hotel for accommodations, and the manager, taking exception to the color of the student, said that he would only permit him to lodge there on condition that he would take his meals in the "ordinary," away from the other guests. We infer that the team stood by its colored brother, and the entire body refused to lodge at the hotel. The plaintiff then brought his action, under the statute, against the proprietor of the hotel, and recovered before a jury, which verdict was sustained by the Appellate Court of Indiana. Besides the application of the statute to the facts in the case there were some questions of pleading of minor importance.

The case of Glidden v. Mechanics' Nat. Bank recently decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio should serve as a warning to banks and holders of collateral notes. In that case it was held that a bank selling collateral pledged with it as security for a loan cannot buy in the same at the sale, unless this is authorized by the agreement under which the pledge was made. The principle upon which the decision is founded has long been established, but the question has seldom arisen upon a collateral note. It has always been the law that a pledgee of property cannot, directly or indirectly become a purchaser at his own sale for the satisfactory reason that he holds the property in a fiduciary capacity which forbids the disposition of it for his personal benefit and requires good faith and fidelity to the interests of the pledgor in making a sale of it. His duty as

a seller is inconsistent with his

interest as a

purchaser and the principle that a trustee

cannot be a purchaser at his own sale is applicable.

The court held the sale, for the reasons stated, void. Had there been embodied in the collateral note an express agreement that the pledgee might become the purchaser at any sale which should be made, the difficulty would have been obviated.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INTERSTATE COMMERCE-KILLING OF GAME-SALE OUTSIDE OF STATE.-The case of Geer v. State of Connecticut, 16 S. C. Rep. 600, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, involved important questions of constitutional law as to sale of prohibited game in another State, the holdings of the court being that the interstate commerce clause of the constitution does not affect the right of a State to prohibit the transportation outside its limits of game killed in the State; that the ownership of the wild game within the limits of a State, so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the State for the benefit of all its people in common, and that the police power residing in a State authorizes it to forbid the killing of game within the State with intention to procure its transportation beyond the State limits. Mr. Justice White delivered an exhaustive opinion for the court, and Mr. Justices Field and Harlan dissented.

CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE. -In People v. Conkling, 44 Pac. Rep. 314, decided by the Supreme Court of California, the nature and extent of the right of self-defense were discussed. The court takes radical ground in favor of such right, and the discussion is of interest in view of the position that has been asserted in some cases and by some text-writers, that a person who has reason to suspect that he may be attacked is under a duty to avoid going where his enemy may be expected to be.

TELEPHONE COMPANY-PUBLIC STATION— DUTY TO FURNISH MESSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE -DAMAGES.-The Appellate Court of Indiana holds in Central Union Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, 42 N. E. Rep. 1035, that it is the duty of a telephone company which main

tains a line between different cities and towns, with stations in such towns for the use of the public on payment of tolls, to furnish a suitable messenger service for the purpose of notifying persons, within a reasonable distance, when its patrons at other stations desires to communicate with them; and for the neglect or omission of such messengers, it is responsible within proper limits; that while a telephone company has the right to adopt reasonable rules, a regulation that it will not be responsible for the negligence of messengers sent from its stations, who must of necessity be of its selection and under its control, but that they shall be deemed the agents of the patron at whose instance they are sent, is void, and that where by reason of the delay of a telephone company in calling a veterinary surgeon to its station, as it undertook to do, he lost several hours in reaching a horse to attend which he was called, and meantime the animal died, the

value of the horse cannot be considered as an element of damages in an action by its owner against the telephone company for negligence in failing to sooner place him in communication with the surgeon; the question as to whether the horse would have been saved had the messenger taken the call at once being entirely a matter of speculation.

GARNISHMENT OF RECEIVER.-That a receiver appointed in an action brought by one partner to wind up and administer the affairs of an insolvent firm, cannot be garnished by a firm creditor without leave of the court which appointed him, is made clear by the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Blum v. Van Vechten, 66 N. W. Rep. 507. The court has this to say on the subject:

It is said that the landlord's liability to his tenant is more restricted than it is to third persons, and this is unquestionably so, in so far as it rests upon the contract between the parties, and want of care in the tenant; but, in this and similar cases, there is a separate and distinct ground of liability, depending, not upon contract or want of contract, but upon the obli gation the landlord or landowner is under to his tenant, as well as third persons, not to expose them to danger which he knows or could know by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The rule laid down does not place upon the landlord the obligation of an insurer or warrantor by contract, nor does it impose the extreme duty of constant care and inspection, but it does impose upon him the duty of reasonable care and diligence to inform himself of the condition of the property which he proposes to let; and if, when he leases, he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable