for cotton deposited with the company does not authorize him to issue receipts in his own favor, even for cotton actually deposited by him.-HANOVER NAT. BANK OF CITY OF NEW YORK V. AMERICAN DOCK & TRUST CO., N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 72.

55. CORPORATIONS-Debts Due Laborers-Stockholders.-Rev. St. § 1769, providing that the stockholders of every corporation, other than railroad corporations, shall be personally liable for all debts that may be due and owing to laborers for services performed for such corporation, is not restricted in its operation to serv ices performed in the State of Wisconsin.-CLOKUS V. HOLLISTER MIN. Co., Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 398.

56. CORPORATIONS-Diverse Citizenship.-A bill by the stockholders of a corporation, filed to impeach the decree of foreclosure and sale on the ground of collusion and fraud and want of jurisdiction in the court to make it, is an ancillary suit, and a mere continuation of the main suit, so far as the jurisdiction of the circuit court, as a court of the United States, is concerned.CAREY V. HOUSTON & T. C. RY. Co., U. s. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 537.

57. CORPORATIONS-Insolvency-Trust Fund.-A corporation, while insolvent in fact, is a "going concern," so that its assets are not a trust fund for creditors in general; but a creditor may, by proper and diligent proceedings, acquire a priority thereon, where, though its mill and contents have been burned, it is transacting its business in the ordinary way, so far as it can under the circumstances, collecting what is owing it, paying debts from time to time when demanded, though not paying in every instance, holding corporate meetings, and at those meetings considering its affairs. -BUCHANAN V. BARNES, Tenn., 34 S. W. Rep. 425.

58. CORPORATIONS-Summons-Service.-A return on a summons in an action against a corporation, reciting a service upon C, "a trustee, being the defendant named in said summons," by delivering to C, trustee, a copy of the summons, for the defendant, is fatally defective, for failure to show that C was a trustee of the defendant corporation.-MATHIAS V. WHITE SUL. PHUR SPRINGS ASSN., Mont., 43 Pac. Rep. 921.

59. CORPORATIONS-Stock Issued Without Authority. -Where brokers, before selling a certificate of stock on account of the corporation's transfer clerk, by whom it was delivered to them, inquired of the corporation, and were informed that the certificate was genuine, when in fact it was not, the corporation is liable for damages sustained by the brokers, who guaranteed the genuineness of the certificate as required by a rule of the stock exchange.-JARVIS V. MANHATTAN BEACH Co., N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 68.

60. COUNTIES-Commissioners-Court House.-There being no statutory authority, the commissioners of a county have no power to rent the court house, owned by the county, or any part of it, for private use, or in any manner to bind the county to assume the relation and responsibility of landlord in respect thereto.STATE V. HART, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 7.

61. COUNTIES-Repair of Bridges-Contracts.-Rev. St. 1894, § 3275 (Rev. St. 1881, § 2885), requires county commissioners, when they think public convenience requires a bridge to be repaired, to cause a survey and estimate to be made, and to direct the work to be done; and Rev. St. 1894, § 3276, authorizes them, if the estimate exceeds the ability of the road district in which the bridge is located, to make an appropriation therefor out of the county treasury: Held, that a contract by county commissioners for repairs to a bridge, ob. ligating the county to pay for the same, was void, where it was made without any survey or estimate having been made.-DEWEESE V. HUTTON, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 14.

62. CRIMINAL LAW.-A conviction in a case of assault with intent to rape will not be reversed because the prosecuting attorney offered to show that defendant on several occasions before the commission of the offense charged had committed similar acts, where

the court refused to permit him to do so.-PEOPLE V. RICKETTS, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 483.

63. CRIMINAL LAW- Adulteration.-An affidavit to charge a violation of the Act of March 20, 1884 (Giauque's Rev. St. § 8805), "to provide against the adulteration of food and drugs," need not charge that an adulterated article of food is sold to be used as human food.-STATE V. KELLY, Ohio, 43 N. E. Rep. 163.

64. CRIMINAL LAW-Appeal.-An order denying a motion for a new trial, made after judgment (Rev. St. § 4719), is not a final judgment, nor an order in the nature of a final judgment.-JACKSON V. STATE, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 393.

65. CRIMINAL LAW-Assault-Rape.-In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, the intent with which the assault was committed is a question for the jury. PEOPLE V. WEBSTER, Cal., 43 Pac. Rep. 1114.

66. CRIMINAL LAW-Bail-Corporal Punishment Defined.-Construing Gen. St. 1883, § 972, empowering the supreme court, or a justice thereof, to grant a superse. deas, and also to admit a prisoner to bail in certain criminal cases pending review, "provided, however, that in cases where corporal punishment is inflicted the prisoner shall in no case be bailed," the words "corporal punishment," in the proviso, do not include imprisonment, but are used in the restricted sense denoting punishment upon the body, such as whipping, the statute having been copied from that of an older State, and the proviso being probably of ancient origin. -RITCHEY V. PEOPLE, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1026.

67. CRIMINAL LAW - Bringing Stolen Property from a Foreign Country.-One who steals property in another country, and brings it into this country, is guilty of larceny here, on the principle that the legal possession of the property remains in the true owner, the taking having been felonious, and that every asportation is a fresh taking.-STATE V. MORRILL, Vt., 33 Atl. Rep. 1070.

68. CRIMINAL LAW-Dying Declarations.-An instruction that a dying declaration "is given all the sanction of evidence which the law can give to evidence" is erroneous, such declaration not being entitled to as much weight as though the declarant had stated the same facts on the trial, and an opportunity had been given to cross-examine him, and to observe his demeanor. PEOPLE V. KRAFT, N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 80.

69. CRIMINAL LAW-Forgery - Evidence.-Where accused becomes a witness in his own behalf, and denies writing a document alleged to be a forgery, he may be required on cross-examination to write in the presence of the jury for the purpose of comparison.-BRADFORD V. PEOPLE, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1013.

70. CRIMINAL LAW - Former Acquittal.-Mill's Ann. St. § 1461, providing that on the arraignment of a pris. oner it shall be sufficient, without complying with any other form, to declare orally that he is not guilty, does not dispense with former acquittal being pleaded specially, it being necessary at common law, and being provided by section 1467, that all crimes for criminal offenses shall be conducted according to the course of the common law, except when this chapter points out a different mode.-GUENTHER V. PEOPLE, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 999.

71. CRIMINAL LAW Former Jeopardy.-An acquittal for arson under an indictment alleging the building burned to be that of C is a bar to a prosecution for the burning of the same building under an indictment alleging it to be the building of E, used by C for storing grain therein, as an indictment for arson may allege the building to be the property of either the owner or the person in possession thereof.-STATE v. COPELAND, S. Car., 23 S. E. Rep. 980.

72. CRIMINAL LAW-Former Jeopardy.-When the defendant in a criminal action is convicted of the crime charged, and subsequently, on writ of error sued out by himself, procures in this court a reversal of the judgment of conviction, for errors in the charge of the trial court to the jury, he is not entitled to be discharged on the ground that he has once been put in

jeopardy.-STATE V. REDDINGTON, S. Dak., 66 N. W. Rep. 464.

73. CRIMINAL LAW Homicide Self-defense.-On a trial for murder, evidence that deceased provoked the quarrel by striking defendant; that defendant, who thereupon picked up an iron poker to strike deceased, was prevented from doing so, and compelled to lay it down; that defendant, after deceased had started away (intending, in good faith, to depart), picked it up again, followed him, and, on his turning about with an open knife in his hand, when overtaken, struck the fatal blow with the poker,-warrants an instruction denying defendant the right to invoke the doctrine of self-defense.-STIDWELL V. STATE, Ala., 19 South. Rep.

323.

74. CRIMINAL LAW-Incest-Force.-A person may be convicted of incest though he accomplished his purpose by such force as to render him also guilty of rape. -SMITH V. STATE. Ala.. 19 South. Rep. 306.

75. CRIMINAL LAW-Indictment - Duplicity.-An indictment under Pub. St. ch. 202, § 26, punishing whoever, "with intent to commit larceny, confines, maims, injures, or puts in fear any person for the purpose of stealing from a building," is not bad for duplicity because the allegations as to the acts done contain all the elements of an assault and battery. COMMONWEALTH V. HOLMES, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 189.

76. CRIMINAL LAW-Indictment.-Const. Art. 1, § 11, giving an accused the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, does not render unconstitutional Hill's Ann. Laws, § 2011, abolishing the distinction between principal and accessory before the fact, and providing that both shall be indicted, tried, and punished as principals, and prevent an accused who procured the commissionĵof a homicide, but who was not present at the killing, from being convicted on an indictment merely charging him with the commission of the overt act.-STATE V. STEEVES, Oreg., 43 Pac. Rep. 947.

77. CRIMINAL LAW-Malice.-"Malice, in common acceptation, means ill will against a person; but, in its legal sense, it means a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse."-STATE V. WEEDEN, Mo., 34 S. W. Rep. 473.

78. CRIMINAL LAW-Murder.-If a party brings on a quarrel with another, with no felonious intent or malice, or premeditated purpose to kill or do great bodily harm, and a difficulty results, in which the person with whom he brought on the quarrel assaults the provoking party, or, by overt act, so menaces him as to endanger his life or threaten him with great bodily harm, or so as to induce the belief of the party thus assailed or menaced that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm, and upon reasonable grounds, and he thereupon kills his assailing or menacing adversary, it is not murder.-STATE V. FOUTCH, Tenn., 34 S. W. Rep. 423.

79. CRIMINAL LAW-Perjury.-In a prosecution for perjury in testifying in a criminal case before the circuit court, it is sufficient to prove for the State, as to the authority of the deputy clerk administering the oath to defendant, that he was acting as clerk.-MASTERSON V. STATE, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 139.

80. CRIMINAL LAW Trespass on Land-Burden of Proof. It is incumbent on a person indicted, under Code, § 1120, for willful trespass on land, to show by way of defense that he entered under a license, or a bona fide claim of right.-STATE V. GLENN, N. Car., 23 S. E. Rep. 1004.

81. CRIMINAL PRACTICE -Murder - Indictment.-An indictment which charged the making of an assault upon the deceased with premeditated malice and intent to kill, and which charged the shooting, striking, and penetrating and the mortally wounding of the deceased, all with the deliberate and premeditated malice of the defendant, lis insufficient to sustain a convic tion for murder. To be sufficient it must charge that the unlawful acts by which the homicide was perpetrated, and the killing itself, were all done with the

premeditated design or intention to effect the death of the deceased.-HOLT V. TERRITORY, Okla., 43 Pac. Rep. 1083.

82. CUSTOM-Evidence.-Proof of knowledge is required, to give effect to a custom, unless it is so widely and generally known and so well established as that knowledge thereof may well be presumed.-UNION STOCK YARDS Co. v. WESCOTT, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 419. 83. DEED-Delivery-Pleading.-An allegation in a pleading that the grantor "made and executed" a deed includes all acts essential to the completion of the muniment of title-the delivery of the instrument to the grantee, as well as the signature of the grantor.BROWN V. WESTERFIELD, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 439.

84. DEED-Municipal Corporations.-After a conveyance in fee of a strip of land known as a certain avenue, subject only to an easement in the public for road purposes, the grantor has no interest therein which he can convey to a subsequent grantee.-SOUTHERN CAL. RY. Co. v. SOUTHERN PAC. R. Co., Cal., 43 Pac. Rep. 1123.

85. DEED- Reservation.-A deed in which the description of the property is followed by a reservation of a portion of that described, to be used for a specified purpose, as an alley, operates as a conveyance of the fee of the portion reserved, subject only to the easement declared.-ToWNE V. SALENTINE, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 395.

86. DEPOSITION Refusal to Answer Questions.While the statute governing witnesses subpoenaed to testify in the courts authorizes the imposition of a penalty upon a witness who fails to appear and testify, and also the commitment of a witness who appears, but refuses to answer proper questions, the latter provision is omitted from that part of the statute relating to witnesses whose testimony is to be taken by deposition (Code, §§ 2801-2822), which applies alike to depositions taken to be used in the courts of the State, and, under certain conditions, to those taken for use in those of another State; and there exists no statutory authority for a court to compel a witness whose deposition is being taken for use either in the courts of this or of another State to answer questions.-Ex PARTE RUCKER, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 314.

87. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION Inheritance per Stirpes.-A died intestate, leaving surviving him neither issue, nor father, mother, brother, or sister. There were surviving four children of a deceased brother, eight children of a deceased sister, and three children of a deceased daughter of such sister: Held, that under our statute of descent the 12 surviving nephew and nieces took each one-twelfth part of the intestate's per capita, and that the grand nephews and nieces took nothing.-DOUGLAS V. CAMERON, Neb., 66 N. W. Rep. 431.

88. DIVORCE-Decree.-A decree granting a divorce may be opened, notwithstanding the person obtaining the divorce has in the meantime been married.— MEDINA V. MEDINA, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1001.

89. EASEMENTS-Construction of Deed.-A deed providing that the grantor, as part consideration, "agrees to open and use as a private alley" a specifically described strip of land, across other land belonging to him to the land conveyed, "to be used as a private alley" as long as the grantee required it, and reserving title to the strip in the grantor, conveys an easement of a private alley way.-SHANNON V. TIMM, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1022.

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90. EJECTMENT - Rights of Holder of Invalid Tax Deed. In an action for the recovery of possession between the holder of a tax deed and the owner of the land, if the tax deed be adjudged invalid, the holder of the deed if entitled to recover, and the successful party should be adjudged to pay, the full amount of all taxes paid on such land, with interests and costs as allowed by law up to the dateļof said tax deed, includ ing the cost of such deed and the recording of the same, with interest on such amount at the rate of 20

per cent. per annum.-BOOGE V. RITCHIE, Kan., 43 Pac. Rep. 1144.

91. EJECTMENT-Title-Purchase at Sheriff's Sale.A purchaser of land at sheriff's sale cannot sue for possession of the land before delivery of the sheriff's deed thereto.-BANK OF CHARLESTON NAT. BANKING ASSN. V. DOWLING, S. Car., 23 S. E. Rep. 982.

92. ELECTION AND VOTERS.-Sess. Laws 1891, art. 190, § 21, provides that no person shall be allowed within the railing of an election room except to vote, or to assist an elector, as thereinafter provided. Section 31 provides that, "in case of necessity," an interpreter may be employed: Held, that where, in a county election, an interpreter hostile to one of the candidates was allowed within the railing of the polling place and conversed freely with foreigners, who only understood their own language, after they had been admitted to vote, although they had not applied for an interpreter, the vote of the entire township should be excluded, where its exclusion would change the result of the election. -MAYNARD V. STILLSON, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 388.

93. EMINENT DOMAIN-Condemnation of Mortgage Lien. The right of eminent domain cannot be exercised by a railroad corporation with respect to a right of way, when it is already the absolute owner of the land included therein; and condemnation proceedings, had under such circumstances, are ineffective against a mortgage lien placed thereon by a former owner.CHICAGO, K. & W. RY. Co. v. NEED, Kan., 43 Pac. Rep. 997.

94. EMINENT DOMAIN Compensation - Damages.Where land has been condemned for levee purposes, and compensation paid, the owner is not entitled, in the subsequent condemnation of additional land, to damages for injuries to houses allowed by the levee commissioners to remain upon the land theretofore condemned by the subsequent uses to which the land then condemned is required to be put.-BOARD OF LEVEE COMMRS. V. BRINKLEY, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 296. 95. EQUITY-Setting Off Judgments.-The jurisdiction of courts of law to set off judgments against each other under the statute does not divest courts of equity of jurisdiction in the same cases.-WHITEHEAD V. JESSUP, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1042.

96. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.-Purchasers of land at foreclosure sale conveyed it by warranty deed to N, who, by like deed, conveyed it to plaintiff. The mortgagor obtained a decree setting aside the decree of foreclosure, the sheriff's deed and the deed to N, for want of jurisdiction by the court rendering such decree, pay. ing into court the amount due on the mortgage, which sum was received by N and paid to plaintiff: Held, that plaintiff and N were estopped from maintaining an action on the warranty in the deed to N's grantors. -SMITHSON LAND CO. V. BRAUTIGAM, Wash., 43 Pac. Rep. 1096.

97. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS-Contract.-Plaintiff sold defendant two lots, and delivered to him a deed which he had received for one of them, with a blank for the name of the grantee, and a deed of the other, in which there was also a blank for the name of the grantee. Plaintiff received in exchange a bond of a corporation, which defendant guaranteed. Defendant afterwards sold the lots to plaintiff's grantor, delivering to him the deed which plaintiff had received from such grantor, with the blank for the name of the grantee; and he and his wife executing a deed to such grantor for the other lot after his wife's name had been filled in the deed executed to him by plaintiff: Held, that defendant was estopped from claiming that there was no consideration for his guaranty of such bond, whether the deeds received by him from plaintiff were valid as legal conveyances or not.-GIBBS V. CRAIG, N. J., 33 Atl. Rep. 1052.

98. ESTOPPEL-To Claim Conveyance Fraudulent.-A ereditor of a vendor is not estopped to assert that the sale was fraudulent because after the sale he made a

contract with the purchaser to paint buildings on one of the tracts conveyed, and was paid therefor by the purchaser, he having, before the sale, had a contract with the vendor to do such painting; and if it should be assumed that he was estopped as to the property relative to which he contracted, he would not be estopped as to other and distinct pieces of property embraced in the same conveyance.-GEILER V. LITTLEFIELD, N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 66.

99. EVIDENCE-Personal Injuries-Res Gestæ.-In an action by an employee against a railroad company for personal injuries caused by being run over by cars, statements by plaintiff as to how the accident happened, made five minutes after he was taken from under the cars, is inadmissible in his favor, as res gestæ. -EASTMAN V. BOSTON & M. R. R., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep.

115.

100. EXECUTION SALE-Action to Redeem.-An action to redeem from a sale on execution after the time for redemption has expired cannot be sustained where no facts are alleged tending to show that the proceedings in obtaining the judgment and making the sale were irregular, and there is no averment of an offer or attempt to redeem within the statutory period.-* BRYANT V. STETSON & POST MILL CO., Wash., 43 Pac. Rep. 931.

101. EXECUTION SALE-Notice.-Under a statute that requires public notice to be given for at least 10 days before an officer can sell property levied upon by virtue of an execution, a sale and delivery thereof upon 8 days' notice is unauthorized, and renders the seizure and all subsequent proceedings the acts of a trespasser from the beginning.-BoWMAN V. KNOTT, S. Dak., 66 N. W. Rep. 457.

102. FEDERAL COURTS.-A federal court has no jurisdiction to punish, as a contempt, an act of disobedience to an order which the court intended to make, but which in fact was never entered; or an act which is a violation of a mere oral stipulation made in open court between the attorneys of the parties. Nor can the court make so punishable an act not forbidden by any order or decree at the time it was committed, by afterwards entering a nunc pro tunc order forbidding such act.-EX PARTE BUSKIRK, U. S. C. C. of App., 72 Fed. Rep. 14.

103. FEDERAL OFFENSE-Improper Use of MailsScheme to Defraud.-Rev. St. § 5480, as amended by Act March 2, 1889, provides that if any person, having de. vised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud by correspondence through the mails, shall, in executing such scheme, place any letter or circular in the post-office, he shall be liable to prosecution: Held, that the fact that the communication placed in the mails by the promoter of a fraudulent investment company contained merely statements as to the future profits which would accrue to investors, and not misrepresentations as to existing facts, did not affect his liability.-DURLAND V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 508.

104. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Leases-Part Performance. -In case of a parol lease of land for a year, to begin at a future date, taking possession and monthly payments of rent thereunder is such part performance as will take the contract out of the statute of frauds.-A. G. RHODES FURNITURE Co. v. WEEDON, Ala., 19 South. Rep. 318.

105. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF Surrender of Written Lease. An executed verbal agreement to surrender a written lease is not within the statute of frauds.-GOLDSMITH V. DARLING, Wis., 66 N. W. Rep. 397.

106. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Evidence-Possession.-A prima facie case of a sale in fraud of creditors is shown by proof that a husband, after selling prop erty to his wife, continued in full possession and management thereof, as her agent.-HIGGINS V. SPAHR, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 11.

107. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Partial Illegality of Consideration.-That a transfer by a debtor in pay

108. GARNISHMENT-By Whom Maintainable.-Under 3 How. Ann. St. § 8058, providing that, "in all cases" where there remains any sum unpaid on "any" judg. ment or decree, garnishment may issue on affidavit of the "plaintiff," his agent, etc., the word "plaintiff" refers to the party moving in the garnishment proceedings, and therefore a defendant who has recovered judgment against the plaintiff may sue out a writ of garnishment.-ESLER V. ADSIT, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep.

485.

109. GARNISHMENT-Interest in Joint Debt.-The defendant's interest in a debt owing to him and another, but not as partners, is subject to garnishment; and upon payment by the garnishee of the full amount of the debt into court, and the appearance of all parties claiming an interest in the money, the court should determine the interest of the defendant, and hold it subject to the garnishment proceedings. -PERRY V. BLATCH, Kan., 43 Pac. Rep. 989.

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110. GARNISHMENT When Lies-Judgment.-Where chattels were sold under an agreement that a third person should pay therefor, and look to the buyer for reimbursement, and that title should remain in the seller, as against such third person, until payment of the price, the buyer is not subject to garnishment by a creditor of such third person to the extent of the price, while it remained unpaid by such third person.-LOCK. WOOD V. RAINEY, Miss., 19 South. Rep. 294.

111. INFANT-Purchase-Necessaries.-A barber shop and chair, and other articles of furniture designed to be used in furnishing a barber shop, purchased by a minor having no means of support, except what he earned, are not necessaries, and he may, therefore repudiate his contract.-RYAN V. SMITH, Mass., 43 N. E Rep. 109.

112. INJUNCTION-Complainant as a Wrongdoer.-The closing of a private alley will not be enjoined where it appears that complainant, to enable him to secure the injunction, destroyed the fence closing the alley, and after it was rebuilt by defendant, without knowledge that the preliminary injunction had issued, again destroyed the fence, and then served the injunction.-DE SALE V. MILLARD, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 481.

113. INJUNCTION-Landlord and Tenant-Alteration of Premises.-A lessee will not be enjoined from using openings which he has cut in two floors of the leased building, where the lessor has an adequate remedy by action for breach of contract, and the right to termi nate the lease for a violation of its terms.-BROWN V. NILES, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 90.

Interest.

Insurable 114. INSURANCE Contract Where a policy of insurance is based on the condition that the assured is the owner in fee-simple, but makes the application a part of the policy, and the insurer accepts a risk, though the application shows that the assured is not the owner in fee, the insurer cannot set up a want of such title to defeat an action on the policy. -DAVIS V. PHOENIX INS. Co., Cal., 43 Pac. Rep. 1115.

115. INSURANCE-Execution of Policy.-An agent holding a commission from an insurance company authorizing him to take risks generally, without placing any limitation thereon, either as to the kind of risks, or as to the territory within which they may be, is a general agent; and the facts that the policy provides that, in any matter relating to the insurance, no per. son shall be deemed the agent of the company unless authorized in writing, and that the agent's commission states that he shall be subject to the rules of the company, and to such instructions as may be given him from time to time, do not impose on one dealing with the agent a duty to ascertain his authority to issue a policy on a risk extrahazardous, and located in a place other than the town in which is situated the agent's

office.-GERMAN FIRE INS. Co. v. COLUMBIA ENCAUSTIC TILE CO., Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 41.

116. INSURANCE-Iron Safe Clause-Warranty.-Where a fire policy is accepted subject to the iron safe clause, set out in a slip attached to it, containing the only description of the insured property, and providing that a failure to comply therewith shall avoid the policy, the provision constitutes a warranty by the insured.PALATINE INS. Co. v. BROWN, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 462. 117. INSURANCE-Live Stock.-A provision in a policy of insurance on a horse, that "if the animal shall become sick or disabled the insured shall notify the com. pany within 15 hours," is valid, and a failure to give the notice within the required time after the sickness is known to an agent of the insured in charge of the horse will preclude a recovery for its death.-SWAIN V. SECURITY LIVE STOCK INS. Co., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 105. 118. INSURANCE-Live Stock - Premature Action.Under a live stock insurance policy providing that the company, on receiving satisfactory proof of death of the animal, would pay the amount of the policy "in 60 days after the approval of the claim by its executive board," proof of death being waived, and liability be ing denied by the company on other grounds, action may be brought at once.-WHITTEN V. NEW ENGLAND LIVE STOCK INS. CO., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 121.

119. INSURANCE

- Mortgage Clause. -A mortgage clause provision in a policy payable to a mortgagee as interest may appear-that the policy, as to the interest of the mortgagee, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor-does not prevent the policy from being invalidated as to the mortgagee on account of misrepresentation by the mortgagor in the application for the insurance; he having, in such matter, acted as the agent of the mortgagee.-AMERICAN CENT. INS. Co. v. COWAN, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 460.

120. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Saloons-Evidence.-An affidavit which states that defendant allowed a person under the age of 21 "to loiter and be" in and about a room where intoxicating liquors were sold as a beverage, charges an offense under Acts 1895, p. 250, § 5, which prohibits a person engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors from allowing any person under the age of 21 years "to loiter" in the saloon or place of business.-ARMSTRONG V. STATE, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 143.

121. JUDGMENT-Collateral Attack-Presumption.-In a collateral attack on a judgment on the ground that defendant was a non-resident of the State, where it appears that the court might have had jurisdiction over him as a transient person within the limits of the State, every presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of the judgment.-HAMBEL V. DAVIS, Tex., 34 S. W. Rep. 439.

122. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.—A judgment in an action wherein the board of commissioners of a county are plaintiffs is not a bar to another action based on the same facts, but brought by a taxpayer as plaintiff. -PRICE V. GWIN, Ind., 43 N. E. Rep. 5.

123. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Tenancy-Termination. -A landlord will be held not to have waived defects in a notice given by defendant, his tenant, or to have released him, though he knew the notice was intended to terminate the tenancy, where he continued to make out bills against defendant monthly for rent, and present them, as usual, at the rented store, and gave credit to defendant for payments, and claimed that defendant was still the tenant, though he received payments from defendant's vendee.-WHICHER V. COT. TRELL, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 114.

124. LIFE INSURANCE-Gift.-A policy of life insurance payable to "the legal representatives of the assured" may be made the subject of a gift, in the same manner as a bond or other moneyed obligation, with the same results.-TRAVELERS' INS. Co. OF HARTFORD, CONN. V. GRANT, N. J., 33 Atl. Rep. 1060.

125. LIFE INSURANCE-Security for Outlawed Debts.Though certain notes, to secure which an insurance policy was taken out on the maker's life, were out

lawed at the time of the insured's death, they are within a clause in said policy providing that the proceeds thereof were to be applied to the payment of the payee's "then subsisting pecuniary demands."TOWNSEND V. TYNDALE, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 107.

126. LIMITATIONS-Concealment of Cause of Action.— Where moneys of complainant's intestate were fraudulently obtained by defendant by means of an apparent indorsement of a certificate of deposit by intestate, a few days before her death, and when she was incapable, on account of old age and physical and mental infirmity, of transacting business, and the possession thereof was fraudulently concealed by defendant, and not discovered by complainant until a short time before he brought suit for the recovery thereof, as be. longing to his intestate's estate, the cause of action was not barred by limitations. - STEBBINS V. PATTERSON, Mich., 66 N. W. Rep. 484.

127. MANDAMUS-Jurisdiction.-In mandamus against a city treasurer to compel him to pay money on hand in a special fund to the holder of city warrants against such fund, where defendant's term of office expires pending the proceeding, judgment cannot be rendered against him.-Fox v. TRINIDAD WATER WORKS Co., Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1051.

128. MASTER AND SERVANT-Death of Servant.-An employer was not liable for the death of an employee by his falling after having been caught and raised by a rope, part of a hoisting apparatus, which commenced to tighten up just as he was stepping over it, where the employee was fully acquainted with the apparatus, and it was working as usual on the day of the accident, and the servant had been forbidden, and his duties did not require him, to cross the rope.-O'BRIEN V. STAPLES COAL Co., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 181.

129. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to Employee-Neg. ligence. When the master intrusts to the superintendent in charge of an excavation the matter of notifying the employees of any latent danger, the foreman in charge of the gangs engaged in the work of excavation are not vice-principals in the absence of said superintendent, so as to render the employer liable for their failure to notify the employee of such danger.DURST V. CARNEGIE STEEL Co., Penn., 33 Atl. Rep. 1102. 130. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to EmployeeNegligence of Foreman.-Where there was evidence that plaintiff was directed by his foreman to assist in moving certain machinery, and that such foreman assisted personally in the moving, the question whether the latter was a fellow-servant or superintendent was for the jury.-GELONECK V. DEAN STEAM PUMP CO., Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 85.

131. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.-Where, in an action by a servant for personal injuries alleged to be due to the negligent manner in which defendant loaded timber on a carriage, and also for its failure to keep its "ways" (St. 1887, ch. 270, § 1) in repair, there is evidence to show negligence in loading the timber, refusal of a request for an instruction to find for defendant on the whole evidence does not bring up for review the question whether the road over which the timber was being transported was a part of defendant's ways. -GAGNON V. SEACONNET MILLS, Mass., 43 N. E. Rep. 82. 132. MASTER AND SERVANT-Term of EmploymentDischarge.-Under Civ. Code, § 2010, providing that "a servant is presumed to have been hired for such length of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages, a hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year," an employment at a stated yearly salary, without other agreement as to the time, constitutes a contract for one year, and this will not be changed by the fact of the monthly payment of salary, nor by the custon of the employer, a railroad company, or of all railroad companies, to employ only by the month.ROSENBERGER V. PACIFIC COAST RY. Co., Cal., 43 Pac. Rep. 963.

133. MECHANIC'S LIEN Jurisdiction.-Under Laws 1885, ch. 342, § 7, providing that a mechanic's lien may

be enforced "by a civil action in a court of record in the city or county where the property is situated, which would have jurisdiction to render a judgment in an action founded upon a contract, for a sum equal to the amount of the lien," a county court has jurisdiction to foreclose such lien on property within the county, though defendant resides elsewhere.-RAVEN V. SMITH, N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 63.

134. MECHANICS' LIENS-Contract-Abandonment.Under Pub. St. ch. 191, § 1, giving a lien to a person performing labor or furnishing materials for a building under an agreement with the owner or by his consent, or by the consent of any person acting for such owner, where persons furnish labor and materials with the knowledge of such owner, under an agreement with the contractor, they are not barred of a lien by a provision in the contract that the contractor shall not let any interest in it without the written consent of the architect, though such architect did not give written consent to the contract between the claimants and the contractor.-WAHLSTROM V. TRULSON, Mass., 43 N. E.

Rep. 183.

135. MECHANICS' LIENS-Enforcement-Limitation.Gen. St. § 2151, providing that no mechanic's lien shall hold the property longer than six months, unless an action be commenced within that time to enforce the same, and section 2152, providing that persons claiming liens on the property may be brought in at any time before trial, merely fix the time within which the action must be brought as against the owner of the land, and do not require, as against third persons claiming liens on the property, that the action to foreclose the lien be brought within the six months.-SAN JUAN HARDWARE CO. V. CARROTHERS, Colo., 43 Pac. Rep. 1053.

136. MECHANICS' LIENS - Foreclosure of Mortgage.When the mortgagor, after foreclosure, remains in possession, under agreement with the purchaser, and contracts for the construction of a building thereon, one furnishing material for the contractor cannot acquire a mechanic's lien therefor, against the purchaser, after the mortgagor has in good faith paid the contractor, as provided by the building contract, for the work done.-ROBBINS V. ARENDT, N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 165.

137. MINING PARTNERSHIP.-To constitute a mining partnership, under the provisions of Civil Code 1895, §§ 3350-3359, two or more persons must not only own or acquire a mining claim for the purpose of working it, but must actually engage in working the same; and the fact that one part owner of a claim is charged by another with wrongfully extracting ore from a portion of a vein, the apex of which is alleged to be within the claim, does not create the relationship of mining partners between the parties.-ANACONDA COPPER-MIN. Co. v. BUTTE & B. MIN. Co., Mont., 43 Pac. Rep. 924.

138. MONOPOLY Action for Accounting.-One who acquired certificates of trust in an illegal monopoly cannot maintain an action against the trustees thereof, for an accounting, where said trustees did not seek to derive any advantage from the illegal agreement, but, in compliance with the wish of the other holders of the trust certificates, the trust was reorganized in the form of a legal corporation, to which said trustees transferred the property in their hands.-UNCKLES v. COLGATE, N. Y., 43 N. E. Rep. 59.

139. MORTGAGE-Construction.-A note and the mortgage securing the same should be construed as parts of one transaction, and the conditions of the mortgage, when not in conflict with the terms of the note, as to the effect of a default in the payment of interest when due, govern the rights of the parties respecting that matter.-KANSAS LOAN & TRUST CO. v. GILL, Kan., 43 Pac. Rep. 991.

140. MORTGAGE FOREClosure Defective Notice.Mere inaccuracies in a notice of a mortgage foreclosure under a power of sale, not calculated to be misleading, are insufficient to invalidate a title acquired thereunder, when the recitals of said notice readily convey