300 PRINCE EUGENE DRIVES THE FRENCH OUT OF ITALY. [1706. and exhibited the versatility of his talents in dictating to nine amanuenses at once, and in superintending Pope's horticulture at Twickenham. "He whose lightning pierced the Iberian lines, Now forms my quincunx, and now ranks my vines." Peterborough, we have seen, had proposed to go to the relief of Turin. The duke of Savoy, having been enabled through the subsidies of England and Holland to expend large sums in preparations for the defence of his capital, treated with contempt the summons to surrender of La Feuillade, the French general, who invested the city with an immense army. The successes of the French in the early part of the campaign had been very great; and though Victor Amadeus lost not heart, even when he left Turin with a part of his forces, whilst the siege was carried on for three months with a fearful loss of life, it appeared very doubtful whether Savoy could be saved. Prince Eugene was beyond the Adige with an army of Imperialists. By a series of movements, in which he displayed that skill and energy which fitted him to be the colleague of Marlborough, he united his forces with the cavalry of the duke of Savoy in September; attacked the French in their entrenchments; obtained a complete victory; and finally drove them out of Italy. The great campaign of Marlborough in 1706, which we shall have to relate in the next chapter, completed a series of triumphs for the Allies, which made this year one of the most memorable of the great war of the Succession. Marlborough's Campaign of 1705-His disappointments and anxieties-He forces the French lines-Retreat of the French under Villeroy-New Parliament-State of Parties-The Regency Bill-Cry of the Church in danger-Marlborough's Campaign of 1706 in the Netherlands-The French and Bavarian armies under Villeroy pass the Dyle-The battle of Ramilies-Results of the Victory. "I NEVER knew the duke of Marlborough go out so full of hopes as in the beginning of this campaign," says Burnet. He embarked at Harwich on the 31st of March. His ardent expectations were soon cooled by the opposition which the Dutch made to his plans. It was a month before he could get the States to agree to his design of leading the English and Dutch troops to the Moselle, there to co-operate with the forces under prince Louis of Baden; and, marching from Treves between the Moselle and the Saar, to penetrate into Lorraine and thus carry the war into the French territory. Without waiting for the force of Baden, Marlborough crossed the Moselle and the Saar on the 3rd of June. The French armies under Villars and Marsin had united. Marlborough was anxious to give them battle; but they retreated; and he followed, though ill-provided with artillery. He encamped at Elft, and there waited for reinforcements. On the 9th he wrote to Harley, that he had not one man with him but those in the English and * "Own Time," vol. v. p. 203. 302 MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGN-HIS DISAPPOINTMENTS. [1705. Dutch pay. He was desirous to begin the siege of Saar-Louis; yet for want of the troops under the prince of Baden and the Prussians, we are obliged to be idle a good part of the campaign, while the enemy are pursuing their designs without any manner of interruption." * Such was the essential disadvantage of an army composed of the various contingents of Allied powers, compared with an army of one great military state. In the campaign of the Danube, the English commander, by wonderful exertions, contrived to make a compact body out of many heterogeneous parts. In the campaign of 1705, he had to prove the full difficulty of divided counsels and petty jealousies. Whilst in camp at Elft the weather was bitterly cold; and to this circumstance he attributes in some measure the desertions which weakened his army. On the 15th of June he writes to the States General, that the season is so inclement that there is nothing on the earth-that all the grass and oats have been destroyed by the cold-that he has no horses or carriages for the conveyance of heavy artillery, the German princes having utterly failed in their engagements.+ Villeroy and the elector of Bavaria were rapidly advancing so as to threaten Holland; and the States, in great alarm, sent express upon express to Marlborough, to march with all haste to their succour. Villeroy had taken Huy, and was investing Liège. Marlborough apprehended that the Dutch would be frightened into a negotiation for peace. The imperturbable general is very nearly broken down with anxiety. He writes to Godolphin on the 16th, "I have for these last ten days been so troubled by the many disappointments I have had, that I think if it were possible to vex me so for a fortnight longer, it would make an end of me. In short, I am weary of my life." A vigorous resolution roused Marlborough out of this despondency. On the 17th of June, at midnight, he broke up the camp at Elft, and marched back to the position which he had occupied a fortnight before. By a series of rapid movements he united his army with that of the Dutch general, D'Auverquerque ; and Villeroy retreated within the formidable lines which the French had constructed, extending from the Meuse, near Namur, to the Scheldt at Antwerp. Marlborough's first object was to regain. possession of Huy, in which he succeeded by the capitulation of the garrison on the 11th of July. But this success was accompanied by a bitter mortification. Upon the approach of a French detachment, the Palatine general D'Aubach abandoned Treves and Saarbruch, and burned the magazines which contained stores that were essential to the further prosecution of the operations on the Moselle. Marlborough's disappointments in the campaign were matters of rejoicing to the High Tories in England, who were now distinguished as "the tackers." The great general took this so to heart that he writes to Godolphin, "this vile enormous faction of theirs vexes me so much, that I hope the queen will after this campaign give me leave to retire." § In answer to a consolatory letter from the queen, he writes to her majesty that he has received a list of the new parliament, by which he sees that there are enough tackers returned, to stir everything that may be uneasy to the government; "to prevent which, I think your majesty should advise with lord treasurer [Godolphin], what encouragement may be proper to give the Whigs." But Marlborough does not want the Whigs to be in power. + Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 87. Coxe, vol. ii. p. 122. + Ibid., vol. ii. p. 103. 1705.] MARLBOROUGH FORCES THE FRENCH LINES. 303 The lord treasurer, he writes "is the only man in England capable of giving such advice as may keep you out of the hands of both parties, which may at last make you happy, if quietness can be had in a country where there is so much faction." * The great operation of this campaign was the forcing of the French lines on the 17th of July. This formidable barrier between Dutch Brabant and the Austrian Netherlands, had been three years in construction. In part of their extent the lines followed the course of the river Gheet, and the river Demer ; and, at various intervals, were fortified posts of considerable strength. Distributed along convenient parts of the lines was the French army of seventy thousand men. Marlborough maintained his usual secrecy, confiding his plans to no one but Auverquerque. He had determined to attack the lines by passing the Gheet near Leuwe-a part where the greatest difficulties appeared to present themselves. The weaker part of the lines was to the south of the Mehaigne; and thither D'Auverquerque was directed to march, "to give the enemy a jealousy that they were to be attacked on that side, and so oblige them to draw their greatest strength that way." The feint had its effect. Villeroy collected his main strength on that weak part where D'Auverquerque had crossed the Mehaigne. "But the bridges prepared over the Mehaigne served equally to bring back Auverquerque's troops to the left of that river, and to unite them to the army of Mariborough; and the movements being all made under cover of night, the object aimed at was attained before the enemy could discover which was the real point of attack. The lines were, however, of the most formidable description: for, besides the height of the ramparts and the largeness of the ditch, they were further defended by the difficulties of the ground over which they were to be approached; and by the river Gheet, which could not be crossed without laying bridges over it, and which was near enough to the lines to be defended by the fire from the parapet. All these obstacles would have been sufficient to have rendered the lines unassailable, though defended by a very inferior body against a whole army, but for the ability with which the attention and the main force of the enemy was diverted from the real point of attack, and the energy with which that attack was conducted." ‡ During the day of the 17th Villeroy was employed in watching the movements of Auverquerque. At eight o'clock at night a detachment of Marlborough's army began its march towards the Little Gheet river; and at the same time Auverquerque recrossed the Mehaigne, and connected his vanguard with the rear of Marlborough. When the morning dawned, the English and Dutch were approaching the French works, concealed by a thick fog. They carried the castle of Wange, and without waiting for the construction of bridges, the troops scrambled through the marshy ground, crossed the Gheet, mounted its slippery banks, rushed into the trench, and were within the enemy's lines. They were encountered by the marquis d'Allegre with twenty battalions of infantry and fifty squadrons of horse. Marlborough himself headed a charge of cavalry, and for a short time, having only a trumpeter and a servant with him, was surrounded as the French repulsed Coxe, vol. ii. p. 132. 174. 304 RETREAT OF THE FRENCH. [1705. his charge. But the English troops rallied to his rescue; and a second charge left them masters of the lines. Villeroy came up too late, and had no resource but a retreat. Marlborough was anxious to pursue, but the Dutch thought a pursuit hazardous, and he encamped near Tirlemont. L'Allegre was taken prisoner, with four other general officers and a thousand men. Harley wrote to Marlborough, after the news of the success, "Your friends and servants here cannot be without concern upon your grace's account, when we hear how much you expose that precious life of yours upon all occasions, and that you are not contented to do the part of a great general, but you condescend to take your share as a common soldier."* Harley's friend, Swift, ventured to insinuate, after a few years, that Marlborough wanted courage. Villeroy retreated beyond the Dyle, and there established a strong position near Louvain. Marlborough was prevented taking any immediate offensive measures through the constant interference of the deputies of the States. The English general was indignant, and sent an officer to the Hague, to represent "that unless the command be more absolute in one person, we shall hardly be able to do anything." Councils of war, he said, were called on every occasion, "which entirely destroys the secrecy and dispatch upon which all great undertakings depend." He wanted to force the passage of the Dyle; and he traversed ground which, somewhat more than a century after, became familiar to every Englishman. On the 27th of August he writes to the duke of Shrewsbury, "I had at the camp at Meldert with great difficulty brought together a provision of about ten days' bread; and having marched four days together through several defiles, and part of the Bois des Soignies, the army came the 18th instant into a spacious plain, with only the Yssche between us and the enemy. About noon we were formed in order of battle, and having visited the posts with M. D'Auverquerque, we had resolved upon making the attack, thinking there was no more to do but to order the troops to advance, when the Deputies of the States, having consulted their other generals, would not give their consent, so that I was with great regret obliged to quit the enterprise, which promised all imaginable success." There was a skirmish on the plain of Waterloo. But for the interference of the Dutch Deputies there might have been a decisive battle on that ground, of which Byron wrote, after the eventful day of the 18th of June, 1815, "Waterloo seems marked out for the scene of some great action, though this may be mere imagination." The opportunity was lost of anticipating the later glories of that plain. Marlborough wrote to Harley on the 2nd of September, entreating that the government should not take any formal notice at the Hague of his "late disappointment," for "I am persuaded if an opportunity should now offer before our leaving the field, the greatest part of the generals who were against engaging the enemy are so sensible of their error, that they would not obstruct anything that might be proposed for our advantage." He was looking forward to a new pleasure when he returned home. Mr. Vanbrugh had informed him that "the first stone at Woodstock" had been laid, and he compliments the architect upon his plans, saying, "the greatest satisfaction I enjoy on this side is from *Coxe, vol. ii. p. 149. + Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 197. + Ibid. p. 237. |