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der authority of the said judgment ren ment against Turner ceased to be a lien after dered against said Alf H. Turner in favor five years from the date of its rendition. He of said W. V. Rinehart in said cause num further contends that the appellants Rinehart bered 16,254 of the superior court of King and Hollenbeck have not been enjoined from ('ounty, Wash., or under any execution is reviving the judgment against Turner, and sued by authority of said judgment until the that having neglected to do so, they now hold further orders of this court; and that said no lien whatever against the land. The redefendant W. V. Rinehart be, and hereby straining order above set forth seems to is, cited to appear before this court upon the have been granted without notice, upon the 5th day of December, 1893, at 9:30 a. m., allegations of the complaint, as an emergency to show cause why this injunction should not order. It directed that the appellant Rinebe made perpetual.” That the foregoing | hart be cited to appear on December 5, 1893, order has never been vacated. That although and show cause why the injunction should . the injunction has never been made permanent, not be made perpetual. There is no allegait is still in full force and effect. That on tion that the order was ever served on the June 17, 1.905, the defendant Rinehart ap appellant Rinehart, or that he was cited to peared in the injunction suit and filed and appear and show cause why the injunction served his answer, since which time no fur should not be made perpetual. His first apther proceedings have been had. That the pearance was made by answer on June 17, injunction suit is still pending. That on 1905, more than 11 years after the entry of March 7, 1905, Alf H. Turner conveyed the
the restraining order, and nothing further land to the plaintiff Frank J. Heman, who
has been done. We then nave before us an took the same with notice of the judgment emergency restraining
restraining order, granted
, on lien of the defendants. That the sum of
November 23, 1893, on the allegations of a $12,200 remains due and unpaid on the judg complaint without notice, and are called ment. That to preserve the judgment lien upon to determine its present legal effect. it became necessary to pay the taxes on the
Section 5435, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.. land. And that the defendants had paid
provides that no injunction shall be granted such taxes, amounting to $221.20, the last
in the absence of reasonable notice, except payment made being taxes for the year that in cases of emergency, to be shown by 1904. For their second affirmative defense the complaint, the court may grant a rethe defendants Rinehart and Hollenbeck al straining order until notice can be given leged that, since the rendition of the judg and a hearing had thereon. Evidently the ment in favor of Rinehart and against Tur
Legislature intended that such emergency ner, he, the said Turner, has been absent restraining order should be granted to prefrom and resided out of the state of Washing serve the existing status for such a reasonton for periods of time equal to eight years able time as might be required to give noin all. To each of these affirmative defenses tice to the party restrained and secure him the plaintiff Heman interposed a general and
a hearing. It surely could not have been the special demurrer, the grounds of special de
legislative intent that such an ex parte murrer being (1) that the action has not emergency order should continue in full force been commenced within the time limited by
and effect for an indefinite period, or, as is law; and (2) that several causes of action now contended by the appellants, for more have been improperly joined. The demur than 11 years, simply because the party rers being sustained to both defenses, the
restrained was not cited, or failed to appear defendants declined to plead further. There and move for a dissolution. In State ex upon judgment was entered in favor of the rel. v. Lichtenberg, 4 Wash. 407, 410, 30 Pac. plaintiff, quieting his title, and the defend 716, this court, in construing section 270, ants have appealed.
Hill's Ann. St. & Codes (section 5435, BalThe appellants contend that the restraining linger's Ann. Codes & St.) said: "The proorder pleaded in their answer is still in full
visions of section 270 show a clear intent on force and effect, that by reason thereof they the part of the Legislature that no injunction have been continually enjoined from taking shall be granted without notice to the adany steps or proceedings whatsoever to en verse party. The only power that is conforce or collect their judgment, that they
ferred upon the court by said section is to have been unable to proceed by execution or grant an order to remain in force long enough by a motion to revive. They further con to enable the required notice to be given. tend that the respondent, Heman, bought
And should the court, without notice, grant the land during the pendency of the injunc an order for a longer time, its action in so tion suit; that by the injunction they doing would be irregular. So long as notice have been been continuously prevented
prevented from can be given and an opportunity had for instituting any proceeding whatever on the party to present his application for an the judgment, and that their judgment injunction, aided by such notice, the restrainlien on respondent's land, which formerly be ing order granted without such notice has longed to Turner, has therefore continued served its purpose, and should, if necesuntil the present time. On the other hand, sary, be set aside by the court. It may well the respondent contends that, under section be held, however, that no action of the court 5132, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., the judg. in that regard is required, as such order
would expire by its own force as soon as ments were not voluntary, but were made the parties were before the court upon no in good faith. The judgment was an actual tice of the application for an injunction. lien for the period of five years after its renThe only purpose of such restraining order is dition, and the appellants have in good faith, to keep things in statu quo until the matter although erroneously, believed and insisted can be brought regularly before the court. that they have continued to hold a lien until And whether such order terminates by its | the present time. Under the previous deown force or is terminated by order of the cisions of this court, they are entitled to an court, the clear intent of the Legislature ap- | equitable lien on the land for the total pears in said section to protect the rights ; amount of taxes paid by them, with interest of a party from other than a temporary in- from the several dates of payment. Packterference without first giving him an oppor. I wood v. Briggs, 25 Wash. 530, 65 Pac. 846 ; tunity to be heard. The court gets no ju- Dunsmuir v. Port Angeles, etc., Power Co., 30
1 risdiction in the matter for the purpose of Wash. 586, 71 Pac. 9; Rothchild Bros. v. interfering with the rights of either party Rollinger, 32 Wash. 307, 73 Pac. 367; Ball v. until the giving of notice as required by stat- Clothier, 34 Wash. 299, 75 Pac. 1099. As the ute. The temporary order provided for in first affirmative defense pleaded facts showsaid section is not the result of the formal ing the appellants to be entitled to an equiaction of the court, with proper jurisdiction, table lien on the land for taxes paid by them, to determine whether or not the defendant's and as some of these taxes were paid as rights should be interfered with, but only the late as for the year 1901, the trial court erred exercise of extraordinary power vested in the 'in sustaining the respondent's demurrer to court from the necessities of the case to such first affirmative defense. The demurprevent a failure of justice. Such being the rer to the second affirmative defense was evident intent of the Legislature, it will not ! properly sustained. Under section 5132, Balbe presumed to have placed it in the power linger's Ann. Codes & St. the judgment ceased of the moving party, against the will of the to be a lien at the expiration of five years
i court, to keep in force indefinitely an order from the date of its rendition. Brier V. which was only intended to remain in force Traders' Ntl. Bank, 24 Wash. 711, 64 Pac. until regular action of the court could be had | 831, Hardin v. Day, 29 Wash. 664, 70 Pac. in the matter." See, also, Coleman y. Colum 118. The existence, validity, and extent of bia, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Wash. 227, 35 Pac. a judgment lien are entirely dependent up1077; Rockford Watch Co. v. Rumpf, 12 on statutory enactments. There is no statute Wash. 617, 42 Pac. 213; Larsen v. Winder, 14 in this state providing that absence of a Wash. 109, 44 Pac. 123, 53 Am. St. Rep. 861; judgment debtor from the state shall extend In re Groen, 22 Wash. 53, 60 Pac. 123.
the duration of a judgment lien beyond the The allegations of the first affirmative de statutory period. The lien expired by limitafense of the answer fail to show that the tion without regard to the presence of Turappellant Rinehart ever appeared in the in ner within the state, or his absence tterejunction suit prior to June 17, 1905, or that from. the order was ever served upon him. As The judgment is reversed, and the cause sume, however, that it was served, and that
remanded, with instructions to the honorable he wished to proceed with the collection of trial court to overrule the demurrer to the his judgment, or desired to institute pro first affirmative defense. ceedings for its revival, and that he did not intend to take any chance of being in con
DUNBAR, HADLEY and ROOT, JJ., contempt of court, he could have directed the attention of the superior court to the re
cur. WOUNT, C. J. and RUDKIN, J., not straining order which had been granted on
sitting. the allegations of the complaint, and to the fact that no further showing had ever been
(44 Wash. 615) made. Had he done this, he would undoubtedly have secured an order dissolving the in
STATE V. PHILIP. junction, and permitting him to proceed in (Supreme Court of Washington. Dec. 8, 1906.) such lawful manner as he might desire. He
CRIMINAL LAW - COURT COMMISSIONERS-JUis now in no position to plead the order for
RISDICTION. the purpose of showing that he has been con Const. art. 4, § 23, provides for the aptinually enjoined, or that his judgment lien pointment of court commissioners with authori. has been preserved until the present time.
ty to perform the duties of a judge of the superi
or court at chambers. Laws 1891, p. 92, c. 54, Nor can the fact that no further action was
§ 5, declares that a judge may exercise out of taken by Turner, the plaintiff in the injunc court all the powers expressly conferred on a tion suit, excuse him for his own laches and judge as contradistinguished from a court, and
not otherwise. Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. delay. The answer fails to show a judgment
6884, requires that a defendant must be arlien on the respondent's land. The first af. raigned “before the court.” Section 6901 defirmative defense does, however, allege the clares that a plea of guilty can only be put in payment of $231.20 of general taxes by the
by defendant himself in open court, and section
6975 that the court must render judgment appellants, which they made for the purpose
where defendant is found guilty. Held, that a of protecting their asserted lien. These pay court commissioner had no power to accept a
plea of guilty on an information for a felony and sentence the defendant to imprisonment thereon.
Appeal from Superior Court, Okanogan County; Frank H. Foster, Commissioner.
One Philip, an Indian, was convicted of horse stealing, and he appeals. Reversed.
Perry D. Smith, for appellant.
RUDKIN, J. The defendant in this action was arraigned before a court commissioner appointed by the judge of the superior court for Okanogan county on a charge of horse stealing. IIe entered a plea of guilty to the information filed against him, and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor for the term of one year. From this judgment and sentence the present appeal is prosecuted.
The only question discussed in the briefs is this: Under the Constitution and laws of this state has a court commissioner power to take the arraignment of a prisoner charged with a felony, accept a plea of guilty, and render judgment thereon? The constitutional provision relating to court commissioners is as follows: “There may be appointed in each county, by the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction therein, one or more court commissioners, not exceeding three in number, who shall have authority to perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers, subject to revision by such judge, to take depositions and to perform such other business connected with the administration of justice as may be prescribed by law.” Const. art. 4, § 23. An act was approved March 19, 1895, providing for the appointment of court commissioners and defining their powers and duties (Law's 1895, p. 164, c. 83); but, inasmuch as that act does not attempt to confer upon court commissioners any such powers as were exercised in this case, its provisions need not be further considered. Under our present system of courts there seems to be a confusion of ideas as to the powers or functions of superior judges at chambers. In Peterson v. Dillon, 27 Wash. 78, 67 Pac. 397, the court used the following language: "Under our present system, when an act of a judicial nature is performed by a judge, it is, in contemplation of law, done in open court, although the act may in reality be done ir: the private room or office of the judge.” If the above is a correct statement of the law, and our Constitution means what it says when it declares that court commissioners have authority to perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers, it is scarcely necessary to add that court commissioners are entirely eliminated from our judicial system. Realizing this, the court in. timated rather than decided in the above case that court commissioners have like powers as were exercised by territorial district judges at chambers at the time of the adop
tion of the state Constitution. This is certainly a strained construction of very plain language, and we cannot believe that the framers of the Constitution intended to de fine the powers of important judicial officers by reference to the legislation of a government which was about to pass out of existence forever. There may be little necessity for conferring any considerable power on a judge at chambers, when the court over which he presides is always open. Yet the fact that a court is always open is not nec“essarily incompatible with the exercise of certain judicial functions by the judge of that court at chambers at least the framers of the Constitution did not so consider it. Nor has the Legislature. Section 5 of the act of February 26, 1891 (Laws 1891, p. 92, c. 54), defines the powers of superior judges at chambers as follows: "A judge may exercise out of court all the powers expressly conferred upon a judge as contradistinguished from a court and not otherwise." Laws 1891, p. 91, c. 54. Here is a legislative recognition and definition of the powers of superior judges at chambers, and we see no reason why it is not controlling. In the case before us it matters little whether the powers of court commissioners are regulated by section 2138 of the Code of 1881, defining the powers of territorial district judges at chambers, or by the act of 1891, supra, defining the powers of superior judges at chambers, or by the act of 1895, supra, providing for the appointment of court commissioners and defining their powers and duties. Under section 6884, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., a defendant must be arraigned before the court. Under section 6901, Id., "the plea of guilty can only be put in by the defendant himself in open court." Under section 6975, Id., the court must render judgment where the defendant is found guilty. In the face of these mandatory provisions of the statute judges at chambers and court commissioners are alike powerless.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
MOUNT, C. J., and ROOT, HADLEY, DUNBAR, and CROW, JJ., concur. FUL LERTON, J., concurs in result.
(44 Wash. 675) GRAVES v. WASHINGTON WATER POW
ER CO. (Supreme Court of Washington. Dec. 13, 1906.) 1. ELECTRICITY – PERSONAL INJURIES – TRESPASSERS.
A boy who was injured while climbing on a pier of a public bridge, by touching a live wire a short distance from such pier, and who was not an agent or employé of the city, having some duty in connection with the bridge, was not in a place where the general public may rightfully go for purposes of business or pleasure, but was a trespasser, and hence the electric company was not liable for the injury under the rule that the law imposes on persons manu.
facturing and dealing in or handling highly , beams and around the top of said bridge, said dangerous elements and substances, the duty of bridge and the supports thereof were attractexercising the highest degree of care to protect
ive to small boys, and that small boys frepersons from danger in all places where the general public may rightfully go for purposes of quented same for playing and climbing business and pleasure.
thereon, and had done so for a long time, and [Ed. Yote.For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. that appellant knew, or should have known, vol. 18, Electricity, $ 8.]
thereof. It is further alleged that on March 2. NEGLIGENCE-PLACES ATTRACTIVE TO CHIL
10, 1905, respondent climbed one of said DREN. The fact that a public bridge over a river
piers, and, when about 30 feet high, somewas attractive to boys did not render an elec thing touched his coat, and he involuntarily tric company liable for injuries to a boy re
put out his hand, and took hold of a live ceived while climbing up a pier, and caused by
wire, and received the shock and injury comhis touching one of the company's live wires, Where he was not lured to the place of the in- plained of, and that as respondent fell be jury by reason of any attraction connected with came in contact with other wires; that his any property of the company.
fingers and thumb had to be amputated. A (Ed. Vote.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig.
demurrer was interposed to the complaint vol. 37, Negligence, $ 55.]
and overruled. Appellant answered, denying 3. SAME--ANTICIPATION OF INJURY.
An electric company was not liable for in the material allegations of the complaint, exjuries to a boy received while climbing up a cept formal matters, and those covered by pier of a public bridge, caused by his touching the following admissions : “That respondent a live wire strung upon the electric company's poles, over 30 feet above the ground, under the
was at least 15 years old at time of accident; rule that one must so use his own property as
that appellant is a corporation, and ennot to injure another, since the company could gaged in manufacturing electricity, and furnot reasonably be expected to anticipate such nishing and selling same; that its power injury.
house is on the south bank of the Spokane [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 37, Negligence, $ 72.]
river, immediately east of the piers of the
Monroe Street Bridge; that the top of said Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane bridge is used as a public thoroughfare; County; Miles Poindexter, Judge.
that the roadway or top of said bridge is Action by Philip L. Graves, by Marie L.
at a great height from the ground and waGraves, as guardian ad litem, against the
ter underneath same; that said bridge is Washington Water Power Company. From
held in position by a series of steel supports a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant
of great height; that the said supports, in appeals. Reversed and remanded.
some places, are held together by steel plates H. M. Stephens, for appellant. 0. C. Moore or slats of steel, which slats or plates are and F. T. Post, for respondent.
run from one support to another on an an
gle; that on and prior to March 10, 1903. ROOT, J. This appeal is from a judg.poles and wires were maintained at the ment against appellant for personal inju- | place complained of, and that some of the ries sustained by respondent, a boy of 15 wires were constantly charged with electriciyears of age. The complaint sets forth that ty.” The defense of contributory negligence respondent was injured by reason of contact was pleaded, and it was alleged that apwith the wires of appellant, which were pellant had used the best means of insulation charged with electricity; that the power known to science. house of appellant is immediately east of There is but little controversy between what is known as the “Monroe Street the parties as to the character of the bridge, Bridge,” which spans the Spokane river, and and the location and use of the electric connects Monroe street on the north and wires. It appeared from the evidence that south sides of said river; that said bridge is pigeons were in the habit of nesting about a public thoroughfare, and is the property of the bridge, and that boys sometimes climbed the city of Spokane; that the driveway, road the piers in order to catch the pigeons, or way, and footpaths of said bridge are at the find their nests, and sometimes as a matter height of about 100 feet from the water in of sport, and in playing such games as said river; that said bridge is supported by "follow the leader.” It appears that near piers built by means of plates of steel at the foot of the piers on the other side of a slight angle, with strips to and from such the river there were good play grounds, but plates, set at an angle, so that same can be such was not the case on the side where used as a ladder, which alleged ladders are respondent was injured, although boys were inviting and attractive to small boys to frequently about there. It was in evidence climb and play thereon; that some of said that boys were seen playing about the piers and alleged ladders are near the power bridge at different times during the period house of appellant; that appellant's electric of two or three years immediately prior wires are in close proximity to one of said to this accident. It does not appear that piers; that by reason of the construction of they were in the habit of climbing the pier said piers in said ladder-like form, in close near which the wires were, and from which proximity to said river, and that at certain respondent fell. The evidence does not show seasons of the year pigeons are in the habit that appellant had actual knowledge of boys of nesting and rearing their young on the climbing these piers, nor that there was such
an anormt of climbing near the wires as would impute knowledge to it thereof. Respondent's witness McCormick, bridge foreman and inspector for the city, testified that the bridge was 138 feet above the water in the river; that the lattice work was sharp and hard on the feet and hands, and did not make a good ladder; that he had sometimes seen boys around the bridge, usually at the other end, and had driven them away; that he had never seen boys on any of the piers higher than 23 or 24 feet. This evidence did not seem to be disputed in any material part. Another of respondent's witnesses, one Rogers, a policemen of the city of Spokane, testified that his duties required him to be near this bridge; that he had seen boys playing about the bridge off and on for two or three years; that he had orders to chase them away, and did so. He had never seen them climb the piers, but had seen them on top of the bridge at each end; that he had or(lers to keep the boys away from there. One Gannon, a witness for the respondent, had seen boys climbing all over the bridge, but usually at places other than where this accilent occurred. He worked for the city, and was in the habit of chasing the boys way. Respondent testified that he
that he was playing "hookey" from school; that he saw some pigeons flying about the bridge, and (limhed one of the piers; that he felt something touch the back of his coat, and reaching around and without seeing the wires, involuntarily took hold of one, and was thrown to the ground by the shock, his hand being badly burned; that he could have seen the Wire had he looked. He stated that he had never previous to that time been under or climbed about the bridge. It appears from the evidence that the electric wires do not run exactly straight or parallel with the bridge, but are nearer to this particular pier than to any other. Respondent was 30 or more feet from the ground when he fell. The plates or strips of steel were 12 to 15 inches long, 2 or 3 inches wide, one-fourth of an inch thick, with sharp corners or edges, and fastened upon the steel piers so as to form sharp angles, rather than being attached at right angles as is the case with the rungs of an ordinary ladder. The wire nearest to the pier was 1512 inches distant therefrom, and was on the lowest arm of the electric pole, and was insulated and carried comparatively low voltage. The next wire above was 18 inches from the pier. From the complant and evidence we think it unquestionably appears that respondent took hold of a wire some distance above those two wires which was heavily charged with electricity, and some 30 inches from the bridge pier.
It is urged by appellant that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and that the evidence introduced is not sufficient to support any verdict or judgment in favor of respoudent. It is contended that the re
spondent was a trespasser toward whom the appellant owed no duty other than to avoid willful injury; that its wires were being used for a legitimate purpose, in a place where they had authority to place them, and that there is nothing in the circumstances alleged or proven sufficient to fix liability upon it for the injuries sustained by respondent. Respondent meets these contentions of appellant by the assertion of several propositions which we will consider seriatim. He urges first: "The law imposes on persons manufacturing and dealing in or handling highly dangerous elements and substances, such as electricity and dynamite, the duty of exercising the highest degree of care to protect persons from danger in all places where the general public may rightfully go for purposes of business or pleasure.” Accepting this as a correct statement of the law, let us apply it to the facts of this case. Can we say that "the general public may rightfully go for purposes of business or pleasure" up or down the side of a high and almost perpendicular pier of a public bridge across a river, climbing upon the diagonally attached slats of steel as did respondent? Was it ever contemplated that such a use should be made of the piers of this bridge by the general public? We apprehend not. The bridge was constructed for the purpose of furnishing the public a means of crossing a goodly sized river. It was intended that the public should walk or ride upon the roadway at the top of said bridge. The lattice work upon the sides of these piers was not intended to constitute ladders or furnish means of access to or from the top of the bridge. The public was not invited nor expected to use such lattice work for such a purpose. No one, other than an employé or agent of the city intrusted with some duty in connection with the inspection, supervision, care, or repairing of said bridge, would have any authority to climb up or down said lattice work. This being true, it follows that respondent as one of the general public had no authority justifying his presence at the place where he was injured. It is not pretended that he was an employé or agent of the city, or that he had any authority therefrom to be there. He was not even a licensee, but was a mere trespasser. It will, there. fore, be seen that the proposition of law urged by respondent, as above set forth, cannot avail him under the circumstances of this case.
2. Respondent urges “that it may always be assumed that every person has performed his duty under the law, and hence that the placing of wires or other electrical apparatus in close proximity to places or structures where persons rightfully go for business or pleasure constitutes an implied assurance of safety, and an invitation to take hold of, or come in contact with, such wires, if such persons may for any reason choose to do so." This proposition of law, even if sound (which