districts was assigned to a church called the church St. B., built under the provisions of those Acts at S., and was called the district parish of St. B., S. A rate was made in form "for and towards the repairs of the district parish church of St. B., S.," but in fact for other necessary expences also, such as lighting and washing, and stationery for registers, &c. Upon a rule for a prohibition, held, that the expences for which the rate was made were legal. Id.

III. By a local Act the vestry of the parish of C. were empowered to make rates, among other things, for the maintenance of the church, and an appeal to the Quarter Sessions was given against any rate. By an amending Act every rate was to be enforced by summons before two justices, and if the person summoned should not prove to the justices that he was not chargeable with or liable to pay such rate, he should payit. A person in that parish who was summoned for non-payment of church rate proposed to give evidence to shew that the rate had not been duly made, which evidence the justices declined to hear. Held, that the justices had no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the rate, and therefore had no power to state a case for a superior Court under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. s. 2. Ex parte May, 426.

IV. A person summoned before justices for non-payment of a church rate contended that the summons should be dismissed on the grounds that the rate was wrongly described in the summons and that the rate was illegally made. These grounds of objection having been argued, and the magistrates being about to deliberate, he gave notice that he disputed the validity of the rate and his liability to pay it; and thereupon the justices decided that their jurisdiction was taken away by the third proviso to sect. 7 of stat. 53 G. 3. c. 127. This Court refused a rule on the justices to make an order for payment of the rate. Ex parte Mannering, &c., 431.

REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE, WANT OF.

See Slander, II.

RECOGNIZANCES, &c.

RECOGNIZANCES IN CRIMINAL CASES.

See Statute of Frauds, I.

REGISTRAR.

See Superintendent Registrar.

REGULA GENERALIS. H. 2 W. 4. r. 93. See Costs, II. H. 25 Vict., p. 60.

REMOVAL, ORDER OF.

I. Stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. s. 4., by which no warrant shall be granted for the removal of any person becoming chargeable in respect of relief made necessary by sickness, unless the justices granting the warrant shall state in such warrant that they are satisfied that the sickness will produce permanent disability," applies only to the case of sickness of the person removed. The Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. George, Middlesex, 317.

II. Therefore where a man, in consequence of sickness, left his wife and children in the respondent parish, and went into an hospital in another, and his the respondent parish, it was held that wife and children became chargeable to an order for their removal to the parish of his settlement need not state that the justices were satisfied that the sickness would produce permanent disability.

Id.

III. By stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76. s. 79., no pauper shall be removed under any order of removal until twenty-one days after a notice of chargeability, accompanied by a copy of the order and of the examination, shall have been sent "by. post or otherwise," by the overseers of the parish obtaining the order, to the overseers of the parish to whom the order is directed. Held that, admitting that the delivery of those documents in the ordinary manner would be service of an order or process within stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6., the transmission of them by post under sect. 79 of stat. 4 & 5

W. 4. c. 76., where, by the ordinary course of post, they reached on Sunday the hands of the overseers of the parish to whom the order was directed, was not void by stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6. The Queen v. The Inhabitants of Leominster, 391.

IV. An order for the removal of a pauper and his family from the parish of F. to the parish of C. was made on the 18th August, 1860, and notice of chargeability, accompanied by a copy of the order and a statement of the grounds thereof, including the particulars of the settlement relied on, were sent on the 30th August, and a copy of the deposi tions upon which the order was made were delivered on the 19th September. On the 1st of October notice of appeal to the next Quarter Sessions for the county of S. was given. Those Sessions were held for the Eastern division of that county on the 15th October, at A., and for the Western division, within which the respondent parish was situated, on the 18th October, at B. The appellants did not, at any time on or before the day and year last aforesaid, send or deliver to the respondents any statement in writing or otherwise of the grounds of the appeal. By the custom and practice of those Sessions, eight days notice of appeal was required. The appellants applied to the Sessions at B. to receive and enter the appeal, and to respite it to the next Quarter Sessions as matter of right, and without shewing any reason for the delay: held, that they had a right to do so, as they had not been guilty of any laches in giving their notice of appeal: per Crompton and Mellor JJ., dissentiente Blackburn J. The Queen v. The Justices of Sussex, 664.

Suspension of.

Upon an application, under stat. 35 G. 3. c. 101. s. 2., for a warrant of distress to levy the charges incurred by the suspension of an order of removal, the justice cannot inquire into the merits of the order directing payment, but is bound to enforce it by issuing his warrant. And this holds even where, by reason of the amount ordered to be paid

not exceeding 201., there is no appeal against the order. The Queen v. Higginson, &c., 471.

RENT.

See Building Society. Lease. Charge, Tithe. See District Parish.

REPAIR.

See Commissioners of Sewers. Church Rate, I. II.

REPLICATION. See Pleading, I.

RESEALING.

See Summons, Writ of.

REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY. See Authority, Revocation of.

SCOTCH BANKRUPTCY.

I. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 79. s. 47, enacts that a warrant granting protection shall protect the debtor from arrest in Great Britain and Ireland, and Her Majesty's other dominions, for civil debt contracted previous to the sequestration; but such warrant shall not be of any effect against the execution of a warrant of apprehension in meditatione fugæ or ad factum præstandum, or for any criminal act: Held, that the exception extended to like process in England and Ireland and other parts of the Queen's dominions. Dutton v. Halley, 748.

II. The defendant being about to leave this country for New Zealand was arrested on a capias under stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 3. The plaintiff had proved his debt in Scotland; and a warrant of protection had been granted to the defendant for a limited period, which had not elapsed when he was arrested: held, that the defendant was not entitled to be discharged. Id.

III. The plaintiff sued as trustee of the estate and effects of a bankrupt in Scotland, under a sequestration in that country; for money received for the use of the plaintiff as trustee after the bankruptcy, and for interest due from the defendant to the plaintiff as trustee after the bankruptcy. The defendant pleaded that, before he had notice of the bankruptcy, and before the sequestration, he gave credit to the bankrupt by becoming the indorsee and holder bonâ fide, within the meaning of the Scotch law, of a bill of exchange drawn by M. & Co. upon the bankrupt for the sum &c., and accepted by the bankrupt, which bill became payable after the bankruptcy, and “which credit so given was a credit of a nature likely to end in a debt from the bankrupt to the defendant, and the amount of the said acceptance was, at the time of the commencement of this suit, and still is, due to the defendant, and, together with interest thereon, equals the plaintiff's claim: and the bankrupt gave credit to the defendant by consigning goods to him for sale for the said bankrupt, and upon the terms that the proceeds should be remitted and paid to the bankrupt in Scotland: and that the money sought to be recovered by the plaintiff is the proceeds of and money arising from the sale of the said goods under and according to the terms of the said consignment, and which said consignment was of a nature likely to end in a debt from the defendant to the bankrupt: and the defendant says that he is ready and will ing, and hereby offers, to set off the amount so due to him, the defendant, as indorsee and holder of the said bill of ex

change as aforesaid, against the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the matter herein pleaded to, and that, by the law of Scotland, he is entitled so to do, and such set-off forms an answer to the plaintiff's claim :" held, that the plea was good. MacFarlane v. Norris, 783.

SERVANT.

See Master and Servant.

SERVICE OF PROCESS. See Removal, Order of, III.

Of Frauds.

STATUTE.

I. A., at the request of B., entered into recognizances for the appearance of B.'s daughter at the Central Criminal Court, to which she had been committed

SUNDAY.

meanor ; and B., in consideration thereof, agreed to indemnify A. against all liability, and from all costs, damages and expences in respect to the same. B.'s daughter not having appeared according to the recognizances, they were estreated, whereby A. was obliged to pay the amount, and incurred other expences: held, that this was a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of another person, within the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2. c. 3. s. 4., and, as such, could not be sued on without an agreement or memorandum or note in writing. Cripps v. Hartnoll,

697.

II. Quare, whether, in order to bring a case within sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2. c. 3., the debt or default must be towards the promisee? Id.

Of Limitations.

The last day for resealing a writ of summons, so as to save the Statute of

Limitations, expired on Saturday the 28th December, within the Christmas holidays. A party who attended at the office on that day for the purpose found it shut, and the officer having refused to reseal the writ on the following Monday, the 30th, the Court refused to order him to do it afterwards, nunc pro tunc. Evans v. Jones, 45.

Of Mortmain. See Devise.

SUMMONS, WRIT OF.

The last day for resealing a writ of summons, so as to save the Statute of Limitations, expired on Saturday the 28th December, within the Christmas holidays. A party who attended at the office on that day for the purpose found it shut, and the officer having refused to reseal the writ on the following Monday, the 30th, the Court refused to order him to do it afterwards, nunc pro nunc. Evans v. Jones, 45.

Company, II.

SUPERINTENDENT RE-
GISTRAR.

I. Under stat. 6 & 7 W. 4. c. 86. s. 7. the clerk to the board of guardians of a union created under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76. has no right to be Superintendent Registrar except in the case of the first appointment after stat. 6 & 7 W. 4. c. 86. coming into operation; and on any subsequent vacancy the power of appointment is in the board of guardians. The Queen v. Acason, 795.

II. W. A., who was clerk to the board of guardians of a union, created under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76., and was also Superintendent Registrar appointed by the Registrar General, under stat. 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 22., died on January 4th, 1861. On the 17th January, the defendant was appointed Superintendent On the 14th February, the relator was Registrar by the board of guardians. dians. Upon information in the nature appointed clerk to the board of guarof quo warranto, Held, that the defendant was duly appointed Superintendent Registrar. Id.

TENANCY AT WILL. See Building Society.

TICKET.

See Railway Company.

TIME FOR APPEALING.

See Quarter Sessions, Appeal at, I.

TITHE RENT CHARGE.

See District Parish.

TITLE DEEDS.

See Detinue.

TOTAL LOSS.

See Marine Insurance.

TRAMWAYS.

See Highway, Nuisance to, I.

TRUCK ACT.

The defendants, master manufacturers, employed the plaintiff, an artificer, without any agreement in writing, to make stocking heels at 7d. a dozen. The plaintiff was to find the labour, and to work on the defendants' premises, using their frame. The settlements were weekly. The amount due for the plaintiff's work was first ascertained; then from the sum coming to him were deducted the following charges: (1.) Frame rent, for the use of the frame with which he worked, at 1s. 9d. per week. (2.) Machine rent, at 4d. per week. (3.) For standing room in the defendants' factory, at 3d. per week. (4.) Winding the yarn, at 1d. per week. (5.) Fines for irregular attendance, at 44d. a quarter of a day for time of absence. (6.) Gas for lighting the defendants' factory, at 4d. per week. (7.) Fire for heating the defendants' factory. The amount of work performed by the plaintiff during the time he was in the defendants' employ varied from time to time according to the state of trade, the plaintiff being sometimes employed for a greater and sometimes for a smaller number of hours in the day; but the charges, with the exception of the fines, were fixed and uniform, and were made whatever the amount of earnings. In an action to

wages otherwise than in the current coin of the realm, within sect. 1 of the Truck Act, 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 37., and was therefore legal. Archer v. James, 61.

TRUST ESTATE.

See Devise.

UMPIRE.

See Public Health Act, I.

UNREASONABLE.

Condition. See Railway Company, I.

Delay. See Railway Company, II.

VARIANCE.

An information under the 4 G. 4. c. 34. s. 3. described the defendant as having contracted to serve "T. B. and his partners." At the hearing it appeared that the contract of service was between the defendant and "T. B., on behalf of himself and his partners, constituting The R. M. & H. Coal Company (Limited): " held that this variance, if it were one, was cured by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. s. I. Whittle, appellant, Frankland, respondent, 49.

defendants pleaded Never indebted, and a set-off, consisting of the above charges. Held, per Pollock C. B., Bramwell® B. and Byles J. (affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, which was founded upon the authority of Chawner v. Cummings, 8 Q. B. 311), Williams, Willes and Keating JJ. dissentientibus, that a contract to pay the plaintiff's wages, subject to the above deductions, was not a contract to pay part of such

Slander.

WAREHOUSE.

See Gunpowder.

WARRANT

See Arrest.