Exchequer Chamber), that this was not a prior use of the invention which invalidated the patent. Harwood v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 194.

PAUPER LUNATIC.

I. A justice of a borough not having a quarter sessions has no jurisdiction, under sect. 67 of stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 97., to send a pauper lunatic to an asylum; and this by reason of the meaning assigned to the word "borough" by the interpretation clause, sect. 132. Churchwardens of Faversham, appellants, Guardians of Isle of Thanet Union, respondents, 275.

II. The jurisdiction of justices under sect. 97 of that Act to adjudge the settlement of a pauper lunatic and make an order for his maintenance, attaches where he is de facto confined in an asylum; and their order is not invalidated by the fact that he was sent there by a justice who had no jurisdiction: (per Wightman and Mellor JJ.: Crompton J. dissentiente.) Id.

III. In 1854, a pauper lunatic was sent to an asylum at the charge of the parish of C, in which she had acquired the status of irremovability: her maintenance was charged to C., and allowed in the half yearly audits until Michaelmas, 1860, when the overseer of C. objected that they ought to be charged to the common fund of the Union to which C. belonged. The auditor disallowed the costs for the six months ending Michaelmas, 1860, against the parish, and transferred them to the common Union fund account, but refused to reopen the accounts previously audited. On motion to vary the allowance, brought up by certiorari under stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c 101. s. 35., by crediting the parish of C. with the sums paid in previous years and debiting the common fund of the Union with those sums: held, that the auditor did right in not reopening the accounts previously audited.

The Queen v. The Inhabitants of Chiddingstone, 294.

PILOT.

See Negligence.

PLEADING.

I. Declaration stated that the defendants wrongfully raised an embankment near the plaintiff's house, and wrongfully continued the same, by reason whereof large quantities of water flowed against and into the house: with an averment of special damage. Plea, that the embankment was raised and continued by

the defendants under certain Acts of

Parliament. Replication: that, although

the embankment was raised and con

tinued under the Acts of Parliament, the flowing of the water against and into the plaintiff's house was occasioned by the wrongful construction and negligent and improper raising of the embankment, and the want of proper and sufficient drains to the same, and the continuing the embankment so wrongfully constructed and insufficiently drained. On demurrer, held:

1. That a departure in pleading was ground of general demurrer.

2. That the replication was not a departure from the declaration; by Crompton and Blackburn JJ., Cockburn C. J. Brine v. The Great not assenting. Western Railway Company, 402.

II. A declaration for breach of a cove

nant or contract for quiet enjoyment must allege an eviction by a person claiming title paramount. Hall v. The City of London Brewery Company, Limited, 737.

POLICE CONSTABLE. See Arrest.

POOR LAW AUDIT.

In 1854, a pauper lunatic was sent to an asylum at the charge of the parish of C., in which she had acquired the status charged to C., and allowed in the half of irremovability: her maintenance was when the overseer of C. objected that yearly audits until Michaelmas, 1860, they ought to be charged to the common fund of the Union to which C. belonged. The auditor disallowed the costs for the six months ending Michaelmas, 1860, against the parish, and transferred them

to the common Union fund account, but refused to reopen the accounts previously audited. On motion to vary the allowance, brought up by certiorari under stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. s. 35., by crediting the parish of C. with the sums paid in previous years and debiting the common fund of the Union with those sums: held, that the auditor did right in not reopening the accounts previously audited. The Queen v. The Inhabitants of Chiddingstone, 294.

POOR RATE.

See Rate, Poor.

POST, SERVICE BY. See Process, Service of.

PRESENTMENT.

See Commissioners of Sewers.

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST.
See Arrest, Privilege from.
PROCESS, SERVICE OF.

By stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76. s. 79., no pauper shall be removed under any order of removal until twenty-one days after a notice of chargeability, accompanied by a copy of the order and of the examination, shall have been sent "by post or otherwise," by the overseers of the parish obtaining the order, to the overseers of the parish to whom the order is directed. Held that, admitting that the delivery of those documents in the ordinary manner would be service of an order or process within stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6., the transmission of them by post under sect. 79 of stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76., where, by the ordinary course of post, they reached on Sunday the hands of the overseers of the parish to whom the order was directed, was not void by stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6. The Queen v. The Inhabitants of Leominster, 391.

PROHIBITION. See Rate, Church, II.

PROSTITUTES.

Prostitutes, as such, are "persons of notoriously bad character" within the meaning of a licence to sell exciseable liquors. Parker v. Green, 299.

PUBLIC NUISANCE.

See Highway, Nuisance to.

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT.

I. Arbitrators under the Public Health Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63., before they entered on the reference, but after the twenty-one days within which, by sect. 125, they ought to make their award, appointed an umpire. By sect. 127, the costs are in the discretion of the umpire, and the submission may be made a rule of Court. The umpire awarded the amount of compensation to be made to the plaintiff, and that the costs of the reference should be paid by the Local Board of Health. Held,

1. That the appointment of the umpire was not too late.

2. Per Cockburn C. J., Blackburn and Mellor JJ., Crompton J. dissentiente, that an action could not be brought for the costs until they had been taxed. Holdsworth v. Barsham, &c., 480.

II. A Local Board of Health for a non-corporate district, acting under The Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63.), gave notice to the owners of the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on certain streets, requiring them to "sewer, level, pave, flag, and channel" the same, according to the provisions of sect 69 of that Act; which notices not being complied with within the specified time, the Board entered into contracts with a third person for the performance thereof; which contained provisions that the contractor was to be paid for the work when the money was collected from the owners of the adjacent properties: the work was done accordingly, but the owners having refused payment, the justices of the peace before whom they were summoned for non-payment dismissed the summonses: Held, on a case in which

QUARTER SESSIONS.

the Court was empowered to draw inferences of fact, that the contractor was entitled to sue the Board of Health for the work done by him under the contracts. Worthington v. Sudlow, &c., 508.

QUARTER SESSIONS.

Appeal at.

I. An order for the removal of a

pauper and his family from the parish of F. to the parish of C. was made on the 18th August, 1860, and notice of chargeability, accompanied by a copy of the order and a statement of the grounds thereof, including the particulars of the settlement relied on, were sent on the 30th August, and a copy of the depositions upon which the order was made were delivered on the 19th September. On the 1st of October notice of appeal to the next Quarter Sessions for the county of S. was given. Those Sessions were held for the Eastern division of that county on the 15th October at A., and for the Western division, within which the respondent parish was situated, on the 18th October at B. The appellants did not at any time, on or before the day and year last aforesaid, send or deliver to the respondents any

QUIET ENJOYMENT. 889

under stat. 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 50. s. 90., by which the Quarter Sessions are authorized and required to award to the party giving or receiving notice of appeal such costs and expences as shall be incurred in prosecuting or resisting such appeal, whether the same shall be tried or not: Held, that the Quarter Sessions were bound to make an order for the costs. The Queen v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, &c., 811. Costs at. See Appeal at, II.

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

I. In a contract for the demise of

land, a promise of quiet enjoyment during the term is implied by law. Hall v. The City of London Brewery Company, Limited, 737.

II. A declaration for breach of a covenant or contract for quiet enjoyment must allege an eviction by a person claiming title paramount. Id.

QUO WARRANTO.

See Costs, V. VI.

grounds of the appeal. By the custom and practice of those Sessions, eight days notice of appeal was required. The appellants applied to the Sessions at B. to receive and enter the appeal, and to respite it to the next Quarter Sessions as matter of right, and without shewing any reason for the delay: held, that they had a right to do so, as they had not been guilty of any laches in giving their notice of appeal: per Crompton and Mellor JJ., dissentiente Blackburn J. The Queen v. The Justices of Sussex, 664.

II. After notice and grounds of appeal against a certificate of justices for the diversion of a highway, the person at whose instance the certificate was given gave notice that he abandoned further proceedings, and should not apply to the Quarter Sessions for the enrolment of the certificate. The appeal was entered, and, being called on and no one appearing, was struck out. Afterwards on the same day the appellant applied for costs

VOL. II.

3 M

ACT.

See Railway Company, I.

RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. A passenger by railway from L. to W., took with him two horses and a retriever dog; the horses were put into a horse-box, and a servant of the defendants proposed that the dog should be placed in the horse-box, to which the plaintiff assented. The dog was fastened in the horse-box by means of a leather collar round its neck, and a strap thereto, which passed through a ring fixed to the side of the horse-box; the collar and strap were furnished by the plaintiff, and were his property. The plaintiff's agent signed a ticket, subject to the following conditions: Company will not be liable in any case for loss or damage to any horse or other animal above the value of 40l., B. & S.

"The

or any dog above the value of 57., unless a declaration of its value, signed by the owner or his agent at the time of booking the same, has been given to them, and by such declaration the owner shall be bound, the Company not being in any event liable to any greater amount than the value so declared. The Company will in no case be liable for injury to any horse or other animal or dog, of whatever value, when such injury arises wholly or partially from fear or restiveness. If the declared value of any horse or other animal exceed 401., or any dog 5l., the price of conveyance will, in addition to the regular fare, be after the rate of 24 per cent., or 6d. in the pound, upon the declared value above 401. or [51], whatever may be the amount of such value, and for whatever distance the horse or other animal is to be carried." The plaintiff made no declaration of the value of the dog, and paid 3s. for the carriage of it. On the arrival of the train at W. a window in the horse-box was found open, through which the dog had escaped, and was lost. The Court having power to draw inferences of fact, 1. Held by this Court, and affirmed by the Exchequer Chamber, that the loss of the dog was not occasioned by neglect or default of the plaintiff, or of the defendants.

2. Held, per Cockburn C. J. and Black burn J., that a dog is one of the animals to which the proviso in sect. 7 of The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31., relates; and, per Wightman J., and the Exchequer Chamber, that the defendants had made themselves liable as common carriers for carrying the dog.

3. Held, per Cockburn C. J. and Blackburn J., that the conditions in the ticket were not just and reasonable within that section, in two respects: first, because the meaning of the ticket was, that if the value of the dog exceeded 57., and its value was not declared, the Company would not be liable for loss or damage occasioned by their own negligence: secondly, because, in the absence of evidence by the Company shewing the contrary, the extra charge of 24 per cent. was excessive; and therefore, the conditions being void,

the Company were liable, as common carriers, for the full value of the dog. But, per Wightman J., the meaning of the ticket was that the Company would not in any case be liable for loss or damage beyond 51. unless the value was declared, and that this was a reasonable condition; and that the Court had no means of ascertaining whether the extra charge of 2 per cent. was reasonable or not, and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover more than 51.

4. Held by the Exchequer Chamber, Erle C. J., Williams and Keating JJ., and Channell B., reversing the judgment of the Queen's Bench Wilde B. dissentiente), that, assuming sect. 7 applied to the case, the conditions in the ticket were just and reasonable within that section; because the effect of the first condition was not to exempt the defendants from liability for loss or injury occasioned by wilful wrong; and if it exempted them from responsibility for any negligence it was severable, and valid to exempt when there was no negligence; and it lay upon the plaintiff to shew that the extra charge in the third condition was exorbitant or unfair, and the question whether it was so was for a jury, and not for the Court.

5. Held, by Erle C. J. and Keating J., that sect. 7 was confined to cases in which the loss or injury was occasioned by misconduct on the part of the Company, and did not apply where it occurred through pure accident. Harrison v. The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company, 122.

II. The plaintiff, arriving in London by the defendants' railway on Saturday evening, left a portmanteau at the luggage and cloak office on the up platform of the Paddington Station, and on paying 2d. received a ticket acknowledging the receipt with printed conditions, among which was a notice that the Company would not "deliver up lug. gage except to persons producing the proper receipt." On Sunday evening, intending to leave London by another railway, he came to the Paddington Station for his portmanteau, and found the office shut. After some time he was told by a porter that the superintendent was on the other side; whereupon he