1862. ARCHER JAMES. to before the 23d section, hereafter to be considered. Then, are these deductions in the nature of payment at all? It seems to us to be the mode of calculating the amount of wages, and nothing more." Now, if it be true that the prohibitory part of the statute does not contemplate stoppages or deductions, it is extremely difficult to see why the Legislature should have enacted the 23d and 24th sections at all-why, if it did not prohibit any stoppages, it should yet legalise some. But surely it is scarcely correct to say that the earlier sections do not mention or allude to stoppages or deductions, when the 3rd section expressly refers to, and in effect incorporates, the exceptions afterwards found in the 23d and 24th, the words of sect. 3 being, "and every payment made to any such artificer by his employer, of or in respect of any such wages, by the delivering to him of goods, or otherwise than in the current coin aforesaid, except as hereinafter mentioned, shall be and is hereby declared illegal, null, and void." And it would have been strange, indeed, if it were otherwise, for the truck system, against which the statute was confessedly levelled, was itself a system of stoppage or deduction. Deduct so much for supplies and pay the balance in cash, constituted the evil the statute was passed to remedy; nor is it easy to perceive how there could be a part payment in goods, or otherwise than in the current coin, without a stoppage or deduction. That the deductions legalised by sects. 23 and 24 are exceptions upon sects. 2, 3 and 4, and not exclusively upon sects. 5 and 6, appears to me to be clear, inasmuch as the prohibitions contained in the latter sections are confined to the set-off and sale of "goods, wares, and merchandise" only; whereas the deductions legalised by sects. 23 and 24 extend to medical attendance, rent, and the costs of educating the artificer's children. I quite agree that what is called "frame rent" in this case is not "rent" within the meaning of sect. 23; but that a deduction in respect of such, if it were "rent," could be made without a contract in writing, which was also laid down in the judgment in Chawner v. Cummings (a), appears to me not to be in accordance with the clear words of the statute. The only case cited in the argument before us, as having been decided upon this subject since Chawner v. Cummings, was that of Bowers v. Lovekin (b). There it was conceded that the deductions were illegal, although some of them were not clearly within the 23rd section; but that case being one of deductions from the wages of a miner, where there was no contract in writing, the question involved in the present case was not discussed, the only contest being whether the collier in that case was an artificer within the Act. But although not, perhaps, an authority upon the point now in question, the case strongly illustrates the anomaly consequent upon the judgment in Chawner v. Cummings (a), namely, that whilst stoppages within the 23rd section are illegal if not made in pursuance of a written contract signed by the workman, all other stoppages are legal without any such formality. The price of implements supplied to a miner to be used in his trade can only be deducted when that price represents their true value, and the contract is in writing; but it would appear from that judgment that the price of the use of implements supplied to a stocking knitter to be used in his trade, as well as gas-light, fire, 1862. ARCHER V. JAMES. 1862. ARCHER v. JAMES. &c., may be deducted without either of those conditions being complied with. It is true, the learned counsel for the defendants did not put the case of his clients altogether upon the ground taken in the judgment in Chawner v. Cummings (a). He relied not so much upon the argument, that if these charges were stoppages or deductions they were legal, not being in the nature of payments, as that they were not really deductions from wages at all; in other words, that the defence to the action was under the general issue, rather than under the plea of set-off. But surely it cannot be contended, in any view, that the stoppage in respect of fines can be made available otherwise than as a set-off; and if that be so, by what reasonable construction of the contract can the deduction for fines be placed upon a different footing from the other deductions? It appears to me that the contract is clearly one for stoppage or deduction from wages-a "contrivance" (to use the words of the 25th section of the Act) by means of which the master makes the interest of his capital a first charge upon the labour of his workman, instead of obtaining it from the consumer in the price of the article when sold, as in the case of a net cash payment of wages; and this, together with the additional control which the master obtains, by such an arrangement, over the earnings of the workman, may probably furnish the answer to a question put during the argument, namely, if 2d. per dozen fairly represents the value of the deductions (and the case does not find otherwise), why do not the defendants pay 5d. per dozen net like other masters? Our attention has been called to the consequences that may result from our decision in favour of the plaintiff in (a) 8 Q. B. 311. this case. In my opinion the plaintiff is, in point of law, entitled to the judgment of the Court. I have to state that my Brothers Williams and Willes concur in this judgment. BYLES J. (1.) 1s. 9d. per week for the use of the frame. (4.) 1s. per week for winding the yarn. (5.) Fines at the rate of 41d. per quarter of a day for absence. (6.) A charge for gas. (7.) A deduction for firing. The artificer was sometimes employed, and sometimes not; but the charges, with the exception of the fines, were fixed and uniform, and made against him whatever the amount of his earnings: so that the fixed charges might equal or exceed the amount to be received by the artificer for making stocking heels. When he came for his wages he might have to pay, instead of to receive. VOL. II. G B. & B 1862. ARCHER v. JAMES. 1862. ARCHER V. JAMES. It was alleged by the artificer that such a contract, and all settlements of account under it, are void and illegal by the provisions of the Truck Act, 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 37. Whether they are so invalidated or not is the question before us. An inquiry into the policy of the Act, for the purpose of forming or expressing an opinion whether that policy be right or wrong, is no part of our duty; but such an inquiry for the purpose of rightly interpreting the Act and giving full effect to the true intention of the Legislature, is legitimate and material. The old truck enactments are very numerous, and date from about the year 1464 (4 Edw. 4.). They were applied first to one branch of manufacture, and then in succession to others, as experience and the progress of manufactures dictated, till they embraced the whole, or nearly the whole, of the manufactures of England. They established the obligation, and produced, or at least fortified the custom, of uniformly paying the whole wages of artificers in the current coin of the realm. They were finally collected and consolidated into one Act by the statute now under consideration, 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 37. They were, in truth, part of a system of legislation regulating the relation of master and workman, this part of it being in favour of the workman, who, as an individual, was deemed weaker than his master, and therefore liable to oppression. On the other hand existed regulations in favour of the master, and against the workmen collectively, who in the aggregate and acting in combination were deemed stronger than their masters, and likely to oppress, not only their employers, but individuals of their own body. These were the laws against combinations and strikes. The laws against combinations have been swept away, except in certain aggravated |