had the possession, or damages for withholding it. As the I therefore think that the plea is bad, and does not answer the declaration, and that our judgment should be for the plaintiff. BLACKBURN J. In this case there was a count in detinue for the plaintiff's title deeds in the usual form. To this the defendant pleads, that the title deeds were deposited with him by one Goodman, since deceased; and that the plaintiff's right to the deeds is as devisee of Goodman, and not otherwise; that the defendant lost the deeds in the lifetime of Goodman, and has never had possession of them since his death. To this there is a demurrer. The authorities, from those to be found in Brooke's Abridgment tit. Detinue, down to Reeve v. Palmer (a), agree that where the defendant in detinue had at one time possession of the plaintiff's goods, under such circumstances that he was bound to return them on demand, he cannot defend an action of detinue by pleading that in consequence of something amounting to a default on his part, as between him and the plaintiff, he, the defendant, has no longer possession of the goods, and, consequently, cannot comply with the demand; and, therefore, as the plea in the present case does not allege that the goods were lost without any default on the defendant's part, it would be bad if it appeared that the defendant ever had the plaintiff's goods. But the plea does not admit this: it shews that the defendant had those deeds before they became the plaintiff's, and that he lost them at a time when the plaintiff had nothing in them; and, as it seems to me, he had no need to excuse that loss as against the plaintiff, inasmuch as the plaintiff was not then injured by the loss of what were not then his goods. It is true that the plaintiff has since then acquired by the devise the property in those deeds, just as he might have acquired property in any other goods by purchase; and I agree that he has a right to maintain an action for any wrong to him, as owner of those deeds, committed subsequently to the time when they became his; but, as a general rule, causes of action already accrued do not run with the property in goods or deeds. This plaintiff could maintain no action of trover or trespass for any act done to the deeds before they were his, nor could he maintain (a) 5 Com, B. N. S. 84. 1862. GOODMAN V. BOYCOTT. 1862. GOODMAN V. BOYCOTT. in his own name any action on the contract of bailment for the loss admitted by the demurrer to have taken place before the plaintiff had any property in them. I quite agree that, having acquired the property in those deeds, he may maintain trover, trespass or detinue for anything done to them subsequently to his acquiring that property. But I think, on this record, we cannot suppose that the defendant has had any control over the deeds subsequent to the time when the plaintiff acquired the property, that is, after the death of Goodman. I think the general rule is, that no right of action already accrued is transferred with the property in chattels. No case has been cited, nor have I been able to find one, for saying that the action of detinue is an exception from this general rule. It follows from this that no action for detinue can, in my opinion, be maintained, though an action by the executors on the contract of bailment would lie: whether, in that action, the damages would be substantial or not I need not now determine. In my opinion, therefore, the judgment ought to be for the defendant. I need not say that I express my opinion with diffidence, as it unfortunately does not agree with that of my brother Wightman. Still I think myself bound to express it. The Court having consisted of only two Judges, and being equally divided in opinion, I shall withdraw my opinion, so that the judgment will be entered, in conformity with the opinion of the senior Judge, for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. 1862. SCOTT and others against PILKINGTON and another. Tuesday, January 28th MUNROE and others against PILKINGTON and Action on another. 1. In an action on a contract where the question at issue has no relation to the manner of performing the contract, or to the consequences of non-performance, and relates entirely to the effect of the transaction at the place where it was entered into, the liability of the defendant must be determined by the lex loci contractus. 2. Where an action is brought on a judgment obtained in a foreign Court, the pendency of an appeal in the foreign Court against that judgment is no bar to the action; although it may afford ground for the equitable interposition of the English Court in which the action is brought to prevent the possible abuse of its process, and on proper terms to stay execution. 3. Concessum, that the judgment of a foreign Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter cannot be questioned here, on the ground that the foreign Court has mistaken the law of its own country, or has come, on the evidence, to an erroneous conclusion as to the facts. 4. In an action on a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant in the Supreme Court of New York, the defendant pleaded that the judgment was erroneous according to the law of New York, and was liable to be reversed, and that he was prosecuting proceedings in appeal, which were then pending; and he set out the record of the proceedings in the original suit there, by which it appeared that the cause had been referred by order of the Court, not to a private arbitrator selected by the parties, but to an officer of the Court directed to ascertain the facts, who found certain facts, with a certain conclusion of law from them, and judgment was given accordingly in favour of the plaintiff; although the same conclusion would not have followed by the English law had the same facts been found to have occurred here: held, that the plea was no answer to the action. IN the first of these actions the plaintiffs were W. B. Scott, R. H. Thorn and R. C. W. Moore, and the defendants were John Pilkington and Daniel Pilkington. Declaration. For that the plaintiffs heretofore, to wit, in and by the Supreme Court of the city and county of New York, in the United States of America, by the consideration and judgment of the same Court, recovered against the defendants the sum of foreign judg ment. Mistake of law. Appeal. .1862. SCOTT v. PILKINGTON. 18,067 dollars and 97 cents, together with 565 dollars and 40 cents costs and disbursements, amounting in all to the sum of 18,633 dollars and 37 cents, which said judgment still remains in full force and effect, and not in anywise satisfied, reversed, or annulled; and the plaintiffs say that no execution hath as yet been obtained of or upon the said judgment, and that the said sum of 18,633 dollars and 37 cents is still wholly unpaid, and is of great value, to wit of the value of £3864. Os. 11d. ; whereby an action hath accrued to the plaintiffs to demand and have of the defendants the said sum of 38647. Os. 11d.; yet the defendants have not paid the same, or any part thereof: and the plaintiff's claim 50007. Plea. The defendants say that the following is the record of the proceedings in the said action in the Supreme Court of the city and county of New York, in which the said judgment was obtained, and of the said judgment contained in the judgment roll now remaining among the records of the said court. "New York Supreme Court. "William B. Scott, Robert H. Thorn and Richard C. W. Moore against John Pilkington and Daniel "Summons for money demand on contract, com. for ser. "You are hereby summoned and required to answer the complaint in this action, which will be filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York, at the City Hall, in the city of New York, and to serve a copy of your answer to the said complaint on the subscribers, at their office, No. 56, Wall Street, in the city of New York, within 20 days after the service of |