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ited to the purpose for which it is adopted. The following cases are of similar effect: Riley v. Brooklyn, 46 N. Y. 444; Hopkins v. Rogers, 11 Tenn. 457.

There is nothing in the cases referred to in the prevailing opinion upon this subject. In all of those cases it was assumed without argument that the matter contained in the specifications, whether referring to the manner of doing the work, or to the materials therefor, or not, were a part of the proceedings or contracts in the particular case. It does not appear that the proposition that the references did not include the specifications for the purposes of incorporating the foreign clauses in the contract or proceeding was brought to the attention of the court. The clauses quoted in the prevailing opinion constitute no part of the contract entered into by the contractor, nor of the proceeding upon which it was based. They did not refer in any respect to the manner of doing the work. the plan by which it was to be constructed, or the quality or character of the materials. It cannot be presumed that they would have any effect whatever upon the various bidders who may have intended to bid upon the work. These clauses are not in fact incorporated, either in the proceedings referred to or in the contract. They could only become a part thereof by reason of the reference, and as the reference was not made for that purpose, but solely to describe the work and materials they were entirely foreign to the case, and could have no effect upon the validity of the assessment.

I concur: LORIGAN, J.

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In an action to foreclose a mortgage securing a note, the testimony that there was no consideration for the note was not contradicted, but it had in itself inherent elements of improbability. Held, that in view of a presumption of consideration arising from the note and mortgage, which under Code Civ. Proc. § 2061, subd. 2, is evidence, there was a conflict in the evidence on the issue of consideration sufficient to support a finding of consideration.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 7, Bills and Notes, §§ 1816, 1819.]

3. MORTGAGES-EXTENSION OF TIME OF PAY

MENT.

An instrument reciting that a debtor is desirous of extending the loan, and declaring that a mortgage, together with the note and debt secured thereby, is renewed for a specified period, and signed by the debtor, is a renewal of the note and mortgage, within Civ. Code, § 2922, providing that a mortgage can be renewed only by writing, etc.

4. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT-SUFFICIENCY.

An instrument reciting that a debtor is desirous to extend a mortgage, and that it is renewed for a specified time, signed by the debtor, is an acknowledgment of the debt, and operates to start a new period of limitation, within Code Civ. Proc. § 360, providing that no acknowledgment is sufficient evidence of a new contract, unless the same is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 33. Limitation of Actions, § 601.]

5. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - AUTHORITY OF AGENT POWER OF ATTORNEY - CONSTRUCTION.

A power of attorney, authorizing the grantee therein to prosecute every kind of business and for and in the name of the grantor execute and deliver agreements, mortgages, notes, etc.. empowers the grantee to execute for the grantor an instrument renewing a mortgage executed by the grantor and the note thereby secured.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 40, Principal and Agent, § 364.] 6. SAME.

A payee of a note secured by a mortgage may, after the transfer of the note and mortgage, act as an agent of the maker to renew the note and mortgage, since, under Civ. Code § 3116, the maker is bound to pay the debt, and the payee is liable only to the subsequent holder. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 40, Principal and Agent, § 465.]

7. SAME-ACT OF AGENT LIABILITY OF PRIN

CIPAL.

A payee of a note secured by a mortgage transferred the note and mortgage. The maker subsequently executed a power of attorney authorizing the payee to renew the mortgage. The payee executed in the name of the maker an instrument renewing the mortgage for a specified period. Held, that the renewal of the mortgage was binding on the maker only, under Civ. Code, 2343, holding an agent liable only when he enters into a contract in the name of his principal without having authority so to do, etc. 8. MORTGAGES FORECLOSURE EVIDENCEPRESUMPTIONS.

Under Code Civ. Proc. § 1962, subd. 2, providing that facts recited in an instrument shall be conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties, a recital in a mortgage is conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 35, Mortgages, § 211; vol. 16, Deeds, § 256; vol. 19, Estoppel, $8 41-45.]

9. MORTGAGES-CONSTRUCTION-TIME OF PAY

MENT.

A payee of a note secured by a mortgage transferred the note and mortgage, and thereafter executed to the transferee a mortgage, which set out the note and recited that the payment thereof had been extended, and which stated that the payee promised to pay the note according to the terms and conditions thereof. Ield, that the mortgage executed by the payee contained a promise by the payee to pay the note as extended, and an action commenced within four years thereafter was not barred, under Code Civ. Proc. § 337, limiting actions on obligations founded on instruments in writing to four years.

10. SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-CROSS-DEMANDS-AVAILABILITY-SECURED CLAIMS.

In a suit under Code Civ. Proc. § 726, to foreclose a mortgage, a claim for services and for goods solds is not available as a cross-demand under section 440, providing that, when crossdemands have existed between persons under such circumstances that if one had brought an action against the other a counterclaim could

have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Set-Off and Counterclaim, § 70.] 11. SAME-DEMANDS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS.

Under Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. 2, providing that in an action on contract any other cause of action arising on contract and existing at the commencement of the action may be set up as a counterclaim, a demand barred by limitations is not available as a counterclaim.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Set-Off and Counterclaim, § 41.] 12. SAME.

Under Code Civ. Proc. § 438, subd. 2, providing that in an action on contract any other cause of action arising on contract and existing at the commencement of the action may be set up as a counterclaim, and section 1500, providing that no holder of a claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless the claim is presented to the executor or administrator, a demand against an estate of a decedent not presented to his representative is not available as a counterclaim in an action by the representative.

13. PLEADING DEMURRABLE PLEADING STRIKING OUT.

Where a demurrer to pleadings should have been interposed and sustained, there was no prejudicial error in striking out the pleadings, or in refusing to receive evidence in support of their allegations.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 4110.]

Beatty, C. J., and Lorigan, J., dissenting in part.

In Bank. Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Frank F. Oster, Judge. Action by Rebecca W. Moore against Will D. Gould and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

James H. Blanchard, William E. Cox, and Will D. Gould, for appellants. Miller & Page, for respondent.

SLOSS, J. This is an action on two promissory notes, secured by two mortgages of real estate and by a pledge of stock of a corporation. Plaintiff had judgment of foreclosure, and the defendants, Will D. Gould, Mary L. Gould, Samuel Peterson, and James H. Blanchard, appeal from the judgment and from an order denying their motion for a new trial.

On July 18, 1892, the defendant Peterson executed to the defendant Will D. Gould a note for $700, payable on or before one year after date, and at the same time executed and delivered to said Gould a mortgage of certain real property in the county of Los Angeles to secure the said note. On the 28th day of September, 1892, Will D. Gould assigned and transferred the said note and mortgage to plaintiff, and at the same time indorsed the note to the order of plaintiff. On June 28, 1897, the defendants Will D. Gould and Mary L. Gould, his wife, made, executed, and delivered to the order of P. R. Moore, the husband of plaintiff, a promissory note in the sum of $550, payable on or before July 18, 1899. Together with their note, they executed and delivered to said P.

R. Moore and to plaintiff, as mortgagees, a mortgage of certain real property in Los Angeles county, which mortgage stated that it was made as security for the payment of the Peterson note of $700, as well as the $550 note. In said mortgage the mortgagors furthermore promised to pay the $700 note according to the terms and conditions thereof. The mortgagee P. R. Moore died, and the $550 note and the mortgage executed contemporaneously with it passed to the plaintiff by virtue of the decree of distribution in his estate. Other facts will be stated in connection with the various points made by appellants.

1. The answers of the appellants allege that there was no consideration for the second note and mortgage, and that said note and mortgage had been executed upon the agreement with the mortgagee P. R. Moore that the sum of $550 should be applied and credited as a partial payment on the $700 note and mortgage. The court found against these allegations. The defendants Will D. Gould and Mary L. Gould gave testimony that there had been an agreement, as averred in the answers, between them and P. R. Moore. This testimony was not directly denied, as, indeed, it could not be; the other active party to the transaction, P. R. Moore, being dead. But the claim of these defendants had in itself inherent elements of improbability. The theory that the second note and mortgage were given to reduce the amount due upon the first note is not readily reconcilable with the form of the mortgage itself, which declares that it is given to secure both notes, and that the mortgagors undertake to pay both. As to the plea of want of consideration, a presumption of consideration arises from the writing itself. Such presumption is itself evidence. Code Civ. Proc. § 2061, subd. 2. There is thus raised a conflict, which is sufficient to support the finding of the court. People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 54 Pac. 833; Sarraille v. Calmon, 142 Cal. 651, 76 Pac. 497; Adams v. Hopkins, 144 Cal. 19, 36, 77 Pac. 712.

2. The statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc. 337) is set up as a defense to both notes. The finding of the court is against this plea. The $550 note was payable July 18, 1899. The complaint was filed February 27, 1903, less than four years after the maturity of the note. As to this note, therefore, it is plain that the bar of the statute had not attached. As to the $700 note, which by its terms fell due July 18, 1893, the complaint alleges, and the court found, that on the 28th day of June, 1897, the defendant Peterson and the defendant Will D. Gould in writing extended the time of maturity and payment until the 28th day of June, 1899, and that on the 25th day of May, 1900, the said defendants similarly extended the time of payment of said note until the 18th day of July, 1902. It appears that on July 18, 1892, the defendant Peterson had executed a power

of attorney to Will D. Gould.

1897, Gould, acting as attorney in fact of Peterson, executed an instrument in writing reading as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that Samuel Peterson, being desirous of extending the loan and in consideration of the same being extended, does hereby certify and declare that a certain mortgage, together with the promissory note and debt secured thereby, bearing date the 18th day of July, 1892 (describing the mortgage first set out in the complaint), is hereby renewed and extended for the further term of two (2) years from this date, provided that this agreement shall not affect or impair any other covenant or condition in said promissory note or mortgage contained, but that they shall remain in as full force and effect as if this agreement had not been made. In witness whereof, the said Samuel Peterson, by Will D. Gould, his attorney in fact, has hereunto set his hand and seal this 28th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven. Samuel Peterson [Seal], by Will D. Gould, His Attorney in Fact." On May 25, 1900, Gould, as attorney in fact, executed a similar instrument purporting to renew and extend the note and mortgage to the 18th day of July, 1902.

On June 23,
On June 23, | receipts, evidences of debt, releases and satis-
faction of mortgage, judgment, and other
debts, and such other instruments in writing
of whatever kind and nature as may be neces
sary or proper in the premises." This power
authorized the execution by Gould of the
two instruments in question. The purpose
and effect of a power of attorney of this kind
is to vest in the attorney full authority to
transact any and all kinds of business for
the principal. Every phrase in it, defining
the authority of the attorney, is in broad and
unrestricted terms, and such terms are to
be given an interpretation in harmony with
the scope and purpose of the instrument,
read as a whole. It is true that, where a
power is given for a limited or specific pur-
pose, general words following the declara-
tion of the particular purpose are to be limit-
ed to such acts as may be necessary to ac-
complish such particular purpose. Washburn
v. Alden, 5 Cal. 463; Billings v. Morrow, 7
Cal. 171, 68 Am. Dec. 235; 1 Am. & Eng.
Ency, of Law (2d Ed.) 1000. But this rule
has no application to such an instrument as
the one now under consideration. Nowhere
in this power of attorney is there any lan-
guage limiting the scope of the business
which may be performed by the attorney,
and the generality of the terms employed
clearly includes authority to execute the in-
struments of renewal. Ward v. Kentucky
Bank, 7 T. B. Mon. 93, cited by appellants,
is not in point. The power of attorney there
considered was closely limited in its terms.
Furthermore, the act of the agent was not
similar to that of Gould in this case.

Each of these instruments constituted a renewal of the note and mortgage within section 2922, Civ. Code. German S. & L. Soc. v. Hutchinson, 63 Cal. 52, 8 Pac. 627; London, etc., Bank v. Bandmann, 120 Cal. 220, 224, 52 Pac. 583, 65 Am. St. Rep. 179; Seaton v. Fiske, 128 Cal. 549, 61 Pac. 666. Furthermore, each of them contained an acknowledgment of the debt, and thus operated to start a new period of limitation. Code Civ. Proc. $360: Concannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14, 66 Pac. 40; Dearborn v. Grand Lodge, 138 Cal. 658, 72 Pac. 154. In either aspect these writings were sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations so far as the defendant Peterson is concerned, if Gould was authorized to execute them as Peterson's agent and in his behalf. Whether or not he was so authorized depends upon a consideration of the terms of the power of attorney. This instrument was in the form in common use in this state and usually described as that of a "general power of attor ney." It authorized Gould, in the name of Peterson, and for his use and benefit, to perform any of a great variety of acts set forth in the instrument. These acts include almost every conceivable mode of dealing with real and personal, tangible and intangible, property, and their enumeration is followed by these words: "And to make, do, and transact all and every kind of business of what nature and kind soever, and also for me and in my name, and as my act and deed, to sign, seal, execute, deliver, and acknowledge such deeds, covenants, indentures, agreements, mortgages, hypothecations, bottomries, char

It is urged that Gould, by reason of his position as payee of the $700 note, could not act as Peterson's agent to renew the note. This position would have much force if Gould at the time of executing the instruments of renewal or "extension" (as they are termed in the record) had still been the holder of the note and mortgage. Wolford v. Cook. 71 Minn. 77, 73 N. W 706, 70 Am. St. Rep. 315. His disability in such case would have rested on the rule that one who acts in a fiduciary capacity cannot be permitted to deal with himself in his individual capacity. Davis v. Rock Creek Co., 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Sterling v. Smith, 97 Cal. 343, 32 Pac. 320. The interest of his principal would have been adverse to his own. Here, however, Gould had already transferred the note and mortgage. Acting for Peterson, he was dealing, not with himself, but with the plaintiff. Even if the renewal might have resulted in his release as indorser or guarantor, such release could have operated only to the disadvantage of plaintiff, not to that of l'eterson. Peterson's liability as maker was primary; that of Gould merely secondary. Peterson was at all times bound to pay the note, and was not entitled to recourse against Gould, who was liable only to subsequent holders. Civ.

ter parties, bills of lading, bills, bonds, notes, | Code, § 3116. The action was therefore com

menced in time as against the defendant Peterson; and this without regard to the allegation and finding of his absence from the state (Code Civ. Proc. § 351) for periods sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from running in his favor.

Whether or not such matter was properly denominated a "counterclaim," the plea of payment was undoubtedly one that the defendants had a right to make. But the order striking out was not prejudicial to the appellants, since the answer had, in another place, affirmatively alleged payment in full. The remaining counterclaims alleged indebtedness from P. R. Moore to the defendant Will D. Gould for services rendered by the latter as an attorney at law in various matters not connected with this litigation, and for hay and other personal property delivered by said Gould to P. R. Moore. It appeared upon the face of said counterclaims that each of the causes of action therein set forth would, if made the basis of an independent action, have been barred by the statute of limitations. The grounds of the motion to strike out were that said claims were so barred, and that they had not been presented for allowance to the personal representative of P. R. Moore, deceased, in the course of the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Either ground afforded sufficient reason for the granting of the motion, unless these counterclaims are to be treated as partial payments of the mortgage debt, compensat

Whether the action on the $700 liability was barred as to the defendants Will D. and Mary L. Gould depends on different considerations. The two instruments executed by Gould as attorney in fact for Peterson could have no effect as against any person other than Peterson. In executing them Gould was assuming to act, not in his individual capacity, but only as agent for Peterson. Since the acts were lawful, and within the scope of his authority, the principal only, and not the agent, was bound by them. Civ. Code, § 2343. The evidence, therefore, did not support the finding that Gould extended the maturity of the $700 note. But the mortgage of June 28, 1897, in which the Goulds undertook to pay both notes, contains the following provisions. It declares that the mortgagors mortgage certain real property as security for the payment of the two notes, which are set out in full. Following the copy of the $700 note signed by Peterson, the mortgage reads as follows: "Said last "Said lasting it pro tanto, under the provisions of secnote of $700 is secured by mortgage, ** and time of payment of said note has been extended to July 18, 1899. And the mortgagors promise to pay said notes according to the terms and conditions thereof.

Here is a direct promise to pay the note, following a recital that the time of payment has been extended to July 18, 1899. This recital is, as between the parties to the mortgage, conclusively presumed to be true. Code Civ. Proc. § 1962, subd. 2. In promising to pay the note "according to its terms and conditions," the mortgagors must be taken to have referred to the terms and conditions, not merely as they appeared on the face of the note itself, but with such modifications as had been recited. To hold otherwise would require us to construe their promise as an agreement to perform an impossibility; i. e., to pay money at a date already past. If the promise to pay was not intended to be a promise to pay at the date to which payment had, as recited, been extended, it is difficult to see why the recital of extension should have been inserted at all. Construing the language as importing a promise to pay the $700 note on July 18, 1899, the action, commenced on February 17, 1903, was not barred by section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under this view, the finding of an extension by Gould becomes immaterial.

3. The answer of the Goulds and Blanchard set up eight separate "cross-demands and counterclaims." At the trial the plaintiff moved to strike them out, and the court granted the motion as to all but one. This ruling is assigned as error. Two of the counterclaims stricken out set up payments on account of the indebtedness sued on.

tion 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that, "when cross-demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated, so far as they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other."

Is this a case of cross-demands which may be mutually compensated, under this section? We think not. The plaintiff was suing on an indebtedness secured by mortgage, an indebtedness which could be recovered only by means of the action of foreclosure prescribed by section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such action the mortgaged premises must first be applied to the satisfaction of the debt, and there is no personal liability on the part of the mortgagor unless the security shall prove insufficient to satisfy the debt. The land is made primarily liable for the payment of the obligation, and the mortgagor can be called on to pay only where the proceeds of a sale of the land are insufficient. Bartlett v. Cottle, 63 Cal. 366; Biddel v. Brizzolara, 64 Cal. 354, 30 Pac. 609: Crisman v. Lanterman, 87 Pac. 89, 149 Cal. 647. For this reason it has been held that in an action upon a simple contract debt (a bank deposit) the defendant cannot set off against such debt a liability of the plaintiff secured by mortgage. McKean v. German-American Sav. Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 Pac. 656. The twe claims, said the court, could not be deemed compensated under section 440, because "the action of respondent for the deposit, and the right of action of appellant to foreclose its

mortgage, are not cross-demands as contemplated by that section." In that case the action was brought by the holder of the unsecured indebtedness, and the defendant sought to set up a debt secured by mortgage. Here the plaintiff sues on the mortgage, while the defendant relies on a simple debt as a cross-demand. But this difference does not make the principle of the McKean Case any less applicable here. If the demands, at their inception, were of such a nature that they were compensated, such compensation affected both parties alike. The rights of the parties under section 440 are necessarily mutual. One claim could not be compensated, without the other being compensated to the same extent. If the existence of the mortgage debt in favor of plaintiff was not available to reduce the amount of Gould's claims, his claims had no greater effect in discharging the mortgage debt.

The alleged cross-demands not being such as could be pleaded as an extinguishment of plaintiff's claim under section 440, they can be supported, if at all, only as counterclaims under subdivision 2 of section 438. As such they failed to state a ground of counterclaim, because (1) they were barred by the statute of limitations (Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 325, 4 Pac. 103); and (2) they had not been presented to the executor or administrator of P. R. Moore's estate (Code Civ. Proc. § 1500). While it might have been better practice to demur to these pleadings, there was, therefore, no prejudicial error in the order striking them out, or in the refusal of the court to receive evidence in their support.

The foregoing discussion deals with all the points presented and argued by appellants in their brief.

The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.

We concur: SHAW, J.; HENSHAW, J.: MCFARLAND, J.; ANGELLOTTI, J.

I dissent from the judgment, and from that part of the opinion of the court which holds that cross-demands of a mortgagor against the mortgagee are not within the protection of section 440, Code of Civil Procedure: BEATTY, C. J.

I concur: LORIGAN, J.

(151 Cal. 754)

KINSEL v. BALLOU. (L. A. 1,962.) (Supreme Court of California. Aug. 20, 1907.) 1. PLEADING-FAILURE TO DENY ALLEGA

TIONS-EFFECT.

Defendant may not attack the finding of the giving of a notice; the complaint having alleged the giving of such notice, and the answer not having denied it.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 39, Pleading, § 1228.]

2. EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE-VARYING INDORSEMENT OF NOTE.

In the absence of fraud or mistake, it cannot be shown by oral evidence that an indorsement in terms "with recourse" was intended by the parties as one "without recourse."

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, § 1799.]

3. BILLS AND NOTES-CONSTRUCTION-TERMS OF PAYMENT.

A note for $900 provided for payment of that sum six months after date, with interest at 1 per cent. per month, payable monthly, and that, should interest not be paid when due. it should become part of the principal, and bear interest, or at the option of the holder of the note the whole principal and interest should become immediately due and payable, and concluded: "Principal and interest payable in gold * * * in sums of $25 or more monthly, together with interest monthly." Held, that the provision as to payment of $25 or more monthly was merely an option to the makers to make partial payments of principal in advance of maturity of the note, and did not limit their obligation to pay interest monthly, or destroy the holder's right to declare the entire sum due in case of default in interest.

4. SAMEINDORSEMENT — DEMAND FOR PAY

MENT.

Under the provision in a note that, in case of default in payment of an installment of interest when due, the whole sum of principal and interest shall become immediately due and payable at the option of the holder of the note, the holder has a reasonable time as against the indorser of the note, as well as its maker, to exercise the option, at least for the purpose of making the indorser liable for the principal and interest accruing after exercise of the option.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 7, Bills and Notes, § 1327.]

5. SAME ACTIONS PRESENTMENT FOR PAY.

MENT-PLEADING.

The complaint against the indorser of a note, alleging presentment of it for payment at the place where the maker had her place of business and residence at the time of her death, and that payment on behalf of her was refused, is not demurrable on the ground of uncertainty, because not showing to whom the demand was delivered this being a matter of evidence. 6. SAME.

Where the complaint in an action on a note alleges the place where demand of payment on behalf of the deceased maker was made, but not the person to whom demand was delivered, defendant, on proof of the person being made, being without evidence to meet it and desiring time. therefor, should ask for a continuance.

7. SAME-ACTION AGAINST INDORSERS-PRIOR RESORT TO MORTGAGE.

Though the makers of a note give a mortgage to secure it, an indorser may be sued on the note without prior resort to the mortgage. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 7. Bills and Notes, § 605.]

8. SAME-ACTION AGAINST GUARANTOR-PRIOR RESORT TO MORTGAGE.

A guarantor of payment of a note may be sued thereon, without prior resort to the mortgage security given by the makers.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 7, Bills and Notes, § 605.]

In Bank. Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; W. P. James, Judge. Action by E. F. Kinsel against L. M. Ballou. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Tanner, Taft & O'Dell, for appellant. H. R. Hervey and W. W. Butler, for respondent.

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