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conveyance of other lands described in the contract.
[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 30, Judgment, g 1108.] 2. Same.
Where, in a suit' to specifically enforce a contract for the conveyance of real estate, plaintiff in his supplemental reply alleged the rendi, tion of a judgment granting the relief prayed for in a prior suit to specifically enforce the contract, defendant, though failing to plead the former judgment not rendered until after the filing of his answer, was entitled to avail himself of the former judgment as a bar to the action.
[Ed. Note.For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 30, Judgment, g 1787.] 3. SAME.
A party seeking to specifically enforce a contract for the conveyance of real estate discovered, before the entry of judgment granting the relief prayed for, a failure to convey other lands as required by the contract, but he failed to ask the additional relief in an amended complaint. Held, that the former judgment was a bar to a suit for the specific performance of the contract so far as the same related to such other lands.
remark was a comment on the evidence, and as such prohibited by section 16, art. 4, of the Constitution. Was the remark prejudicial? We think it was. As we have said, there was a sharp conflict between the re spondent and the conductor as to what occurred when the respondent was made to leave the train, and clearly it would aid the jury in determining which of them told the truth to know their respective conditions as to sobriety. It is no justification to say that the comment occurred when the court was ruling on the admission of evidence and not in the charge to the jury, as it is just as harmful to the party offering the evidence to have it discredited by the trial judge in advance of its admission as it is to have it discredited afterwards. For cases from this court when the general question is discussed, see State v. Walters, 7 Wash. 246, 34 Pac. 938, 1098; State v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 021, 47 Pac. 106; State v. Ilyde, 20 Wash. 231, 55 Pac. 49; State V. Surry, 23 Wash. 655, 63 Pac. 557; Miller v. Dumon, 24 Wash. 648, 64 Pac. 804; French v. Seattle Traction Co., 26 Wash. 264, 66 Pac. 404; State v. Bliss, 27 Wash. 403, 68 Pac. 87: State v. Eubank, 33 Wash. 293, 74 Pac. 378; State Y. Manderville, 37 Wash. 365, 79 Pac. 977; Patten v. Auburn, 41 Wash. 644, 84 Pac. 594.
The respondent testified that on the afternoon of the day of the injury he visited Priest River, going and coming on the appellant's trains. On cross-examination the appellant sought to ascertain the purpose of this visit, but objections to its questions directed to that end were sustained. It would seem that this might properly have been gone into. The respondent was complaining of physical injuries which his own testimony indicated were somewhat severe. As he paid this visit before he consulted with a physician concerning his injuries, and on the afternoon of the day he received them, it would have thrown some light on the question whether or not he was exaggerating his condition to know wbether this visit was one of necessity or one of mere convenience. The cross-examination should have been permitted at least to that extent.
Since there must be a new trial, it is not necessary to inquire whether or not the verdict is excessive.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County ; R. B. Albertson, Judge.
Action by John Collins, prosecuted after his death by Angie B. Collins and others, executors and trustees under his will, against James P. Gleason and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
William Martin and Jas. F. McElroy, for appellants. John B. Hart and Maurice D. Leebey, for respondents.
CROW, J. This action was commenced on June 22, 1901, by John Collins, now deceased, against James P. Gleason, H. S. Connor, and the Fidelity Trust Company of Seattle, a corporation, to compel the conveyance of certain lands in sections 25 and 30, township 21 N., of range 5 E., W. M., in King county, Wash. The plaintiff in his amended complaint, dated October 2, 1902, alleged: That Connor and Gleason were the president and secretary of the defendant corporation; that on or about January 22, 1901, an action, Xo. 31,138, had been commenced by John Collins, as plaintiff, against the same defendants, to compel the defendants to transfer to him certain stock in the Fidelity Trust Company, or to reconvey certain property there tofore conveyed by him to such company. That the cause was afterwards settled, a written memorandum or agreement being made as follows: "Seattle, Washington, May 3rd, 1901. Collins surrender 0240 shares, stock and trust certificate on Island County land. Fidelity Trust Company make special warranty to Collins for all real estate conveyed by him to company, mortgage on tide land assumed by Collins & take property in mortgage. Company also to convey to Collins one half interest in Anacortes judgment. All monies now on hand belonging to corporation, except Colman money now in court to go to plaintif. Collins vs. Fidelity Trust
HADLEY, A J., and CROW and RUDKIN, JJ., concur.
(47 Wash. 62)
COLLINS et al. v. GLEASON et al. (Supreme Court of Washington. Sept. 6, 1907.) 1. JUDGMENT-RES JUDICATA.
A judgment granting the relief prayed for in a suit to specifically enforce a contract for the conveyance of real estate by compelling a conveyance is a bar to a subsequent suit for the
Company to be dismissed, each party to pay own costs. Defendants to have Colman money now in court, and to have no other money from plaintiff. Defendants to pay no cost of receivership. Martin vs. Fidelity Trust Company to Je dismissed without cost to either party. Connor vs. Collins to be dismissed without cost to either party. Fidelity Trust Company vs. Colman to be dismissed without cost and release of all claims against each other, growing out of any of said suits. Roberts & Leehey, Attorneys for Defendant. William
William Martin, Attorney for Plaintiff." That the plaintiff fully performed the agreement on his part. That the plaintiff had theretofore conveyed to the defendant company the land above mentioned, but that the defendant neglected and refused to reconvey it to him in pursuance of the terms of the written agreement. The defendants in their answer, after making certain denials, in substance, alleged that the defendant company never authorized the written agreement; that it had never ratified the same; that the plaintiff was not entitled to any conveyance, and that the defendant company, by its answer, offered, by placing all parties in statu quo, to rescind any action its officers had taken towards part performance of the written agreement. To this answer the plaintiff originally replied by denials only. On July 11, 1903, it having been suggested to the trial court that the plaintiff John Collins had died testate, an order was entered substituting Angie B. Collins, John Francis Collins, and R. L. Hodgdon, his executors and trustees, as parties plaintiff. On March 30, 1904, the substituted plaintiffs, with leave of court, served and afterwards filed a supplemental reply, in which they affirmatively alleged that theretofore, to wit, on May 7, 1901, John Collins, is plaintiff, instituted action No. 32.4.2 against the Fidelity Trust Company of Seattle, one of the defendants herein, to compel specific performance on the part of the Fidelity Trust Company, of the above contract, by requiring it to assign to Collins a certain lease from the state of Washington to the Fidelity Trust Company of a certain harbor area in King county, Wash., in said lease and in the pleadings of said action particularly described, being lease No. 64, the said contract upon which said action was brought being the same contract and agreement set forth in the amended complaint and the answer in this action; that thereafter sich proceedings were had in said cause No. 32,452, that on August 20, 1902, a final decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff Collins, requiring the defendant Fidelity Trust Company to specifically perform the contract by assigning the lease; that the Fidelity Trust Company appealed to the Supreme Court of the state of Washington; that on Octobor 3, 1903, subsequent to the filing of the origiral reply herein, the Supreme Court
affirmed said decree, and that all issues raised by the affirmative defense herein were raised in said cause No. 32,4.52, and determined in favor of the plaintiff ('ollins. Ljoon these issues trial was had and, after the plaintiffs had introduced their evidence and rested, the defendants declined to offer any evidence, but moved for judgment. The trial court thereupon, without making any findings of fact, entered a final judgment dismissing the action. The plaintiffs have appealed.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the action. The respondents contend (1) that the act of the attorneys in making the memorandum of settlement was unauthorized ; (2) that the sanie was nerer ratified by the Fidelity Trust Company ; and (3) that, even if it was executed with full authority and subsequently ratified, this action cannot be maintained, as the appellants' testator during his lifetime maintained one action to enforce the same agreement in which he obtained judgment, and that if the testator ever had any cause of action against the respondent company, as alleged in the complaint herein, the same was split by the former action, and the present one cannot be maintained.
The last point being conclusive of this case, the others will not be considered. It appears from the evidence, as well as the allegations of the supplemental reply, that actiou No. 32,152 in the superior court of King county was instituted for the purpose of securing the specific performance of the identical agreement upon which the present ar tion is based, and that the decree entered therein, in favor of appellants' testator, was afterwards affirmed by this court. Collins v. Fidelity Trust Company, 3:3 Wash. 136, 73. Pac. 1121. This is a subsequent and independent action, brought on the same contract. Although appellants' testator heretofore compelled the respondent, the Fidelity Trust Company, to specifically perform the contract by assigning to him the tide land lease, they are now seeking to compel it to further specifically perform by conveying to them the land in dispute. Appellants' testator never had more than one cause of action on the contract. The failure of respondent to convey all the lands contemplated thereby was but one breach which authorized one action only. For one breach of an indivisible contract there can arise but one cause of action, and, if in such action the plaintiff does not demand the entire relief to which he is entitled, he cannot afterwariis complain. If this action can now be maintained. the appellants (an hereafter maintain any number of additional actions upon the same contract. The recent case of Kline V. Stein (Wash.) 50 Pac, 1041, is controlling here.
Appellants contend that the respondents cannot claim they are estoped by the former
judgment, for the reason that the respondents rejected the offer and tender of the responddid not plead such former judginent. The ents to place the parties in statu quo. appellants themselves pleaded it in their The judgment is affirmed. supplemental reply, and, when they did so, the respondents demanded judginent upon HADLEY, C. J., and FULLERTON, RUDthe pleadings. The former judgment had KIN, MOUNT, and DUXBAR, JJ., concur. not been entered when the original answer was made herein. The facts were all be
(47 Wash. 69) fore the court in this action, and we fail to
COLLINS et al. v. GLEASON et al. see why it should not apply the law to the
(Supreme Court of Washington. Sept. 6, 1907.) facts pleaded and admitted, whether plead
JUDGMENT — RES JUDICATA – SPECIFIC PERed by the respondents or the appellants. The FORMANCE. appellants further contend that, at the time A judgment granting the relief prayed for of the bringing of the former action, they
in a suit to specifically enforce a contract for
the conveyance of real estate is a bar to a had not discovered the failure of the respond
suit to reform a deed executed in part performents to convey the land now in dispute; that ance of the contract, since actions to reform the they learned of such omission later but prior
deed and specifically enforce the contract may be
joined. to the commencement of this action. The amended complaint, however, contains no al Appeal from Superior Court, King County : legation that such want of knowledge was R. B. Albertson, Judge. due to the fraud or deceit of the respond Action by John Collins, prosecuted after ents. Appellants' testator did discover such his death, by Angie B. Collins and others, failure to convey, not only before the former executors and trustees under his will, against judgment was entered, but also before he James P. Gleason and others. From a judg. filed his amended complaint in this action. ment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. AfHe had ample opportunity to ask the addi. firmed. tional relief, by specific performance, in such William Martin and Jas. F. McElroy, for amended complaint, but failed to do so. It is appellants. John B. Hart and Morris D. a general rule in both law and equity that, Leehey, for respondents. where a party inadvertently or by reason of his own negligence or mistake, and with PER CURIAM. This action, which was out fault or fraud of the adverse party, takes
commenced on June 22, 1901, arises upon the judgment or decree for less than he is entitl
same memorandum of agreement upon which ed to recover, he is estopped from bringing
cause No. 6,561, Collins v. Gleason et al. (dea second action for the residue. When the
cided by this court on this date), 91 Pac. 560, appellants' testator discovered the omission
is based. The plaintiffs here sue to reform a or failure of the respondents to make an
deed executed by the defendant, the Fidelity assignment of the tide land lease, it was his
Trust Company, in part performance of that duty to immediately ascertain whether other
agreement; it being alleged that certain land omissions or breaches of the contract existed,
was by mutual mistake incorrectly described and to bring his action for all remedies to
therein. From a judgment in favor of the which he was then entitled. Having failed
defendants, the plaiutifüs bave appealed. to do this, he certainly could in his amended
The appellants have heretofore recovered complaint have demanded the further specific
a judgment for specific performance in a sep
arate action on the same contract; hence on performance now sought, as the record discloses that he did' actually learn all the
the authority of Collins v. Gleason et al., No. facts in ample time to do so. In Kline v.
6,561, supra, the judgment herein must be af
firmed. Although the appellants here seek to Stein, supra, we said: “But the appellants
reform the original contract, there has neverassert that the allegation to the effect that
theless been a splitting of actions, as actions this tract was left out of their original complaint through accident and mistake was
to reform and specifically enforce the same
contract may be joined. We will, however, made advisedly, and, inasmuch as the re
state that we do not find the evidence suffispondents' motion for judgment on the plead
cient to sustain the appellants' allegation of ings concedes it to be true, this fact alone
mutual mistake. is sufficient to show the inconclusiveness of
The judgment is affirmed. the original judgment. This contention, also, mistakes the rule. If the appellants have
(47 Wash. 35) by accident or mistake on their part failed
STATE ex rel. CLIFFORD V. SUPERIOR to recover all of the land that they were
COURT OF PIERCE COUNTY et al. entitled to recover, their remedy is not to sue for the omitted portion, but is rather
(Supreme Court of Washington. Sept. 5, 1907.) to seek relief in the original action by open
CERTIORARI — DISMISSAL-TERMINATION OF
CONTROVERSY. ing up the judgment amending their plead
Where, pending a writ of review for the ings, and trying anew their rights to the revision of an order dismissing an application property." The appellants in this action to show cause why a witness should not be com:
pelled to give testimony by deposition in response have not only elected to retain the original
to a subpana duces tecum in a pending actioti, judgment and its fruits, but they have also the action was disinissed without prejudice, the
controversy was thereby terminated, and the 2. SAME. writ would be dismissed.
A private citizen, having no special interest
in land deeded by the state to another, but mereApplication by the state, on relation of M.
ly claiming that he was prevented by fraud L. Clifford, for the revision of an order of from bidding for it at the public sale, and not the superior court of Pierce county and oth being able to require it to be resold if the deed
be set aside, and as a taxpayer not having sufers dismissing a petition to compel a witness
fered an injury different from that suffered by to give testimony by deposition under a sub
the public at large, cannot maintain a suit to pæna duces tecum. P'etition dismissed. set aside the deed.
R. F. Lafioon, for plaintiff. G. C. Israel, Appeal from Superior Court, King Counfor respondents.
ty; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.
Action by W. W. Powers against Edwara PER CURIAM. A commission, with in
E. Webster and others. Judgment for deterrogatories annexed, to take the deposition
fendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. of a witness, was issued by the district court
Million & Houser, for appellant. John D. of the district of Alaska, Division No. 1, at
Atkinson, Atty. Gen., for respondent land Juneau, Alaska. The cause wherein the com
commissioner. mission issued was then pending in said court, and the witness whose testimony was
MOUNT, J. The appellant brought this sought was the plaintiff in the action and re
action to set aside a sale of school lands, to sided in Pierce county, Wash. The commis
cancel a deed therefor executed by the state sion was directed to J. L. Clifford, a notary public residing in Pierce county. Upon re
to respondent Croft, and to compel the re
spondent Ross, the state land commissioner, ceipt of the commission the commissioner at
to reoffer the land for sale. The lower court tempted to take the testimony of the witness,
sustained a demurrer to the amendeil comand it is claimed that the witness refused to
plaint, upon the grounds that the court had honor a subpæna duces tecum to produce cer
no jurisdiction, that plaintiff had no legal tain letters and documents, and refused to
capacity to sue, that there is a defect of answer cert:in interrogatories propounded to
parties, and that the complaint fails to state him. The commissioner thereupon applied to
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of acthe superior court of Pierce county for an or
tion. The plaintiff refused to plead further, der requiring the witness to show cause why
and the action was dismissed. he should not be compelled by order of said
The complaint alleges, in substance, that court to produce the documents and answer
the state has been, and now is, the owner of the interrogatories aforesaid. An order to
the school land in question, being 10 acres show cause was issued, and, upon return thereto, the court held that it was without
situate in King county; that prior to June,
1906, Joseph I. Croft was in possession of jurisdiction to make any order in the premises, and dismissed the petition. Applica
the land under a lease, and had a sawmill
thereon of the value of $1,000 and no more; tion was then made by the commissioner to
that on June 1, 1906, said Croft applied to this court for a writ of review to review the
the state board of land commissioners for action of the superior court. During the pen
appraisement and sale of the lands, and dency of the proceeding before this court, a
thereafter the land was appraised at $350 certificate from the said district court for the
per acre, and ordered sold; that thereafter district of Alaska has been filed here, show
certain of the defendants and E. W. Ross, ing that the original cause in which the com
land commissioner, entered into a conspiracy mission to take the deposition was issued was
to obtain said land at less than its real valby that court dismissed without prejudice on
ue; that, in pursuance of that conspiracy the Sth day of January, 1907. The relator, in
said Ross caused the appraisement to be rean affidavit filed, does not controvert the fact
duced to $100 per acre, and fraudulently of dismissal, but asserts that the testimony
caused the sawmill thereon to be appraised should still be taken to preserve it for future
at $5,453.34; that said land at said time use in any action that may be brought concerning the same subject-matter. Inasmuch
was worth $1,000 per acre, exclusive of the
improvements; that on June 30, 1906, at the as the action in which the commission to take
time and place where the sale was fixed, the testimony was issued has been discontinued, we think it should be held here that the con
plaintiff and certain of the defendants ap
peared and the land was offered for sale by troversy presented by the relator's applica
the deputy auditor of King county, where tion here has ceased.
the land was located, whereupon Joseph I. The relator's petition is therefore dismissed.
Croft bid the sum of $0,153.34, the amount
of the appraised value as reduced as afore(47 Wash. 99)
said ; that thereupon the respondent RayPOWERS v. WEBSTER et al.
mond made a bid of $14,453.34, and there be(Supreme Court of Washington. Sept. 6, 1907.) | ing no other bids, the land was struck off to 1. PUBLIC LANDS – SUIT TO CANCEL DEED | said Raymond; that said Raymond frauduFROX STATE-PARTIES.
lently refused to make payments upon his The state is a necessary party to a suit to cancel a deell from it, the property reverting to
bid, and thereafter the said Ross frauduit if the deed is canceled,
lently and unlawfully reported the sale of
said land to said Joseph I. Croft for the satisfied, it can, on its own account, authorize sum of $1,000, and induced the Governor and proceedings to vacate the patent or limit its Secretary of State to issue a patent for said operation." If the patent may be avoided land to said Croft; that said bid of said for fraud, the appellant has no interest in Raymond was a fraudulent bid, for the pur the land except as a citizen of the state. pose of preventing the plaintiff from bidding When the deed of the state is set aside, the at said sale; that said Ross knew that the land reverts to the state. The appellant caninterests of the state had been injuriously not even require the land to be resold, beaffected by fraud and collusion, and that cause the power of resale rests in the discresaid Croft was not the highest bidder at tion of the board of state land commissionsaid sale; that the defendants knew that er's. State ex rel. Bussell v. Bridges. 30 plaintiff was desirous of bidding on said Wash, 268, 70 Pac. 506; State ex rel. l'elton property at said sale, and was present
V. Ross, 39 Wash. 399, 81 Pac. 80.. Vor with $10,000 to bid for said land, but was can appellant maintain the action as a citiprevented from bidding by the conduct of zen and taxpayer. Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. said Raymond, who was in collusion witn St. 57, 27 Pac. 1067; Birmingham v. (heetthe other respondents; that appellant had
ham, 19 Wash. 057, 51 Pac. 37; Tacoma v. no knowledge of the conspiracy or fraudu Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 6) l'ac. 186; State lent acts of respondents, and therefore filed ex rel. White v. Fish Company, +? Washi. no affidavit with the commissioner of lands
409, 85 Pac. 22; State ex rel. Shores v. Ross setting forth fraud or asking for a resale;
(Wash.) 87 Pac. 202. In the case of Tacoma that, if said land is offered for resale, plain
5. Bridges, supra, this court said: “Whattiff will bid $10,000 therefor; that plaintiff
erer may be the rule elsewhere, it is the has demanded of the Attorney General that
rule in this state that a taxpayer and citihe bring an action to set aside said sale, but
zen suing in a private capacity cannot mainthe Attorney General reiuses to do so; that
tain a suit to enjoin a state officer from plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of King
committing a breach of his public duty,
without showing that he would suffer an incounty, and will suffer irreparable injury if
jury thereby differing in kind from that sufdefendants are permitted to retain said land, and brings this action as a taxpayer and as
fered by the public at large." And in State an intending buyer and on behalf of others
ex rel. Shores v. Ross, supra, we said: "If
the deed to these tide lands had been deliysimilarly situated. The trial court properly sustained the de
ered after the respondent was reliably ininurrers. The first object of the action is
formed that the application and bidding to set aside the deed from the state to re
were fraudulent, to the detriment of the
state, it would be the duty of the respondent spondent Croft. If the deed of the state is
[commissioner of public lands] or of some set aside, the property reverts to the state.
official of the state to immediately cause an Therefore the state is a necessary party to such an action. The action cannot be main
action to be brought to cancel said deed, and tained at the suit of a private person who
to recover the property, title to which was
thus fraudulently acquired." 26 Am. & Eng. has no interest in the property. St. Louis
Enc. of Law (20 Ed.) pp. 39-397. Smelting Co. v. Kemp. 104 L'. S. 036, 26 L.
The complaint, having shown that the apEd. 875; Welsh v. Callvert, 34 Washı, 250,
pellant has no special interest in the lands 75 Pac. 871; Horsky v. Moran, 21 Mont.
and not being authorized to maintain the 345, 53 Pac. 1061; Tacoma V. Bridges, 23
action as a taxpayer, fails to state a cause Wash. 221, 65 Pac. 186; State es rel. Shores
of action. v. Ross (Wash.) 87 Pac. 262. In the case of
The judgment is therefore affirmed. St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra, the court said: “If in issuing a patent its offi
HADLEY, C. J., and CROW, ROOT, RUDcers took mistaken views of the law, or
KIX, and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. drew erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or even from corrupt motives, a
(47 Wash. 85) court of law can afford no remedy to a par FREDERICK & NELSOX F. SPOKANE ty alleging that he was thereby aggrieved.
GRAIN ('0. et al. lle must resort to a court of equity for re (Supreme Court of Washington. Sept. 6, 1907.) lief, and even then his complaint cannot be ASSIGXMEXTS – EQUITABLE ASSIGNMEXTS – heard unless he connects himself with the BILL OP EXCIIANGE. original source of title, so as to be able to
Laws 1899, p. 302, c. 149, $ 126, defines a
bill of exchange as an unconditional order in arer that his rights are injuriously affecteil writing, addressed by one person to another, by the existence of the patent; and he must signed by the person giving it, requiring the per prossess such equities as will control the le
son to whom addressed to pay on demand or at a
fixed or determinable time a sum certain to order gal title in the patentee's hands. Boggs r.
or to bia rer. Section 127, p. 363, provides that Merrel Mining Co., 1+ Cal. 279, :;63. It does a bill of itself does not operate as an assignnot lie in the mouth of a stranger tu the title
ment of the funds in the hands of the drawee, and to complain of the act of the government
that the drawer is not liable unless he accepts
the same. Held, that a writing addressed by with respect to it. If the government is dis- ¡ one to another, requesting him to pay a third