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Said petition was acted upon by the board of county commissioners and a certificate of error was issued as prayed for. On the 20th day of January, 1906, a petition was presented to Charles R. Bostick, county attorney of Noble county, by more than seven resident taxpayers of Noble county, asking that he, as county attorney, appeal to the district court from the aforesaid decision of said board of county commissioners, and on the 22d day of January, 1906, said county attorney filed his notice of appeal with the county clerk and duly perfected the same. the 24th day of February, 1906, said cause was heard by the district court upon the merits. Some evidence was introduced by the respective parties-the plaintiff contending that the board of equalization had increased the valuation as returned by the assessor, and that such assessment was excessive as returned by the board of equalization, and, further, that no evidence had been heard by the board of equalization, but that the increase of valuation had been made upon information coming from other sources. No evidence was offered on behalf of the Perry Mill Company tending to show that the same property had been assessed more than once, or had been assessed in the county for the taxes of a year to which the same was not subject, or that the property had been damaged by flood or tornado. At the close of the evidence of the plaintiff the county attorney demurred to the same, which demurrer was overruled. The county attorney then attempted to show that the same proposition had been before the board of county commissioners prior to the time of this action, and the relief prayed for had been refused. This evidence was excluded by the court, and the court rendered judgment approving and affirming the action of the board of county commissioners. The appeal was taken from this order. Motion for new trial was filed and overruled.

It is contended by the plaintiff in error that under the statutes of Oklahoma a board of county commissioners has no jurisdiction or power to correct an alleged erroneous assessment upon any other ground than because the same "has been assessed more than once for the taxes of the same year or has been assessed in the county for the taxes of a year to which the same was not subject, or where the property of the complainant has been destroyed by flood or tornado; or tornado; second, the jurisdiction of the district court, when proceeding upon an appeal from an inferior tribunal, does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of that tribunal from which the appeal arose." The statute referred to by the plaintiff in error is section 5972, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, which is as follows: "The boards of county commissioners of the various counties of the territory of Oklahoma are hereby empowered to correct, either upon the assessment rolls or upon the tax rolls of the county, any double or

erroneous assessment of property for taxation for any particular year, in the manner provided in the next section, and not otherwise: Provided, that this act shall in no wise be construed as a grant of power to boards of county commissioners to equalize valuations of property for taxation, as between individuals." Section 1, art. 1, c. 31, p. 341, Sess. Laws 1995, amending section 5973, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903. provides as follows: "That section 5973 of Wilson's Revised and Annotated Statutes of Oklahoma be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: 'Section 61. Whenever, at either of the regular meetings of the said boards in January, April, July and October, upon complaint of the person or persons beneficially interested, their agent or attorney, it shall be made to appear, by the testimony of the claimant and at least one reputable witness, borne out by the records of the county, that the same property, whether real or personal, has been assessed more than once for the taxes of the same year, or the property, whether real or personal, has been assessed in the county for the taxes of a year to which the same was not subject; or where the property of the complainant, whether real or personal, has been destroyed by flood, or tornado to the extent of at least fifty per cent. of its cash value, which said damage or decrease in value shall be established by the testimony of at least five reputable witnesses who shall be freeholders and residents of the county in which complainant resides, the said board is hereby empowered to issue to complainant a certificate of error, showing that the complaint has been investigated by the said board; that the said board has been satisfied of the truth of the allegations of the said complaint, and direct the same to the county treasurer of their said county directing the said county treasurer to accept the said certificate as a payment of cash to the amount found by the said board to have been unjustly assessed, or entitled to be refunded, which said amount shall be named in the said certificate, and shall by the treasurer be credited on his tax roll against the tax so found to be erroneous or to be refunded; and the treasurer shall retain the said certificate, and shall be credited with the same, as cash, in his settlement as such treasurer.'" These sections are the only provisions of the statutes of Oklahoma granting the power to a board of county commissioners to correct any kind of an individual tax levy and issue certificate of error therefor. The first empowers the board to correct an erroneous assessment, and the second provides the character of erroneous assessment that may be corrected, and the manner in which the same shall be corrected, and for the issuing of the certificate of error. The character of assessments that may be corrected are: First, a double assessment; second, when the property has been assessed

more than once for the taxes of the same year; third, when the property has been assessed for the taxes of a year to which the same is not subject to assessment; and, fourth, when the property has been damaged by flood or tornado to the amount of 50 per cent. of its value.

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It is contended by the defendant in error that the substance of the petition was to suggest to the board of commissioners that a legal assessment on the property of the Perry Mill Company had been made and returned, and that the subsequent act of the board of equalization was entirely without authority of law and not done under any pretense of comparing valuation or adjusting assessments between taxpayers; that, therefore, the board of county commissioners had a right to adjust the matter. will be noticed by an examination of the record that in the original assessment the valuation of the real estate was $6,325; that the valuation of the personal property was $3,000-making a total of $9,325. By the action of the board of equalization lot 10 was raised from $2,000 to $5,000, lot 11 from $2,000 to $5,000, lot 12 from $1,500 to $3,000, and lot 13 from $1,000 to $2.000, and the personal assessment was raised from $3,000 to $10,000, making a total raise of $15,500. the petition it was conceded that, notwithstanding the original assessment was $9,825, yet a fair valuation would be $10,000, and that the commissioners' action was upon a basis of $10,000, so that it cannot be contended that this action before the board of county commissioners was intended to correct the action of the board of equalization by placing the assessment where it originally stood; that is, by entirely eliminating the action of the board of equalization, so as to leave the assessment where it originally stood. This in effect conceded the authority of the board of equalization to take action in the direction in which it had proceeded, but was in effect to claim that the act of equalization had been erroneous and excessive, and this was in effect asking the board to equalize the valuation of the property for taxation as between individuals, which is specifically prohibited by the first section quoted. There was nothing whatever before the board of county commissioners that would authorize that body to issue a certificate of error upon any ground named in the statute, and there was no pretense of doing so. These sections of the statute above quoted are the only sections pertaining to the power of the board to issue a certificate of error or correct assessments of any character for which certificates of error can be issued.

ers has only such authority as is prescribed by the statute, and, no matter what relief a court of equity could give in a case of the character under consideration, the board of county commissioners is not clothed with that equitable power, and we cannot conceive upon what principle or upon what authority a board of county commissioners would assume to issue a certificate of error in a case of this character, which is in effect discharg ing the complainant's property from taxation to the amount named in the certificate. Boards of county commissioners in this territory are given no such jurisdiction, and we think that the withholding of such authority from boards of county commissioners is a wise one. It is well settled that, upon appeal from an inferior tribunal, the appellate court takes only such jurisdiction as the inferior tribunal had, and can only investigate in a given case those propositions which were before the inferior court, and which the inferior court might have investigated and determined. 2 Cyc. 537; Cooper v. Armstrong, 3 Kan. 78. Therefore, the board of county commissioners having no power to take the action which they assumed, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court being the same as that of the inferior tribunal, the judgment of the board of county commissioners should have been reversed.

This action, upon appeal to the district court, should not have been so construed as to give the district court the same power and authority which the court would have had in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose of questioning the right or authority of the board of equalization to raise the valuation of the property or to prohibit the correction of the tax which is claimed to have been void by reason of the erroneous action of the board of equalization. There has from time to time been a vast amount of just criticism growing out of the unequal valuation of property, and it would seem that there must have been some reason for the board of equalization to take action in this matter. Whether or not they acted legally and in pursuance of law it is not necessary for us here to determine. If they did, their acts were invalid. If they did not, there was a remedy by action in a court of equity, and the parties aggrieved should seek a remedy in the proper forum, as there, and there only, could the matter properly be investigated. There, and there only, could the full facts be shown. But, be that as it may, the question here presented is only as to the power of the board of county commissioners to make a correction and issue a certificate of error upon the case made to them, and the power of the court upon appeal to assume at this time jurisdiction which the board of county commissioners could not

It is claimed, however, that the action of the board of equalization was void, and, being void, that the board of county commissioners, and also the district court on appeal, could correct the same and do equity between the parties. We cannot agree with this contention. The board of county commission-taining the board of county commissioners

assume.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the trial court erred in rendering judgment sus

in their action, and for that reason the case is reversed, with directions that the district court vacate its judgment and enter an order reversing the judgment of the board of county commissioners. All the Justices concurring, except HAINER, J., who tried the case below, not sitting, and IRWIN, J., absent.

(19 Okl. 51)

NOLAN V. ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 4, 1907.) 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS AUTHORITY-JUDICIAL NOTICE.

In this territory, attorneys at law receive their license, and are authorized by the Supreme Court to engage in the practice of the law, and to transact business as attorneys at law, and the courts of the territory will take judicial notice of the fact that one appearing and acting as an attorney is or is not duly authorized. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 1.]

2. SAME SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.

Any duly authorized attorney may, after the subject-matter has been placed in his hands, give any notice affecting the substantial rights of his client which the client himself might have given, and those affected by such notice must take notice of it.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 147.]

3. SAME-DISPUTE OF AUTHORITY-BURDEN OF

PROOF.

Where notice material to the maintenance of a suit has been given by an attorney, those disputing the authority of the attorney, and who rest their defense, in an action based thereon, upon the fact that they dispute the attorney's authority to give important notices, must maintain such defense in court, for a court of record in Oklahoma will presume that an attorney admitted to the practice is acting, in all matters affecting his client's rights, with authority from the client he represents.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 104.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from District Court, Grant County; before Justice James K. Beauchamp.

Action by the St. Louis & San Francisco
Railroad Company, a corporation, against
Thomas Nolan. From a judgment for
tiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Mackey & Mackey, for plaintiff in error.
Flynn & Ames, for defendant in error.

both plaintiff and defendant. On the 18th day of March, 1905, the agent of the plaintiff at Lamont served a notice upon the defendant terminating said lease within 60 days from the date of such service, describing the premises, and requesting defendant to remove therefrom and give possession of the same, which notice was signed: "St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Company, by Flynn & Ames." The defendant failed to vacate the premises at the expiration of 60days, and on the 27th day of May, 1905, the agent of the company at Lamont served another notice upon the defendant such as re quired by the statute to be given prior to the commencement of the action of forcible entry and detainer, and which notice demanded the immediate vacation of the premises, or suit for such possession would be commenced within three days, which notice was also signed by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, by Flynn & Ames, its attorneys. The defendant continuing the occupancy of the premises notwithstanding the foregoing notices, suit was brought therefor in the probate court of Grant county and tried on the 24th day of June, 1905, resulting in a judgment for plaintiff and for the restitution of the premises above described. Thereupon the defendant appealed said cause to the district court, where the same was retried February 27, 1906, by a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant brings the case tothis court predicating error upon the rule of the trial court, because of the overruling by said court of a motion for a new trial, which motion was upon the ground: First, that the verdict and judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law; second, error of law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the defendant.

Only one ground of error is now complained of in the trial of this case. The plaintiff upon the trial offered in evidence the written notice to terminate the lease, to the introduction of which defendant objected, and at the time excepted to the ruling of the court adplain-mitting the same; the point being that the notice terminating the lease was signed: "The St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, by Flynn & Ames, Its Attorneys." That at the time said notice was served, and upon the trial of the cause, there was no proof offered that Flynn & Ames were attorneys of the plaintiff and authorized to. give the notice. No evidence was offered upon the trial by the defendant, and the record shows that, when notice to terminate the lease was served, he at that time made no objection to the form or sufficiency of the same. No authority bearing upon the point involved is presented by the briefs upon either side, and the writer of this opinion has been unable to find any. The license to thedefendant, and by force of which he occupied the premises, provided that it could be terminated by the railroad company on 60 days'

GILLETTE, J. This action was commenced in the probate court of Grant county, to recover possession of a portion of the depot grounds and right of way in the town of Lamont, in said county, which at the time of bringing said action, to wit, June 2, 1905, and from the 28th day of April, 1903, had been occupied by defendant under and by force of a license from the plaintiff, which license provided that it should terminate on 60 days' notice by the plaintiff railroad company, and provided that the defendant on receiving such notice should at once vacate such premises. The license was signed by

notice. Without notice, therefore, by the railroad company 60 days prior to the bringing of this action, the company had no cause of action against defendant, Nolan. Such notice was, however, served upon the defendant by the company's station agent at Lamont. It was signed: "St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, by Flynn & & Ames, Its Attorneys." Was this sufficient, in the absence of specific proof, of their authority to act in this respect? The word "atThe word "attorney." as used in this case, means an attorney at law, and an "attorney at law" in this territory is an officer of the court, authorized to appear therein, and as such present to the court for its consideration the interests of his client, as well as to appear generally for his client with reference to the transaction of business usually confided to members of the legal profession, and are, before being authorized to appear in court or to do business as an attorney at law, requir ed to prove their qualification and to take an oath that in the transaction of business as attorneys they will do no falsehood or consent that any be done in court, and will not knowingly promote, sue, or procure to be sued any false or unlawful suit. These requirements of the law have given to attorneys, admitted to the practice of the law, a status before the courts, and with reference to business they assume control of, different from that of other agents. A presumption follows their act, when acting for another, that they are authorized by such other to act for him touching the particular subjectmatter. Attorneys admitted to the practice in Oklahoma obtain such right through and by reason of the authority of the Supreme Court, and the courts of the territory may therefore properly take notice of the right of an individual to act as an attorney at law, and to presume that in so acting they are not prosecuting any false or unlawful suit. If Flynn & Ames, as attorneys at law, had without authority of the railroad company undertaken to cancel the license by which the defendant held possession of the premises, their act would have been a violation of their oaths as attorneys. The court upon the trial of the cause could not, and would not, assume that they had so acted. On the contrary, it would hold that their authority is presumed until some step was taken which would challenge that presumption. No such step was taken in this case, and we think the court did not err in the admission in evidence, over the objection of counsel for defendant, the notice of the termination of the lease in 60 days, signed. "St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, by Flynn & Ames, Its Attorneys," for the presumption would be in such case that they were the company's attorneys and authorized to act in that respect.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. All the Justices concurring, except IRWIN, J., absent.

(19 Okl. 80)

SHAPEK et al. v. OAK CREEK VALLEY BANK.

(Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 4, 1907.) 1. PARTNERSHIP-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS-NATURE OF PARTNER'S AUTHORITY.

Under the provision of section 3879, Wilon's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903, a partnership obligation executed by one partner without the knowledge or consent of the other, binds the firm and each general partner, if the obligation so executed is within the reasonable conduct of the partnership business.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. SS, Partnership, § 206.] 2. SAME-RENEWAL NOTE.

The execution and delivery of a promissory note as a renewal of a firm obligation already outstanding and due upon which liability is admitted is a transaction within the scope of the business of the partnership.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 38. Partnership, § 242.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Probate Court, Garfield County; M. C. Garber, Judge.

Action by the Oak Creek Valley Bank against A. B. Shapek and another, partners. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Denton & Denton, for plaintiffs in error. McKeever & Walker, for defendant in error.

GILLETTE, J. This action was brought and tried in the probate court of Garfield county, to recover from A. B. Shapek and Frank Hakel, partners as Shapek & Hakel, upon a promissory note indorsed by said partnership and delivered to the plaintiff as a renewal of a former note of the same parties, which had been indorsed and transferred to the plaintiff. From the record it appears that Shapek & Hakel were partners engaged in the mercantile business in the state of Nebraska, and that in December, 1902, such firm was the owner and payee named in a note of $425 executed by F. T. Stoner and W. B. Van Sandt & Co., which note was not paid at maturity. Upon the execution and delivery of said note, it was sold tothe plaintiff bank, and, not being paid at maturity, was renewed by the makers by their executing a new note to Shapek & Hakel, who, in turn, indorsed the same to the bank and thereby took up the original note. Afterwards Mr. Shapek removed to Oklahoma, and, while he was in Oklahoma, said note again became due, and was again renewed. Mr. Hakel of the firm then in charge of their Nebraska business, without consulting his partner. Shapek, indorsed and negotiated this renewal in the same manner as had theretofore been done.

No question is raised with reference to the liability of Shapek & Hakel upon the note renewed and extended by the execution of the note in question, or that, by reason of the execution and delivery of the present note, the former note upon which they were

admittedly liable was canceled and delivered up. The sole question presented by this record being a question of the liability of Shapek & Hakel as indorsers and guarantors of the renewal note sued on, such indorsement having been made by Hakel without the knowledge and consent of his partner Shapek. The amount of the judgment is not questioned, nor the fact of the execution and delivery of the instrument; the only question being the right of Hakel as a partner to so execute and deliver the same as a firm obligation. The statute of Oklahoma (section 3379, Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St. 1903) provides: "Every general partner is agent for the partnership in the transaction of its business, and has authority to do whatever is necessary to carry on such business in the ordinary manner, and for this purpose may bind his co-partners by an agreement in writing." As the partnership is admitted, with Shapek & Hakel as general partners, the liability of the firm and each member thereof is governed by the above-quoted statute, which provides that each partner has authority to do whatever is necessary to carry on the business, and for such purpose may bind his copartners by an agreement in writing. The commercial world deals with a partnership in the light of its rights and liabilities as fixed and governed by the law, and under the law, as above stated, each partner has full power to act with reference to partnership affairs. No private agreement between the partners can affect third persons acting without knowledge of it, and, when Hakel indorsed the firm name to the instrument sued on in this case, the firm was thereafter liable by force of such indorsement if it was so done in the reasonable conduct of the firm's business.

Now, what were the facts? The record makes it clear that at the time Hakel indorsed the note in question with the firm name the firm was already indebted as indorsers upon another note which was then due and unpaid for the same indebtedness. By the indorsement and delivery of this note, the former note was canceled without other payment. The act was therefore the transaction of partnership business clearly within the provisions of the above statute, which governs in this case, in the absence of proof of a different law governing in the state of Nebraska. It would be clearly inequitable and unjust to hold that the partnership or that either of the partners might escape this liability after having, by the execution and delivery of it, canceled an obligation upon which they were admittedly liable, and we think that no rule of law or any statute can be invoked to excuse them from such liability. The plaintiff in error complains of the rule of the court in excluding the testimony of Shapek touching an agreement between him and Hakel to the effect that Hakel had no authority to sign the firm name. Such an agreement could in no wise

bind third persons in dealing with the partnership business, where neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or attempted to be shown, and, as neither fraud nor collusion was shown or proposed to be shown, any private understanding between the partners was wholly immaterial. Exceptions were taken upon the trial of the case by the plaintiff in error to the instructions of the court. We have already seen that the plaintiff in error was liable upon the instrument sued on, and, in the absence of complaint as to the amount of the judgment, an erroneous instruction would not be sufficient to justify a reversal.

We have examined the instructions, however, as well as those asked for by the plaintiff in error and refused, and are of the opinion that the rule of the court under the facts in the case was correct.

The judgment of the court below will be affirmed. All the Justices concurring, except GARBER, J., who tried the case while probate judge of Garfield county, and IRWIN, J., absent.

(19 Okl. 433)

GARRISON v. KRESS et al. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 20, 1907. Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1907.)

1. EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING WRITTEN CONTRACT-FRAUD OR MISTAKE.

A contract in writing, if its terms are free from doubt and ambiguity, must be permitted to speak for itself, and cannot, by the courts at the instance of one of the parties, be altered or contradicted by parol evidence, unless in case of fraud or mutual mistake of facts.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, § 1756.]

2. SAME--MERGER OF ORAL NEGOTIATIONS.

The execution of a contract in writing supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, § 1756.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Probate Court, Oklahoma County; Wm. P. Harper, Judge.

Action by Samuel H. Kress and another against G. W. Garrison for rent. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

On or about the 23d day of July, 1904, Samuel H. Kress and Claude W. Kress leased to G. W. Garrison two upper stories of a certain brick building on lot 9, in block 35, in the city of Oklahoma City, Okl., to be used in connection with the Illinois Hotel, which the said G. W. Garrison at that time occupied. Prior to the completion of the said building, which was to be used in connection with the said hotel, the said G. W. Garrison sold out his interests in the Illinois Hotel and assigned his lease on the proposed annex to said hotel to the purchaser, one Mrs. M. J. Wade. The lease provided that the lessee could as

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