Opinion of the Court. was to the effect that the claimant was entitled to five square leagues of land within this sobrante or surplus. The District Court, however, held that the claimant was entitled to eleven square leagues, if so much should be found within the sobrante, and to all that was found therein if it were less than that amount. The language of this decree, as set forth in the body of the bill, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States at its December Term, 1863, United States v. D'Aguirre, 1 Wall. 311, describes the land confirmed as "the sobrante or surplus lands remaining within the boundaries of the tract of land called San Jacinto, as the same are represented and described in the map of said tract contained in the expediente of Miguel Pedrorena filed in this case and referred to in the grant, over and above certain lands granted to José Antonio Estudillo, and certain other lands granted to Miguel Pedrorena, within the aforesaid boundaries, to the extent of eleven square leagues of land; and if said sobrante or surplus within said boundaries should be less than eleven square leagues, then such less quantity." The bill alleges that the location by survey of the lands confirmed by this decree was not at all within the sobrante of the San Jacinto grant, but that it was located upon other lands than those on which it should have been, because those which were embraced by the survey were valuable as containing ores of tin; and that nearly all the officers engaged in making or establishing it, from and including the Commissioner of the General Land Office down to the deputy surveyors, were interested in the claim at the time. It is alleged that throughout the whole transaction, from the beginning of the effort to have this survey made until its final completion and the issue of the patent, all the proceedings were dictated by fraud, and all the officers of the government below the Secretary of the Interior who had anything to do with it were parties to that fraud, and to be benefited by it. The principal points upon which this fraud is said to rest are, that the land surveyed was not within the larger exterior boundaries out of which the sobrante of San Jacinto Viejo y Neuvo was to be taken, but that said survey described a tract Opinion of the Court. of land of about the same extent, to wit, of about eleven square leagues, situated more than six miles at the nearest point, and more than twenty miles at the farthest point, away from the land in fact granted and conceded by Pio Pico, governor, to the grantee; that the survey of said land was never made in the field, nor from any actual measurements of distances or observation or determination of courses in the field, as the law of the land department required, nor according to the directions of the decree confirming said grant; that the plat and survey were made arbitrarily and without any actual data in the office of the Surveyor General of the United States for California, under the direction and dictation of that officer and one Edward Conway, then chief clerk in charge of that office, and performing the duties of Surveyor General, and by one George H. Thompson, a deputy surveyor acting under the Surveyor General and the chief clerk; that it was so made up without any reference to the expediente that accompanied the grant or juridical possession given at the time of the grant, or to the decree, but that it was made solely with reference to securing, surreptitiously and fraudulently, letters-patent for the land included and described within the said survey and plat, although the same lies outside of the boundaries of the tract called San Jacinto; that the land so surveyed and platted was at that time supposed by said Surveyor General and Edward Conway to contain, and did in fact contain, valuable lodes of tin and other mineral ores, and that all this was well known to the defendant, or to persons composing its stockholders, at the time the patent was issued. It is further alleged that Upson the Surveyor General, Conway, the chief clerk in his office, and Thompson, the deputy who was directed to make the survey and did make the plat, and Joseph H. Wilson, the Commissioner of the General Land Office at Washington, were all interested in and part owners of the claim at the time this survey was made, and at the very time they acted in reference to its final confirmation. Other persons are also said to be inculpated in this fraudulent proceeding whose names it is not necessary at present to mention. Opinion of the Court. It will thus be seen that the entire foundation for the relief sought in this case rests upon a fraud alleged to have been committed upon the government by its own officers, they being interested in the claim to be surveyed and patented. There is no pretence of any mere mistake in the matter, but on the contrary it is asserted that the parties knew exactly what they were doing, and that it was intended to cheat the United States out of valuable mineral ores for the benefit and advantage of those parties and their confederates. The issue is thus narrowed exclusively to the question of fraud. Another question, however, is raised by counsel for the defendant, which is earnestly insisted upon by them, and which received the serious consideration of the judges in the Circuit Court, namely, the right of the Attorney General of the United States to institute this suit. The question as presented is one surrounded by some embarrassment. But as it is in some form or other of frequent recurrence recently, and if decided in favor of the appellees will require the dismissal of the case without a judgment by this court upon its merits, we feel called upon to give the matter our attention. It is denied that the Attorney General has any general authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States to commence a suit in the name of the United States to set aside a patent, or other solemn instrument issued by proper authority. It is quite true that the Revised Statutes, in the title which establishes and regulates the Department of Justice, simply declares, in § 346, that "there shall be at the seat of government an Executive Department to be known as the Department of Justice, and an Attorney General, who shall be the head thereof." There is no very specific statement of the general duties of the Attorney General, but it is seen from the whole chapter referred to that he has the authority, and it is made his duty, to supervise the conduct of all suits brought by or against the United States, and to give advice to the President and the heads of the other departments of the government. There is no express, authority vested in him to authorize suits to be brought against the debtors of the government, Opinion of the Court. or upon bonds, or to begin criminal prosecutions, or to institute proceedings in any of the numerous cases in which the United States is plaintiff; and yet he is invested with the general superintendence of all such suits, and all the district attorneys who do bring them in the various courts in the country are placed under his immediate direction and control. And notwithstanding the want of any specific authority to bring an action in the name of the United States to set aside and declare void an instrument issued under its apparent authority, we cannot believe that where a case exists in which this ought to be done it is not within the authority of that officer to cause such action to be instituted and prosecuted. He is undoubtedly the officer who has charge of the institution and conduct of the pleas of the United States, and of the litigation which is necessary to establish the rights of the government. If the United States in any particular case has a just cause for calling upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts, for relief by setting aside or annulling any of its contracts, its obligations, or its most solemn instruments, the question of the appeal to the judicial tribunals of the country must primarily be decided by the Attorney General of the United States. That such a power should exist somewhere, and that the United States should not be more helpless in relieving itself from frauds, impostures, and deceptions than the private individual, is hardly open to argument. The Constitution itself declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases to which the United States shall be a party, and that this means mainly where it is a party plaintiff is a necessary result of the well-established proposition that it cannot be sued in any court without its consent. There must, then, be an officer or officers of the government to determine when the United States shall sue, to decide for what it shall sue, and to be responsible that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases. The attorneys of the United States in every judicial district are officers of this character, and they are by statute under the immediate supervision and control of the Attorney General. How, then, can it be argued that if the United States has been deceived, en Opinion of the Court. trapped, or defrauded into the making, under the forms of law, of an instrument which injuriously affects its rights of property, or other rights, it cannot bring a suit to avoid the effect of such instrument, thus fraudulently obtained, without a special act of Congress in each case, or without some special authority applicable to this class of cases, while all other just grounds of suing in a court of justice concededly belong to the Department of Justice, and are in use every day? The judiciary act of 1789, in its third section, which first created the office of Attorney General, without any very accurate definition of his powers, in using the words that "there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as Attorney General for the United States," 1 Stat. 93, c. 21, § 35, must have had reference to the similar office with the same designation existing under the English law. And though it has been said that there is no common law of the United States, it is still quite true that when acts of Congress use words which are familiar in the law of England, they are supposed to be used with reference to their meaning in that law. In all this, however, the Attorney General acts as the head of one of the Executive departments, representing the authority of the President in the class of subjects within the domain of that department and under his control. In the case of the United States v. Hughes, 11 How. 552, one Godbee had entered and paid for land at the United States land office in New Orleans, but had not taken out his patent. Hughes, well knowing this fact, entered, paid for, and received a patent for the same land, the prior entry of Godbee being overlooked by the land officers. The United States having tendered Hughes his purchase money, the Attorney General filed an information on behalf of the United States to repeal the patent. The defendant, Hughes, demurred on the ground that no authority existed for bringing such a suit; but this court, saying that it cannot "be conceived why the government should stand on a different footing from any other proprietor," p. 568, overruled the demurrer. When the case afterwards came into this court on appeal from the decree on the final hearing, it said: "It was the plain duty of the United |