Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. You referred to your desire to have as large a number of trained men on the canal as possible. Will you give us some statement of your idea of the defense of the canal in time of warthat is, in its larger bearings?

Col. GOETHALS. The canal ought to have seacoast defenses, and they ought to be ample for all purposes. I am one of those, Mr. Hobson, who do not believe that any fleet will attempt to engage the batteries on the seacoast until the naval fight is settled.

Mr. HOBSON. You do not believe that?

Col. GOETHALS. I do not believe it.

Mr. HOBSON. What do you think would be the policy in case of an attack by a naval power probably stronger than ours on the sea?

Col. GOETHALS. Any naval power stronger than ours would probably approach the canal to develop the fact whether our defenses were properly and efficiently manned. Having developed that, even though stronger than ours, they would withdraw, because the engagement would be so unequal. They can not run the risk of reducing their naval strength before they meet our fleet, so that assuming our guns are mounted

Mr. HOBSON (interposing). In fact, you can almost say that even after meeting our fleet, the fight would always be unequal?

Col. GOETHALS. They will never put ships against the forts. Take the fortifications of this country, and arrangements must be made to prevent, by land batteries and earthworks, an attack from the rear on the defenses, but I do not think at Panama that the defenses for the protection of the rear of the seacoast batteries is so important as defenses around the locks. The rear attack necessitates the landing of a force on the coast, and after landing they will be able to approach the locks as quickly as they will the seacoast batteries. The destruction or capture of a lock settles the use of the canal. So, I think, the canal is an exception to the policy that we adopt of building seacoast batteries in this country, relying, in time of war, upon defending them from the rear, after the outbreak of war, and that we ought to go to the European policy of seacoast defenses against an attack from the sea and strongly intrenched camps around the locks.

Mr. HOBSON. Have the mobile Army ready?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir. The mobile Army has got to be ready to take the offensive when the landing is attempted, and, if forced back, must be provided with such works around the locks and dams as to force the enemy, if necessary, to resort to siege operations in order to capture them.

Mr. HOBSON. In that work you can easily conceive how the enemy would want to preserve the canal? Of course they might undertake to destroy it.

Col. GOETHALS. I can understand how an enemy might prefer to capture the canal rather than destroy it.

Mr. HOBSON. If he has sufficient power?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir; and if he has not, his object will be to render the canal useless to our fleet, so as to avoid that engagement, if possible. Those are the two conditions.

Mr. HOBSON. How many men do you think it would require, Colonel, to give reasonable assurance of having an adequate mobile Army, in case we lose control of the sea, if we had reasonable time to support an army?

Col. GOETHALS. If we were a military nation, the ideal condition. would be to put not less than 20,000 or 25,000 men there, and keep them there at all times, and adopt the principle that those men must at all times be so thoroughly trained that there is absolutely no duty. that will devolve upon them in time of war that they will not have had in time of peace. That is another reason why I advocate the depopulation of the zone. But the number of men that can be placed there must be determined by the military policy of the Nation. With our present Army strength we can only provide sufficient to be sure of warding off any attack made by men who can be gathered together from the fleet and landed to make a raid.

Mr. HOBSON. Could you hold out a considerable length of time, even if you had 25,000 men, if the sea were open to a military power with a large transport service and with an army ready when war broke out?

Col. GOETHALS. I think I could hold out as long as Port Arthur did.

Mr. HOBSON. How long did Port Arthur hold out?

Col. GOETHALS. Eight or nine months. I don't remember the exact time.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you charge the maintenance of the 25,000 men there to the military establishment or to the operation of the canal?

Col. GOETHALS. To the military establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. And not as a part of the canal?

Col. GOETHALS. No, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. It would only be a question, comparatively, of the length of time?

Col. GOETHALS. It is only a question of time in any attack. With the enemy in control of the sea, it is only a question of time when it falls. The hope that I would have would be to hold the canal, because I can not imagine a condition where our entire Navy would be wiped out, until such repairs could be made that our Navy could again take the field and become at least a pestiferous enemy, if not a very formidable one, or relief could be secured.

Mr. ROBERTS. You are assuming that the enemy controls both oceans. If they only control one ocean, you could hold out indefinitely?

Col. GOETHALS. I can not imagine a war where we have lost control of the sea where the enemy's ships will not be on both seas. They will send ships around the cape.

Mr. ROBERTS. In time they would send ships around the cape? Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And that would give us time to rush in supplies and food?

Col. GOETHALS. We could get supplies, but it will be difficult with a condition of war in this country with the Isthmus 2,000 miles away to get additional troops.

Mr. ROBERTS. Is the coast of such a nature that a force could be landed out of the range of any batteries that might be placed there? Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir; they can land anywhere on either coast, and then the difficulty will be to get to the canal. That is where the function of the Army comes in, to prevent them from getting to the

canal. If they should come in such numbers as to force the Army back, then the Army must take shelter in the land defenses.

Mr. ROBERTS. The reason I asked the questions I have was because I have heard it stated that it would be impossible for an enemy to land and come in the rear of any of the fortifications because of the nature of the country through which they would have to travel.

Col. GOETHALS. No, sir; you could get an army through anywhere in that country. You could not get through certain parts with large numbers; but if you can force the enemy to bring all of his siege materials and begin siege operations against the intrenched camps around the locks, that is going to take time, and you can harrass him greatly in doing that if you have enough of an army, or if you have sufficient numbers to warrant the sacrifice of some men in doing it. Mr. ROBERTS. You have given more or less personal study to the question of defenses there, have you not?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Have you considered the desirability of having, in addition to the land batteries, a torpedo-boat flotilla, with both submarines and destroyers, at each end of the canal to keep an enemy's ships at a reasonable distance?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Do you think, with the defenses now contemplated, that it would be possible for an enemy to blockade either end of that canal if we had a sufficient number of torpedo boats, submarines, and destroyers at both ends?

Col. GOETHALS. No, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And if they could not blockade the entrance to the canal, they could not land troops?

Col. GOETHALS. Oh, yes; they could land troops anywhere, but I do not know how many troops. They will not dare to bring transports with troops under those conditions, but how many men they could land from the fleet I do not know. The naval contingent which was on the defense board of the canal estimated that it would be possible to make such a landing with about five or six thousand men; but I have heard others dispute that proposition, maintaining that the battleship of to-day must keep all of its men until the sea fight is over, and I can not imagine a naval commander reducing the number of his men unless he has some great inducement for doing it.

Mr. ROBERTS. If we had a large flotilla of torpedo boats, of both destroyers and submarines, stationed at either end of the canal, how close would an enemy dare to come, knowing that this large flotilla of submarines, destroyers, and torpedo craft was there? Col. GOETHALS. They would keep pretty well out.

Mr. ROBERTS. A good many miles out?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Fifteen or twenty miles from either end?

Col. GOETHALS. It would depend upon the distance at which the torpedo craft could operate. It would depend upon their radius of action.

Mr. ROBERTS. The radius of action of the torpedo craft, including both submarines and destroyers, would practically determine the nearness of the enemy's approach?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Do you contemplate having, in addition to the land batteries and defenses, these flotillas of torpedo craft?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir; I believe there will be; but the naval program for the canal is something I know nothing about.

Mr. HOBSON. Do you contemplate anything for the defense of the locks as against aerial craft?

Col. GOETHALS. We had four aerial experts on the Isthmus, each one of whom was going to demonstrate how quickly he could put the locks out of action. After spending some little time on the Isthmus, they concluded that on account of adverse currents, or the unreliability of currents, none of them would attempt an ascent. I do not fear any aerial attacks on the locks.

Mr. HOBSON. The target offered by the locks to one on an air craft out of range of shot, say two or three thousand feet up, would be negligible, would it not?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir; furthermore the charge of dynamite or other explosive would have to be located very carefully in order to do damage, and the dropping of packages of explosives of the size that have been suggested would not do any damage to the locks.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Goethals, you were speaking about the possibility of landing forces there a moment ago; do you think that it is within the reasonable probabilities that an enemy would bring his army on transports and take the chance of landing them at the canal when the transports would be subject to attack from the fleet?

Col. GOETHALS. No, sir; I do not think any transports will be used until after the sea fight.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the only ships that will be brought there will be fighting ships?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. I want to ask you this question of practical application: Suppose we are still on a one-fleet basis as a Nation, and that war should break out in one ocean-say, for instance, the war should break out in the Pacific, with our fleet in the other ocean-do you think that you could insure the integrity of the canal for a sufficient length of time to guarantee the safe passage of our fleet to the other ocean?

Col. GOETHALS. I do.

Mr. HOBSON. Suppose we should have control of the sea in one ocean and the enemy should have control in the other ocean; then, of course, you could always guarantee against his passage. His control of the sea would be in the other ocean, and, consequently, his ability to fight is in that ocean, and troops could be sent to the Canal Zone indefinitely. Now, do you think that the ultimate event of such a war would be settled by the meeting of armies in the Canal Zone? You referred to the fact that you did not expect any more troops after war was declared, but, of course, that is assuming that the enemy has control of the sea in both oceans and that we did not undertake to operate in either ocean; but let us assume that we could operate in one ocean while the enemy held the other ocean

Col. GOETHALS. There are certain conditions that I think ought to be taken into account, Mr. Hobson. Assuming that war is declared and that the enemy is making his advance on the Pacific side, I can not imagine any condition arising which would prevent our Navy

from going over there and getting into the Pacific Ocean before he I could reach the canal.

Mr. HOBSON. But suppose the war should occur at a time when our fleet is inferior to the enemy's fleet and at a time when we did not care, at least for some time, to make that experiment; you could save our fleet from a forced engagement with the enemy, but you would not be able through the aid of our fleet to prevent the enemy's land operations.

Col. GOETHALS. I can not imagine an enemy encumbering its fleet with transports, or of anything that could arise on the Pacific Ocean, for instance

Mr. HOBSON (interposing). Assuming that it is on the Pacific side. Col. GOETHALS. Assuming that that condition does arise

Mr. HOBSON (interposing). And that our fleet, which is on the Atlantic side, is inferior to the enemy's fleet in the Pacific.

Col. GOETHALS. If we have, say, 25,000 men there, or that they can be sent there even assuming that the enemy can land a large enough force to make us retire in our intrenched position-I think we could hold out until we got reenforcements.

Mr. GREGG. And that is assuming that we have control of the Atlantic?

Col. GOETHALS. Yes, sir. On the other hand, with our fleet in the Pacific and that ocean under our control, the enemy's superior force being in the Atlantic, nothing is going to be gained by an attack on the canal

Mr. HOBSON (interposing). The enemy would destroy the canal if he could.

Col. GOETHALS. To prevent our fleet going through

Mr. HOBSON. And then he would concentrate there.

Col. GOETHALS. I think Germany is better equipped than any other power with transports, and I do not think they could land troops there before we could get reenforcements.

Mr. HOBSON. How many men are they allowing you?

Col. GOETHALS. Eight thousand.

Mr. HOBSON. What could you do with 8.000 troops?

Col. GOETHALS. That is about the proportion of our present military force that can be spared for the canal, and assuming that a landing force from the fleet does not exceed five or six thousand men, this would be sufficient to stop a raid.

Mr. ROBERTS. Recurring to the condition that was put before you by Capt. Hobson, of our fleet controlling one ocean and the enemy's fleet controlling the other ocean, with a suitable number of torpedo craft, submarines and destroyers, at the ocean entrance of the canal on the side controlled by the enemy, do you believe that they could land any number of men that would be at all sufficient for that dertaking?

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Col. GOETHALS. That was not Capt. Hobson's last proposition. He assumed that we were not prepared on either ocean.

Mr. ROBERTS. My assumption was that we would have a flotilla of torpedo craft, submarines and destroyers, at both entrances to the canal.

Mr. HOBSON. Well, we are assuming that the enemy would have torpedo craft, also, and that he would have more on either ocean.