Mr. ROBERTS. Who has the allotment of the space, Mr. Secretary? Secretary MEYER. I do not know.

Mr. ROBERTS. Does that come under the superintendent of buildings?

Secretary MEYER. I do not know. There would be a different arrangement if the State Department went out.

Mr. ROBERTS. I understand. That is what I had in mind, who would have the final determination of the space vacated.

Secretary MEYER. We have now 68,860 square feet of floor space in the State, War, and Navy Department Building, and 49,504 square feet of floor space in the Mills Building. If that could be all in one building it would help to economize time and expense.

Mr. ROBERTS. The Navy Department could occupy practically all of the State, War, and Navy Department Building?

Secretary MEYER. Undoubtedly, if we could centralize everything

there.

Mr. ROBERTS. If you had the building at your disposal you could fill it all?

Secretary MEYER. Over half, because we are very much crowded

now.

Mr. ROBERTS. And the War Department could much more than fill it?

Secretary MEYER. I imagine so. I can not answer for the War Department.

Mr. HOBSON. The rentals outside make a very considerable item? Secretary MEYER. I think in the case of the Mills Building we are paying 6 per cent on the cost of the building. We occupy it all. The CHAIRMAN. Is not a part of the Mills Building occupied by the Isthmian Canal Commission?

Secretary MEYER. That is a separate building that is occupied by the Isthmian Canal Commission.

The mobilization of the fleet was an important feature this year in the way of educating the people and giving an ocular demonstration. We had 31 battleships in commission. We would have had 32 battleships at the review, but a shaft was broken in one of the vessels just a month or two previous and could not be ready in time. That demonstrates the method we are employing of keeping the vessels either in active service or in reserve, and we are practically doing all that now with about the same amount of money.

Mr. HOBSON. Have you ever considered the idea of considerably enlarging the matériel of the navy and putting it in reserve and having periodical mobilizations, but keeping the expenses down by keeping actually a part out of commission; I do not mean less than we have in commission, but suppose we had a fleet in commission on the Atlantic and a fleet in commission on the Pacific, anything over and above that had better be laid up under our expensive system?

Secretary MEYER. It has been found that a ship out of commission deteriorates so very rapidly

Mr. HOBSON (interposing). Is that necessary? Could we not develop the Philadelphia Navy Yard for big ships and some inland water somewhere for smaller craft like destroyers, with the advantage over any other nation in the world of having available for our use fresh water?

Secretary MEYER. The fresh-water basin in Philadelphia is to be the port of the reserve fleet of battleships, and the council have been studying this very question of a system which will put these ships in such condition that they will be ready at the shortest possible notice and at the same time will not deteriorate. Our experience is this, that it is more economical to the Government, taking into account the rapidity of deterioration, to have reserve crews in the engine room one-third and the deck crews one-quarter. In that way the ships can be kept in condition.

Mr. HOBSON. Of course, there would be nothing in the expenditure of coal, very little in oil, and the cost of maintenance would be very low, and still the integrity of the ship would be kept in intact! Secretary MEYER. In case of an emergency, that was demonstrated the other day when they equipped two ships to go to Turkey. Those ships were in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point, Mr. Secretary, when the emergency arose for two ships, you could supply them easily and readily?

Secretary MEYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But suppose the emergency had called for 15 ships?

Secretary MEYER. We would have sent the fleet; that would be the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to the fleet?

Secretary MEYER. We would have to be at war to do that. We are not on a war basis, but we have the ships on an emergency basis. Mr. HOBSON. While you could expand the personnel on short notice, we have not the ships?

Secretary MYER. I wish to submit for the very serious consideration of the committee the question of the naval reserve. If we can get a reserve of 50,000, half of whom have been in the Navy and the other half in the mercantile service, either on the Lakes or along the coast, then we will have a personnel emergency reserve which would be of great value in time of need.

The CHAIRMAN. When Admiral Pillsbury was chief of the bu reau, he made a statement before this committee that it takes longer to train a seaman than it does to build a battleship.

Secretary MEYER. Well, I do not know; I would think that he would want to reconsider that, because at the training station in six weeks we can train them so that we can put them aboard ship, and they are useful in connection with the other men.

Mr. HOBSON. The average man in the fleet has had less than two years' experience?

Secretary MEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. Please put in the hearing some definite recommendation with regard to the reserve in connection with the existing conditions and the personnel reserve in connection with the proposed condition of development of the militia.

Secretary MEYER. The only form of naval reserve now existing is the naval militia. The development of that force can best and only be properly attained by the passage of the naval militia bill now on the calendar of Congress. The passage of that act is therefore earnestly recommended.

In view of the limited number of small vessels in the Navy and the increasing demand for their services it is recommended that Congress consider the construction of a type of small vessel for Naval Militia use in time of peace and to be used by the Navy in cases of emergency, either in peace or war. The above conditions will make possible the full development of the Naval Militia.

The Naval-Militia recruits form a very intelligent class of citizens. They are, however, on enlisting, untrained, except that part which comes from the skilled trades. They are, however, attaining a high degree of efficiency, and additional reserve can be formed from two classes of men who are already trained in the duties they will be called upon to perform in time of war. These are ex-officers and men of the Navy and officers and men of the merchant marine. In time of war these two classes of men would be called upon as follows:

(A) Ex-officers and men of the Navy, together with Naval Militia, to man the active and reserve ships of the Navy.

(B) Merchant marine officers and men to officer and man the 300 or 400 auxiliaries that will be needed.

The Navy Department has been collecting data on the subject of this latter type of reserve and is able to report that the plan meets with almost universal favor. The department bases its estimate of the favor with which the proposed Naval Reserve will be received on the many approving letters from the officers at the head of the largest merchant marine associations, such as Neptune Association, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, masters, mates, and pilots, etc., steamship managers, merchant marine officers, and from the ex-officers and men of the Navy. About 2,000 have volunteered to enroll at the present time.

Mr. ROBERTS. The point you are bringing out is that under this present system of reserve ships you can get them into active commission as rapidly as you get men for them?

Secretary MEYER. Yes, sir; and if the men are not ready we can take men temporarily from the fleet, if we want to strip the fleet in a small proportion.

The CHAIRMAN. Can not you take men from civil life and mingle them with the trained men?"

Secretary MEYER. We could if we had a reserve. We did that in the mobilization with the Naval Militia.

Mr. HOBSON. If that could be worked out along this line, that we have not become a first-class naval power in commission, but that in potentiality we should be a first-class naval power, to work out a system under which at reduced cost we could maintain the reserve of material and personnel and the legislation required?

Secretary MEYER. I will do that.

Mr. ROBERTS. Have we enough men on the ships, in reserve, so they, in conjunction with the Naval Militia, could make an efficient crew?

Secretary MEYER. I think our Naval Militia is only about 7.000. The CHAIRMAN. Seven or eight thousand.

Secretary MEYER. Is it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Are the Naval Militia well enough trained and with enough experience so that they could go aboard ship and join in with

the officers and men stationed on the reserve ships and make an efficient crew?

Secretary MEYER. In order to demonstrate that and to get experience we made arrangements with the Naval Militia to come to the mobilization and we distributed them on some of the battleships with very satisfactory results. I hope it will become an accustomed event, this mobilization of the fleet, so that such trials in connection with the personnel reserve or Naval Militia could be brought out and put in practice in order that we may put our reserve vessels in commission temporarily and in order to demonstrate to the country whether we are going backward or forward. We got those two ships, with supplies, men, crews, and everything, out inside of 72 hours to go to Constantinople.

Mr. LEE. How many battleships have we now lying in the reserve basin?

Secretary MEYER. About 10.

Mr. LEE. Do you know how many they can put in the back basin? Secretary MEYER. Enough for our purposes.

I want to call the attention of the committee to the preparedness of the fleet as regards repairs. The preparedness of the fleet as regards repairs and upkeep has been maintained at a most satisfactory standard, and the ships of the Navy, irrespective of their classes, have been generally in a condition to respond to the many calls that have been made upon them. That is shown in the table of vessels of the Navy ready for service and those undergoing extensive repairs at the end of certain calendar years. In 1909 we had in active service 109 and 50 repairing, and in 1912 we had 160 in active service and 20 repairing. None of those repairing were battleships and none colliers. There was one armored cruiser and five cruisers.

Mr. BATHRICK. Are those all fighting ships?

Secretary MEYER. The battleships are all ships of the first line, capital ships, 33 in service, and one on the Pacific coast, the Oregon. Experience has shown the wisdom of systematic preparations for war. If we wait until a crisis comes, it is then too late to make effective preparations, and the result is confusion, waste, and unnecessary loss of life. I claim that this insurance against war is the greatest certainty of peace we can have.

I want to call your attention to the fact that while we are urging battleships, for they must be the basis of the fleet, we distinctly realize that the torpedo boat and submarine, auxiliaries, etc.

Mr. TALBOTT. How about the airship?

Secretary MEYER. We do not go into the airship, which is known as the dirigible. We are going into the question and study of the heavier-than-air ship known as the hydroplane.

Mr. BATHRICK. Have you followed the Zeppelin class in Germany and France?

Secretary MEYER. I have tried to follow it personally, but we get reports from our naval attachés, and so does the Army from their military attachés abroad. I believe so far as the Navy is concerned it is the hydroplane that we shall develop. The hydroplane is the air vessel that will rise from the water and can light on the water.

The CHAIRMAN. One which would arise from the water in a bad sea?

Secretary MEYER. I do not suppose so, because a ship has difficulty in a bad sea.

The CHAIRMAN. And light again?

Secretary MEYER. Not in a bad sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not the wind that made the sea bad make the atmosphere so bad that the plane could not go up?

Secretary MEYER. When we first saw the Wright experiments held at Fort Myer they had to wait until it was almost a calm. Now you see these men going up in quite strong breezes. Sometimes they go up for the last time, but they go up. We are giving more attention to all this, and we have asked for about $100,000, limited to $50,000 from construction and $50,000 from steam engineering.

Mr. BATHRICK. If it should develop later on that the attempts that have been made and are contemplated to cross the ocean in a dirigible balloon are successful, do you think that would change the trend of defense?

Secretary MEYER. I do not think so, as far as the Navy is concerned.

I want to touch on powder. Owing to the fact that the United States and France both use a nitrocellulose powder, the deplorable accident to the French battleship Liberté furnished a basis for criticism of the American powder and for assertions that similar disasters were to be anticipated in the United States Navy. While the two powders are of the same general type, both being nitrocellulose powders, they differ materially in the kind of solvent used. The French official reports show that their methods of manufacture, blending, and reworking are such as to cause the two powders to be radically different. Recent reports from France are to the effect that all powder now in service is to be withdrawn and replaced by powder exactly like that used in the United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Twining explained to us in detail the characteristics of the powder.

Secretary MEYER. Then I will not go into that any further.

Mr. HOBSON. Are you in favor of developing Indianhead both as a proving ground and for the manufacture of powder?

Secretary MEYER. Yes. I am not in favor of the Government doing it entirely. We should have other resources, and the private parties are always making experiments.

Mr. HOBSON. Do you not think the Government should have a larger capacity?

Secretary MEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TALBOTT. The private firms report to the Government anything they find out?

Secretary MEYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking about the Indianhead proposition, there is an estimate submitted for the purchase of about 9,100 acres of land below Indianhead and on to the point of the peninsula for a proving ground, an enterprise that will cost, in addition to the land, $450,000, and $200,000 for the land. What have you to say with reference to that?

Secretary MEYER. My recollection is that that came up to me and I studied it and made some alterations in the suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole project recommended would cost about $650,000?