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SUMMARY-ENLISTED MEN, ACTIVE LIST.
General court-martial prisoners.
$2, 073, 224
333, 180 117, 500 122, 000
4, 352 45, 000 73, 200 8, 000
1, 000 300, 620 3, 078, 076
87, 860 3, 165, 936
400 additional men submitted
Col. RICHARDS. I will explain this item of “Pay of enlisted men by saying that on the base pay of the enlisted force there is an increase of, roughly, $103,000 on account of the 400 additional men authorized last year, who have just been added to the corps, and we are now providing a full year's pay for the 400; also for continuousservice pay, $48,000 increase. There is an increase of $122,000 for sea pay of the marines serving afloat, for the enlisted force. For expert riflemen, sharpshooters, and marksmen we ask an increase of $53,000.
Mr. BUTLER. Why?
Col. RICHARDS. Because we estimate there will be 48 per cent of the Marine Corps qualified in marksmanship. Capt. Harllee, one of our best officers and an expert on target practice, told me the other day that one expert rifleman was worth three or perhaps four ordinary men. So we consider this an economy.
Mr. BUTLER. As the men qualify as marksmen their pay under the general law is increased ?
Col. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. There are three grades: An expert rifleman, who gets $5 a month; a sharpshooter, who gets $3 a month; and a marksman, who gets $2 a month; and by adding $5, $3, or $22 to a man's compensation you get a man who is worth three or perhaps four ordinary men.
Mr. ROBERTS. What is the distinction between an expert rifleman and a sharpshooter?
Col. RICHARDS. I am not familiar with that. It is a little bit out of my line as paymaster.
Gen. BIDDLE. In order to qualify as a marksman it is necessary for a man to make 60 per cent of the possible in a course requiring slow fire at 200, 300, 500, and 600 yards; rapid fire at 200 and 300 yards; and skirmish fire which covers the ranges from 200 to 600 yards.
To qualify as a marksman a man must have received, prior to going on the range, a course of instruction in all the elements of rifle shooting, and a man who makes the necessary percentage to qualify in this course must be a very good shot. His value as a soldier is greatly increased by the fact that he has attained this qualification.
To qualify as a sharpshooter a man must first have qualified as a marksman and must fire slow fire at 800 and 1,000 yards and rapid fire at 500 yards, making an aggregate of nearly 64 per cent in the combined marksman's and sharpshooter's course. A man to qualify as a sharpshooter nust be a very good shot at the long ranges mentioned.
To qualify as an expert rifleman a man is required to undergo a test which is entirely different in its scope from either of the other courses. The shooting is done at silhouettes of a man kneeling and a man lying down. These silhouettes are of an olive-drab color, difficult to see under the most favorable conditions. The ranges are from 200 to 600 yards. The targets at these ranges are, in some instances, moving on a track; others are bobbing targets, being exposed for five seconds only, and then disappearing. This test is considered very difficult, and it is shown to be such by the comparatively small number of men that are able to qualify as expert riflemen. Besides being an excellent shot, it requires quick judgment and, if anything, a keener vision than the other courses. Out of 50 shots in this test a man must make 25 hits on the silhouettes to qualify.
In addition to the above courses, each course carries with it an estimating distance test, in which a man must be able to estimate distances from 200 to 1,200 yards within 80 to 90 per cent of accuracy.
A qualification as expert rifleman holds good for enlistment in which attained and one year in subsequent enlistment, provided the man reenlists within three months. If during the first year of subsequent enlistment he qualifies as sharpshooter, then at the expiration of expert rifleman qualification he is entitled to pay of a sharpshooter, and so on.
Mr. ROBERTS. Having once attained this rank, he does not hold it! Col. RICHARDS. No, sir; only for a limited time.
Mr. Hobson. Has not your corps been unusually successful in the last year!
Col. RICHARDS. Indeed, we have. We ask here now for increased compensation for 655 expert riflemen, 3,038 sharpshooters, and 1,140 marksmen out of a corps of a little under 10,000. That is about 48 per cent.
Mr. BUTLER. Some of those men are on ships all the time and do not have an opportunity to qualify?
Col. RICHARDS. Oh, yes; they have opportunities to qualify there. Mr. BUTLER. Are they taken off the ships to the targets?
Col. RICHARDS. For instance, the fleet goes down to Guantanamo, and there they have a fine range where the men have an opportunity to qualify.
Mr. BUTLER. Would they have the same opportunity, as the men on land, alongside the range?
Col. BIDDLE. They have a very fine range in Guantanamo.
Gen. BIDDLE. A marksman is required to make 64 per cent of the possible hits.
Mr. Roberts. Do you furnish the men all the opportunity they desire to go on the range and all the ammunition, or do you give them a certain amount for each year and send them out under detail?
Col. McCAWLEY. They are sent out with an allowance of ammunition; they can not have all they want, but they have the right to fire so many rounds.
Col. RICHARDS. Part of their training consists of gallery practice and not really firing on the range.
Mr. BUTLER. This increase, as I understand, is because the men have increased in numbers in marksmanship?
Col. RICHARDS. Yes, sir. An officer was telling me only yesterday in my office-he had just returned from Nicaragua--that his company had about 75 per cent of recruits, men who had served six or eight months; that prior to their service in Nicaragua every one of these men had been given an opportunity to go on the range ai Winthrop and a number of them had qualified as marksmen and sharpshooters, with a few as expert riflemen. They had learned how to handle themselves and the rifle. This officer spoke of the remarkable shooting these men did in the assault on Coyotepe Hill.
By request of a member of the committee, Gen. Biddle submitted the following statement as to the recent operations of the marines in Nicaragua :
Under date of August 6, 1912, in accordance with instructions from the Navy Department, orders were cabled to Maj. Butler to leave a small detachment at Camp Elliott and proceed with a battalion of three companies to the city of Panama and there embark on the U. S. S. Justin for Corinto, Nicaragua ; the battalion arrived at Corinto on August 14.
A detachment of bluejackets from the U. S. S. Annapolis had previously been sent to Managua as a guard for the American legation at that place. The detachment was under the command of Lieut. James E. Campbell, United States Navy. It later became a part of Maj. Butler's battalion and served as such throughout the campaign.
On August 21, 1912, the department directed that additional marines be sent from the United States to Nicaragua. A regiment of 750 marines from various posts from Portsmouth, N. H., to Charleston, S. C., under command of Col. Pendleton embarked on the U. S. S. Prairie at the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., at about noon August 24, 1912, fully equipped for foreign tropical service beyond the seas.
Upon arriving at Corinto, September 4, 1912, Col. Pendleton reported to Rear Admiral Southerland, the commander in chief. Headquarters were established at Managua. Lieut. Col. Long (with two battalions of bluejackets and marines) was assigned the district of Leon and vicinity.
A skirmish occurred about September 20, 1912, when, in order to procure uninterrupted railroad traffic, a battalion under command of Maj. Butler was ordered to Granada, where conditions were reported as exceptionally bad. While passing through Masaya the train transporting this detachment was fired upon by a large force of Nicaraguan rebels and several Americans were wounded : Corpl. Bourne, Pyts. Browne and Betzer, and Trumpeter Brown. The fire was promptly returned and the rebel force dispersed. After some delay caused by the making of necessary repairs to bridges and the re-laying of dismantled track, the train without further molestation proceeded to Granada, where Maj. Butler called for the surrender of and received all railroad property held by the rebels in that vicinity.
Not only did Maj. Butler's command succeed in opening and maintaining communication by rail with Granada, but it effected a disarming of rebel forces in that vicinity and the turning over of the city to Federal authorities; and the various duties, both civil and military, required of Maj. Butler on this occasion were performed by him in a most creditable manner.
The naval forces now held all important points between Granada and Corinto except Masaya and Leon, and in order to insure the security of the several commands and to assist in restoring harmonious conditions it appeared necessary that control of these localities be obtained.
In consequence of the refusal of the rebel forces to surrender and evacuate strongly fortified positions on Coyotepe and Baranca, in the immediate vicinity of Masaya, which, as long as they were held by the rebel forces, prevented uninterrupted railroad traffic and were a source of constant danger, an attack by the naval forces under the command of Col. Pendleton was made on October 3, 1912. His command consisted of one battalion commanded by Maj. Butler; one
battalion commanded by Maj. McKelry; one battalion from the U. S. S. Califor. nia, commanded by Lieut. Commander Steele. On October 4 the rebel position was assaulted, and though for years it had been considered throughout Central America as impregnable, it was taken in less than 40 minutes by a force of marines and bluejackets whose numerical strength was less than that of the defenders.
Col. Pendleton has been complimented most highly by the commander in chief for the manner in which he conducted the attack and assault on this rebel position, and he deserves commendation not only for the immediate success then attained by bim, but also because the ultimate success of our Government in its intervention was largely due to his zeal and efficiency.
During the attacks upon Coyotepe and Baranca the following casualties occurred :
Killed: Pvts. Bobbett, Durham, McGill, and Pollard.
It is believed that special mention should be made here of the bravery of Pvt. Durham. During the assault on Coyotepe on October 4, 1912, the attacking party encountered barbed wire fences and entanglements within about 50 yards of the rebel position. Reports show that Pvt. Durham. regardless of the danger to which he was exposed, succeeded, under a heavy fire, in cutting the wire obstruction. While performing this duty he was killed by a shell from the rebel lines, and, though he sacrificed his own life, he made it possible for our forces to advance and gain the enemy's position with but few casualties.
On October 6, 1912, Lieut. Col. Long, in command of the forces consisting of one battalion commanded by Maj. McKelvey, one battalion commanded by Maj. Reid; one battalion from the C. S. S. California, commanded by Lieut. Commander Steele; one battalion from the U. S. S. Colorado, commanded by Lieut. Wallace, United States Navy; and a detachment of marines commanded by Maj. Ilill; a total of about 1,300 men, though opposed by about 2,000 rebels. entered and assumed control of Leon,
The following casualties occurred during this affair:
Killed: Pvt. Bartels; Turret Capt. Morgan, from the U. S. S. Colorado; Ordinary Seaman Burgess, from the U. S. S. Colorado.
Wounded: Pvt. Kittsmiller, from the U. S. S. Colorado; Ordinary Seaman Lamper, from the U. S. S. Colorado.
Several others, whose names were not correctly recorded in official reports, were slightly wounded.
From the reports of Rear Admiral Southerland and Col. Pendleton it is evident that Col. Long performed a very difficult duty in an exceptionally efficient manner.
Throughout this service officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps, and officers and enlisted men of the Navy, from the Annapolis, California, Colorado, Clereland, and Denver worked side by side, performing cheerfully and efficiently the many and varied duties incident to field service, and officers and enlisted men demonstrated that they could, in emergencies, conduct civil affairs, build roads and railroad bridges, lay railroad track, and run trains, as well as carry on an offensive campaign in a highly satisfactory manner.
Col. Pendleton, however, has stated that all officers and men performed so well the various duties assigned them, and incident to their grades, that individual commendation is almost impracticable.
On October 19, a force of mounted marines and bluejackets, under the command of Col. Pendleton, left La Paz for Matagalpa, about 90 miles distant, for the purpose of assuring the inhabitants of the friendly intentions of the United States Government, and to endeavor to dispel any feeling of unrest that might be found to exist.
This expedition returned November 1, having obtained most satisfactory results.
On November 22 (officers and enlisted men of the Navy having returned to the various vessels to which they were attached) the remainder of the various forces, with the exception of about 400 marines, who were left in the vicinity of Managua, embarked on the U. S. S. Buffalo for Panama.
From the recent experience of our troops in Nicaragua I am convinced that the training of our officers and enlisted men at home stations has been productive of most desirable results.
Mr. Kopp. Have the marines participated in any international contests?
Col. RICHARDS. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kopp. How have they fared in the last five years, speaking in general terms ?
Gen. BIDDLE. They have not fired in an international match as one team, but there have been individual marines on the international teams, and next summer, when we have the big international match at Camp Perry, the Marine Corps will be represented by a team of its own.
Mr. Hobson. Was the Marine Corps represented at Stockholm?
Gen. BIDDLE. At Buenos Aires we had two marines on the team, but at Stockholm I do not think we had any.
Mr. Hobson. Do you know the maximum percentage of qualifications in any battalion of your corps ?
Gen. BIDDLE. The battalion on the Isthmus of Panama is probably the only complete battalion we have now.
Mr. Hobson. What percentage did the battalion on the Isthmus make?
Gen. BIDDLE. I will insert that in the record. For 1911 the reports show that 1 per cent qualified as experts, 28 per cent as sharpshooters, and 13 per cent as marksmen: The reports for 1912 have not been received as yet, but I have been informed that the percentage of qualifications is very much higher.
The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to state what percentage of the men in the Marine Corps reenlist for second enlistment, third enlistment, and fourth enlistment?
Cos. McCAWLEY. I put that information in my hearing on the public works.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have it here also.
Col. MCCAWLEY. About 23 per cent of those who complete their first enlistment reenlist.
The CHAIRMAN. And also the percentage of second enlistment men who reenlist for the third enlistment?
Col. McCAWLEY, About 74 per cent.
Mr. Foss. It would seem to me that if more than 50 per cent of the men have to be at sea all the time that you would hardly need this enlarged scheme of barracks at the different navy yards.
Col. McCAWLEY. We do not have half of the men at sea. We have at sea, out of the 10,000 men, 2,150, and this is increasing each year with the growth of the Navy. Mr. Foss. That is about 21 per cent?
Col. MCCAWLEY. We keep at the present time nearly 1,200 men in the Philippines, 430 on the Isthmus of Panama, 100 at Guantanamo, over 200 at Honolulu, over 230 at Peking, 105 at Guam, and so they are scattered all over the world. About 23 per cent on foreign service, not counting men en route or on expeditionary service, which at times rises to another 23 per cent or 25 per cent.
The CHAIRMAN. How many marines have we in this country, in the United States?
Col. MCCAWLEY. The normal strength is about 2,800 at the various stations, and recruits, varying from 900 to 1,200, in addition. This is when there are