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c. Date, time, and place of payment. The date of an instrument is a material part thereof, and it cannot be changed without materially affecting the rights of the parties to the instrument.5 Any change in the date of an instrument, whereby the time of payment is accelerated, is a material alteration, and when made without the consent of the maker, destroys its validity.60 The time of payment specified in a negotiable instrument is also a material part thereof, and any alteration therein without the consent of the parties will avoid the instrument.61 And where a change in the place of payment of a bill or note is made without the consent of all the parties, it constitutes a material alteration and will avoid the instrument.62 It has been held in New York that the validity of a note is not affected by inserting therein the name of a bank at which a note should be paid, if such bank is located in the village where all the parties liable on the note reside.63 If no place of payment is specified in the instrument, it is a material alteration to insert therein a place of payment.64

d. Amount; medium of payment; addition of interest clause.— Any alteration in the amount for which a negotiable instrument is given voids the instrument as to all parties liable thereon. The rule is the same however little the change in amount may be,

59. Alkire v. Jahle, 123 Ill. 496, 17 N. E. 693, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540; Owings v. Arnott, 33 Mo. 406; Wyman v. Yeomans, 84 Ill. 403.

60. Change of date.- Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881, 52 Am. Rep. 152, in which the court says: "The absence of а date upon a negotiable instrument at its inception, or the fact that it is post or antedated, may not be material upon the question of its validity, but when a date has been once inserted and its time of payment has been thus fixed, such date is material and cannot be altered without the consent of the maker." See Armstrong v. Penn, 105 Ga. 229, 31 S. E. 158; Lisle v. Rogers, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 528; Mitchell v. Ringgold, 3 Harr. & J. (Md.) 159, 5 Am. Dec. 433; Brown v. Straw, 6 Neb. 536, 29 Am. Rep. 369; Bowers v. Jewell, 2 N. H. 543; Newman v. King, 54 Ohio St. 273, 43 N. E. 683, 56 Am. St. Rep. 705, 35 L. R. A. 471; Miller v. Stark, 148 Pa. St. 164, 23 Atl. 1058. The acceptor of a bill may

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alter the date thereof before he accepts, and the concurrence of the other parties in the alteration will bind him. Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 425.

61. Stayner v. Joyce, 82 Ind. 35; Post v. Losey, 111 Ind. 74, 12 N. E. 121, 60 Am. Rep. 677; Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen (Mass.), 236; Henderson v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 65.

62. White v. Hass, 32 Ala. 430, 70 Am. Dec. 548; Adair v. Egland, 58 Iowa, 314, 12 N. W. 277; Whitesides v. Northern Bank, 10 Bush (Ky.), 501, 19 Am. St. Rep. 74; Troy City Bank v. Lannan, 19 N. Y. 477; Southwark Bank v. Gross, 35 Pa. St. 80.

63. Etz v. Place, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 203, 30 N. Y. Supp. 765; Shuler v. Gilette, 12 Hun (N. Y.), 280.

64. Gwin v. Anderson, 91 Ga. 827, 18 S. E. 43; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa, 166, 16 N. W. 64, 47 Am. Rep. 808; Townsend Star Wagon Co., 10 Neb. 615, 7 N. W. 274, 35 Am. Rep. 493.

V.

65. Winkles v. Guenther, 98 Ga. 472, 25 S. E. 527.

and is applicable whether the amount is reduced or increased.66 If the alteration is made in the marginal figures of a note, so as to make them correspond with the amount specified in the body of the instrument, it is not such an alteration as will vitiate the note.67 The insertion in the note of a provision for the payment of costs and counsel fees is a material alteration.68 If an instrument does not upon its face as originally executed bear interest, the insertion or addition of an interest clause is a material alteration, and any change made in the rate, whether to increase or diminish it, is a material alteration.70 The change of the time from which an instrument will bear interest, as where the instrument originally bore interest after its maturity, and by the change it was made to bear interest from date, constitutes a material alteration."1 It is a material alteration as to the maker

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66. Hewins v. Cargill, 67 Me. 554; State Sav. Bank of St. Joseph v. Shaffer, 9 Neb. 1, 1 N. W. 980, 30 Am. Rep. 394.

67. Fisk v. McNeal, 23 Neb. 726, 37 N. W. 616, 8 Am. St. Rep. 162; Horton v. Horton, 71 Iowa, 448, 32 N. W. 452. In the case of Merritt v. Boyden (Ill.), 60 N. E. 907, it was held that the marginal figures placed above and outside the body of a note are not a part of the note itself, and that the alteration thereof will not necessarily deprive a purchaser of his character of a bona fide holder.

68. Monroe v. Paddock, 75 Ind. 422. In the case of Decorah First Nat. Bank v. Laughlin, 4 N. Dak. 391, 61 N. W. 473, the erasure of an agreement contained in a promissory note to pay the expense of collection including attorney's fees was an alteration of the instrument, because with those words included it was a nonnegotiable note and the erasure converted a nonnegotiable into a nego

tiable instrument.

69. Brown v. Jones, 3 Port. (Ala.) 420: Post v. Losey, 111 Ind. 74, 12 N. E. 121, 60 Am. Rep. 677; Shepherd v. Whetstone, 51 Iowa, 457, 1 N. W. 753, 33 Am. Rep. 143; Waterman v. Vose, 43 Me. 504; Brady v. Mann, 37 Mich. 1; Jones v. Bangs, 40 Ohio St. 139, 48 Am. Rep. 664. In the case of McGrath v. Clark, 56 N. Y. 34, 15 Am. Rep. 372, the defendant indorsed a note with the time and place of payment in blank, and delivered the

same to the maker, who filled in the
blanks and added the words
"with
interest;" it was held that as there
was no authority to add the interest
clause, it was a material alteration.
See also Bonstead v. Cuyler, 116 Pa.
St. 551, 8 Atl. 848.

70. Palmer v. Poor, 121 Ind. 135, 22 N. E. 984, 6 L. R. A. 469; Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315, 17 Am. Rep. 92; Thompson v. Massie, 41 Ohio St. 307; Heath v. Blake, 28 S. C. 406, 5 S. E. 642.

Where a note in blank to be used as a security is signed or indorsed by a person and delivered to another, it authorized the person to whom it is delivered to fill the blanks in respects essential to the completion of the note as such; but in the absence of an express authority, none can be implied from the delivery to insert a special agreement that after maturity the note should draw a special rate of interest greater than the regular rate, although the law of the State where the note was made permits special agreements to be made for the rate specified. Weyerhauser v. Dunn, 100 N. Y. 150, 2 N. E. 274. See, generally, Weaver v. Leseure, 89 Ill. App. 628; Howie v. Lewis, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 232; Merritt v. Boyden, 191 Ill. 136, 60 N. E. 907.

71. Dietz v. Harder, 72 Ind. 208; Nelson v. Dutton, 51 Mich. 416, 16 N. W. 791; Courcamp v. Weber, 39 Neb. 533, 58 N. W. 187.

and all sureties,72 to insert or add a clause to an instrument making it payable in gold or in specie.'

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e. Change in number or relation of parties.- It is a general rule that any change in the personality, number, or relations of the parties to an instrument is a material alteration. The addition to a note after its execution of the name of a maker, with the permission of the holder, but without the knowledge of the original maker, affects the validity of the note as to the original maker and the sureties.75 There is some conflict of authority upon this proposition. There are a number of cases to the effect that the addition of a name as a maker of a negotiable instrument will not affect the liability of the parties thereto.76 The statute has, to a certain extent at least, disposed of this apparent conflict by definitely declaring that any alteration which changes the number of the parties is a material alteration. This leaves the question in each State where the statute has been enacted to be determined upon the fact as to whether it was intended by the addition of the name of the party that he should be bound as a joint promisor with the original maker, or as a surety or guarantor only. If the intent was that he should be bound in the latter capacity, the addition of his name will not be a material alteration."

72. Hanson v. Crawley, 41 Ga. 303; Wills v. Wilson, 3 Ore. 308; Bogarth v. Breedlove, 39 Tex. 561.

73. Darrow v. Rippey, 63 N. E. 318. 74. 2 Cyc. 212. And see Hoffman v. Planters' Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E. 134.

75. McVane v. Scott, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 379. See also Houck v. Graham, 106 Ind. 195, 6 N. E. 594, 55 Am. Rep. 727; Hamilton v. Hooper, 46 Iowa, 515, 26 Am. Rep. 161; Singleton v. McQuerry, 85 Ky. 41, 2 S. W. 652; Anderson v. Bellinger, 87 Ala. 334, 6 South. 82, 4 L. R. A. 680; Brown V. Johnson, 126 Ala. 93, 28 South. 579, 51 L. R. A. 403. In the case of Montgomery v. Crossthwaite, 90 Ala. 553, 8 South. 498, 24 Am. St. Rep. 832, 12 L. R. A. 140, it was held that the addition of "and Co." to his signature by the maker of a promissory note, without the knowledge or consent of the indorser, will discharge him, although such addition was made without authority from the partnership.

76. Additional name of maker. In the case of Brownell v. Winne,

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29 N. Y. 400, 86 Am. Dec. 314, where a note made payable to W." or bearer, was delivered to "W.," who thereupon applied to the plaintiff to advance money upon it, and the plaintiff consented to do so if "W." would sign his name to it. "W." signed his name under that of the maker, and delivered the note to the plaintiff, who let him have the money thereon. It was held that the addition of " W.'s" name to the note was not such a material alteration as to void the note. See also McCaughey v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 49; Hochmark v. Richler, 16 Colo. 263, 26 Pac. 818; Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich. 441; Produce Exchange Trust Co. v. Bieberbach, 176 Mass. 577, 58 N. E. 162. The addition of the name of a maker before the delivery of the note does not release those previously signing, although done without their knowledge. Evans v. Partin (Ky.), 56 S. W. 648.

77. 2 Cyc. 222, citing among other cases, Rudolph v. Brewer, 96 Ala. 189, 11 South. 314; Reilly v. First Nat. Bank of Springfield, 148 Ill. 349, 35 N. E. 1120; Union Bank. Co. v. Mar

f. Alterations affecting negotiability.-Any material change in an instrument which operates to change it from a nonnegotiable to a negotiable instrument, is a material alteration.78 Where a note is made payable to order, it is a material alteration to erase the word "order" and insert in place thereof the word "bearer," without the consent of the maker.79

§ 127. Statutory provision as to forged signatures.

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"Where a

The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that: "signature is forged or made without authority of the person "whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, "or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from "setting up the forgery or want of authority." 80 This section is taken from the English Bills of Exchange Act and states the rule of law as generally accepted.81 Nothing is better settled than that a forged signature does not pass title to commercial paper, and does not justify a payment made on such paper.

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§ 128. Forged instrument or indorsement thereon.

a. In general.- Blackstone defines forgery to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right.82 The essence of forgery is an intent to defraud, so that one may be guilty of forgery if he fraudulently signs his name, although it is identical with that of the person who should

tin, 113 Mich. 521, 71 N. W. 867. In the case of Mersman v. Werges, 112 U. S. 139, 5 Sup. Ct. 65, 28 L. Ed. 641, it was held that the addition of the signature of a surety to a note, without the consent of the maker, is not a material alteration of the note, and does not discharge the maker. See also Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 294, 12 Am. Rep. 306; International Bank v. Parker, 88 Mo. App. 117.

78. Insertion of word "bearer."An unauthorized alteration of a nonnegotiable promissory note by a payee after the execution thereof by the insertion of the word "bearer," after the name of the payee, is a material alteration which will nullify the instrument. Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 35 Neb. 173, 52 N. W. 883, 16 L. R. A. 468. See also Porter v.

Hardy, 10 N. Dak. 551, 88 N. W. 458.

79. Sherman v. Rollberg, 11 Cal. 38; McCauley v. Gordon, 64 Ga. 221, 37 Am. Rep. 68; Needles v. Shaffer, 60 Iowa, 65, 14 N. W. 129; Croswell v. Lebree, 81 Me. 44, 16 Atl. 331, 10 Am. St. Rep. 238; Belknap v. National Bank of North America, 100 Mass. 376, 97 Am. Dec. 105; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 221; Flint v. Craig, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 319; McDaniell v. Whitsett, 96 Tenn. 10, 33 S. W. 567; Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45 Wis. 373.

80. Neg. Inst. L. (N. Y.), § 42. For same section in statutes of other States see Appendix.

81. English Bills of Exchange Act, § 24.

82. 4 Bl. Comm. 247.

have signed.83 The essential elements of the crime are: (1) A false making of some instrument in writing; (2) a fraudulent intent; (3) an instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.84 Any person who signs a fictitious, false, or assumed name to an instrument, with intent to defraud another, is guilty of a forgery.85

b. Making or alteration of instrument.—Where a blank check, note, or bill is signed by a principal and left with his agent for a specified purpose, to be filled out by such agent as directed by him, it has been held a forgery for such agent to fraudulently fill out such instrument and make it payable to himself.86 But this is not universally held,87 as will be seen by a reference to preceding sections relating to instruments executed in blank.88 Any wrongful and fraudulent alteration of a negotiable instrument whereby a party thereto is injuriously affected constitutes a forgery.& But the subject of alterations of negotiable instruments has already been considered in this chapter, and it will be seen that the principles controlling the effect of such alterations upon the rights of the parties are somewhat different from those where the signatures of the parties thereto have been forged.

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An instrument which, upon its face, is invalid and not binding upon the alleged parties is not the subject of forgery.90 But it has been held that an indictment for the forgery of a promissory note may be sustained notwithstanding the instrument did not contain the name of the payee.

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83. Commonwealth v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311, 19 Am. Rep. 353. In the case of United States v. Long, 30 Fed. 678, the court said: 'One may be guilty of forgery if he fraudulently signs his name, although it is identical with that of the person who should have signed. Thus, if a bill of exchange is payable to A. B. or order, and it comes to the hand of a person named A. B. who is not the payee, and who fraudulently indorses it for the purpose of obtaining the money, this is a forgery. See also Beattie v. National Bank of Illinois, 174 Ill. 571. 51 N. E. 602, 66 Am. St. Rep. 318; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127, 74 Am. Dec. 49.

84. State v. Wheeler, 20 Ore. 192, 25 Pac. 394, 23 Am. St. Rep. 119.

85. People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 28 Am. Rep. 183; Luttrell v. State, 85 Tenn. 232, 1 S. W. 886, 4 Am. St.

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89. Commonwealth v. Hide, 94 Ky. 517, 23 S. W. 195; State v. Higgins, 60 Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 816, 27 L. R. A. 74; State v. Kattlemann, 35 Mo. 105; State v. Robinson, 16 N. J. L. 507; State v. Floyd, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 58, 53 Am. Dec. 689.

90. Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467, 25 Am. Rep. 639; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 239, 16 Am. Rep. 427; People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 778.

91. Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359; State v. Baumon, 52 Iowa, 68, 2 N. W. 956; Commonwealth v. Paulus, 11

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