face of them. The Divisional Court held that in the exercise of their discretion they would not interfere.

This case will be a warning, we hope, to those ladies who wish to claim the privileges of the sterner sex without their corresponding liabilities, especially to those who would like to combine the freedom of spin. sterhood with the joys of matrimony, and shelter the liability of the former under the protection of a concealed marriage.

The second case was Bonner v. Lyon (6 Times Reports, 318). There a married woman ordered a lot of jewellery, and when sued for the amount endeavoured to set up the defence that at the date she entered into the contract she had no separate estate which could be bound. It was proved that she had had at the time a sealskin mantle, dresses, and jewellery, and other goods to the value of £300 or £400. She then contended that on the principle of Leake v. Driffield, this was property which could not be considered separate property within the Married Women's Property Act. Nay, a further suggestion was made: that the property was not bound, because, when she entered into the contract, she did not intend to bind it. But happily, the Court did not view the statute in this light. A fine thing it would be, if every time a married woman ordered goods at a shop, the tradesmen were to be laid under the onus of ascertaining not only whether she had separate property, but whether she intended to make it liable. If this were the law, a married woman with £1,000 a year in private property could order goods to any amount, and when sued for the price could escape paying by saying, "True, I had separate estate at the date of the contract, but I never meant to make it liable." Vaughan Williams, J., said very clearly that the words in sect. 1 (3) of the Act, "unless the contrary be shown," were not intended to let in evidence of the intention of the married woman. Besides, sect. 3 says positively that every contract entered into by a married woman shall be deemed a contract entered into by her with respect to, and to bind her separate estate, unless the contrary be shown-and that means unless the property is of such a nature that the presumption to bind it cannot ariseas was the case in Leake v. Driffield. The intention, in fact, is not material. By this decision, then, a great chance for fraud is barred.

The third case was Jay v. Robinson, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th ultimo. There the facts were as follows: Mr. and Mrs. R. were married in 1881, and in August, 1886, J. recovered judgment against Mrs. R., and execution was issued limited to such of her separate property as she was not restrained from anticipating. In June, 1888, Mr. and Mrs. R. were divorced. In February, 1889, Mrs. R. married Mr. C., and executed a settlement whereby she agreed to settle any sum which might be ordered to be paid her under a petition she had filed for variation of her marriage settlement with Mr. R., the sum to be settled on her for life with restraint upon anticipation. A sum was ordered by the Divorce Court to be paid to the trustees of this settlement, and J. now sought to levy execution upon it. It was coutended that neither sect. 13 nor sect. 19 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, had reference to the debts of a married woman contracted "during marriage.' For the plaintiff, it was argued that sect. 13 of the Act rendered Mrs. R. liable to the extent of separate property for all debts contracted by her before marriage, and this, though such property was fettered by a restraint on anticipation. But, contended Mrs. R., "before marriage means fore ever having been married," and I was married when I contracted the debt. The Court, however, refused to listen to this argument; and held that "before marriage" meant "before the existing marriage," and that therefore the settled sum was liable for debts contracted prior to the marriage between Mrs. R. and Mr. C., and that the restraint on anticipation, being contained in a settlement of her own property, was not valid against her creditors, any more than such a settlement would have been had it been made by a man; for the Act says that the restriction imposed in such cir

"be

cumstances shall not have any validity against debts contracted by her before marriage; and this means before the marriage existing at the time she is sued,

It is a matter of special note that the Courts are, as it were, recovering their senses, and are inclined 10 read the Married Women's Acts strictly, and not to strain their construction in favour of the fair sex. It has always been our contention that freedom to contract must be accompanied by fulness of liability; and we are, therefore, still hostile to the decision in Palliser v. Gurney.-Law Notes.

CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS.

A point which would have given rise to a very interesting discussion before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, had the jury not acquitted the prisoner, arose before Mr. Justice Charles, during the assizes now being held at Leeds, upon the prosecution of a prisoner under 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 14, for attempting, by drawing the trigger of certain loaded arms, to wit, a revolver loaded with three leaden bullets, to discharge the same at the prosecutor with intent to kill aud murder him. The evidence for the prosecution was that the prisoner had presented a revolver at the prosecutor and drawn the trigger, which act had caused the hammer to rise and fall so as to strike one of the chambers of the revolver; that such chamber contained an empty cartridge case, but that in three of the other chambers were loaded cartridges, which would have been exploded had the trigger been pulled often enough, so as to cause the chambers to revolve and bring them into position for firing. Upon such evidence objection was taken on behalf of the prisoner that, as the revolver could not have been discharged by the drawing of the trigger once, and as the prisoner had only been shown to have pulled it once, he could not be convicted of attempting to discharge a loaded arm within the meauing of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 14. Mr. Justice Charles, however, overruled the objection, and directed the jury, in summing the case up to them, that in law a revolver loaded in three of its chambers with ball cartridges was a loaded arm within the meaning of the section, although the particular chamber which the prisoner had attempted to discharge was not loaded. We do not intend to question his Lordship's ruling, but merely to refer to the previous decisions which bear upon this point. The first of these was the case of Rex v. Carr (Russ. & Ryan, 377), decided in 1819, in which it was held that, in order to constitute the offence of attempting to discharge a loaded firearm within the meaning of 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, the weapon must be so loaded as to be capable of doing the mischief intended, and the objection in the present case was, therefore, that, as the chamber of the revolver which the prisoner attempted to discharge was not loaded, the revolver could not be said to be loaded so as to be capable of doing the mischief intended. Iu Rex v. Carr the jury had found the prisoner guilty, but at the same time had added that the blunderbuss, which the prisoner was charged with attempting to discharge, was not primed at the time when the prisoner drew the trigger; and a majority of the judges considered such verdict as equivalent to a finding that the blunderbuss was not so loaded as to be capable of doing mischief by having the trigger drawn, and that it was therefore not loaded within the meaning of the statute. Again, in 1831, Patteson, J., in Rex v. Harris (5 C. &. P. 159), told the jury that he did not think a pistol, of which the touch-hole was so plugged up that it could not possibly do any mischief, ought to be considered as loaded arins within the meaning of 1 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 11. The next case was decided in 1840, under 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 3, the words of which were the same as those in the present enactment (24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, s. 14), namely: "Whosoever shall shoot at any person, or shall, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person intent to commit murder," shall be guilty of a felony whether any bodily injury be inflicted or not. The case was that of Reg. v. St. George (9 C. & P. 483), in which

with

Baron Parke held that, where a person iutending to shoot another put his finger on the trigger of a loaded pistol, but was prevented from palling the trigger, he could not be convicted of an attempt to discharge loaded arms by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, within 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 3. With reference to the words "in any other manner," the learned Baron said: "It seems to me that the object of this Act was to punish proximate attempts-that is, those attempts which immediately lead to the discharge of loaded arms. Therefore, if a person drew the trigger, and the gun was loaded, in that case the offence would be complete, though the gun did not go off, and though it did not happen to strike the percussion cap; and the Act also provides for the case of firearms which do not go off with the ordinary lock." To the same effect were the decisions in Reg. v. Lewis (9 C. & P. 523), Reg. v. Oxford (Id. 525), and Blake v. Barnard (Id. 626); and in Reg. v. Baker (1 C. & K. 254), Baron Rolfe, on the trial of an indictment in 1843, uuder 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 3, in summing up to the jury, said to them: "You must consider whether the pistol was in such a state of loading that, under ordinary circumstances, it would have gone off, but that from some accidental cause, the nature of which we cannot discover, it in fact did not go off. The question for your consideration is, was the priming and loading of the pistol such that, in the natural and ordinary course of things, it would have gone off?" In Reg. v. James (1 C. & K. 530), decided in the following year, Chief Justice Tiudal left a case to the jury with a similar ruling. But in Reg. v. Brown (48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 270; 15 Cox C. C. 199; 10 Q. B. Div. 381) the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in 1883 expressed considerable doubts as to the correctness of the ruling of the learned judges in Reg. v. George and Reg. v. Lewis. In the two last-mentioned cases, and also in the case of Reg. v. Brown, however, the weapon was capable of being discharged bad the trigger been drawn, whereas the ruling of the learned judges in the earlier cases was based upon the iucapability of the weapons being discharged, and the doubt which has been thrown upon Reg. v. George and Reg. v. Lewis may not extend to the earlier casey. At the same time the intention of the prisoner must have been the same in each of the cases, and, so far as the prisoner's intention is concerned, the attempt to discharge the weapon is none the less an attempt because it is frustrated by the prisoner being prevented from discharging a weapon capable of being discharged instead of its being frustrated by the parti onlar weapon being incapable of being discharged. However this might be, it would still be an open question whether, under the circumstances of the case at Leeds, Mr. Justice Charles was not right in leaving the case to the jury.-Law Times.

A NEW BOOK BY MR. W. BARLOW, LL.D.,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

The many personal and professional Irish friends of Mr. William Barlow, who emigrated to Adelaide in 1870, as well as those to whom he is so well known as one of the joint editors of the standard Equity Index published in 1868, will feel a proud pleasure that he has now sustained his reputation by a new venture in legal literature at the antipodes. Of his new work (THE LOCAL COURTS Aor, Rules and Forms and Special Magistrates Confirmation Aot; together with the Iutercolonial Debts Acts of South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria; and the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt Act, with notes by William Barlow, LL.D., barrister-at-law. Adelaide: Vardon and Pritchard, 1890) an Australian reviewer says:-"In Dr. Barlow's book we have as careful and complete a work as could be desired. The learned doctor relieves even the driest passages with a pleasant lightness of style; and he has, by the exercise of careful discrimination, cited almost every authority which bears directly on the subject matter. He has wisely collected in one volume not only the Local Court Acts and rules, but also the Intercolonial Debts Acts of South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria, and the Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt which was passed last session in this colony. The reader cau see at a glance from the difference of type how far the Local Court Act of 1886 differs from that of 1861. The index is complete, and so far as we have been able to test it devoid of any mistakes even in printing. The type is clear and good, and the volume is of a convenient size and shape. There is one drawback to all works like Dr. Barlow's; when once they appear they become necessities. Hitherto a special magistrate or even a J.P. may have felt easy in construing any section of the Local Courts. Act without fear of objection or appeal, but now that it has been brought to the minds of solicitors and suitors that almost every line of the Act has received some judicial construction, either in the High Court or one of the leading county courts in England, he will find it necessary to arm himself with as thorough a knowledge of the authorities as that which the parties to the case are likely to possess. For instance, an unsatisfied judgment summons is an every day proceeding, and the question of what debts may be attached under a garnishee order may seem simple enough; but when we see how elaborately the words "owing or accruing due" have been defined, we can well understand a magistrate feeling bound in each case to look through Dr. Barlow's elaborate note to see whether any particular debt is attachable. Nor is the value of the work by any means confined to the practice of the Local Court, as many of the sections are word for word the same as the rules of the Supreme Court made under the Judicature Act; in fact, the work will be as useful to practitioners in the Supreme Court as any of the English authorities. Perhaps the most valuable portion of it, for the present at any rate, will be the long notes on the Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt-a statute which has not yet been sufficiently long in operation in the colony for practitioners to have become familiar with the routine of business, but which contains provisions that have been the subject of judicial decision in almost every division of the High Court in England for many It is to be regretted that South Australian legislators do not seem to have studied the subject as carefully as Dr. Barlow. Had they done so they could hardly have failed to observe that some serious blots on the English Act of 1869 had been pointed out by so eminent a judge as the late Sir George Jessel, in consequence of whose representations an amending Act was passed ten years later. Instead, however, of combining the two, the Parliament of this colony has introduced the earlier Act alone-thus leaving our local law ten years behind that of England. It is to be hoped that some legal member of Parliament will take the same hint from Dr. Barlow that Mr. Marten, Q.C., did from the Master of the Rolls. Nor is the Intercolonial

years.

Debts Act of 1887 entirely satisfactory, although we cordially endorse its principles, and agree with the tribute paid by Dr. Barlow in his preface to the good work done by Mr. Moulden in introducing it. It is, to say the least, unfortunate that the first direction issued under it by Mr. Russell, S.M., should be either so inaccurately expressed as to be misleading, or made in excess of his powers; yet so it would seem to be. The whole machinery of the Act-whereby the original judgment is neither transferred to nor registered in the other colony, but a second judgment is eutered-seems as clumsy a contrivance as could well be devised. Dr. Barlow's acquaintance with Irish law makes his notes on this Act of special value, as a large number of the cases most closely bearing on the subject are contained in the Irish law reports. But in fact this is only one of the many points in which the learned author has shown himself well qualified for the laborious task he has undertaken, which we heartily hope may meet with the success which it deserves."

NOTES OF ENGLISH CASES. [From the Law Journal.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

BEEVER HANSON, DALE & Co.

July 2.-Negligence-Evidence of Guarding or Fencing Machine after Occurrence of Accident-Employer's Liability Act (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), s. 1, subs. 1; s. 2. subs. 1.

In an action under the Employers' Liability Act, the fact that the defendants have subsequently to the occurrence of the accident complained of caused that portion of the machine which gave rise to it to be fenced or guarded cannot be put forward as evidence of negligence. Where this is the sole evidence of alleged negligence, the case should be withdrawn from the jury.

This was an appeal by the defendants against a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in a County Court in an action under the Employers' Liability Act for £156, the full amount claimed.

The defendants were lead merchants, and the plaintiff was in their employ as a lead worker. In August, 1889, the defendants put up a rolling-mill, under the supervision of the makers and of engineers. The lead was, by means of small wooden rollers, carried through two heavy steel rollers and pressed to the thickness required. There were a number of cogs which drove the rollers, and these were unprotected. The machine was worked by a special engine placed at the side. The plaintiff's duty was to prepare the lead for the mill and to guide it through the rollers. When the machine was set in motion wooden rolleis carried the lead towards the heavy rollers. Occasionally these wooden rollers did not grip the lead, and it was then necessary to bring some pressure to bear upon the lead. To do this the plaintiff had been in the habit of stepping from a platform on to the machine and placing his foot on the lead. He had to step over the cogs-a distance of from eighteen inches to two feet--to get on to the machine from the platform. On one occasion he did not take a sufficiently long stride, his right foot slipped off the edge of the machine between the cogs and the engine, and was cut off. Since the accident the defendants placed a board over the cogs so as to render its recurrence impossible.

The plaintiff stated, in the course of his evidence iu chief, that the lead sheet was at the mouth of the rolling wheels; the sheet did not go in; he was on the stage regulating the distance between the rolling wheels. He strode over, but his foot slipped, and the cog-wheels which turned the feeding rollers caught it. He had seen other men so step over many times whenever the lead stuck. In cross-examination he stated that he did not consider the machine dangerous in itself, and had never heard any complaint about cog-wheels from anyone. A fellow-workman who gave evidence stated, in reply to the jury, that he had been stageman at times,

and had put his foot on the lead sheet before, but never since the accident, till the boxing was put over the cog-wheels. He had stepped on the lead in the presence of the defendants, who had never complained of his doing so, nor had he complained to them. An inspector of factories stated that he regarded the machine as dangerous to anyone going up steps to get on to the stage, as he might slip and get his hands in the cogs; and in cross-examination that standing on a sheet of lead on three feeding rollers he considered the proper way of using the machine, but a workman might get his foot in. The learned County Court judge pointed out to the jury that if the machine could not be safely used by the workmen it was defective. The questions left to the jury and their answers were as follows: (1) Was the machinery in such a condition at the time of accident that it could be safely used? Answer: No. (2) Or was it in such a condition that it could not be safely worked? Answer: Yes. (3) Was the machine in a defective condition to the knowledge of the defeudants? Answer: They either did know, or ought to have known, that it was defective. Upon this a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with costs. On the part of the defendants it was submitted that they were entitled to a nonsuit upon the grounds: (1) That there was no evidence of negligence of the defendauts to entitle the plaintiff to succeed under section 1, subsection 1, and section 2, subsection 1, and no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. 2. That the verdict was contrary to the evidence. 3. That the answer to the third question did not bring the defendants within section 2, subsection 1.*

Compton Smith (Robson with him) for the defendants. Montefiore for the plaintiff.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J.: It appears to me that this is one of those oppressive actions to which a very salutary Act of Parliament has given rise, and which it is most important, if that Act of Parliament is to stand and be worked, should be corrected by the judgment of the Court. This action should have been stopped by the judge. It is a pity that these cases are left to the jury where there is no evidence. Where there is evidence, such a tribunal is a very proper one; where there is none, it is a pity the judge does not stop the case, because experience shows that the sympathy of the jury is naturally with the person injured, and, if there is a person on the other side who can pay, the too common result is to make him pay whether he ought to do so or not. In this case I cannot see that there was any negligence whatever. There is a rolling machine and three or four small cogs which revolve, and which everyone who has to work the machine knows and can see. The plaintiff saw the cogs working rapidly and stepped across them two or three times, when his foot slipped and he got entangled. Obvious common sense points out that if anyone crosses a machine in full action and driven by steam he runs a great risk of entangling either his coat or trousers in the revolutions of the wheel, and damage follows. Now a perfectly humane man naturally makes it physically impossible that a particular accident, which has once happened, can happen again, by fencing or covering, or, at any rate, making safe the particular thing trom which it arose. That, however, is no evidence of, and I protest against it being put forward as evidence of, negligence. A place may be left for a hundred years unfenced when at last someone falls down it. The owner, like a sensible and humaue man, then puts up a fence, and upon this the argument is

that he has been guilty of negligence, and shows that he thought the fence was necessary, because he put it up, This is both most unfair and unjust. It is making the good feeling and right principle of a man evidence against him. This is no evidence of negligence, Beyond this, in the present case, there was no evidence of negligence at all except the opinion of the inspector, who said he considered the place dangerous because people going up the steps to feed the machine might slip, and if they did slip they might put out their hands, aud if they put their hands out they might get them into the cog-wheel. Anything might be dangerous at that rate, If a man slips anywhere near a steam engine and puts out a hand to save himself and the hand gets into the machinery, probably there is an end of his hand; but this does not show that there is negligence on the part of the owner of the steam engine because someone slips and does that which is perhaps irresistible. It is no proof of negligence against the owner of the engine. I am of opinion that in this case there was no evidence to go to the jury, and that judgment must be entered for the defendants,

"Be it remembered that on the 14th day of Dec., in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine at the house of Robert Headrick at Red Deer Hill in the District of Kinistino in the Province of Saskatchewan a diseased red and white cow is convicted before us, Alox. S aud AStwo of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the said District. That the said diseased red and white cow on complaint of Robert Headrick made under oath that upon reasonable inquiry no owner could be found, that said cow was liable to convey disease to his cattle, and upon examination by us, we the said Justices of the Peace, adjudge the said diseased red and white cow viz, large lump on jaw and fetid discharge in a very advanced stage. Therefore we order the destruction of said diseased cow, in accordance with form 'C' of the Northwest Ordinance. The sum of $5.80 fee for examination and mileage, $5.00 for destruction total $10.80 to be paid from General funds of the Territories Ordinance 1889, 'C' 18, sec. 2, 5. Given under our hands and seals the day and year first above mentioned and the conviction shall be good and effectual to all intents and purposes.

THERE has been a singular case of contempt of court in Ceylon. A man sold a horse; the purchaser did not pay for it, and the vendor claimed that the horse should be returned to him. This, Mr. Mason, a magistrate, ordered should be done. But in the meantime the horse had been resold to the Chief Justice, Mr. Mason ordered the horse to be produced, So a policeman, seeing the animal standing near the court in the carriage that had brought the Chief Justice to the court, laid his sacrilegious hands upon it, took it out of the carriage, and delivered it over to Mr. Mason. This the Chief Justice held to be contempt of court, and fined Mr. Mason £10.

CORRESPONDENCE.

We throw open the columns of this journal most willingly for the discussion of subjects of interest to the profession; but it must be understood that we do not necessarily agree with all the opinions expressed by our correspondents.

Letters and communications intended for publication and addressed to THE EDITOR, 53 Upper Sackville-street, Dublin, must be authenticated by the name of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith.

*.* Letters intended for publication in the same week should reach the Office not later than Thursday morning.

THE EFFECT OF THE LAND LAW ACT, 1887, S. 1, ON FREEHOLD LEASE 3.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE IRISH LAW TIMES.

SIR,-Having, since my letter to you contained in your last issue, perused more fully the Act of 1881, and particularly section 21 (which many, if not all, of your correspondents on the above subject may not have read), I have changed my opinion, and am inclined to think that the term in any lease, whether freehold or not, is not changed by any lessee taking the benefit of the Act of 1887. Of course, I assume that the first section of the latter Act should be read with the 21st section of the Act of 1881, which says that any leases existing at the passing of the Act should remain in force to the same extent as if the Act had not passed, and that holdings, subject to such leases, should be regulated by the lawful provisions contained in the leases, and not by those relating to tenancies in that behalf contained in the Act; and it also provides that at the expiration of such leases, the lessees, if in bona fide occupation of their holdings, should be deemed tenants of present ordinary tenancies from year to year, and further that the land. lord should have the right of resumption as therein.

If Mr. Gallagher or any of your correspondents who are not tired of the subject, would peruse the sections referred to, I would like to know if he or they still hold the opinion already expressed by them,

COURT PAPERS.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

ADJUDICATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY.

LEX.

[The dates of Adjudications are first given, the Sillings follow in italics.]

DUBLIN.

Elliott, William, of 17 and 18 Thomas-street, in the city of Armagh, publican and provision dealer. September 12; Friday, October 3, and Tuesday, October 21. J. Williamson and W. J. Brett, solrs.

Green, John, of Tiermaughan, near Kilcock, in the county of Kildare, farmer. September 10; Tuesday, September 30, and Friday, October 17. Thomas Falls, solr.

Moloney, Maurice of Clonaslee, Portarlington, in the Queen's
County, police pensioner. September 16; Tuesday,
October 7, and Tuesday, October 21. Thomas Percy
Mathews, solr.
O'Dwyer, Richard E., of Ennis, in the county of Clare, grocer
and spirit merchant, trading as "M1. O'Dwyer and Son."
September 19; Friday, October 3, and Tuesday, October
21. Molloy & Molloy, solrs.

Holloway's Ointment and Pills.-Travellers and Emigrants.-Those who cross the seas change the climate, but they do not change the constitution. The altered conditions of life, the exigencies of travel and other causes render the traveller and emigrant peculiarly liable to diseases and accidents when far from efficient medical aid. With these associated remedies at hand they may be said to have a physician always at their call, and they may be certain that situations will be constantly arising in which they will require a ready resource in time of need. The directions for use which accompany each box and pot of Holloway's Pills and Ointment are written in plain and simple language, and are applicable in all cases.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

CONNER-September 25, at Mount-street, Crescent, Dublin, the wife of H. D. Conner, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. DUNDON

- September 21, at George-street, Limerick, the wife of Alderman J. Dundon, solicitor, of a son. GREER- September 19, at Savalmore, Newry, the wife of Edward N. Greer, solicitor, of a daughter.

WALKER-September 22, at Gardiner's-place, the wife of Garrett H. W. Walker, barrister-at-law, of a son.

10 National Bank (Limited)

25 Provincial Bank

Steam.

100 City of Dublin

50 Dublin & Livern Steam

Ship Building. Co.

10 Dundalk (Limited)

Miscellaneous. Alliance & Dub. Cons QAN

Do.

100 Do., 4 pc Debenture Stock Arnoll & Co., limited

ICO Do., 6 p c Debenture

5 Bell's Asbestos, Limited
5 Boland's, Limited

4

Do., 5 pc Deb.

Do..6 pc Preference Shares Cannock & Co. Lim`k, lit'd C'bellingham & Drogheda 20 City & County Building Sy 10 Distilleries Co., lim.

Do., 6 pc Cum Pref.

Dub. (S'th) City Market Co. 3 to Guinness, Nos. 80,001 Son, & Co. ( to 250,000

100

Do., 5 p o Debenture Stock

10 Do., 6 p c Pref.

25

Ir. C S. Building Society..

5 John., M'ney & O'Brien, ltd The Official Guide, Ltd,

5 Thom & Co., Nos. 4,304

Alex lim.

Thwaites & Co.,

to 13,000 Pref.

to N'th Metr. Tramway, Lond 10 Provincial Trams, lim.

100

Railways.

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Gt.South'n & West'n 4 p Mid. Great Western. 4 pe Watfd. & Limerick, 4 p c 4 pc (1860)

Do.

Rys. Guaranteed

C. Musk. Lt. Ry., perp. 4 po Leased at Fixed Rentals Dublin and Kingstown Debenture Stocks. Gt.Northern(Ireland) 4 p

100

Do., + p c

Do.. 5 p c

.

..

Gt.South n & West'n, 4 p Midland Gt. West'n. 4 pc Waterf'd & Limerick 4 re Miscellaneous Debent. Ballast Office Deb., £92 6s 2d. 4 pc Dub. Cor. Stock, redeem. 1944..

Rathm. & Rathgar Tship., 34 pc

Shares not fully paid np are given in Italies. Bank Rate Of Discount- 44 per cent Of Deposit-1 per cent. Name Days Oct. 9th and 28th, 1890. Account Days Oct. 10th and 29th, 1890.

Busin's commences at 120 p.m.

On Account. § Exceptional amount at special price.