injunction to prevent Hands from selling beer other than that made by Cain. The Vice-Chancellor granted the injunction, and an appeal was brought to the Court of Appeal.

A main question raised was whether the covenant ran with the land or the reversion. The lessee contended that it did not ran with the reversion, but was confined in its operation to the case where the beer was made at this particular brewery, then carried on by the lessor, whereas now that brewery had ceased to exist. On the other hand, the landlords contended that the covenant ran with the land, and as the defendant was in possession under a deed containing a restrictive covenant he was bound by it. The Court of Appeal held that the covenant was in force against the hotel. keeper. Cotton, L.J., said that this was not a personal covenant with the particular landlords who granted the lease, nor was it impossible for the benefit of it to be conveyed to somebody else. It was a contract relating to the way in which the business of the house is to be carried on. It was a contract relating to the public. house just as much as a contract as to the mode in which the cultivation of a particular piece of land is to be carried on relates to the land. It affected the value of the reversion; it affected the house; and it was a Contract running with the land. The present owner of the reversion was, therefore, entitled to sue. As the goodwill was sold to Cain, he was entitled to sue independently of the question of its running with the land. Lindley, L.J., also said that this case was one of very great importance both to brewers and also to tenants who take tied houses, for certainly it was rather a startling thing to anybody to be told that when you have agreed to buy beer of a particular brewer, you may find yourself bound to take bad beer of somebody else's. Whether you are or not depends on the agreement into which you have entered. Then the learned Judge said that his chief difficulty was as to whether this tenant entered into an agreement relying upon the brewer's skill and personal reputation alone, or whether he entered into a very much wider contract, agreeing to buy all his beer from them or persons to whom they might assign their business or the public-house. Whether it was a personal unassignable contract or not depended on the construction of the lease itself, having regard to the position of both parties. The Judge concluded by saying that the lease contained the wider of these two agreements, and hence the brewer's assignee was held entitled to enforce the covenant against the hotelkeeper.

The lessee's covenant to buy all beer from the landlord seems, therefore, to be a valuable right to the landlord, and is capable of being protected and enforced. Justice of the Peace.

REMINISCENCES OF THE FRENCH BAR. In 1839 there was published an extremely amusing and interesting book entitled "Souvenirs de M. Berryer, Doyen des Avocats de Paris de 1774 à 1838." The author, M. Berryer, the father of the celebrated orator of that name, entered the profession of the law in 1774, and continued in active practice upwards of sixty years. He was the first advocate who condescended to plead before the revolutionary tribunals, and he was concerned more or less in almost all the causes of consequence which came before them. His reminiscences cousequently comprise the ancient regime, the transition period, and the established order of things; and they are narrated fully and frankly, in clear, easy, familiar language, with some of the caution taught by experience, but with none of the garrulity of age. They have, moreover, a merit which few French contemporary memoirs possess that of authenticity.

M. Berryer begins his work by describing the courts of law as they existed when he first entered on his novitiate. At the head stood the Parliament of Parisan august and erudite body, justly venerated for the fearlessness with which, on many trying occasions, they had refused to register tue arbitrary edicts of the Crown.

This body was divided into chambers, which held their sittings in the Palais de Justice-a building which rivalled Westminster Hall in the richness and variety of its associations, though far inferior in architectural magnificence. Around the Parliament of Paris were clustered a number of inferior jurisdictions, closely resembling those of which the ancient judicial system of England, and indeed of every country with feudal institutions, was made up. There existed provincial parliaments and other local tribunals, it is true-for the administration of justice in France was never centralized; but what with appellate and exceptional jurisdiction, the concourse of suitors to the capital was immense. A countryman inquired of a lawyer whom he saw about to ascend the grand staircase of the Palais de Justice with his bag of papers, what that great building was för. He was told it was a mill. "So I see now," was' the reply; "and I might have guessed as much from the asses loaded with bags."

It is a remarkable circumstance that a great majority of the public buildings of London are of comparatively recent date, those which they replaced having been destroyed by fire. The same fate has befallen the public buildings of Paris; and M. Berryer states that the immense vaulted galleries which, from the shops established in them, had procured the Temple of Justice the name of the Palais Marchand, were swept away by a conflagration in 1774.

He also duly commemorates the Grand Chatelet, the seat of sundry metropolitan jurisdictions, and relates some curious circumstances regarding the ancient debtors' prisons - the Fort-l'Evêque and the Couciergerie.

In the former was confined no less a person than Maximilian, the reigning Duke of Deux Ponts, afterwards King of Bavaria. In the latter, M. Berryer tells us, a rich Englishman, Lord' Mazareen, was detained during many years for a large sum due on bills of exchange, which, though possessed of ample means, be obstinately refused to pay, on the ground of his having been cheated out of them at play. He lived at the rate of more than a hundred thousand francs a year, kept open table, and had his servants and carriages.

A second edition of Lord Mazareen appeared more recently in the person of an American, Mr. Swan, who was confined twenty-two years in Saint-Pelagie. This gentleman was in the habit of publishing memorials against his detaining creditors, which he invariably commenced by stating that he possessed more than five millions (francs) in the United States; that it would be easy for him to pay twenty times the amount of the claim, but that it was unjust, and his conscience did not permit him to purchase his liberty by a dastardly sacrifice. Swan was nearly fifty-two years of age when be was arrested; he was seventy-four at the period of bis release, which he owed to the Revolution of July. He died two months afterwards.

But to return to M. Berryer. After describing the mode of becoming an advocate, which in those days was much the same as at the present day, the author tells the following anecdotes:

"Le Maitre, a celebrated advocate of the age preceding, used to amuse himself during the vacation by going into the country, incognito, and pleading causes for the peasantry. On one occasion he made such an impression that the provincial magistrate told him he di wrong to waste his splendid abilities on trifling matters in the provinces. Go to Paris, you will there find a fitting field for them; you will become the rival of the famous Le Maitre.'"

On another occasion Le Maitre, having introduced several Latin quotations with the view of embarrassing the judge, provoked a curious addition to the judgment. "We fine the advocate a crown for having addressed us in a language which we do not understaud."

An advocate, by way of accompaniment to his speech, was flourishing about his haud in such a manner as to show off a magnificent diamond ring. He was young, good-looking, and pleading for a lady of quality who had demanded a separation from her liege lord. The

husband, who happened to be present, interrupted him in the midst of his appeal, and turning to the magistrates, said: "My lords, you will appreciate the zeal which M- is displaying against me, and above all the purity of the grounds on which he relies, when you are informed that the diamond ring he wears is the very one which I placed on my wife's finger on the day of that union she is so anxious to dissolve." The court, says M. Berryer, rose immediately; the cause was lost, and the advocate never had another. What adds to the point of the catastrophe is the fact that it does not appear that the husband's statement had the slightest foundation, or that he entertained any suspicion of the sort.

Clever graphic sketches of the leading lawyers of the day are given by M. Berryer; but these possess little interest for American readers, to whom the very names of most of them must necessarily be unknown. Some specific facts, however, are communicated regarding Gerbier, the Erskine of the French bar, when M. Berryer first joined it.

Gerbier had a fine Roman head, with a voice of great compass, and his action was peculiarly impressive. He consequently excelled in passages where a dramatic effect was to be produced; and these may almost always be introduced with little risk of failure in France. Thus, in his defence of the brothers Du Queyssat, tried for a cowardly murder, he introduced the chapel of the Palatinate, in which the sword of one of them, a gallant soldier, had been suspended by the express command of bis general, and demanded if this could be the same sword which had been basely turned against the murdered man.

The peroration of his speech for the Bishop of Noyon, prosecuted by his own chapter, affords another example of his style:—

"It once fell to the lot of Constantine the Great to receive at his imperial levee several deputies from the clergy, who came to denounce the shamefully irreligious conduct of the primate, their chief. To these virulent accusations, the prince, after having listened to them with the most conscientious attention, made answer: "My duty and yours are to place no faith in suspicions, which the impious may be anxious to raise against the sacred character of the primate; so that to suppose an impossibility-if I surprised him in the very act of siu, I would cover him with my purple! It is now for you, my lords, to cover by your decree the sacred person of the Bishop of Noyon."

Gerbier, aware probably of his weak point, was wont to get two of the best lawyers to discuss the merits of bis great causes in his presence. He then chose his topics and formed his plan, but trusted to the inspiration of the moment for the language and the imagery. That the required aid might be constantly at hand, he had always an advocate or two content to play the part of crammers in his cabinet. It was said that Gerbier, in a single cause, had received a fee of three hundred thousand francs.

M. Duvaudier-an able advocate, though of inferior celebrity, whom the high society of Paris received on a footing of equality-had an aged client, a woman of quality, who, in the intoxication of success at the happy termination of a suit, conceived the idea of presenting a fee in a novel manner. She repaired first to a notary, by whom she caused the grant of an annuity of four thousand francs a year to be prepared; then to a coachmaker's, where she ordered a handsome carriage; to a horse-dealer, of whom she purchased two superb horses; lastly, to a tailor, who, by a day named, was to make complete liveries for coachman, footman, aud porter.

On the day chosen by the lady, M. Duvaudier was summoned to the Palais for another suit. At its termination he was accosted by his servant, attired in livery, who informed him that Madame Duvaudier had given orders for the carriage to come for him. M. Duvaudier, a little surprised at the dress of his servant, decided, notwithstanding, to follow him, expecting to learn the key to this enigma from his wife. On reaching the

carriage, his surprise increased at finding the coachman similarly arrayed. The footman, on opening the door, begged, in Madame Duvaudier's name, that he would look at a paper which he would find under the cushion. This was the deed for the annuity destined to maintain the equipage.

Toward the close of 1799 the principal tribunals were broken up, and the order of advocates was suppressed. New courts were established, and suitors were permitted to appear by deputy, so that the public gained nothing beyond the substitution of a set of ignorant adventurers for a body of men distinguished by learning and integrity. A small proportion of the ancient bar continued the practice of their profession under its new titles, and amongst the most conspicuous was M. Berryer.

A remarkable suit was instituted by the journeymen carriers against their masters for the amount of a certain percentage on their wages, retained during many years, as the masters alleged, to form a fund in case of sickness. The journeymen were represented by M. Berryer, who seems to have entertained no very exalted opinion of the justice of their claim. But at the time in question it was a crime of the deepest dye to be a proprietor or a capitalist Equal rights required unequal judgments; and Le Roy Sermaise, a judge of the genuine democratic school, decided almost without hesitation for the journeymen.

This worthy was once trying a cause between two peasants regarding the property in a field. The claimant produced a deed which had nothing to do with the question. The defendant relied on long possession exclusively. "How long?" inquired the judge. "Why, citizen president, from father to son, eighty or ninety years at least." "In that case, my friend, you ought to be satisfied; each in his turn; it is now your adversary's." He ordered the claimant to be put into possession without delay.

We might go on indefinitely quoting from this interesting book, but time and space alike forbid any further extracts.-Green Bag.

INDORSED RECEIPTS ON BUILDING
SOCIETIES' MORTGAGES.

A perusal of the authorities on this subject suggests the question, How many titles are defective by reason of mortgages to building societies being discharged by indorsed receipts instead of by reconveyances?

It will be remembered that in the case of a building society established under the Act of 1836 (6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 32) a receipt indorsed on the society's mortgage for all moneys intended to be secured thereby is sufficient to vacate the security and vest the estate in "the person or persons for the time being entitled to the equity of redemption," without any reconveyance (s. 5). The object of this section, as pointed out by Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Hosking v. Smith, 58 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 368; L. R. 13 App. Čas. 585, was merely to get rid of conveyancing formalities and to make the receipt given under the statute to operate as though it were a conveyance; and where the equity of redemption has not been dealt with, there can be no doubt as to the effect of the section--the mortgage is at an end and the estate revests in the mortgagor. But where the equity of redemption has been split up by mortgages, a serious question arises as to the person in whom the estate is to vest.

The first reported case in which this question appears to have been cousidered is Prosser v. Rice, 28 Beav. 68 (1859), where Lord Romilly, M.R., held that the effect of the section was to vest the legal estate in the next incumbrancer in point of time, although the building society was paid off by a stranger. In Pease v. Jackson, 37 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 725; L. R. 3 Chanc. Div. 576 (1868), the same judge came to a similar decision, but ou appeal was reversed by Lord Cairns, L.C., who held that the section means either that the legal estate revests in the mortgagor on payment off by him, or that, whoever pays off the mortgage, the legal estate goes at large to

whichever of the persons entitled to the equity of redemption has the best right to call for it. It was unnecessary for the decision to determine which of these alternative constructions was the right one; but, as Lord Cairus commented on the difficulty and inconvenience which would be caused by the second construction, it seems not improbable that he considered the effect of the statutory receipt was to revest the estate in the mortgagor, on payment off by him, as the owner of the ultimate equity of redemption.

A few years after the last-mentioned case, the Building Societies Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 42), was passed; and it might have been expected that the Legislature would have made some clearer provision for vesting the estate on payment off of a mortgage; but, although the Act gives incorporated societies the option of indorsing or aunexing a reconveyance "to the then owner of the equity of redemption or to such persons and to such uses as he may direct," it provides (s. 42) for vesting the estate by an indorsed receipt in "the person for the time being entitled to the equity of redemption," using substantially the same words as those used in the Act of 1836. At first sight the clause authorising a reconveyance does not seem to afford much help as to the constraction of the words providing for the effect of the indorsed receipt; but in The Fourth City Mutual Benefit Building Society v. Williams; Marson v. Cox, 49 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 245; L. R. 14 Chanc. Div. 140 (1879), Sir George Jessel, M.R., relied on the former clause as explaining who was meant by "the person entitled to the equity of redemption " in the case of an indorsed receipt, and as showing that the legal estate was iutended to vest not in the mortgagor but in the person who in equity is best entitled to call for it. But although the judgment seems to be based on the reconveyance clause, which occurs for the first time in the Act of 1874, it can hardly be inferred that the Master of the Rolls would have come to any other conclusion in a case under the Act of 1836, as it is difficult to see how different constructions could be placed on the same words used in both Acts. In Lawrence v. Clements, 31 L. T. (N. 8.) 670 (1874), Vice-Chancellor Hall followed Pease v. Jackson; as did the Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Trevor, 53 Law J. Rep. Q. B. 85; L. R. 12 Q. B. Div. 423 (1883), Lord Justice Baggallay intimating his preference for the construction in favour of the person having the better equity, although the other Lords Justices expressed no opinion, as it was again unnecessary for the decision. In Hosking v. Smith, 58 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 367; L. R. 13 App. Cas. 582 (1888), the question for decision was whether the legal estate passed by an endorsed receipt was acquired for all purposes, so as to enable subsequent advances to be tacked. This question the House answered in the affirmative, and Lord Halsbury, L.C., and Lord Watson expressed their opinion that under the Act of 1836 the estate vests in the person who has the best right to call for it.

The preponderance of authority, therefore, is in favour of the estate vesting in "the person having the best right to call for it; " but the meaning attached to that expression can only be understood by examining the facts of the reported cases. All that we can do here is to indicate the main points. In Pease v. Jackson, Lawrence v. Clements, Robinson v. Trevor, and Hosking v. Smith, the estate was held to vest in third mortgagees who had paid off a building society's first mortgage and obtained the title-deeds without notice of the second mortgagees; in The Fourth City Mutual Benefit Building Society v. Williams the estate was held to vest in a second mortgagee whose money had been applied by the mortgagor in paying off a building society's first mortgage; while in Marson v. Cox the estate was held to vest in fourth mortgagees by whom a building society's first mortgage had been paid off without notice of the mesue incumbrance. The cases, therefore, seem to show that the person in whom the estate vests by res son of his having the best right to call for it is the person by whom, or out of whose money, the building ciety is paid off.

The curious consequences which may follow from this construction are exemplified by the case of Sangster v. Cochrane, 54 Law J. Rep. Chanc. 301; L. R. 28 Chanc. Div. 298 (1885), where Mr. Justice Kay felt himself bound by the previous decisions (against his own opinion) to hold that a stranger paying off a building society's mortgage, and procuring its discharge by an indorsed receipt under the Act of 1874, obtains a charge in priority over an absolute assignee of the equity of redemption.

Although the result of the cases is to protect the best equity, it cannot be regarded as satisfactory that the legal estate is liable to be blown about by every breath of equity, so that a person purchasing or taking & mortgage cannot, by the utmost precaution, make sure of obtaining it. Indorsed receipts given by trustees of societies under the Act of 1836 may mention the name of the person paying off the mortgage, if so prescribed by their rules; but it will be observed that the form of indorsed receipt prescribed by the Act of 1874 does not contain any reference to the name of such person; accordingly a conveyancer, anxious to secure the possession of the legal estate, must inquire by whom the society was paid off. That is to say, instead of the position of the estate being shown by the ordinary muniments of title, it is left to depend on the truth of a letter or statutory declaration, so that a purchaser or mortgagee carefully investigating the title may yet be deprived of his principal safeguard. This objection, though evidently regarded as a serious one by Lord Cairns in Pease v. Jackson, does not appear to have had much weight in subsequent cases; and it is to be regretted that the Legislature should have perpetuated in the Act of 1874 a provision so ambiguous in its meaning, when all uncertainty might have been avoided by making the estate vest in the person named in the receipt.

In conclusion, it may be observed that the present state of the law furnishes an additional reason for not omitting equitable mortgages from an abstract of title, although they may have been paid off. For if a first legal mortgage to a building society is paid off by a second equitable mortgagee and discharged by an indorsed receipt, the second mortgagee, according to the authorities, acquires the legal estate, and if afterwards paid off and discharged by a receipt without any reconveyance (as not infrequently happens in the case of equitable mortgages), the legal estate would be left outstanding in him. But, if the second mortgage were, suppressed, it would appear from the abstract as if the legal estate had revested in the mortgagor, and the purchaser, trusting to the abstract, would require merely an equitable title, exposed to the risk of being defeated by some secret incumbrance of which he had no notice.

In examining a title, therefore, where a mortgage to a building society has been discharged by an indorsed receipt, it seems to be a proper precaution to inquire by whom it was paid off, and whether there were any subsequent incumbrances not disclosed by the abstract.Law Journal.

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF

IRELAND.

The Council of this Society met on Wednesday, Mr. William Findlater, ex-President, in the chair, and seventeen other members present. A report from the Court of Examiners on recent intermediate examinations was read. The New Registration Bill introduced by the Attorney-General into the House of Commons was referred to the Parliamentary Committee. An important report containing suggestions for improvements in County Court procedure was adopted. A report of the House Committee suggesting joint action of the Bar and the Law Society with reference to the arrangements of the coffee-room at the Four Courts was adopted, and the Secretary was directed to invite the Bar Committee to meet the House Committee of the Council to discuss

suggestions for improvements. A report of the special Committee as to the payments to benchers was adopted. The Council adjourned for a fortnight.

NOTES OF CASES.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before LORD ASHBOURNE, C.)
In re FOLEY.*

July 7, 1890.-Admission of solicitor-Indentures of apprenticeship not signed by master-Death of masterPortion of lectures unattended-Illness.

Application on behalf of Mr. Edward Richard Foley, a son of late Mr. Edward Green Foley, solicitor, that he be permitted to present himself for the Final Examination of the Incorporated Law Society, notwithstanding the fact that he had not obtained the necessary certificates of passing the intermediate examination and keeping necessary lectures, and that upon passing said final examination be be admitted a solicitor, notwithstanding the fact that the necessary affidavit of his master as to due service could not be made, owing to death of his master. The applicant stated in his affi. davit that he passed the preliminary examination in October, 1882, and entered into indentures with his father, which were duly executed on 30th May, 1884, and that he served his full period of five years, ending 30th May, 1889, and worked in his father's office up till February, 1890, in which month his father died; that, owing to deafness, he was unable to get any benefit from lectures, some of which he attended, but found it useless to continue doing so, and consequently could not obtain the necessary certificate of the Common Law Professor to enable him to present himself for intermediate examination. An affidavit of Murdock Green Foley, solicitor, applicant's brother, stated that applicant had duly served as apprentice to his father from the date of indentures, 30th May, 1884, for a period of five years, and had continued so serving up to February, 1890.

W. Greene, in support of motion.

Mr. Wakely, solicitor, on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, stated that the Society did not oppose the application under the special circumstances.

Motion granted.

NOTES OF ENGLISH CASES. [From the Law Journal.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before KAY, J.)

TAYLOR v. RUSSELL.

The note of this case previously published was defective. Ed.

with Toward, and believing him to be honest, did not make any requisition as to the identity of the property. The mortgage was carried out by a deed dated February 15, 1883, which described the property accurately and referred to the plan on the forged deed which was handed over to the plaintiffs as mortgagees.

The property at the date of the forged deed belonged to Surtees' trustees, subject to a legal mortgage made in 1862 to Legard's trustees, which mortgage included other property. Toward afterwards purchased the property subject to the mortgage from Surtees' trustees, and it was conveyed to him by Surtees' surviving trustee by deed dated January 30, 1883. It was admitted, therefore, that the plaintiffs obtained the equitable estate by their conveyance of February 15, 1883, though the real title was not disclosed to them.

The defendants' title was under a deed of October 20, 1887, by which Toward mortgaged the same property to the defendants for £2,500, disclosing his real title under Surtees' trustees.

The defendants afterwards received notice of the plaintiffs' mortgage, and then induced Legard's trustees (who were satisfied with the security of the rest of the property subject to their mortgage) to reconvey this property to Surtees' trustees, who a few days afterwards, voluntarily and knowing of the plaintiffs' mortgage, conveyed it to the defendants.

This was an action in which the plaintiffs claimed priority. The defendants, on the other hand, sought to pospone the plaintiffs' security: first, on the ground of negligence; and, secondly, by virtue of the legal estate now vested in the defendants under the above circumstances.

Haldane, Q.C., and Levett for the plaintiffs.
Renshaw, Q.C., and Scott Fox for the defendants.

KAY, J., held: first, that the plaintiffs had not been guilty of any negligence sufficient to postpone their prior equitable title; and, secondly, that the defendants could not rely on the legal estate got in after notice of the plaintiffs' mortgage as a protection against that mortgage, and made a declaration on the footing of the plaintiff's priority, directing each party to add his costs of the action to his security, without interest on such

costs.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION.
(Before the PRESIDENT.)

IN THE GOODS OF MARY TAYLOR (deceased). June 17.-Will-Portions of the document cut out-Revocation.

Mary Taylor died on March 4, 1890, at Wesley Place, Low Moor, Bradford, a bastard, without children. She left a will. This will was found after her death, with two pieces cut out of it, one in the margin, and one a long strip between the attestation clause and the signatures of the witnesses. The affidavits in support of the motion were to the effect that the initials of the attesting witnesses were written on the piece cut out in the margin, and nothing at all on the other piece cut out.

Bargrave Deane moved for probate of the will. He read a letter from the solicitor for the Treasury consenting to the grant.

The PRESIDENT (Sir James Hannen): It is very difficult to guess what the testatrix meant in her mind when she cut out these portions of the paper, if, indeed, she did do it. The question I have to consider is whether I am bound to conclude she did it with the intention of revoking the will. In the first place, she kept the will, and this seems to show that she attached importance to it. Then she has left her own signature, and one would think that if she intended to revoks the will she would have cut it out. I see there was something written at the end of the attestation clause, which has been cut out, but what I cannot tell. But as-whatever it Was it came after the attestation clause, and as the attestation clause is a good one, I am

enabled to arrive at a favourable conclusion. The name of the first attesting witness has been cut through, but this appears to have been an accident. I make the grant accordingly.

CORRESPONDENCE.

We throw open the columns of this journal most willingly for the discussion of subjects of interest to the profession; but it must be understood that we do not necessarily agree with all the opinions expressed by our correspondents.

Letters and communications intended for publication and addressed to THE EDITOR, 53 Upper Sackville-street, Dublin, must be authenticated by the name of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith,

** Letters intended for publication in the same week should reach the Office not later than Thursday morning.

COSTS OF CIVIL BILL EJECTMENTS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE IRISH LAW TIMES.

SIR-I observe, by the newspapers, that a point of very considerable interest to the profession has been decided in their favour by a very eminent Judge, at Cavan Summer Assizes.

It will be in the recollection of your readers that the late Lord FitzGerald moved and carried the introduction of a clause in the Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1887 (now section 33, sub-section 2), which had the effect of cutting down materially the costs of ejectments brought in the Civil Bill Courts for non-payment of rent; the section directed the authority mentioned in 40 & 41 Vic., cap. 56, sec. 84, to amend the existing scale of fees so that, as far as practicable, the costs of ejectment should not exceed the costs of an ordinary civil bill for rent.

The 34th section defines "ejectment" to mean an action for recovery of possession of land, and "holding" as not including any holding not agricultural or pas toral, or partly so. The authority framed and promulgated a schedule of fees on the 9th September, 1887, and headed it scale of fees, &c., in ejectments for nonpayment of rent. Hitherto this schedule has been held to apply to all ejectments for non-payment of rent in the Civil Bill Courts.

At Cavan Summer Assizes an appeal was taken from a decision of Judge Waters, by which he held that this schedule of fees applied to an ejectment of a house and offices in the town of Cavan.

The question argued upon the appeal was whether this schedule applied or not, and Judge Murphy held that the schedule did not apply to any holding not agricultural or pastoral, or partly so, and that, therefore, the solicitor was entitled to have his costs in the case before the Court taxed under the schedule in force prior to the making of the schedule of 9th September, 1887, the costs under the old schedule amounting to £2 10s. 10d., under the new schedule (if applicable) to £1 4s. 6d.

As this decision is of so much importance to civil bill practitioners, I think it desirable to call attention to it. Yours faithfully,

A. FETHERSTONHAUGH. [The decision referred to by correspondent is included in last week's Notes of Cases.- Ed]

BUDGET OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY

(IRELAND).

TO THE EDITOR OF THE IRISH LAW TIMES.

SIRA remarkable Parliamentary paper recently issued shows the receipts and expenditure of the Ac countant-General of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland in respect of the funds of the suitors for the year ended 30th September, 1889. The receipts and transfers into Court during the year, added to the balances in hand on 30th September, 1888, amounted to £7,898,695, and 21,000 rupees and 15,000 dollars "expressed in foreign currency." After payments and transfers out of Court, amounting to £2,078,561, there

remained balances in haud at the close of the year amounting to £5,820,134. The return also shows that a deficiency of cash balance, in respect of suitors' cash, amounting to £244,150, appropriated many years ago, pursuant to Act of Parliament, towards the cost of building the Courts of Law in Dublin, and of a loss of £7,905, arising from a deficiency in the accounts of a former Chancery Master, is liable to be made good from the Consolidated Fund, in the event of the funds iu Court being at any time insufficient to meet payments to suitors.

It would, therefore, seem that a considerable portion of these funds consist of unclaimed money, and this is confirmed by official lists of "dormant" funds being periodically published in the Dublin Gazette, but the information there given is at present of te value to persous interested. The following are the more curious items:

Henry Andrews, a lunatic.

D. Bell, credit child being name of Esther.
Duchess of Chandos, a lunatic.

Denis Conolly, bequest of £800.
New Gaol of Downpatrick.

Louisa Guiness, trusts and legacy to G. Sayers.
Hickson. Aylward, residue of sale of lands in 1839.
Mary Hone, legacy to Unitarian Missionary Society.
James Keefe, legacy to May Keefe.

Mullingar Gaol.

George Sloan, a bankrupt.

People interested in these unclaimed funds naturally ask why this list is not issued in the same form as the English one, which, in addition to being alphabetically arranged, gives (1) cross references, (2) year in which accounts were opened, (3) date and nature of last transactions, and (4) date of orders directing last transactions to be made. At present, persons searching the Irish List stand a very good chance of missing the name sought, owing to no cross references being given. Thus, who would think of looking for the item "Representatives of Mary Merrick" under the heading "Peter Doyle?" Many similar instances might be quoted. What is good for England is surely good for Ireland, and I therefore venture to ask your valuable aid towards obtaining the additional information above indicated in future Irish lists. It would also be a great boon to claimants if the amount unclaimed in each case were stated.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

SIDNEY H. PRESTON,