Continued in the name of ALEXANDER RADCLIFFE HORDERN, surviving Trustee and Executor of the Will, dated the 3rd day of March, 1888, of the said EARL OF SHANNON, Deceased. WHEREAS application has been made to the Court by the abovenamed ALEXANDER RADCLIFFE HORDERN, for an Order, pursuant to the 14th Section, Subsection 1, of the "Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1887," that the amount of the advances sanctioned in this Matter in respect of Sales to Tenants of the lands set forth in the Schedule hereto (or part thereof), less the amount of the guarantee deposits, be paid into the Bank of Ireland, to the account of the Irish Land Commission and credit of this Matter, and that the claims of all persons (except the tenants or persons claiming under them) who are interested in the lands sold, whether as incumbrancers or otherwise, shall attach to the purchase-money of such lands in like manner as immediately before the sales they attached to the lands, and shall cease to be of any validity against the lands.

And whereas the said HENRY BENTINCK, late EARL OF SHANNON, claimed to be seized of the said lands in fee-simple, except the lands of Desert and Drombeg, to which the said late EARL OF SHANNON claimed to be entitled under lease renewable for ever, subject to £107 38. 5d. per annum for rent, renewal fines, &c., and subject only as is mentioned in the Originating Statement in this Matter, filed 4th day of March, 1889

Let all parties Take Notice that the said Application will come before me to report upon on Friday, the 27th day of June, 1890, at my Chambers, 24 Upper Merrion-street, Dublin, at Eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and will come on for hearing before Mr. Commissioner LYNCH, at his Court, Upper Merrion-street, aforesaid, on Friday, the 4th day of July, 1890, at Eleven o'clock in the forenoon, when a Final Order will be made, and all persons are at liberty to inspect the said Originating Statement at my Office, and any person, for any valid reason, objecting to such Order being made, may enter an appearance in the Matter, and file an Affidavit of Cause against the said Order being made, and appear on the hearing of such application.

And Further Take Notice that, immediately on the making of such Order, the Court will proceed to vest the several holdings in the purchasing tenants thereof, and to charge the said holdings with the annuities in respect of the said advances. Dated this 29th day of May, 1890.

JOHN O. BLUNDEN, Assistant Chief Clerk. N.B.-No application to the Court by letter or memorial can be entertained.

SCHEDULE REFERRED TO IN THE FOREGOING NOTICE.
Cappeen, Cloheen, part of, Parish of Kilgarriff, Crohane (East),
Desert, Fourcuil, Parish of Kilgarriff, Fourcuil, Parish of Templebryan,
Gallanes, part of, Garranecore, Parish of Kilgarriff, Garranecore,
Parish of Templebryan, Grillagh, Parish of Kilnagross, Kilgarriff,
Knockshagh, Mauln gearagh, Maulnaskehy, Miles, Scartagh, Tawnies
Lower, Tawnies Upper, Templebryan North, Templebryan South,
Youghals, Parish of Island, Youghals, Parish of Kilgarriff, all in the
Barony of the East Division of East Carbery, and
COUNTY OF CORK.

Cahergal, Parish of Templemolus, Cahergal, Parish of Desert, Caherlarhig, Drombeg, Garrymore, all in the Barony of Ibane and Barryroe, and County of Cork.

AND

VOL. XXIV.

JOURNAL.

CONTEMPT OF COURT BY NEWSPAPERS.-II.

WHERE the publisher does the thing in ignorance of the fact that there was a legal proceeding pending, and the Court accepts his defence that he was actually ignorant, it will not commit him for contempt. In the case of Metropolitan Music Hall Co. v. Lake, 58 L. J. Ch. 513, 60 L. T. 749, 5 Times L. R., the publication-containing comments on the subject-matter of the action, and reflections on possible parties—was made without knowledge of the proceedings having been instituted, and the paper refrained from any further reference to the matter on being informed of the fact that the proceedings were begun. The Court refused to commit, holding that as contempt involving imprisonment was a quasi-criminal offence, which a man could not commit without knowledge (see Re Pollard, L. R. 2 P. C. 106), in such a case scienter must be shown or reasonably inferred, as in the case of interference with wards of Court (Herbert's case, 3 P. Wms. 115). Then arises the question, is the publisher, when he has no actual knowledge, still bound by cognisance of what is going on in Her Majesty's Courts; does the old doctrine of lis pendens apply in such cases? Chitty, J., in the case referred to, answers this question in the negative. The other alternative would be very hard on publishers. For example, suppose a writ in an action is issued and served to-day, and there is no opportunity for the publisher to know of it, yet if he published that to-day which he could have published with immunity yesterday (so far as contempt is concerned), he would render himself liable to attachment.

As regards his ignorance of what he prints and publishes it is otherwise. The proprietor is liable for everything published in his paper, even in his absence (Reg. v. Walters, 3 Esp. 21), and ignorance of its contents does not excuse the printer: Ex parte Jones, 13 Ves. Jun. 237. It was held, as far back as the year 1742, that a publisher and printer, although he has no knowledge of the contents of his publication, and may be entirely ignorant thereof, is responsible, and may be committed for contempt. Printers and publishers therefore "must exercise their trade with prudence and caution, for if they print anything that is libellous, it is no excuse to say that the printer had no knowledge of the contents: (per Lord Hardwicke in Re St. James' Evening Post, 2 Atk. 469). In the same case the judge remarks: "Nothing is more incumbent upon Courts of Justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned in causes before the cause is finally heard." This decision was followed in Tichborne v. Mostyn, 7 L. R. Ex. 55, where the printers had to pay the costs of the motion, and in the recent case of In re the

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No. 1,222

American Exchange in Europe, 61 L. T. 502. In the latter case an action was brought by a company in liquidation against several defendants, one of whom, L., was examined by the liquidator under section 115 of the Companies Act, 1862. The New York Herald published an account of an interview held with L., containing statements purporting to be made by her of what occurred at her examination. The printer and publisher was ignorant of the contents of the article, but he did not disclose the name of the writer (had he done so it might have mitigated his offence apparently: see Roach v. Garven, 2 Atk. 472). He was held responsible for the contempt it was held to be contempt and ordered to pay the costs, but as he apologised, and offered an undertaking not to repeat the offence, the Court, although it had power to do so, did not actually commit him.

It is, therefore, vain for the publisher to plead that the paragraph was inserted in the paper in the ordinary course of business as an item of general news, that he was not aware of the paragraph, that he has no interest in the action, and had not inserted the paragraph with any idea of prejudicing the trial; he is technically guilty of contempt: Hunt v. Clarke, 61 L. T. 343, 37 W. R. 724; but the Court will not necessarily interfere when the contempt is merely technical and of a trifling nature, and not serious, and may even order the applicant to pay the costs. The vendor of a newspaper is not liable for libel contained in it, if he does not know of the libel: Emmens v. Pottle, 16 Q. B. D. 354.

Persons engaged in the business of the Court are under the protection of the Court; therefore it was at a very early period decided that the judges, parties, solicitors, counsel (Hodson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & A. 232; Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. D. 588; Mackey v. Ford, 5 H. & N. 792; Needham v. Dowling, 15 L. J. C. P. 9), and witnesses, either in affidavit or vivâ voce (Bevis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Astley v. Young, 2 Burr. 807), in a cause are exempt from an action for slander, provided that the allegations be made in a Court of competent jurisdiction and be pertinent to the cause: Waterer v. Freeman, Hob. 266; Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255. But printing and publishing a counsel's brief before the cause comes on for hearing has been held, in several cases, to be contempt of Court: Re Perry, 2 Atk. 471, and circulating a copy of the pleadings with comments depreciating the case of one of the parties during the progress of the action is contempt: Kitcat v. Sharp, 54 L. J. Ch. 134; 48 L. T. 64. In another old case an attachment was granted against an attorney who published his brief after the trial; and counsel cannot publish, subsequently to the hearing, scandalous matter uttered by him in discharge of his duty, unless it is shown that it

is published for the purpose of giving the public information which it was fit and proper for them to receive, and that it was warranted by the evidence: Flint v. Pike, 6 D. & R. 528. In Cann v. Cann (3 Hare, 333 n.) the defendants were committed for contempt and restrained from publishing, printing, or vending their answers in a suit. The principle is applicable equally to any bill, answer, or petition, which may be filed in the Court, the statements therein contained being necessarily exparte and unaccompanied by any evidence or pleadings on either side. Lord Eldon held the report of an exparte trial to be libellous, because the party who did not appear had no chance of contradicting statements which might do him irreparable harm, see Usil v. Hales, 9 C. P. D. 319; Myers v. Defries, 4 Ex. D, 176.

As regards reports, a fair, correct, and impartial account of what takes place is privileged, both in Superior and Inferior Courts. The Court of Common Pleas in England, in the year 1796, decided that an action cannot be maintained for publishing a true account of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, however injurious such publication may be to the character of an individual: Curry v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525. The fact that the publication may affect the character of third persons, even, is no restriction (Ryalls v. Leader, 1 L. R. Ex. 296), because the general advantage to the county in having proceedings in Courts of Justice made public, more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings; therefore, the Court will not grant a criminal information against a bookseller for printing a report: Reg. v. Wright, I Term Rep. 298; Davison v. Duncan, 7 E. & B. 231. The report need not be a verbatim one: Andrews v. Chapman, 3 C. & K. 289; Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20. It need not be accurate to the very words so long as it is a fair representation of what has taken place in a Court of Justice, whether upon an interlocutory application or on the hearing of the cause: Buenos Ayres Co. v. Wilde, 29 W. R. 44.

But the report should be an absolutely fair abstract of the trial: Milissich v. Lloyds, 13 C. C. C. 575, 36 L. T. 423; Turney v. Sullivan, 6 L. T. 130. It must not contain disparaging observations (Styles v. Nokes, 7 East. 493), save such as occur in the Judge's remarks (Delegal v. Highley, 5 Scott, 154), nor a mere opening statement by counsel (Saunders v. Mills, 3 M. &. P. 520), or a libellous speech by counsel, without the evidence by which it is supported (Kane v. Mulvany, 2 Ir. R. C. L. 402); nor obscene or blasphemous matter (Steele v. Brennan, 7 L. R. C. P. 261, Libel Amendment Act, 1888, cl. 4); nor an incorrect report of evidence (Shaw v. Collingridge, Q. B. D., 1888), nor any evidence not produced in Court (Hibbins v. Lee, 4 F. & F. 247; Lynam v. Going, 16 Ir. L. R. 259), but any evidence which was given may be reported, no matter how irrelevant (Ryalls v. Leader, 1 L. R. Ex. 296). The proper parties should be given: Marks v. Conservative Newspaper Co., 3 T. L. R. 244. In Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & A. 612, it was held that the party must publish the whole case, and not merely

state the conclusion which he draws from the evidence, but, on the other hand, a case may be reported even if not finally disposed of: R. v. Gray, 10 Cox's C. C. 184. Care should be taken not to put anything into the mouth of a Judge which he did not say: Marks v. Conservative Newspaper Co., 3 T. L. R. 244. In Scott v. Stanfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, it was held that the remarks of a Judge were privileged, even if false and malicious, but these old cases have been somewhat upset by the recent case of Macdougall v. Knight (55 L. T. R. N. S. 274, 17 Q. B. D. 636, 14 App. Cas. 194) in the House of Lords, where the Lord Chancellor laid it down that the judgment of a Judge was not necessarily privileged in all cases, especially where it is unaccompanied by the evidence in the case, showing the reasons of the decision. Therefore, it would appear that partial publication may not be privileged, and that the publication even of a Judge's charge is not safe. The Court of Appeal in England have, however, followed their own previous decision in a second branch of this case involving the same question-viz., that a fair and accurate report of a judgment alone is privileged, if published bona fide and without malice, and this would therefore still appear to be the law.

THE STAMP LAWS.

There is a novel plan adopted by those who write begging letters for societies and institutions which is apparently to some extent within the mischief of the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic., c. 97). The plan is to send with the charitable appeal a paper in the form of a cheque. This is for the charitably disposed to fill up, By filling it up they will call upon their own bankers to pay to the bankers of the society or institution a sum of money. Now, the cheque is sent to the charitable public, naturally enough, without a stamp upon it. It does not bear any warning notice that a peuny stamp is required. Consequently, when a donor fills it up, be will probably omit to put a penny stamp upon it. Speaking generally, a bill of exchange-which of course includes a cheque--cannot be stamped after execution, But by sect. 54 of the Stamp Act, if a bill of exchange for the payment of money on demand, liable only to the duty of one penny, is presented for payment uustamped, the banker may put upon it an adhesive stamp, and cancel that stamp as if he had been the drawer of the bill, either charging the amount against the drawer or deducting the amount from the sum payable, and the bill is then, so far as concerns the duty, good and valid. This saving, however, is "not to relieve any person from any penalty he may have incurred in relation to such bill." This being the state of things, the mau who draws an unstamped cheque may subject himself to unknown penalties, though the bauker will doubtless stamp it when presented. But a trap is laid for the charitable by the system of putting unstamped cheques in their hands without a word of warning,

Bankers in general do not remember the section in the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vic., c. 97), s. 48 (3), which says that "an order for the payment of any sum of money weekly, monthly, or at any other stated periods, and also any order for the payment by any person at any time after the date thereof of any sum of money, and sent or delivered by the person making the same to the person by whom the payment is to be made, and not to the person to whom the payment is to be made, or to any person on his behalf, is to be deemed for the purposes of this Act a bill of exchange for the payment of money on demand." In other words, when a man gives his banker an order to pay to a third person so much a week, so much a month, so much a quarter, or so much a year, that is a bill of

exchange and liable to stamp duty accordingly. This is a rule which is very generally lost sight of or ignored, to the detriment of the Revenue. It is a constant practice for executors, to take an example, to give their bankers an order to pay so much regularly to each annaitant under their will. This order bears no stamp. It obviates the necessity for a monthly, quarterly, or annual cheque, which would of course bear its penny stamp. It escapes duty altogether, and it never or rarely comes before Somerset House or before the courts so as to have the duty exacted. To our mind there is here a legitimate subject upon which Mr. Goschen can exercise his financial skill in the next Budget. It would be difficult to tax the order at its inception according to the length of time which it may remain in operation, as that period will very seldom be certainly known. Therefore either such standing orders upon bankers should have a fixed stamp of sixpence or a shilling, or else they should be fixed with an ad valorem duty. As things are, a large amount of money changes hands every year without contributing a penny to the Revenue. Some contribution that money ought certainly to make.-Law Times.

HYPNOTISM AND THE LAW.

The Jurist of last November contains a remarkable account of a Swedish trial, in which a medical student sued a doctor for hypnotising him against his will. The defendant was enterprising enough to follow up his previous offence by bypnotising all the plaintiff's witnesses and making them contradict themselves and behave in a generally irrational manner; and this course of action so bewildered the judge that instead of committing the defendant for contempt, a step which would seem to have been quite justifiable under the circumstances-unless, perhaps, he feared to meet with the same fate as the witnesses-be adjourned the case for the purpose of calling in medical assistance. The reader cannot but fear that some of the picturesqueness of this anecdote is attributable to the fact that it comes by way of "one of the evening papers;" yet it is impossible to read Dr. James's interesting paper on the "Hidden Self" in the March "Scribner's" without reflecting on the part which hypnotism may yet play in the law. It is strange to think of our jury system and present judicial machinery applied to some of the many questions which the subject may raise, more especially in the criminal law; but up to the present time it does not seem to have come before the courts of this country.

*

The

In France, however, there have been such cases, an account of which, together with a very learned and valuable discussion of hypuotism in its legal aspects, will be found in a recent work of M. Jules Liegeois, Professor of Jurisprudence at Nancy. This book is an elaborate treatment of the subject and contains facts of great importance to medical jurisprudence. author believes that there are serious dangers in hypnotism with which the law may be called upon to deal, and he gives many striking experiments to show how the hypnotised person may be made the victim of fraud or crime, or may, by means of the post-hypnotic sug. gestion, be used as a tool in the hands of another.+ In the latter case, M. Liegeois is of opinion that the law should regard the hypnotiser as the criminal, treating the subject as legally irresponsible.

Among the few occasions when the question has actually come up in court is a remarkable case some twenty-five years ago in which a beggar had enticed

De la Suggestion et du Somnambulisme dans leurs Rapports avec la Jurisprudence et la Medecine Leg le. Paris, Octave Doin 1889.

In an article, entitled " Hypnotism and Crime," in the April "Forum," Dr. Charcot, who belongs to a different school from M. Liegeois, states his belief that the danger of such a use of the hypnotic suggestion is much overrated: his views seem, however. to be connected with the peculiar doctrines of his school. A treatise on Hypnotism by Dr. Bjornstrom, of Stockholm, recently translated for the Humboldt Library, also contains a readable, though rather thin, chapter on Hypnotism and the Law.

from her home, under very peculiar circumstances, the daughter of respectable French peasants. He was arrested, and the magistrate put to two doctors the question whether the accused "could by the influence of magnetic passes have destroyed her moral liberty to such an extent as to give his ac's the character of rape." The doctors answered in the affirmative, and at the trial, which resulted in a conviction, other experts were called and testified before the jury to the same effect. M. Liegeois points out that the physicians seem to have imperfectly understood the nature of the " magnetism' of which they testified, but that the circumstances of the case were such as entirely to confirm the theory that the prisoner exercised a hypnotic infiuence over his victim. The facts of a more recent case, where the memory of a girl convicted of theft was awakened by hypnotism, and it was thus discovered that she had secreted the missing article while in a state of somnambulism, bear a strange resemblance to the main incident of Wilkie Collins's "Moonstone."-Harvard Law Review.

MURDER AND INSANITY.

The recent trial of John Henry Bennett for what is known as the St. Kilda murder and his acquittal by the jury on the grounds of insanity once more raises the vexed question of responsibility in mental diseas. Simply stated the facts were that the prisoner shot his uncle apparently to avenge some injuries which his uncle had been guilty of toward his mother. The prisoner appeared to have been actuated by the memory of a long series of acts of unkindness on the part of his uncle towards his mother, but the immediately provoking cause a sort of culminating cause-did not occur till a few days before the murder. There was some slight very slight-evidence of hereditary taint in the form of alcoholism, but it is questionable whether this evidence was worth weighing at all, and there was also evidence a good deal stronger-of practices on the part of the prisoner which one of the medical witnesses said, very correctly, would produce a weakening effect on the nervous system. In addition to this, it was said that the prisoner when a baby had suffered from water on the brain, and also that a piece of dead bone com. municating with the brain had been removed-it did not appear clearly when-and that this was a critical operation not unlikely to affect the brain. The defence of insanity was practically based on this evidence, of more or less strength, per ly fact partly deduction and partly physiological conjecture. It is always a vexed question where insanity ends and where insanity begins, and the summing up of the Chief Justice was noticeable for a remark, with which we thoroughly agree, that there were few men who did not suffer from partial in. sanity, and that in all cases of the conduct of a person suffering from partial madness it was necessary to apply some test of responsibility for the purpose of ascertaining whether the person charged with au offence against the law was or was not respousible. But when the Chief Justice went on to say that the test was (in such a case as the present) that the accused was responsible unless the jury were satisfied that at the time the act was committed he was not in a suffi. cient possession of reason to know what he was doing then, assuming the report be correct-it seems to us, with all deference to the learned judge, that this is simply arguing in a circle-it is merely another way of saying to the jury that the test of the prisoner's insanity is the jury's satisfaction thereon, which is simply begging the whole question. It seems to us that it would be far more satisfactory, assuming the present jury system to obtain in trials for insanity, to give the jury definitions with instances and ask them to apply those definitions to, and compare those instances with the facts before them. Of course it may be arged, and we think with a great deal of force, that trials for murder in which the defence of insanity is pleaded, and which therefore are really inquiries into the sanity or insanity of a prisoner, should not be left to the