debenture trust deed contained a provision that the principal moneys and interest intended to be secured by the debentures should take precedence over all moneys which might thereafter be raised by the company by any means whatsoever, it was held that the company could mortgage specific property not comprised in the deed, so as to give the mortgagee priority over the debentures: (Buzzard v. Trelfalls Brewery Company Limited, 88 L. T. 396.) Sect. 43 of the Companies Act, 1862, requires all mortgages and charges specifically affecting property of the company to be registered in the company's register of mortgages; but it has been recently decided by the House of Lords that the omission to so register, even in the case of a mortgage to a director, will not invalidate the charge: (see Wright v. Horton, 56 L. T. Rep. N. 8. 782; 12 App. Cas. 371.)—Law Times.

INFANTS' BENEFICIAL CONTRACTS.

The courts have always had much trouble in settling matters relating to infants, their contracts and property, their pauper settlements, and their maintenance when heirs to a good estate; indeed, one might almost guess that the Chancery Division is more or less kept going by the perpetual succession of difficulties connected with people in their teens. Justices of the peace have also a very good share of the employment given to courts by this class of exacting litigants. Most people will remember the great convulsion in the legal world caused by a few cases in the common law courts as to the promises which these little people often make to marry each other, for they have even the audacity to embark in such great enterprises at most injudicious times and seasons. The Common Pleas Division had to solve the intricate points as to ratifications of such promises to marry. At first it was doubted whether the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, included these promises at all, but it was soon held that such Act did include them. Then it was started as a great difficulty whether it was for a jury to say that a ratification of the promise after majority, or some similar state of things, amounted to a fresh promise, or was nothing more than a ratification, and so void. At last the difficulty devolved on the judges themselves to say whether certain love letters and clandestine meetings and other flirtations amounted to sufficient evidence of a fresh promise to go to the jury, and, as might be expected of such authorities who had outgrown all their juvenile recollections, they differed in opinion. Two judges, Denman, J., and Lindley, J., thought, in one case, that there was evidence of a fresh promise, while Lord Coleridge, C.J., thought there was none, but that there was evidence of nothing more than a ratification of the old promise. This seemed to bring matters to a deadlock, and the infants have ever since apparently managed the whole matter for themselves, and not troubled to ask any further opinions from so antiquated a tribunal.

There is another head of law relating to infants' contracts which causes much trouble and anxiety to the courts. It has always been the law that infants could make good contracts for necessaries, and hence great judicial acuteness was brought to bear on the question what are necessaries for infants-whether cigars, riding horses, gorgeous sleeve-links, and goblets were necessaries. Then came the further difficulty whether, if they were or might be necessaries, yet that, if the infant could be shown to have been supplied with ample articles of the same kind, this was evidence admissible to rebut the liability. And in Johnstone v. Marks, 19 Q. B. D. 509, the Court of Appeal held that an infant could escape liability if he showed that he had been amply supplied with everything of the kind when he ordered the so-called necessaries. And still further complications arose where a wife living separate from her husband clothed her child at the expense of the husband who resisted the tradesman's claim to recover. But the court, by a majority of three to one, ingeniously discovered that the husband and father was liable because the wife, being justified in living apart from him

and having no sufficient means of her own, was held entitled to bind her husband for the child's necessaries because these were included in the wife's necessaries.

Justices of the peace have had their share of the troubles attending the doctrine of contracts being beneficial to the infant, as may be seen in Meakin v. Morris, 12 Q. B. D. 352. An infant had been apprenticed by deed to a hollow-ware presser, in Staffordshire, and the infant absented himself from his work, whereupon he was proceeded against by the master, who sought an order of justices directing him under 38 & 39 Vic., c. 90, to perform his duties. By the apprenticeship deed, the infant bound himself to serve for three years. At that time there had been strikes, and the deed provided that the apprentice should not, during the term, become or be a party to turn out among the workmen, and in case he should be so concerned, then the master was to be at liberty to put an end to the apprenticeship, and further, that the master should not be liable to pay any wages so long as the business might be interrupted or impeded by or in consequence of any turn-out, and the said apprentice was thereby expressly authorised and allowed during any such turn-out to employ himself in any other manner or with any other person for his own benefit. At the hearing before the justices, it was proved that there was a turn-out, but there was plenty of work for apprentices to do, and there was nothing to prevent this apprentice from earning wages, and moreover, that he would have no difficulty, except in the case of a general turn-out, in getting temporary employment with any other manufacturer. The apprentice contended that the apprenticeship deed was void on the ground that the stipulations were unfair and inequitable as against himself. The magistrates held the deed void, and refused to make an order, but a case for the opinion of the High Court was granted. The High Court held that here the contract was not for the benefit of, but was to the disadvantage of the infant, inasmuch as on the occasion of a turn-out the master could refuse to pay the apprentice, and even when such apprentice should have obtained work elsеwhere, he would be bound to return to the master and resume the service. It was said to be impossible to say that such a contract was for the infant's advantage, and hence the justices were right in treating it as void.

Another form which the same objection assumed was found involved in the case of an infant suing at law through the medium of a next friend. In Rhodes v. Swithenbank, 22 Q. B. D. 577, a girl of 16 was injured while in the service of her employer, and was advised to bring an action for negligence against him. And she sued in the Leeds county court through a next friend. The plaintiff was nonsuited. It was then suggested that if there was to be no appeal, the defendaut would not ask for costs; and this was agreed to by the plaintiff's counsel, and judgment of nonsuit without costs was accordingly entered. Afterwards, notice of appeal was given, and on the case coming before a Divisional Court, that court held that the undertaking was binding, and the appeal was dismissed, but leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was given. It was accordingly taken to the Court of Appeal, and it was then contended that the compromise was not for the benefit of the infant, and though the next friend consented, such consent was not binding. It was said not to be for the benefit of the infaut, because costs could not have been given against the infant. even if the next friend could have, in theory, recovered from the infant such costs as he might have been made liable for, yet such recourse here was valueless, for the infant had no property. The consequence was, that the compromise could not benefit the infant, though it might have relieved the next friend from his own costs. The Court of Appeal agreed with the contention on behalf of the infant. Lord Esher, M.R., said that of course the next friend had the conduct of the action, but the waiver of the right to appeal was a matter beyond the ordinary conduct of the action, and, considering that the right of appeal might be of the greatest value to the infant, the compromise could not

And

benefit, and, therefore, was not binding on the infant. And Fry, L.J., put it shortly thus: "A next friend has no power to enter into a compromise by which the infant gives up a right and the next friend obtains a benefit. This is a compromise exactly of that sort, although I have no doubt it was made in good faith."

The latest case of an infant setting up his repudiation of a contract contains a novel feature. The case of Valentini v. Canali, reported in another column, turned on the 1st section of the Infants Relief Act, 1874, which enacted that all contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, thenceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or goods supplied other than contracts for necessaries, and all accounts stated with infants shall be absolutely void; provided always that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity enter, except such as now by law are voidable.

In this case the infant had agreed with the defendant to become tenant of a house and to pay £102 for the furniture therein. He had occupied the premises and used the furniture for some months, and had paid a sum of £68 on account, and given a promissory note for the balance. He afterwards sued the defendant for a return of this £68, on the ground that he was an infant at the time of entering into the contract, and claimed a declaration that the contract was void and that the promissory note should be cancelled. The county court judge gave judgment for the plaintiff except as to the return of the £68, whereupon an appeal was brought, and it was contended that as, by the statute, the contract was void, it followed that there being a complete failure of consideration, the plaintiff had a right to recover back the sum of £68. The Divisional Court, however, was shocked at this audacious claim, inasmuch as it offended against the familiar proverb that one cannot save his pudding and eat it. The grossest violations of justice night he perpetrated if an infant were to have all the benefit of goods supplied, to consume and use them, and yet be able afterwards to recover back the price he paid for them. Here the infant had had the use of the furniture for five months, the transaction being fair and there being no taint of fraud. Hence the county court was said to be right in refusing to order repayment of a price for which full value had been given.

This last decision turned rather on the common-sense applicable to the situation than on the authorities, which, curiously, were not much considered. In the case of Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, an infant paid £157 as a premium for a lease, and enjoyed the same in partnership with another for about three months. Then he became of age and dissolved the partnership, aud left the premises and sued for recovery of the money. But the court held that as he had paid the money with his own hand he could not recover it back, having partially enjoyed the consideration. Another case, of Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252, was decided 16 years afterwards, where the infant had paid £100 to a tailor as a deposit towards purchasing a share in the business, which share was to oost £1,000, and the partnership deed contained a proviso that, if the intended purchase was not carried out, the deposit was to be forfeited. It happened that the infant soon discovered that the value of the business had been fraudulently magnified. He rescinded the contract when he became of age, and sued to recover the £100 back. And the court distinguished the case from Holmes v. Blogg, where the infant had some valuable consideration, namely, three months' eujoyment. But in that second case there had been fraud and no valuable consideration, and hence the court held that the infant could recover hack the sum paid. This latest case of Valentini v. Canali seems to he put on the intelligible footing, that, though the infant could rescind his contract, yet as he had some valuable consideration, and as he could not restore the defendant to the position in which he formerly stood, it would be nufair to compel the defendant to repay the money.Justice of the Peace.

NOTES OF CASES.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
CHANCERY DIVISION.

(LAND JUDGES.)
(Before MONROE, J.)

Re RYAN'S ESTATE.

June 3, 1890.-Practice-Land Judges-Petition for sale by owner-Second petition by incumbrancer-Showing cause— Carriage of proceedings.

The owner filed a petition for sale of certain premises, on the 12th of April. This petition set out as the only incumbrance affecting the premises a mortgage which The had long since been paid off and re-conveyed. only incumbrancer's charge was not set out at all in the owner's petition, nor was the conditional order for sale served on him. On the 17th April the incumbrancer, having no notice of the former petition, filed a second petition for sale of the premises, as the interest on his mortgage was unpaid for more than a year. The conditional orders for sale on both petitions were dated the same day. The owner then served a notice showing cause against the incumbrancer's order for sale being made absolute, on the ground that on the 17th April there was already a petition for sale filed by

May, 1890.-Debtor's Act-Summons for payment by instalments-Costs.

H. M. FitzGibbon, on behalf of the plaintiff, applied for an order, under the Debtor's Act, against the defendant for payment of a sum of £11 debt, and £2 costs, on foot of a judgment of the Queen's Bench Division, and for the costs of the motion. The debt was due by the defendant for arrears of rent of a house of which the defendant was tenant and the plaintiff was landlord. The defendant had sub-let apartments in the house, and also held a situation worth 25s. a week in the Post Office.

The COURT, in making an order for payment of the debts and costs by monthly instalments of a pound, refused to allow the usual three guineas costs of the motion, and ouly allowed one guinea therefor, on the ground that proceedings for the recovery of such s small sum should have been brought in the Civil Bill Court and not in the Superior Courts.

The most constant companion of Sir Henry Hawkins is his dog, and his faithful and attached canine friend is the subject of endless jokes among the junior Bar, In a recent case tried by Sir Henry, counsel for the defence insisted that the evidence against his client was insufficient "to hang a dog." "And pray, sir," quoth Sir Henry, in those calm and bland tones which too often mean mischief, "may I enquire what you would consider sufficient evidence on which to hang a dog." "That, of course, depends a good deal, m'lud," replied the learned counsel, to whom the dog belongs."

NOTES OF ENGLISH CASES. [From the Law Journal.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

In re ROBSON.

(Before NORTH, J.)

May, 14-Solicitor-Bill of costs-Taxation-General Order under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881-Sched. 1, Part II., rules 1, 5-Lease partly in consideration of a premium and partly of a rent.

Adjourned summons.

A lease was granted for a term of ninety years from September, 1883, in consideration of a rent of £50 and a premium of £4,400. The lessor's solicitor, in his bill of costs, charged a scale fee of £14 in respect of the rent and a scale fee of £42 in respect of the premium. No title was deduced. The taxing-master disallowed the £42.

Mr. Robson took out a summons to review the taxation.

Vernon R. Smith, in support of the summons.
Swinfen Eudy, contra.

NORTH, J., held that the direction in rule 5 that (in addition to the scale fee for the rent) "there shall be paid a further sum equal to the remuneration on a purchase at a price equal to the premium," was not intended to be confined to a case precisely identical to that of a purchase; and that the scale fee of £42 must be allowed.

THE WINDHILL LOCAL BOARD v. VINT.
(Before STIRLING, J.)

May 13.-Agreement Illegal consideration-Stifling a prosecution.

In August, 1880, the defendants were indicted on the prosecution of the plaintiffs for obstructing a highway called Gaisley Lane. The defendants pleaded not guilty, but there was no real defence to the prosecution. By a memorandum of agreement, dated August 4, 1880, it was agreed between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the defendants should repair the road within seven years, that the indictment should lie in the office as security for the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement, and that when the said terms were fulfilled & verdict of not guilty should be consented to by the plaintiffs. This agreement received the approval of the Court, and it was ordered that the indictment should lie in the office as proposed. The plaintiffs now brought an action for specific performance of the covenants contained in an indenture dated in November, 1889, which embodied the terms of the above agreement. The defence was that the agreement was entered into for an illegal consideration.

Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Bardswell for the plaintiffs.

Fischer, Q.C., and R. C. Glen for the defendants. STIRLING, J., held, following the principle of Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. R 475, and Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B. Div. 808; 9 Q. B. Div. 371; 13 Law J. Rep. Q. B. 359; 15 Law J. Rep. Q. B. 360, that the consideration was illegal, and be dismissed the action, but without costs. Dictum of JAMES, L.J., in Fisher & Co. v. The Apolli naris Company, 44 Law J. Rep. Chano. 500, 502; L. R. 10 Chauc. 297, 302, not followed.

Re Fox. Fox v. Fox. (Before STIRLING, J.)

May 15.-Will-Gift for maintenance of widow during her life-Power for her to dispose of capital "inter vivos" for that purpose-Gift whether absolute or restricted- Power of court to interfere with widow's user of the capital.

Testator, who died on August 24, 1886, by his will, dated February 16, 1882, gave all his real and personal estate and effects to the defendaut (his wife aud J. H.

upon trust to allow the defendant to have the full and entire use and enjoyment thereof for her maintenance during her lifetime; and he declared that she might at any time during her lifetime sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise absolutely dispose of all or any part of the said estate for her maintenance, but not by way of tes'amentary disposition. And he declared that after her death J. H., his executors or administrators, should convert into money all his said real and personal estate, or the residue then remaining thereof, and stand pos sessed of the proceeds upon trust for certain persons therein named. He appointed the defendant and J. H. to be his executrix and executor. J. H. renounced probate and disclaimed the trusts.

The defendant had sold part of the testator's real estate, and realised part of his personal estate, but she declined to render to the persons entitled in remainder any account of her dealings with the estate. Those persons thereupon commenced this action for the administration of the estate. The defendant, in her statement of defence alleged as a point of law that by virtue of the will and upon the true construction thereof she became entitled to an absolute interest in the whole real and personal estate of the testator, subject only to the payment of his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses.

The point of law was set down for hearing under Order XXV., rule 2, of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Phipson Beale, Q.C., and Carson, for the defendant, in support of the contention that the gift amounted to an absolute gift to her, referred to 1 Jarman on Wills, 4th edition, pp. 362, 363, and cases there cited. They also contended that if it was not an absolute gift the defendant had, at any rate, an absolute discretion to determine how much of the estate she required for her maintenance, and the remaindermen could only have what she left, and the court would not interfere at their instance, during her lifetime, with the exercise of her discretion.

Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Gatcy, for the plaintiffs, were not called upon.

STIRLING, J., held that the defendant did not take an absolute interest in the property, inasmuch as she could not dispose of it by will. He did not read the gift as a gift to her of as much as she thought fit to take generally and a gift over of what remained, but as a gift for one purpose only-namely, her maintenance during her lifetime. She could apply the proceeds of the capital for that purpose, but he could not accede to the view that the Court would not, in her lifetime, interfere with her user of the property, as she might use it for a purpose which could not fairly be called her maintenance; and he could not see why the Court should not interfere at once to prevent her abusing ber power. He declined, however, to say how far the Court would go in its interference until he had before him the particular state of facts in which the interference of the Court was sought.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

KING'S INNS.

CONTINUOUS COURSE EXAMINATION, 1890.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Friday, 30th May, 10 o'clock, Morning.

SENIOR CLASS.

Examiner.-R. E. MEREDITH, Esq.

1. In what cases, and subject to what conditions, does the Judicature Act enable the Assignee of a debt or other legal chose in action to sue, or give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the Assignor?

What steps does the Act enable the debtor or trustee to take where he has received notice of conflicting claims to the debt or chose in action?

2. In what cases may a Writ of Summons be specially indorsed? What object is gained by such indorsement? Draft a short form of special indorsement for a Writ in an action for goods sold where the Defendant has made a payment on account.

3. In what oases may the Court allow a Writ of Summons to be served personally on a Defendant out of the Jurisdiction? When should an application for leave to effect such service be made, and what statements should an affidavit to support the application contain?

4. (a) In what cases may a notice in lieu of Statement of Claim be delivered?

(b) What is the effect of a joinder of issue?

5. When is it necessary for the Defendant in an action for the recovery of Land to plead his title? State shortly the effect and operation of a plea that the Defandant is in possession of the lands sought to be recovered in the action? Would this plea be a good defence to an ejectment for non-payment of Rent?

6. A recovers judgment against B for a sum of £100. B has no goods which can be taken in execution by the Sheriff, and the Sheriff makes a return of nulla bona to a writ of fieri facias. What proceedings should A take to realise his judgment debt in each of the following

events

(a) Cowes B £150.

(b) B is entitled for his life to the dividends on a sum of £1,000, New Consols, standing in the name of the Accountant-General, to the credit of an action in the Chancery Division ? 7. In what manner may an infant sue, and in what manner defend an action? How, and by whom, and at what stage should an application to appoint a guardian ad litem be made? What evidence is required to support the application?

8. Explain the following terms in reference to proceedings in the Chancery Division for the administration of the estate of a deceased person

(a) Administration Summons.

(b) Accountant-General's Certificate.
(c) Chief Clerk's Certificate.

(d) Order on further consideration.

(e) Allocation order.

9. What proceedings must be taken by a Trustee to lodge money in Court under the Trustee Relief Act? How must persons claiming to be entitled to the fund apply to have it paid out to them?

10. How are appeals from judgments or orders of the High Court brought to the Court of Appeal? Within what time must an appeal be brought?

(a) From the refusal of an exparte application.
(b) From an interlocutory order.

(c) From a final order.

Can further evidence be given on the appeal without the special leave of the Court, in any, and if so what Савев ?

JUNIOR CLASS.

Examiner-R. E. MEREDITH, Esq.

1. Under what circumstances, and subject to what restrictions, does the Judicature Act enable a Mortgagor to bring actions for rent in his own name ouly against tenants on the mortgaged lands?

2. State shortly the necessary averments in an affidavit to ground a motion for final judgment on a specially indorsed writ. At what stage of the action should the motion be made?

3. (a) When a Contract is alleged in any pleading, what is the effect of a bare denial of such Contract by the opposite party?

(b) What are the exceptions to the rule that allegations of fact in a pleading if not denied or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, shall be taken to be admitted?

4. Is there any, and if so what, exception to the rule, that affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the witness is able of his own knowledge to prove?

5. A sole defendant fails to appear to a writ of

summons

(a) In an action in the Queen's Bench Division where the Plaintiff's claim is to recover damages for assault.

(b) In an action in the Chancery Division where the Plaintiff's claim is for specific performance of a contract.

What steps must a Plaintiff take to obtain judgment in each of the above cases?

6. At what stage of an action in the Chancery Division can application be made

(a) By the Plaintiff,

(b) By the Defendant,

to fix the mode of trial?

How is such application made?

7. How, and at what stage of an action, may a Plaintiff, without leave of the Court or a Judge, wholly discontinue his action, and what are the consequences of his so doing?

8. By whom may an application be made on Summons at Chambers to have the personal estate of a deceased person administered in the Chancery Division? Explain the terms

(a) Chief Clerk's certificate,

(b) Order on further consideration,

(c) Allocation order.

9. How is an infant constituted a ward of Court? 10. By whom may a Petition be presented to the Land Judges for the sale of lands subject to Incumbrances? Mention the principal statements which the Petition should contain.

What is the object of the "Final Schedule of incum. brances," and how are objections thereto made and determined?

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF

IRELAND.

FINAL EXAMINATION FOR APPRENTICES TO SOLICITORS, Pursuant to the Attorneys and Solicitors (Ireland) Act, 1866.

TRINITY SITTINGS EXAMINATIONS, 1890.

CHANCERY.

1. A decree is pronounced on the 1st February, 1890, what is the earliest and latest date upon which it cau be enrolled without leave of the Court?

2. Describe accurately the procedure for obtaining a statutory writ of injunction to affect stock transferable at the Bank of Ireland?

3. In an action to administer the personal estate of a deceased person the executor brings in an account of such personal estate. He is charged with one sum of £300 more than appears by his account to have been received and disallowed one sum of £200 for which

be has taken credit. Write out that portion of the chief olerk's certificate which would deal with such accounts,

4. What is meant by a demurrer ?

5. Write out the usual order for simple administration of personal estate.

6. A writ is issued and served on the 1st March, within what time must be delivered

(a.) The Statement of Claim;

(b.) The Statement of Defence;
(c.) The Reply.

CHANCERY DIVISION-LAND JUDGES.

1. Upon what parties should the final notice to tenants be served ?

2. A bids for an estate and is declared the purchaser, but having bought not for himself but for B, when must he declare that he has bought in trust, and what are the respective rights and liabilities of A and B in relation to the estate so purchased?

3. What effect has a Landed Estates Court Conveyance as to vesting the land in the purchaser discharged from liability to existing charges or outgoing, Is there any exception to the general rule?

4. Who should prepare and who should approve of the draft conveyance to a purchaser?

5. What is the procedure as to allocating and paying out the proceeds of a sale?

6. In what priority is a petitioner entitled to his costs of sale according as he is—

(a.) An owner;

(b.) An incumbrancer.

PROBATE AND MATRIMONIAL.

1. Whether is it the duty of the Plaintiff or the Defendant in a Probate cause to file the Declaration ! State within what time the Declaration should be filed.

2. Can an Executor who has renounced Probate in respect of a grant applied for in any English Probate Registry act as Executor for the same deceased in respect of a grant applied for in Ireland?

3. A.B., sole Executor of C.D., dies, leaving assets of his Testator unadministered. What steps should the Executor of A. B. take in order to become the personal representative of C.D.?

4. What legacies do not lapse by the legatee predeceasing the Testator, although there is no gift of such legacy over? State the events in which the legacies are payable and to whom.

5. What is the limit of the County Court Judge's Jurisdiction (distinguishing between personal estate and lands) in contentious cases as regulated by "The County Offices and Courts (Ireland) Act, 1877."

6. What is a script, and within what time should the parties in a cause file their respective affidavit of scripts?

COMMON LAW.

1. State concisely the proceedings (1) by Plaintiff, and (2) by Defendant in an ordinary action for breach of contract against a public company, tried at Assizes by a Special Jury, from commencement of the action to its termination, where there is no objection to the Judge's charge, or to the verdict of the Jury, State the periods within which each proceeding ought to be taken. When do the duties of the Solicitor for the successful party end?

2. State the different classes of Juries by which an action may be tried. When can Plaintiff have his case tried by a Special Jury? Should Defendant desire a Special Jury, what course ought he take and within what time? Is there any exception as to the time within which Plaintiff may obtain a Special Jury-if there be, state the exception and procedure in such case? What right of Jury challenge have the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively?

3. How, and on what evidence, or documents, and within what time, should an application to set aside a verdict, or for new trial of an action, be applied for? Under what circumstances should the application be grounded on affidavit, and what should such affidavit contain? When an application to set aside a verdict, or for a new trial, is made, what steps have to be taken (1) by the party applying, and (2) by the opposite party, and within what periods? When there has been more than one issue, and the Jury had agreed on one of the issues and did not agree on the other, what proceeding ought to be taken to obtain a finding on the issue on which the Jury had disagreed?

4. Within what time should an appeal he taken (1) from the decision of a Judge at Chambe's; (2) where the Court has made "no rule" on an application; (8) from an interlocutory order; and (4) from a Judgment? State in what manner and to what tribunal such appeals ought to be taken, and how proceeded with in each of the foregoing cases.

5. To what description of property do Bills of Sale relate? How is a Bill of Sale attested? When, in what Court, how, and within what time should it be registered? In case of property dealt with by a Bill of Sale being in different counties how ought it be registered?

6. State how, and by what procedure viva voce evidence of a necessary witness who is unable to attend a trial may be given. Are any, and if so, what facilities afforded to foreign and to colonial tribunals respectively, to obtain evidence from persons resident in this country for use before such tribunals; if there be, before whom can such evidence be taken ?

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.

NOTE BENA.-Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Friday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed.

Lord Morris has been co-opted a Bencher of Lincoln's Iun.

An American lawyer tells the following story of a famous pun: "I was spending an evening with Mr. Justice Wills, who is famed for his knowledge of the wit of the English Bench and Bar. I tried to match his stories with such shining specimens as I could think of from the contributions of our American lawyers, reserving for the last the famous pun of Judge Hoar regarding a friend of his, 'who,' he said, 'first got on, then got honour, and then got honest. To my surprise. Mr. Justice Wills scarcely smiled at this sally. Indeed, his manner rather savoured of offence. "That is a good story,' he remarked dryly, but I fear I must dampen your enjoyment of it somewhat by telling you that it was borrowed from our side of the water. My friend, Sir Frederick one of the most gifted of punsters, as well as of lawyers,' said Mr. Justice Wills, with some severity, made that pun originally in my hearing many years ago,' Against this view I protested so valiantly that Mr. Justice Wills promised to write to Sir Frederick without delay. That gentleman's reply confirmed my own belief. He admitted borrowing the pun from America. His letter was so charming that I sent it to Judge Hoar. I received this reply: "The letter which you were so kind as to forward me would once have given me great pleasure, but alas! it arrived too late. Two days ago, in looking over an old law magazine of the date 1827, I came across what I had fondly believed to be my own pun, likely an old one then!'"

The retirement of Mr. Justice Stephen is a loss to the Bench, and the circumstances of his illness are sad beyond measure. We understand that Mr. R. S. Wright, the "Treasury Devil," has accepted the vacant position created by the retirement of Stephen, J. This will no doubt be a step forward for Mr. Danckwertz.-Pump Court.