3. Rules of court.-Rules of court shall be made for the purpose of carrying this Act into effect.

4. Interpretation.-(1.) In the construction of this Act

(a.) The "principal Act" shall mean the Deeds of Arrangement Ac', 1887.

(b.) "A deed of arrangement" shall mean a deed of arrangement as defined in the priucipal Act.

5. Short title.-This Act may be cited as "The Deeds of Arrangement Amendment Act, 1890."

6. Commencement.-This Act shall come into operation on the first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION.

Hubbard v. Goodley, decided on Thursday week last, and reported in the Times of May 2, should be carefully noted by all County Court practitioners. The plaintiff claimed £56 for breach of covenant, but reduced his claim to £44 by giving credit for a set-off, which he admitted was due to the defendant. His Honour Judge Price, at the Wisbech County Court, had ruled that, as the £56 was above the £50 limit of the County Court jurisdiction, and as the defendant did not admit the setoff as well as the plaintiff, his jurisdiction was ousted, and from this ruling the plaintiff appealed, but the Court dismissed the appeal. Now, by section 7 of the repealed County Courts Act, 1867, it was enacted that where in any action of contract brought in a Superior Court the claim on the writ did not exceed £50, or where, though it originally exceeded £50, it was reduced by payment, "an admitted set-off," or otherwise, to not more than £50, a judge might order the action to be tried in the County Court; and upou the construction of this section (now represented by section 66 of the Act of 1888) it had been held in Perceval v. Pedley, L. R. 18 Q. B. Div. 635; 35 W. R. 566, that the words "admitted set-off' comprehend & set-off admitted by the plaintiff only, and uot admitted by the defendant also. But by section 57 of the County Courts Act, 1888, ou which Hubbard v. Goodley was decided, " where in any action the debt or demaud claimed consists of a balance not exceeding £50, after an admitted set-off of any debt or demand claimed or recoverable by the plaintiff, the Court shall have jurisdiction to try such action." It will be seen at ouce on collating the two enactments that their words are substantially different, so that the proper construction of the new enactment might be expected to be different. The decision in Hubbard v. Goodley is, therefore, anquestionably correct. As Mr. Justice Grantham observed, if it had been decided otherwise, a man could bring into the County Court two claims of a larger amount than £50, against the will of a defendaut, simply upon an unfounded allegation that the defendant had a set-off. Section 66 of the Act, however, will still have to be construed in accordance with Perceval v. Pedley.-Law Journal.

LEGAL LIFE IN ENGLAND.

"Of all the professions, probably the bar is one which presents the most obvious attraction to a young man. As a career it offers great possibilities. But though the prizes of the bar are both numerous and great, there is no walk in life which has so many blanke. Success is well advertised aud known to all, but little is heard of tuose who fail; and the number of failures is out of all proportion to those who attain even a modicum of

success,

"A moderate amount of success, it may be noted, is not a common thing. A marked line is drawn between success and failure. The more work a mau has at the bar, the more he is likely to get; while the man whose practice is small is always liable to lose what little he has. The tendency is for the work to coufine itself to a comparatively small number and to leave the many idle. While a mere handful of men make very large income, very many hundreds at the bar earn practically

nothing at all. These disappointed ones struggle on for a while and then drift away in different directions, some to undertake work for which they are more suited; others to live at e880 on money which they have inherited; others to find themselves stranded, after having wasted the best years of their lives, without work and without means on which to live. The risks of the bar are very grea', and demand very careful cousideration by any one inclined to make the bar his profession.

"No one can practise as a barrister nntil he has been 'called' to the bar, and the first step toward a call is to join one of the Inns of Court. There are four of these inus-the Inner Temple, the Middle Temple, Lincoln's Inn and Gray's Iun. The choice of au inn is a comparatively uuimportant matter, as the functions of the inns toward barristers are confined to providing a dining hall and a library for the use of their respective members and to letting chambers at high rents to any who are willing to take them. Most of those, however, who intend to devote themselves to common law and oircuit work become members of either the Inner or the Middle Temple, while those who intend to practise on the Chancery side or to become conveyancing counsel join Lincoln's Inn. There is, however, no fixed rale iu the matter. Several of the leaders of the common law bar, with Sir Charles Russell at their head, are members of Lincolu's Iun, while the rauks of the Templars are swelled by many "equity draftsmen aud convey

ancers.

"The last of the four Inns of Court-Gray's Inn-is a very much smaller society than any other of the three inns, and attracts but few students. The various inns have but few advantages of a solid nature to offer students. In the way of education for practice at the bar they do practically nothing, and fill a position analogous to that of the city livery companies towards their respective trades. It must not be forgotten, however, that they are all the possessors of very fine libraries, which are open to the use of their members. Probably the library of the Inner Temple, which is the richest of all the inns, is the finest; but all the libraries are good, and kept up to date with new books, legal and otherwise.

"The fees payable on admission are practically the same at each of the Inns of Court, and it will be sufficient to quote the following list as a fair example:

"As a matter of fact, the deposit of £100 is often not demanded of students, for it is not required from members of the Scotch bar, nor from members of any of the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, Loudou, Durham, or of the Royal University of Ireland, provided that before call they take a degree or produce a certificate of having kept two years' terms. Before commencing to keep terms' at the inn which he may have chosen, the student is required to execute a bond of £50, with two sureties, for payment of 'commons' and dues. The commons' are the dinners which the student is required to eat in order that he may keep his term. Three dinners only every term are exacted fron university men, while the number for the other students is six. The cost of commons and dues may be estimated at about £8 or £9 a year for three years. When the regulation number of dinners have been consumed, and the terms duly kept, then more fees are payable before call. Approximately these amount to nearly £100. Stamps and fees, £82 10s.; commutation for future dues, £12; total, £94 10s. With them, however, the payment of fees ceases, aud the full-blowu barrister is mulcted no more by his inv.

"The keeping of terms by means of eating of diuners

is a survival from the time when the Inns of Court performed some of the functions of a college, and the presence of a student at dinner time was the simplest means of proving residence. A perfect analogy still exists in the various colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, where terms are kept by undergraduates by taking a daily commons of bread and butter out of the college buttery. Now that residence in an Inn of Court has ceased to be necessary, the eating of dinners has become a useless farce, inconvenient to students, and pleasing only to the antiquarian.

"Before his call to the bar, the student has to pass an examination; the details of which are settled from time to time by a Council of Legal Education, which is nominated by the four Inns of Court. Roughly speaking, it is divided into two parts-Roman law, in which one paper is set, and English law, which is sub-divided into three branches, with an examination paper for each branch. This examination entails, of course, the reading of a certain number of legal textbooks; but its nature is not such as to tax severely the powers of any man of ordinary intelligence, and success in the passing of it by no means implies any profound legal learning.

"The necessary expenses of a call to the bar with a view to practice are by no means confined to the Government stamp duties and the fees payable to an inn. The inns provide nothing in the nature of legal training except a few lecturers; and no lectures, however good, can qualify a student for practice. For practice experience is necessary, and experience can only he gained in the chambers of a practising barrister. There, and there only, can a knowledge be acquired of what may be called the unseen work of the bar-the advising of clients, the drafting of the "pleadings" in an action, and the drafting of deeds and other documents. It is very commonly supposed that a barrister's business consists mainly, if not entirely, in arguing cases in Court. This is by no means the case with "juniors," that is to say, barristers who have not attained the status of a Queen's Counsel. Every junior barrister (except those who devote themselves to criminal work) has a great deal more work to do in bis chamber thau in Court. Many conveyancers rarely or never go into Court at all. It may be safely said that a junior barrister's first acquaintance with an action is seldom gathered from his brief. In all probability he has advised on the subject matter of action, has drawn the pleadings, and has been responsible for all the preliminary stages before the actual hearing.

"Thus it is necessary for every student to learn his business in a barrister's chambers, and for the privilege of a seat in a pupil room during a year and the right to read any papers which may come in, the customary fee is a hundred guineas. Some barristers try to give their pupils some definite tuition, but the busiest men are those who have most pupils and the result generally is that the pupils are left to shift for themselves as best they can and pick up what kuowledge they may. Two years' reading in chambers is usually considered the minimum equipment for practice at the bar, and this implies the disbursement of 200 guineas.

It is not unusual to read in a solicitor's office as well as in a barrister's chambers, and there can be but little doubt that this is a wise course to pursue. By so doing the ordinary machinery of legal business is learned from the bottom upward and a solid foundation is laid for the knowledge of law which is to follow. Many who are best qualified to judge have expressed their opinion that the wisest course for the would-be barrister to pursue is to begin his legal career as a solicitor, and only to join the higher branch of the legal profession when of maturer years. However this may be, a course of training in a solicitor's office must always prove of great practical value to a barrister; for there he has an opportunity of learning much that is useful and much that renders the course of business intelligible, which could only be learned indirectly and with some difficulty in a barrister's chambers. There is no customary fee

for a course of reading, as suggested, in a solicitor's

office, but the fee to be paid is a matter of arrangement in each particular case. Many young barristers continue reading in a barrister's chambers after they have been called to the bar; but it must be remembered that professional etiquette strictly forbids a barrister from reading in a solicitor's office. Consequently such reading must take place, if at all, before call, and not after.

"The regulation two years' reading in chambers is usually divided between the Temple and Lincolu's Inn-that is to say, half the time is spent in the chambers of a common-law barrister and half in the chambers of one who practises on the chancery side. In the majority of cases this is probably wiser, for the young barrister ought to know something about each of the great branches of the law, and ought never to be obliged to refuse any work which may be sent to him. The nature of most men is shaped for them almost accidentally, and the barrister must be ready to seize his opportuuities as they arise or they are quickly gone-perhaps never to return. Some, perhaps, feel that they have not the power of achieving success except in one particular line, aud that an opportunity for distinction offered to them in any other would inevitably be wasted. For instance, one man may have a gift of advocacy without any power of storing up a knowledge of law. Such a one would be most likely to succeed on circuit and at sessions, and for him it would be a mere waste of time to enter any chambers where he would see nothing but the drier work of a chancery practice. Another, again, may have opposite powers and tastes, and may revel in the drafting of complicated deeds and wills and the grubbing out of obscure points of law. "Apart, however, from the question whether the necessary reading in chambers ought to be wholly in the Temple or wholly in Lincolu's Iun, or equally divided between the two, some of a man's chances of success depend on a good choice with whom to read. If he has many friends who are able to help him when he is called to the bar he will probably be wise in entering the chambers of some barrister in very full practice with whom he can be sure of seeing plenty of work. If, however, he has not a practice of his own assured to him he had better read, for part of his time at least, with some barrister who is not overwhelmed with work, and who is likely to give his pupil work to do for him in the future in the opacity of his 'devil.' In the same way a young barrister who intends to join a particular circuit ought to read with some one who is already in practice on that circuit, and to whom he may hope more or less to attach himself in the future."-Pall Mall Gazette.

CAVEANT EMPTORES.

The recent case of Jones v Padgett (as yet unreported) seems to bave laid down a rule somewhat aualogous to the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Ex. 341). There, as our readers know, it was laid down that the damages recoverable for a breach of contract are such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contempla. tion of the parties, at the time the contract was made, as a probable result of a breach of it. Similarly, in Jones v. Pudgett, a rule is enunciated, with regard to the implied warranty that manufactured goods shall be merchantable, that they shall only be fit for such purposes as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the order was given. That is to say, there is no warranty that the manufactured article shall be fit for all the purposes to which such an article might be put. The case almost goes as far as to say that the manufacturer will not be deemed to warrant the quality of the article for any purpose or use, as to which he has not notice (coustractively, at least), that the article is actually going to be pat.

We cannot help thinking that the law, if it be correctly laid down in this case, does not sufficiently insist on unadulterated honesty and uprightness in trade dealings. If I buy cloth from a manufacturer,

surely the manufacturer ought, and ought to be bound by law, to supply me with cloth which will be fit for any purpose to which cloth of that particular kind is ordinarily or may reasonably be put. Why should it be open to him to say, "1 supply that cloth for clothes which are to be worn on Sundays only, and not for clothes which are subjected to the wear and tear of every-day work. You did not tell me that you wanted the cloth for 'business suits,' and so you cannot complain if, when worn as business suits, it only lasts a couple of weeks." Yet this is what he would be justified in replying to the person who buys his cloth, if the decision in Jones v Padgett be sound.

Our readers may perhaps remember that in our issue for the month of July, 1887, we had an article on the case of Drummond v. Van Ingen (12 App. Ca. 284). Jones v. Padgett is very like it, and yet was distinguished from it with what we are almost inclined to think 18 over-refined subtlety. In both there was a sale of cloth by sample; in both the goods were equal to sample; but there existed a defect in the bulk, which also existed in the sample, but which was not discoverable from the sample.

First of all, let us recall the facts in Drummond v. Van Ingen. There A., & cloth merchant, ordered worsted coatings (which were to be according to a sample designated by him), from B. a manufacturer. The goods supplied were up to sample, but there was a defect in them (undiscoverable from the sample) which made them unmerchantable for the purposes for which they had been bought, i.e., the bulk was not merchantable as worsted clothing, and not suitable to be made up into coats in the ordinary course of tailoring. It appears that B. knew that A.'s object was to sell the cloth to clothiers and tailors.

The main question in the case was, was there, in addition to the implied warranty that the bulk was equal to the sample, an implied warranty that the cloth should be fit for use in the manner in which goods of the same quality or material and the same general character and designation ordinarily would be used? The House of Lords held that there was such an implied warranty; but Lord Herschell qualified the full statement of the law in terms which no doubt were the cause of the action of Jones v. Padgett being instituted.

In Jones v. Padgett the facts were very similar. The plaintiff was a cloth merchant and tailor who made liveries. He ordered cloth from the defendant, a cloth manufacturer at Leeds, as "indigo blue cloth" of a certain quality according to certain samples. This cloth is sometimes used for making liveries. The plaintiff used the cloth for liveries; and it turned out that they wore very badly, and were not fit for use after a fortnight's wear. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for breach of the implied warranty that the cloth was " merchantable." In the County Court a verdict was found for defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. He no doubt relied on Drummond v. Van Ingen as being conclusive in bis favour. But the Divisional Court confirmed the desision of the Court below, holding that the plaintiff was straining the law as laid down in Drummond v. Van Ingen, and endeavouring to make it go further than it did.

Lord Coleridge said, "Where a manufacturer knows the purpose for which an article is supplied, there is an implied warranty that it is fit for that purpose or any purpose reasonably involved in it. It was supposed that Drummond v. Van Ingen carried the law further in that direction, but it is not so. It is necessary, to fix the manufacturer with an implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose, to show a knowledge on his part of that specific purpose. In the present case there was no such knowledge-i.e, of any specific purpose for which the cloth was to be used,-and there were many purposes for which it might have been used. It cannot be said that the cloth was unmerchantable; and there is nothing in Drummond v. Van Ingen to carry the law of implied warranty further than it has been before. On the contrary the Law Lords all clly disclaimed any

such extension of the law, and based their decision on the fact that the cloth was expressly sold as coatings. Lord Herschell said that a manufacturer could not be supposed to know all the purposes to which a commodity he made might be applied. It is not proved in this case that the cl th was only used for liveries, and the manufacturer, not having known it was to be used for liveries, is not liable on au implied warranty that it was fit for liveries."

Lord Esher said, "There is no implied warranty that cloth was fit for liveries, except where the cloth is ordered and supplied for that particular purpose, in which case there would be an implied warranty that the commodity is fit for that purpose. In this case, the cloth was only ordered as of a particular quality, and it was ordered by a person who was a woollen merchant as well as a tailor. There is no evidence that such cloth is not sold by woollen merchants to other than tailors, or never sold even to tailors for the purposes of liveries. The manufacturer was not told expressly or by implica tion that the cloth was ordered to be sold to tailors, or used to be made up for liveries or clothes. Drummond v. Van Ingen did not raise this question, for there the order was for coatings,' which implied that the cloth was to be made up for clothes. It is insisted that a manufacturer must be taken to know any purpose for which his cloth is ordinarily used. But Lord Herschell carefully negatived that, and cloth sold to a merchant cannot be presumed to be sold only to tailors. What was said in that case only amounts to this--that cloth sold for coatings must be taken to be warranted to be fit for coatings, i.e., to be made up into coats. That is the law, and it is not to be carried further. The head-note in the 'Law Reports' is too wide, and left out the limitation, and so may be understood as carrying the law further than the decision."

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

There were, then, distinctions between the facts of the two cases, and the most important one was that in Drummond v. Van Ingen the manufacturer knew that the cloth was bought for the purpose of being re-sold to tailors, and therefore knew that the purpose for which the cloth was required was the making of clothes. Now in Jones v. Padgett (the buyer being a merchant as well as a tailor), the seller, thus not having been informed constructively of the purpose for which the cloth was required, could not be deemed to know every purpose for which the merchant might have sold the cloth.

Lord Herschell, in his judgment in Drummond v. Van Ingen, said, "It is true that the purpose for which the goods were required was not stated in express terms, but it was indicated by the very designation of the goods, 'coatings.' I think, upon such an order, the merchant trusts to the skill of the manufacturer, and is entitled to trust to it, and there is an implied warranty that the manufactured article shall not, by reason of the mode of manufacture, be unfit for use in the manner in which goods of the same quality of material and the same general character and designation ordinarily would be used." Continuing, he made this important qualification: "Where the article may be used as one of the elements in a variety of other manufactures, I think it may be too much to impute to the maker of this common article a knowledge of the details of every manufacture into which it may enter in combination with other materials."

But is it so clear after all that there was so great a distinction between the two cases as that the decision in each should be different? True, in Drummond v. Van Ingen, the goods were ordered as "coatings," and therefore the manufacturer must have known from this word that the merchant who gave the order intended that the use to which the cloth should be put when bought was ultimately the making of coats. Batin Jones v. Padgett, the buyer was a tailor as well as a merchant, and surely this fact should have put the manufacturer in the position of one who has constructive notice that the most likely use to which a "merchant and tailor" will put cloth when he buys it is the making of clothes. He may not be saddled with the knowledge that the cloth

is actually bought for clothes and for no other purpose, but surely he should be deemed to be enough of a "reasonable man" in the legal sense of the word to contemplate the probability that the goods most likely will be used for clothes, or at least that this is one of the most probable uses to which the cloth will be put, and that, therefore, he must make his cloth sufficiently strong for this purpose. We do not say that he should warrant them fit for every purpose. For instance, if the purchaser sold the cloth for it to be made into carpet-bags, we do not think that if the cloth was not found strong enough for that purpose there would be any genuine ground of complaint against the manufacturer. But where, as in the case under consideration, the cloth was made into clothes for waiters, and was of such unsuitable material that it became unfit to wear any longer after a fortnight's use, we do think that the manufacturer had supplied cloth which was not merchantable, in a sense to make him liable in damages. Could such cloth be fit for any pur pose whatever, if it was useless after a fortnight's wear, even by a waiter?

Jones v. Padgett is the decision of a Divisional Court only, but it will be observed that it is the decision of two strong judges-Lord Coleridge and Lord Esher. In fine, while we agree with the statement that a manufacturer cannot be bound impliedly to warrant his cloth fit for any purpose to which the buyer might choose to put it, we do submit that in Jones v. Padgett, considering the nature of the cloth ordered, the manufacturer must have known that it probably would be used to make clothes of, and therefore ought to have been legally bound to supply cloth of sufficient strength to make clothes which would not succumb in a fortnight to what was by no means extraordinary wear and tear.— Law Notes

ADEMPTION BY ADVANCEMENT ON
MARRIAGE.

In an unreported case of Re Cowley, the question of the ademption of legacies by the portions settled on children on their marriages came before Mr. Justice Chitty last week; but the counsel for the children who claimed the double portions admitted that the case was not arguable, as the trusts of the legacies and marriage settlements were the same. In Trimmer v. Bayne (7 Ves. 508) Lord Eldon said: "Where a parent gives a legacy as a portion, and afterwards upon marriage, or any other occasitn calling for it, makes an advance in the nature of a portion to the child, that will amount to an ademption of the gift by the will, and this court will presume he meant to satisfy the one by the other." Pym v. Lockyer (5 My. & Cr. 29), decided by Lord Cottenham in 1841, may be taken to have finally established the proposition that the gift of a smaller sum does not totally adeem a legacy larger in amount, but only pro tanto. The House of Lords, in Lord John Chichester v. Coventry (17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 35; L. Rep. 2 H. of L. 71), pointed out that "the question whether a gift in a will is to be considered as a satisfaction of a portion given by a settlement, or a portion given by settlement is to be taken as an ademption of a gift by will, is one of intention. It is certainly easier to arrive at a conclusion as to that intention where the will precedes the settlement, than where the settlement is first and the will follows." Differences in the nature of the two provisions afford intrinsic evidence in favour of a double provision, but slight differences are not regarded. "Slight differences," said Sir J. Leach in Weall v. Rice (2 Russ. & My. 251, at p. 268)" are such as in the opinion of the judge, leave the two provisions substantially of the same nature; and every judge must decide that question for himself." It cannot be said that the judicial view of "slight" is the same as that likely to be held by beneficiaries. In Durham v. Wharton (3 C. & Fin. 146) W. bequeathed £5,000 to a daughter of J. charged on real estates, which he devised to J. in fee. J. bequeathed £10,000 (in addition to the £5,000 bequeathed by W.) in trust for the same daughter for life with remainder to her children.

ren

On that daughter's marriage J. advanced £15,000 to the daughter's husband, he providing out of his property pin money, and a jointure for his wife aud portions for the younger children of the marriage, and the £15,000 was declared to be in satisfaction of the sums bequeathed by W. It was held by the House of Lords that the £15,000 was an ademption of the legacy of £10,000 as well as a satisfaction of the £5,000. "I conceive," said Lord Lyndhurst, on p. 155, "that the circumstance of the limitations being different does not at all affect the question." In Sheffield v. Earl of Coventry (2 Russ. & My. 317) a legacy to a daughter was held to be adeemed by her settlement, as though the husband took under the settlement but not under the will, and the wife took more as a legatee under the will than she did under the settlement, and the limitations to the childwere different, both were substantially for the benefit of the daughter and her family. That case is also an authority against the maxim Expressio unius exclusio alterius, as the express declarations as to the portions of other children were not permitted to raise an implication that the testator did not intend this daughter's legacy to be adeemed on the ground that he had not made any declaration as to it: (see also Lloyd v. Harvey, 2 Russ. & Mv. 310, and Hopwood v. Hopwood, 7 H. of L. Cas. 728.) In Powys v. Mansfield (3 My. & Cr. 359) it was argued that if a legacy is adeemed by a settlement, that legacy will be revived by a codicil executed subsequently to the settlement confirming the will, as it makes the will speak as from the date of the codicil. For some purposes undoubtedly it does, as for instar ce, for the sake of passing after acquired lands or exercising some powers not in existence at the date of the will: (Re Blackburn; Smiles v. Blackburn, 43 Ch. Div. 75.) Lord Cottenham held that the codicil could not thus revive a legacy revoked, adeemed, or satisfied. "The codieil can only act upon the will as it existed at the time; and, at the time the legacy revoked, adeemed, or satisfied formed no part of it." That was also the opinion of the Irish Lord Chaucellor Manners, as expressed in the year 1810 in Monck v. Lord Monck (1 Ball & B. 298). Lord Justice Knight-Bruce, however, in Ravenscroft ▾. Jones (9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 818; 4 De G. J. & Sm. 224) thought that the existence of such a codicil, though not decisive of the question, could not be left out of cousideration.

Settlements on strangers do not adeem legacies to them, as the presumption that the legacies are intended for portions does not arise in their case as in the case of gifts from a parent or person in loco parentis. There is an exception to this, however, where a moral obligation is recognised in the will, though without reference to any special application of the money. In Re Pollock (52 L. T. Rep. N. S. 718; 28 Ch. Div. 552) J. bequeathed all his property to his wife F. absolutely, but verbally expressed a wish that L should receive some gift after F.'s death. F. made a will in which she bequeathed £500 to L. "according to the wish of my late beloved husband." During her lifetime F. wrote to L., stating that she wished to give her £300 out of which she was to purchase a clock or inkstand as a souvenir of J., and Boon after sent the £300. The Court of Appeal held that the £500 legacy was adeemed to the extent of £300. Lord Selborne compared the moral obligation expressed there with the parental obligation under the sense of which a father provides for his children. "The reasonable presumption is the same, namely, that as the purpose of both gifts was to fulfil one and the same antecedent obligation or duty, a double fulfilment was [presumably] not intended." A person would be considered in loco parentis who meant to put himself in the situation of the person described as the lawful father of the child with reference to the pecuniary wants of the child, though the child's lawful father might be living: (Powys v. Mansfield sup.) Though a clause providing for payment of the testator's debts may affect the question whether the legacy is meant as a satisfaction of a previous portion or not, the presumption of the ademption of a previous legacy by a marriage portion cannot "depend upon or Le influenced by

the presence or absence in a prior will of any mere general provision for the payment of the testator's debts:" (per Lord Selborne, in Cooper v. Macdonald, 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 693; L. Rep. 16 Eq. 258.) It was formerly held that a share of residue would not be adeemed by a subsequent advance, but now it is clearly settled that it would, though the amount advanced would be only brought into account for the benefit of the children of the testator, and not of his widow: (Meinertzhagen v. Walker, 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 326; 7 Ch. App. 670.) It seems to be established that extrinsic evidence may be adduced to contradict, or if necessary support, this presumption of ademption.-Law Times.

INEQUALITY OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES.

The recent debate in the House of Lords has again brought forward this much-vexed question. Lord Herschell, the originator of the debate, desired to call attention to the difference of opinion which prevailed as to the principles which should regulate the severity of the sentences to be inflicted upon criminal offenders, and the consequent inequality in the sentences passed in cases of the like gravity. It is to be regretted that the noble lords who followed him did not confine themselves more to the main point of Lord Herschell's theme, which was the difference of opinion as to the principles of punishment. It is generally accepted that punishment may proceed on the theory of reformation of the criminal, of the prevention of crime, or of retri bution; and it seems that, in truth, all these elements should be taken into consideration in attempting to fix a canon or standard system of sentences. A criminal is punished in the first place for the greater safety of the community, secondly, to satisfy and remove the craving for personal vengeauce, and lastly, for his own good. And, in our opinion, this is the proper order in which these elements should be taken into consideration. Now, in the House of Lords, Lord Coleridge is reported to have said that, if he questioned anything in the speeches of his noble and learned friends, it was their use of the word "principle," for he doubted very much whether those who administered the criminal law were conscious, when pronouncing sentence, of administering law according to any elaborate and philo. sophical principle. But we should hold it to be one of the first duties of those who are called to the office of a judge amongst us to try and keep before them a right principle, and to apply it to the facts in passing sen. tence just in the same way as if they were giving judg ment in a civil case. This is absolutely the only way in which anything like equality of sentences can be obtained without sacrificing the substance for the shadow of justice. It is, of course, impossible to prevent the misapplication of principle to facts, and the principle must, in the nature of things, be so framed as to be very wide in its terms. But there are, it will be found on consideration of the subject, many safeguards that will keep the judge from going very far wrong. The first object, as already stated, to be kept in view is the greater safety of the community. With reference to this object the facts may be grouped somewhat in the following way :-The nature of the crime must be considered. If it affec's that which every member of the community possesses, the punishment must be the more deterrent, as any member may be liable to suffer from the like crime at any future time. In this view of the case, offences occasioning bodily injuries would be regarded as more heinous than those involving injuries to property, and we think, to a certain extent, this ought to be so. Then it must be considered whther the like offences are rife in the neighbourhood, so as to occasion a widespread feeling of terror or insecurity. It may here be observed that crimes committed in combination by several offenders should be punished more severely than isolated offences by single criminals, because the existence of combin-tions autagonistic to the geueral interests of the commuuity is more dangerous to public safety than any single iudividual can be, however many offences be cau commit. With regard to

offences against property, it seems that injuries to public property should be punished more severely than those against private property, and in punishing injuries against private property, it may fairly be taken into account whether such property is of a nature to be beneficial to the community such as industrial property, or is purely for the benefit of the individual possessor. Lord Coleridge remarked that the one most important duty of a judge was to take care that a sentence did not erlist the sympathy of the public on the side of the criminal. It is obvious that if the judge keeps always in view the greater safety of the community as the first object of punishment, he will run far less risk of enlisting public sympathy on the side of the criminal, especially if, in sentencing him, he takes care to make it clearly appear how far the offence is a violation of the public right. The repetition of offences is not always of great importance in this connection, and that is why it has not been sooner referred to. Its importance really depends upon the class of offence, so far as the public are concerned. It should always be remembered that the preventive power of punishment is strictly limited. In the case of repeated offences, it comes to be limited solely by the length of the term of imprisonment awarded to inveterate offenders.

The second object of punishment as above stated is retribution. It is quite hopeless to urge that this element should not be taken into account. Unless the desire for vengeance is in some way gratified by the law, the injured party takes the law into his own hands. Besides, if justice is retributive, it has a better deterrent effect. It stands in a sort of way in the place of compensation. The prisoner pays with his body. But, for practical purposes, this object need not be kept so clearly in view by the judge as the first object of prevention of further crime. A punishment which is sufficient to secure the prevention of further crime is generally sufficient to satisfy the party actually injured. The third and last object of pauishment is the reformation of the criminal. If a puuishment is sufficient to prevent a criminal, either by its deterrent effect or by main force during its continuance, from the further commission of crime, that is the utmost extent of reformation with which punishment has practically to do. It cannot be altogether lost sight of in inflicting punishment, because it is to that extent involved in the first object of punishment, namely, the prevention of crime. But a real reformation consists not only in ceasing to do evil but in learning to do good. And it is plain that the teaching of how to do good can scarcely be accomplished within the same period that will suffice for the first half of the lesson, namely, as to ceasing to do evil.

In the debate in the House of Lords, Lord Herschell at first asked the Government whether they would cause inquiry to be made by royal commission, committee, or otherwise into our present system of punishments and the principles which should guide its administration, and whether it was possible to diminish the unequal incidence of punishments and to render them more effectual. At the conclusion of the debate he merely expressed a hope that the Government would give the matter early attention, and that if no other inquiry was made than that by themselves, they would, before proposing any legislation, favour the House with returns or statistics as to the results of light sentences where they had been tried. Lord Coleridge thought that the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal would have a most powerful effect in promoting greater uniformity of sentences. A steady course of decisions by such a court, disregarding as it would all emotional feelings which tended to warp the judgment, would certainly, he believed, have that effect, for those who inflicted sentences would know that they were subject to revision. But if there was to be a Court of Appeal it must have the power, not only of reducing punishment, but also of increasing inadequate sentences. He did not desire that the court should simply diminish punishment; he desired to make it useful in accordance with the righteous sentiment of the community.