appointment of a receiver, and that therefore the basband's life interest could not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, as it had previously determined. In Re Moon; Ex parte Dawes (55 L. T. Rep. N. S. 114; 17 Q. B. Div. 275), the settlement contained a proviso to the effect that, if the husband should assign, charge, or otherwise dispose of the said income, or any part thereof, or should become bankrupt, or do or suffer anything whereby the said income, if payable to him absolutely, or any part thereof, would become vested in any other person, then his life interest should determine. The husband, after a receiving order had been made on his own petition, executed a deed of composition which was daly approved by the Court. Mr. Justice Cave, after commenting upon the use of the word "would," which appeared to his Lordship to have been an improper mood to have used, said that the words must mean "do or suffer something the effect of which is that the income does become thereby vested in somebody else." The filing of the petition and the execution of the composition deed did not vest the property in somebody else, so the husband was held entitled to retain his interest. This case was taken to the Court of Appeal, but it became unnecessary for that Court to decide the point in question. The general result of these authorities would seem to be, that the Courts are inclined to protect life interests as far as they can.-Law Times.

Do., 5 p c Debenture Misoellaneous.

to Alliance & Dub. Cons.' Gu Do. do. New

8

Do., 4 p c Debenture Stock 4 Arnoll & Co., limited Do., 6 p c Debenture Bell's Asbestos, Limited Boland's, Limited

Do.,

6 p c Pref.

4 Cannock & Co. Lim'k, lit'd Distilleries Co., lim.

to Guinness, Nos. 80,001 to 250,000

100

Son, & Co.

10 Do..6 pc Preference Shares Do., 5 p c Debenture Stock 10 Hotchkiss Ordnance, Lim., Nos 1,501 to 45,000

25 Ir. C S. Building Society.. John., M'ney & O'Brien, ltd

Do., Do.,

6 pc Cum Pref.

5 p c Deb.,

red. after 1900

7 Mrchts' Whousing Co., ltd 25 National Assurance

9-4-7 Patriotic Assurance Pim Brothers, Limited

Do., 5 pc Cum. Pref.

5 Thom & Co., Nos. 4,304 Alex, lim. to 13,000 Tramways.

10 Belfast Trams

10 Dublin United Tramways Do., 4 p c Debenture

to L'pl Un'td Tram & Bus l'td N'th Metr. Tramway, Lond. Railways.

to

So Belfast and Northern Cos. 100 Dublin, W'klow, & W'ford 100 Great Northern(Ireland) too Gt.Southernand Western 1128 too Midland Gt. Western So Waterford and Limerick.. Railway Preference

too Gt. N'th'n (Irind) gt'd 4p. 100 Do., (Derry) 4 p e

100

100

100

100

100

100

Gt.South'n & West'n 4 p Mid. Great Western, 4 p c Do., 5 pc

Watfd& Limerick, 4 p c

Do., new red, 1878, 5 pe Do. do. 4 pc, 1873 100 Do., 41 pe 1860

Debenture Stooks. Belfast & Co. Down, 4 p c Belfast & Nth'n Cos, 4 pe Gt.Northern(Ireland) 4 p Do., pe

Do.. 5 p c

Gt. North'n & West'n 4} p c Gt.South & West'n. 4p. Midland Gt. West'n. 4pc

137

Of Deposit-11 per cent.

Shares not fully paid up are given in Italics. Bank Rate Of Discount-3 per cent.

1 x d

Name Days-May 14th and 29th, 1890. Account Days- May 15th and 30th, 1890.

Busines commences at 1 30 p.m.

AND

VOL. XXIV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ORDER XIII. THE use of a special indorsement on a writ of summons is entirely optional, but it should be adopted in all cases where it is applicable, as very considerable advantages are derived from its use, the principal one being the obtaining of summary judgment. Final judgment without a trial may be obtained either by default of appearance; or by default of pleading; or by adjudication after appearance but without pleading, under Or. XIII. This latter is a very special remedy, and is applicable to all actions begun by specially indorsed writ. The procedure under this Order-which is an extension (recommended by the Judicature Committee) of the principle embodied in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, and which is similar in the main to a provision in the Common Law Procedure Act on default of appearance has been much used, to the great saving of time and expense, in numbers of cases which were practically undefended. The Order has the effect of a statutory enactment, and no former practice can alter the meaning of the words embodying it: Shurmur v. Young, 33 Sol. Jour. 155. It is in terms only applicable to cases originating under Or. II., r. 3-i.e., where the writ is specially indorsed, and where the defendant has appeared. Special indorsement is a condition precedent to moving under this Order. It would appear that, although the writ should by right be specially indorsed at the time of appearance by the defendant (Imbert-Terry v. Carver, 34 Ch. D. 506), still it may be specially indorsed by amendment after its issue: Robinson v. Ralston, 8 L. R. Ir. 26; Denison v. Franklyn, Rep. in Cha. 83. In Cuthbert v. Haynes, the writ was specially indorsed for £225, two years' rent due under a lease, which the plaintiff in his affidavit alleged had become vested in the defendant previously to, and at the time of, the accrual of the rent sued for. The plaintiff's affidavit further stated that the defendant was in possession of the demised premises, had paid rent in former years, and obtained receipts in his own name. The defendant, however, made an affidavit denying that he held under a lease. The Court (Ex. Div.) declined to allow the indorsement to be amended by adding a claim for use and occupation for the purpose of proceeding with the motion for final judgment. They made no rule on the motion, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend their writ as they might be advised: 18 L. R. Ir. 473.

There have been a great number of decisions, both in this country and in England, as to what is and what is not a "special" indorsement, and we purpose referring to some of the most recent and important.

A claim in order to be specially indorsed should -set out all such particulars as will serve to identify

No. 1,215

it. Under the English Order a special indorsement may be used in case of actions for the recovery of land, but in Ireland it is restricted to debts or liquidated demands in money of a purely personal nature. A debt or liquidated demand includes any money recoverable as liquidated damages whether by statute or by agreement of the parties: Von Lederer v. Burton, 87 L. T. J. 316. It may be "with or without interest." Interest which arises by express contract is properly the subject of special indorsement. Thus, where a writ was indorsed with particulars of claim for money due on a promissory note, for money lent, and for interest thereon, it was held by the Court of Appeal in England that the item for interest, although no express agreement therefor, was alleged, did not prevent the writ from being specially indorsed : Waite v. Power, "The Annual Practice," 1889-1890, p. 188. See further Ex p. Charmian, W. N. 1887, 184, and Re Gillespie, 18 Q. B. D. 286. If sufficiently specific particulars are stated to bring to the mind of the defendant knowledge as to what the plaintiff's claim is, there is a good special indorsement; it must contain particulars of the amount sought to be recovered. Thus, where a writ claimed £130 due to the plaintiff from the defendant, under and by virtue of an assignment to the plaintiff, under the hand of one M. J., and dated July 14, 1888, and then set out the assignment of a sum of £130 due by the defendant to M. J. on an I.O.U., and the I.O.U. was made an exhibit and contained the words "for money lent," the Court granted final judgment : Bickers v. Speight, 22 Q. B. D. 7. Where the indorsement on a writ claimed £500 as the principal sum due on a bond conditioned for the payment to the plaintiff by the obligor of an annuity of £26 during the life of a child, and until she should attain the age of 16 years, by specific quarterly payments, and alleged that two of such payments were due and unpaid, the Court of Queen's Bench in England refused final judgment, but for special reasons, and we doubt that this case is applicable to Ireland : Tuther v. Caralampi, 21 Q. B. D. 414.

In an action upon a solicitor's untaxed bill of costs for £161 9s. 3d., where the defendant admitted the retainer and the work done, and only disputed the propriety of the charges, an order for final judgment was made after appearance and before taxation. Such an order should direct that the bill be taxed pursuant to the Solicitors' Acts, and that judgment be signed for the amount when ascertained: Smith v. Edwards, 22 Ch. D. 10.

Where solicitors brought an action for the amount of their bill of costs, and the defendant, who had denied the retainer and counterclaimed for damages on the ground of negligence, did not appear at the

trial, and the plaintiffs proved their case, the Court of Appeal in England held that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the counterclaim dismissed with costs and to have judgment for the amount to be certified on taxation, with costs of the hearing: Lumley v. Brooks, 41 Ch. D. 323.

But in strictness, the rule does not apply to cases of matter of account still to be ascertained. See, further, Larkin v. M‘Inerney, 16 L. R. Ir. 246. The amount found due by the Taxing Master for costs of vexatious opposition to a bill in Parliament may be a special indorsement, and judgment under this rule may be granted on it: Mallet v. Hanley and another, 18 Q. B. D. 787. See W. N., 1888, 221.

A writ of summons for arrears of rent due out of premises held under a lease, is specially indorsed, although the lease is not stated in the indorsement, and final judgment will be given in such a case: Burton v Allen, 23 Ir. L. T. R. 81, following Cantillon v. Histon, 15 Ir. L. T. R. 56. In such a case the affidavit in support of the motion need not set out the various steps in the devolution of the title from the original lessors to the plaintiffs in the action.

The case of Blizard v. Mullony was very peculiar. The plaintiff having, in an action for goods sold, allowed credit for £5 by mistake-it having never really been received from the defendant-and the defendant having paid the amount claimed, with costs, the plaintiff discovered his mistake and brought a second action to recover the £5. Palles, C. B., refused to allow him to sign final judgment in the second action, for though in form that action was for a liquidated sum, still in substance it was to set aside a transaction for fraud, as otherwise he was not entitled to split the cause of action: 21 Ir. L. T. R. 11. No indorsement is "special" unless solely confined to claims mentioned in Order II., r. 3; there must not be anything in addition to the liquidated demand. A writ which claims payment of a sum which is in dispute, as for dilapidations in an action by a landlord against a tenant, besides payment of a liquidated demand, is not specially indorsed so as to entitle the plaintiff to summary judgment for the liquidated demand: Clarke v. Berger, 36 W. R. 809. So where mortgagees brought an action claiming (1) to have an account of what was due on the mortgage for £8,000, and that the mortgage might be enforced by foreclosure or sale, (2) the appointment of a receiver, (3) a claim for £8,000, principal and interest, due under the covenants contained in the mortgage, giving the particulars, it was held, following Hill v. Sidebottom (47 L. T. N. S. 224), that the plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment: Imbert-Terry v. Carver, 34 Ch. D. 506. A previous action, however, by a mortgagee to realise his security is, before decree therein, no bar to a subsequent action on the covenant in the mortgage for payment of principal and interest, and an application for summary judgment therein may be entertained: Bourke v. Donoghue, 20 L. R. Ir. 325.

We hope to conclude this subject next week.

CURRENT ENGLISH CASES.

The Law Journal Reports for the present month comprise two Privy Council Cases, pages 33 t 40; 12 cases in the Chancery Division, pages 281 to 328; and 9 Queen's Bench Division cases, pages 169 to 216; and also Statutes of the Realm, pages 1 to 64.

The case of Alison and others v. Brown, in the Privy Council, decides a question arising in New South Wales under the Crown Lands Act, 1884, and Gilmour and others v. Manroit relates to a question with respect to Canadian Crown lands under the Injunction Act, 1878 (41 Vict. c. 14, Quebec).

In the Chancery Division, In re The Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association, ex parte Wainwright, deals with the question which has so frequently arisen, of persons applying for aud being allotted shares on the faith of statements in a prospectus; and a contract to take shares was rescinded and the deposit ordered to be repaid with interest at 4 per cent., by way of special damage. In re Smith; Keeling v. Smith is a case of implied cousent by trustees to the marriage of a testator's son. In re The Great Northern Salt and Chemical Works defines what constitutes a compliance with Table A. of the Companies Act, 1862, with respect to the appointment of the first directors of a company. In Van Gelder & Co. v. The Tower Bridge Flour Society it was held that a mortgagee of a patent whose name is on the register is a proprietor of the patent and a necessary party to an action for infringement. In re Musther; Groves v. Musther is a case of substitutionary gift under a will, approving and following Christopherson v. Naylor, 1 Mer. 320. In re Rhodes; Rhodes v. Rhodes, lays down the principle that a lunatic's estate, though he be not so found by inquisition, is liable for necessaries supplied to him. Faithfull v. Woodley decides that in a fore. closure action a defendant's admission, by not pleading, can only be treated as made for the purpose of the relief asked by the statement of claim, and does not include a personal judgment when not so asked. In re Rees, Williams v. Davies, decides that a gift by a testatrix to such persons as should be entitled to her husband's personal estate under the statute, had he died intestate and without leaving a widow, did not include one of the husband's next-of-kin who predeceased the testatrix. Colley v. Hart is a case of "due diligence" in the prosecution of his action under section 32 of the Patents Act, 1883, on the part of a patentee who threatens legal proceedings against another for infringement. In Myers v. Catterson the Court of Appeal, affirming Mr. Justice Kekewich, held that there was an implied obligation on the part of a railway company which sold a house to the plaintiff and retained the adjoining land not to interfere with the plaintiff's lights more than was necessary for the construction of the railway. Johnson v. Wild decides that there is no right of contribution in the assignee at au apportioned rent of part of demised lauds against the sublessees of other parts, when the former has, under threat of distress, paid the entire rent to the lessor. The Court of Appeal reversed Mr. Justice Chitty in Ward v. Lawson, and held a London agent who had agreed not to ask payment of agency bills of a country solicitor until the latter had himself been paid not to be entitled to share in interest paid to the country solicitor ou unpaid costs.

In the Queen's Bench Division the Court of Appeal, in Regina v. The Bishop of London (the St. Paul's Reredos case), affirming a majority of the Queen's Bench Division, from which the Lord Chief Justice dissented, decided an important question as to the jurisdiction of the bishop under the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874. In Barlow v. Ross the Appeal Court held that section 20 of the Artisans' Dwellings Act, 1875, which provides compensation in respect of easements on lands purchased by a local authority, includes nascent or inchoate rights which have a money value. In Parsons v. Brand, the Court of Appeal held that a bill of sale is invalid unless it contains the name, address, and description of the attesting witnesses. The AttorneyGeneral v. Emerson decides that the discretion of the

Court under Order LVIII., rule 16, to order or refuse a stay of proceedings in cases of appeal is absolute and unrestricted. A bill of sale given by one member of a partnership, of partnership chattels, as security for a loan to the firm, was held, in In re Tamplin, to be valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the firm, but only to the extent of the grantor's interest. Morgan v. Hutchins is a case under the Employer's Liability Act, which declares an employer liable for injury caused by having the wheel and cogs of a machine unguarded, though the macbiue was in no way defective for its purpose. Mayor v. Collins decides that an infant cannot be ordered to answer interrogatories. In Stubbs v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, it was held that where a prosecutor had entered into recognisances to carry on a prosecution, but had given no security for costs, and a true bill had been found, the director of public prosecutions was not liable under 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22, on the acquittal of the accused, to pay the costs of the accused. The Court of Appeal, in The Duke of Devonshire v. O'Connor, decided that on the true construction of a reservation clause in an Inclosure Act passed in 1798, there was no express or implied right in the lord of the manor to shoot game on the land allotted to the allottees, and declared to be freehold to all intents and purposes. Sowerby v. Smith (43 Law J. Rep. C. P. 290) was followed.-Law Journal.

AUDIENCE OF PERSONS UNQUALIFIED AS SOLICITORS.

At the Waterford Petty Sessions, held on the 3rd inst., a case was called in which Mr. John Harty, rent agent, appeared on behalf of an owner of houses to recover possession of a small tenement. Alderman Strange, solicitor, stated that the members of the solicitors' profession had been furnished with a circular from the Incorporated Law Society, containing an opinion of the Solicitor-General to the effect that no person could appear and conduct proceedings in Court on behalf of another, unless he were a duly qualified solicitor, a member of the Bar, or came within the exemptions of the 45 & 46 Vic. cap. 24. Mr. Harty did not fulfil the requirements of the recited Act, nor was he possessed of any legal qualifications, and therefore had no right to appear in Court save as a witness.

Mr. Slattery, J.P.-What you want to do is to boycott everyone but the solicitors.

Ald. Strange.-Personally I do not care if all the rent agents in Waterford appear as advocates in Court, but having received a circular from the Incorporated Law Society, I think I am bound to call the attention of the Bench to the contents of that circular.

Mr. Nelson, J.P.-To my mind it is quite clear that agent meaus anyone appointed to appear by the complainant.

Ald. Strange.-The Solicitor-General does not agree with you, sir.

Mr. Slattery. It would be a nice thing if every agent had to be a solicitor,

Mr. Allingham, solicitor.-The opinion relates only to the meaning of agent under the Act, and not agent for any other purpose.

Ald. Strange, continuing. I will take the liberty of calling the attention of the Bench to the case of Webb v. Catchlove, which was ruled in a Divisional Court by Justices Denman and Hawkins, two of the most eminent English Criminal Judges. I quote from the Irish Law Times of the 29th January, 1887. Mr. Justice Denman said, "he could not too strongly condemn the practice which appeared to prevail in some parts of the country of allowing the police to act as if they were advocates. Mr. Justice Hawkins concurred, and emphatically endorsed the latter remarks of his learned brother." If this raling of the Judges was applicable to the police, who were custodians of the public peace, how much more so to volunteers acting for private individuals.

Mr. James M'Cy, solicitor, who had been sent for by Mr. Harty, bere entered Court, and after a short consul

tation with his client stated he had been instructed to appear for Mr. Harty.

Mr. Slattery.-That removes your objection. Ald. Strange.-Yes, in this particular case. Mr. James Roche, rent agent, then appeared for Mrs. Margaret Ahearn and proceeded to prove a similar case. Ald. Strange objected on the same grounds as in the former case.

Mr. Slattery. We will hear the case, and Mr. Hanrahan, our clerk, will write to the Incorporated Law Society, so that they can take any steps they like. Ald. Strange.-I am quite satisfied with that. Mr. Wm. Dobbyn, solicitor, who is Hon. Secretary to the Waterford Law Society, will report the case with a view to a prosecution.

Mr. Dobbyn then took a note of a case which will probably be made the subject of further proceedings.

At the Lisburn Petty Sessions, held on the 12th inst. (before Messrs. J. Theodore Richardson, J.P. (in the chair); T. Dunlop Gibson, R. M.; James Crossin, J.P.; and N. W. Grimshaw, J.P.),

Mr. John M'Creight summoned a party for possession of a house (in the name of the landlord), who did not appear, nor was be represented by a solicitor.

Mr. Wilkins stated that he objected to Mr. M'Creight proceeding, as the landlord was not present, nor was he represented by a solicitor.

Mr. M'Craight said he had a power of attorney to appear.

Mr. Wilkins asked for the power of attorney, and read ont the clause upon which Mr. M'Creight relied. Mr. Wilkins said that he had received a circular from the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, enclosing an opinion of the Solicitor-General deciding that an agent meant a legal agent, and directing him to oppose any infringement upon the privilege of the profession of a solicitor. The Council of the Society were determined to assert the rights of the profession, aud to oppose unauthorised persons performing the duties of solicitors. Mr. Gibson, R.M.-I think in this case the power of attorney protects the agent. I am relying on an opinion given by the late Lord Cairns.

Mr. Wilkins.-Well, sir, the opinion I bold in my haud is the highest authority in Ireland, and agents have been prevented from acting all over the country by it, and I hold that the words of the document do not give Mr. M'Creight power to appear here.

The Chairmau said-The magistrates are of opinion that the wording of the document enables the agent in this case to act.

Mr. Wilkins. Very well, sir; I will report the case to the Incorporated Law Society; but I warn Mr. M'Creight and other house agents that, if they break the law in discharging the duties of a solicitor, the penalty is £50.

ADHESIVE STAMPS ON CHEQUES.

In the English Queen's Bench Division, before Huddleston, B., and Grantham, J., on Monday, judg ment was given in Hobbs v. Cathie, which raised and decided an important question as to the validity of cheques on unstamped paper. Ordinarily the stamps are "impressed," and bankers issue cheques in books s0 stamped. But the Stamp Act of 1870 allows adhesive stamps to be used in cases in which it is convenient, cheques being drawn on blank paper, but on coudition that the drawer shall put on and cancel a penny stamp; and that if a cheque is issued without being so stamped, the person who takes it shall not recover thereon, though the banker on whom it is drawn may put the stamp on and charge the penny to his customer. The court has now decided that in the hands of any intermediate holder the cheque shall be invalid and not available, and that no such holder can put the stamp on so as to make it valid. In this case the defendant had given the cheque to one Bull, who had put the stamp on, and passed it to the plaintiff, and someone had cancelled it before it got to the bankers, the drawer having stopped