AND

VOL. XXIV.

IRISH COUNTY COURT PRACTICE.-XVI.

FEES.

A PERSON not duly qualified as a solicitor who nevertheless acts for parties in a County Court action and does solicitor's work for them, either in or out of Court, is not entitled to recover any expenses and fees from those for whom he acts: Verlander v. Eddolls, 51 L. J. Q. B. 55; 45 L. T. 543; 30 W. R. 104. But the Judge of Reading County Court decided that an agent, not a solicitor, can recover fees paid and work done out of Court. The Attorney and Solicitors Act refers to services in Court. The claim was in consequence referred to the Registrar of the Court to settle the amount: 15 Ir. L. T. 131.

The case of Fowler v. The Monmouthshire Railway and Canal Co. decided that when the solicitor, whose name was on the record, was uncertificated and unqualified, the party employing him could not recover any costs: Q B. D. 334; 41 L. T. N. S. 159. This principle has been extended, and in England it has recently been held that this rule applies, although the solicitor on the record is duly qualified, if the proceedings are in fact taken by a person who is not a solicitor; the solicitor on record being a mere dummy: Irvin v. Sanger, 58 L. J. Q. B. 61; see 22 Ir. L. T. 658. The qualified solicitor in that case was suspended for two years, and the unqualified person was imprisoned for three months for acting as a solicitor: see, also, Abercrombie v. Jordan, 8 Q. B. D. 187; Re Simons, 15 Q. B. D. 348; Re Jones, 9 Eq. 36; Re Hope, 7 Ch. 766; Sparling v. Brereton, 2 Eq. 64.

When the defendant appears by attorney and disputes the plaintiff's claim, and thereby puts the plaintiff to unnecessary expense, the Court will not order payment of the demand to be made by instalments: Copland v. Symmonds, 1 C. C. C. 69. As in Civil Bills the solicitcr for the successful party is entitled to fees on the original sum sued for, according to the schedule of fees, and not on the amount recovered, whether in the Civil Bill Court or on appeal, the Court, as a check against filling up Civil Bills for excessive amounts, exercises a discretion, considering whether or not the amounts claimed are reasonable and right and in accordance with the instructions received from the clients: per Palles, C. B., in Simpson v. Wilson, 17 Ir. L. T. 546. Where it lies in the discretion of the Judge to allow or disallow a fee to counsel, application for such fee must be made at the close of the case and an order made for its allowance: Or. XVI., r. 10 (old r. 90). On an appeal from a committal order made by a County Court Judge under the Debtors Act, 1872, the Court has power to certify for counsel's fee: Broderick v. Wilkinson, 15 Ir. Ļ. T. R. 58. Penalties against attorneys for taking greater fees

No. 1,212

than those specified in the schedule refer to fees demanded from and paid by the client, not those demanded from and paid by the opposite party: Cranston v. Gardiner, Ir. C. C. 83. An attorney has a right to be paid a reasonable sum for services done out of Court before the commencement of the suit: the provisions of the statute apply only to work done in Court: Keighley v. Goodman, 9 C. B. 338; 19 L. J. C. P. 166; Re Toly, 12 Q. B. 694; 12 Ad. & El. N. S.

696.

Where the amount sued for by an ordinary Civil Bill is tendered before the entering of the Civil Bill, the plaintiff's solicitor is entitled to payment of the prescribed fee for instructions, as it is necessary that the solicitor should have instructions to ascertain whether or not the case is one in which a Civil Bill should be issued (Gamble, C.C.J.): Bell v. MNally, 16 Ir. L. T. R. 14. After process was served, proceedings taken, notices served, &c., the attorney for the defendant tendered the amount of the debt due (£2 58. 9d.) with 28. costs of Civil Bill. The attorney refused to receive the amount tendered unless an additional sum of 2s. 6d., to which he had a right, in point of law, as costs was also paid. The question was whether this fee was properly charged against the defendant or against the plaintiff. Brady, C.C.J., granted a decree for the amount, fee included, being clearly of opinion that the fee of 2s. 6d. was included in the costs under r. 21 (1851) as portion of the costs of suit up to the time the money was tendered, and therefore the tender must be accompanied with this fee, being costs between party and party under s. 153, and taxable against defendant: Re Newry-st. E. Water Co., 9 Ir. L. T. 194. An action by Civil Bill lies for the costs of a dismiss in Civil Bill ejectment: Tyrrell v. Haughney, 2 Leg. Rep. 311; Ir. Cir. R. 530.

Where a record is tried at the Assizes, on the taxation of costs as between party and party, the solicitor, though resident and practising in another county, is not entitled to charge for his attendance at the Assizes on any day before the case is reached: Martin v. Nixon, 22 Ir. L. T. R. 9.

Under 33 and 34 Vic., c. 28, s. 4., solicitors can make binding agreements in writing with clients for remuneration for their services; but no action can be brought upon such agreement. It may be enforced by motion or petition, however, if it be a reasonable and fair agreement, in the discretion of the judge. It has been held that an agreement between attorney and client that the attorney is to receive a lump sum for business done by him (as an attorney) in the event of success, and costs out of pocket only in the event of failure, is not binding on the client: no signed bill had been delivered for taxation: Philby v. Hazle, C. C. Rep. (1860) 10. A barrister and his client are mutually incapable of

entering into a binding contract of hiring with respect to the services of the former as advocate. No action can be brought by either on such an agreement: Robertson v. Macdonagh, Ir. R., 6 Q. B. 433; Kennedy v. Brown, 13 C. B. N. S. 677.

When a solicitor allows himself to be arrested for debt and detained in prison, even though it arises from default of his client in not paying his costs and expenses according to his agreement, he is not entitled to any lien upon papers in his hands for costs due by the client: Re Williams, C. C. Rep. (1860) 80.

Formerly an attorney plaintiff was privileged to sue in the Superior Courts for debts and demands within the jurisdiction of the County Court, and to full costs when so doing: (Lewis v. Hance, 11 Q. B. D. 921, 1 C. & M. C. C. 75; Jones v. Brown, ib. 102; Nixon v. Johnson, ib. 38; Jeffreys v. Beast, 17 L. J. Q. B. 290; Borrowdale v. Nelson, 14 C. B. 622), but this is no longer the case: Blair v. Eisler, 21 Q. B. D. 185 (12 & 13 Vic., c. 101, s. 18).

It is purposed in the next article to treat of the question of Service of Process.

THE CREWE CASE.

Mr. George Augustus Sala, contributing under the title of "Echoes of the Week" to the Manchester Evening News, says: "In every well appointed library there should be a criminal case or flagitious shelf, There you would be able to put your hand at once on your Knapp and Baldwin's Newgate Calendar,' your Howell's State Trials,' your Pike's 'History of Crime,' your 'Lives of the Pirates and Highwaymen,' your 'Old Bailey Sessions Papers,' your Causes Celebres,' and your Arthur Griffith's Chronicles of Newgate.' Yet does such a catalogue lack, among others, one particular book, which, rightly read, might be of much service to the psychological student. The work is lacking for the sufficing reason that it has not been written. I would have it called 'The Analogy and Coincidences of Crimes.' You may think that I have brought down analogy with a very long shot indeed, when I declare that all the time I was reading the sickening details of the trial and condemnation to death of the wretched young Crewe murderers, my head was running on the historic murder of Fraucisco Cenci by his daughter Beatrice and his wife Lucrezia. That the crime was in both cases parricide had little to do with my musings, It was in the motive which prompted the deed that the resemblance seemed to lie. The recent researches of a learned Italian professor have exonerated Francisco Cenci from the guilt of the monstrous outrage which, according to the long-accepted legend, incited Beatrice, with the concurrence of her mother-in-law, to slay him. In reality the two women conspired to have old Cenci done to death principally for the reason that he had become an intolerable domestic tyrant and nuisance. He beat them, he swore at them, he starved them, his intolerable vituperative tongue never ceased to wag. The old brute was, in fine, an infernal bore; his family could stand him no longer, and they made away with him, Now, turn to the Crewe case. Instead of the murdered Francisco Cenci, consider the murdered tailor of the Hough.' He was an incorrigibly malevolent and ruffianly brute. He was prosperous enough, and owned six shops; yet he half-starved his family, allowing them, as he did, only a miserable pittance of thirteen shillings a week for the sustentation of eight mouths, He thrashed his wife, threatened to shoot her, and tried to burn her in bed. He habitually thrashed his daughters and his sons, and would not suffer them to attend a place of worship. His sons, driven almost crazy by his cruelty, conspired together

and slew him. All this is said without any wish to palliate by one iota the dreadful heinousness of parricide. It is only the similarity of motive of the Cenci and Davies cases that seems to be striking."

AUDIENCE OF PERSONS UNQUALIFIED AS SOLICITORS.

At the fortnightly petty sessions in Lurgan, on Tuesday, the magistrates on the bench being Messrs. B. M'Glynn, J.P., presiding; G. Garrick, J.P.; J. M'Nally, J.P.; and Dr, Magennis, J.P., & discussion took place on the question as to whether a complainant or defendant who does not conduct his case personally has a right to be represented by his "agent" or by any person other than a solicitor or a barrister. The discussion arose on the hearing of a case in which Patrick M'Avoy, a shop assistant of Mr. Andrew Donnelly, and who collects or receives rents from certain weekly tenants of that gentleman, had brought a summons in his (M'Avoy's) own name to recover possession of a house held by a man named Bell as weekly tenant under Mr. Donnelly. Mr. Donnelly did not appear, and the defendant was not professionally represented. During the progress of the hearing Mr. Hayes, solicitor, referred to a circular he had received from the Incorporated Law Society, who, being anxious to protect the rights of the profession, and especially of country solicitors, had taken the opinion of the SolicitorGeneral for Ireland as to the meaning of the word "agent," as used in the Petty Sessions Act. The Solicitor-General gave it as his opinion that agent meant "legal agent," namely-the solicitor or barrister appearing for a complainant or defendant. On this view of the law Mr. Hayes appealed to the court to hold that Patrick M'Avoy could not represent Mr. A. Donnelly in the case now at hearing. The magistrates agreed with Mr. Hayes and "pilled" the case, In another case at the suit of Mr. Cusack, Excise Officer, Lurgan, against a young man for carrying a gun for which he had no licence, Mr. Munce, supervisor, Dungannon, prosecuted, and Mr. Hayes raising a similar objection to the latter gentleman acting in the case, said-Let Mr. Munce produce his appointment. Dr. Mugennis, J.P-I think he should do so. Mr. Cusack entered the witness-hox to prove that Mr. Muuoo was supervisor, when Mr. Munce direotod Mr. Cusack not to answer any questions put by Mr. Hayes. Mr. Hayes-You should commit this gentleman. This is a nice way to treat the court. [To Mr, Cusack]-Did you ever see Mr. Munce's appointment? Mr, Munce-Do not answer Mr. Hayes. Only answer the questions put by the bench. Mr. Cusack-That is all I will do. Mr. Hayes -Arcades ambo. I have borne with a good deal of impertinence in my time, but I never heard the like of this. The court eventually held that Mr. Munce had a right to act in the case, which was then proceeded with, and, after evidence taken, dismissed.

THE LATE BARON DOWSE,

On Tuesday, at the sitting of the Exchequer Division, the Lord Chief Baron said :—

We cannot commence the business of the sittings without giving expression to the feelings with which we are impressed of the loss sustained by the Irish Judiciary, and, in a special sense, by the members of this Division, in the death of our dear friend and colleague, Baron Dowse. For eight years of the lengthened period during which this Court had the advantage of his presence, Mr Justice Andrews and myself had the privilege of being associated with hima privilege which for nearly nine years previously I had, engaged in common with two other colleagues, whose names can never be mentioned without admiration and respect, Baron Fitzgerald and the late Lord Justice Deasy. Baron Dowse and I had been law officers together, and had been united in close friendship for years before. Indeed, to revert to the time when I first learned to love his genial good nature, and to admire the vigour of his intellect and the sparkle of his wit, would be to go back for nearly thirty years; and now

that he is gone it is a melancholy satisfaction to me to know that during the entire of that long period not one circumstance occurred which cast a cloud upon our friendship, or could lessen the admiration and affectionate esteem in which I held him. The loss of such a colleague, and of so dear a friend, has made an impression upon my mind that it will be difficult, indeed, to efface. I am unwilling, however, to enlarge upon my feelings for him as a friend. It is in another, and far higher, capacity that he was known in this place where he did so much to develop and improve our system of jurisprudence. Appointed a judge in 1872, he brought to this beach an intellect of unusual originality and power, habits of thought of peculiar independence, and a logical cast of mind which subordinated his brilliant genius to a sober and rational judgment. These qualities had, at the outset of his career at the Bar, foremarked his rapid success; and in little more than ten years, no case in which passions were to be swayed, or falsehood and fraud to be unmasked, was heard in these Courts in which his fervid eloquence and inexorable logic did not largely affect the result. In the House of Commons, too, his rare gifts met with immediate recognition. Within a few months after his election to that assembly he coped successfully with the keenest intellects there; and when, after four years, he was removed to the calmer atmosphere which prevails here, he left behind him in the House of Commons a reputation for eloquence, powerful reasoning, sound sense, and brilliant wit, which it often takes almost a lifetime to acquire. Coming to the Bench after such a training, and with such knowledge, it is not surprising that Baron Dowse should have developed remarkable judicial faculties. Very marked in his career as a judge was his desire to interpret in a liberal and generous spirit every new principle introduced by legislation, and whilst strictly conforming to previous decision in everything of substance, to rise above matters of technicality whenever principles, viewed in their most enlightened spirit, enabled him to do 80. His unwearying effort was that the law, as administered by him, should, so far as could be without unsettling foundations, conform with ethical justice. This train of thought will be found to run through all his judg ments, and those who havo markod the progress of legal decision in this country during the last twenty years know that whilst no judge has been more deferent to authority, none has contributed more largely than has Baron Dowse to the establishment and enforcement of the enlarged views which prevail more day by day and subordinate form to substance and principle. Strongly marked, too, in him was the quality which, perhaps more than any other, tends to the formation of a model judge-I mean that almost intuitive perception of truth which so eminently characterised bim. In many a case full of complexity and contradiction, before some had well understood the questions at issue, the master mind of Baron Dowse had penetrated the clouds of sophistry and falsehood which concealed the facts, appreciated the very substance of the case, and by one perspicuous sentence convinced every intelligence present on which side the truth lay. So, too, he took every opportunity of reconciling the principles of law, however abstruse, with the common sense of mankind; and it was his especial pleasure to bring home their consistency with clearness to the minds of his auditors, lay and professional. In strong contrast with his rapid intellectual action was the laborious industry with which he applied himself to the consideration of the new and difficult questions of law which so frequently arose. My brother Andrews and myself well know the care he bestowed upon questions reserved for judgment, the new views he suggested, the tests to which, by the application of cognate principles, he subjected the arguments presented, and, above all, his anxiety that each new decision should logically fit in with established principles, and form part of a consistent and uniform whole, which would, so far as concerned this Court, be for the future a safe point of departure. The standard of duty which he set for himself was a high one, and to

the last he acted up to it, not only in the vigour of his health, but when God, in His providence, had touched him with illness. To many features in his judicial career I cannot refer. I cannot speak of the independence of his judgment, which, while he treated with all due respect the opinions of his colleagues, was in a marked sense the result of his own individuality; his scientific knowledge of the principles of our jurisprudence ; his love of justice for justice's sake-his unceasing determination to attain to it in every case; his unsullied purity in the exercise of his high office. Those qualities, happily, are not in the present day of exceptional occurrence, nor can they be claimed as merits; neither can I, by giving expression to the many thoughts which crowd in upon my mind, allow my few words of sorrow and esteem to take the character of a panegyric upou my deceased brother. That is not the function of a friend or of a colleague. His life was spent in public; and were he alive, the only opinion of himself which he would desire, or indeed would tolerate, would be that of the public, whom he served so well. Their verdict has been long since pronounced, and the name of Baron Dowse will go down to posterity linked with the best traditions of the Irish Judiciary. In this Division, as long as it may continue to exist, as indeed in all other Courts here, his memory will be cherished and revered, and so long, too, shall we feel that by his loss we have been deprived of a tower of strength from which we derived assistance in our doubts, and increased confidence in our convictions.

gavo

Con

The SOLICITOR-GENERAL (Mr. Atkinson, Q.C.)-Perhaps your lordship will permit me, on behalf of the Bar of Ireland, to express the sorrow which we feel at the sad event to which your lordship has so feelingly alluded. Your lordship has alluded to the triumphs of Baron Dowse at the Bar and in the Senate. sidering that he sat upon the bench for 18 years, these must be to many members a pure matter of tradition; but if they are, they are traditions that will live, and, I have no doubt, will be communicated to many succeeding generations of my professional brethren, and dwelt upon with pride. Those who had the privilege of hearing Baron Dowse must remember that his briliant fancy, his sparkling wit, and his genial humour a charm and fores to his advocacy. while they never marred the beauty and dignity of the loftier passages, or concealed the deep and earuest feelings and sentiments which were the foundation and strength of the man's character. My lord, we well remember the unrivalled power with which the late judge conveyed an argument of his own, or refuted the argument of an adversary with poignant thrust or happy allusion. It was these qualities, in addition to the great information and ripe scholarship of Baron Dowse, that at a time when the Irish Bar could boast of some of its greatest ornaments placed him in the front rank and equal with the best of them. But it is as a judge-in his judicial character-that I would like to speak of him. In that character he was known to all of us. His great ability, his broad judgment, his unswerving integrity, commanded, as they must have commanded, the admiration of us all. But in addition to that there was in his geniality and kindliness, even to the most junior member of the profession that appeared before him, something that touched the heart and won for Baron Dowse sincere affection and regard from every member of my profession. It is only those who practise in this court must know what loss the Irish Bench has sustained in his death. It is only those who practise here can know how deep and sincere must be our regret at his departure. But it is some consolation to know that we do not mourn alone-tbat multitudes of men in this country, of all creeds and all classes, join in our sorrow, and that without straining a metaphor, or being guilty of exaggeration, I might almost say that the nation's tears fall upon his grave to-day, because the public must know they not only lost an able, impartial, and independent judge, but a man who was a great personality in himself-a great and illustrious Irishman of whom his country must be proud.

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

At Limerick Quarter Sessions, on the 11th inst., Mr. Connolly, solicitor, complained, at the instance of the Incorporated Law Society, of a contempt of Court. Some members of the colony of Jews in Limerick sell goods to the poorer classes, receiving payment by weekly instalments. Recently it was ascertained that when defaulters were unwilling or unable to pay, the Jews served them with fictitious civil bills purporting to emanate from the Court, and being almost identical with the ordinary processes. Judge Purcell characterised the proceeding as unprecedented and extraordinary, and said he would deal with it as contempt of Court.

ORDER UNDER "THE PUBLIC OFFICES FEES ACT, 1879."

Fees payable under the 50th Section of "The Land Law Ireland Act, 1881" (44 & 45 Vic., cap. 49), and the 33rd Section of "The Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1887" (50 & 51 Vic., cap. 33).

WE, the undersigned, being two of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, do, in pursuance of the provisions of "The Public Offices Fees Act, 1879," hereby declare and direct that the Fees payable in the Court of the Irish Land Commission under the 50th section of "The Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1881," and the 33rd section of "The Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1887," and set forth in the Schedule annexed to this Order, shall be collected by means of Stamps.

Giving under Our bauds this 31st day of March, 1890.

SCHEDULE.

SIDNEY HERbert. W. H. WALROND.

Hope deferred maketh the heart sick; and rich men well stricken in years so often cause during their lives the fondest hopes of their prospective heirs to be iudefinitely deferred, that there is positively no excuse for their continuing to do so after death, like a late inhabitant of Warsaw, M. S This gentleman died six years ago. He had confided his last will and testament to M. B- his executor, at whose house the friends and relatives gathered together after the funeral to learn their fate; but they only heard the inscription on the envelope read, which was to the effect that the seal was to be broken on that day twelvemonth. This was sad news to many of them whose creditors were restive aud threatening; but possessing their souls, their interjections, and their adjectives in patience and in silence, they went their several ways. In 1885 they were all punctually at the try sting place once more. Breathless was the silence-like unto that described in the second book of the Eneid, when Venus' son was about to tell his tbri ling tale. Bbroke that silence and the seal solemnly and tenderly, and found inside of the envelope a somewhat smaller enclosure sealed with an identical seal, and bearing an identical superscription: "This seal is to be broken this day twelvemonth; not before." It is to be

M.

hoped that the spirit of that departed citizen, if hovering at all near the spot, was not within earshot of the uncourtly ejaculations which that announcement elicited, as the disappointed audience rose up and dispersed ; nor was the discovery of the year following of a nature to soothe the angry feelings of the impatient relatives who met once more under M. B- 's hospitable roof. Briefly, year after year the kith and kin of that rich man gathered together and "quoted Scripture" at the practical joker of the other world, heartily wishing him back again in this one for the nonce.

The will proved to have seven seals, the last of which was broken a few days ago, when it was found that the rich man's property was divided into four equal parts,: one of which was to be equally distributed between his nieces and nephews, another was left to the children of a former wet nurse, a third was given to his friend and executor, M. Band the fourth was directed

to be invested till the year 1910, when it is to be handed over to that one of the nephews who is blessed with the most numerous progeny.

"

THE TRANSLATION OF 34 EDWARD III., C. 1.. Mr. J. Theodore Dodd points out, in the Pall Mall Gazette, that there is a not printed in the English translation of 34 Ed. III., c. 1, "which is not to be found in the old French," and there is no doubt of the discrepancy between the translation (or rather translations, for, as pointed out in the notes to the Statutes of the Realm and the two editions of the Revised Statutes, all translations agree in printing the "not") and the original. The statute in question is the wellknown one investing justices of the peace with power, among other things, to inquire of all vagabonds "and to take and arrest all those that they may find and to put them in prison, and to take of all them that be [not] of good fame" sufficient security," and the other duly to punish." "How much," asks Mr. Dodd, "of this highly penal Act is due to the Parliament of Edward III, and how much to the error of the transcriber?" We should imagine that the error was in the transIcriber of the French, and that the translators erred, if err they did, in trying to make better sense of the statute. As for the probability of the English version being the correct one, we may point out that in the Introduction to the Statutes of the Realm (from which the text of the Revised Statutes is taken) it is stated that "for the purpose of correcting errors in the translation the several editions, as well of the text as the translation, have been compared with each other."-Law Journal.

"PICKETING."

At Bristol (Western Circuit), on Thursday and Friday, March 27 and 28, before Mr. Justice Cave, John West- · lake, George Walters, Caleb Rowles Phillips, Jobu: Drake, Albert Thomas Knight, William Williams, Lawrence Holcombe, William Coleman, Frederick Duffy, and Henry Tuose, all on bail, were charged with offences under the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vic., c. 86), and with conspiracy. This case arose out of one of the receut strikes in Bristol, and was important as raising the question of; how far "picketing," if carried on peaceably and with.. out resorting to violence of any kind, is legal. An oldestablished unlimited joint-stock company, known as the "Bristol Flour and Bread Concern," was managed by one Wilmott, and up to October last the men employed there were satisfied with their wages, though the work was almost entirely done at night. At that time a strike of the men employed by the bakers took: place, and the men who belonged to a journeyman: bakers' trade-union, of which the prisoners Drake and Knight were respectively president and secretary, held out for an increased rate of pay for night work. Wilmott's men, four in number, appear to have been contented with things as they were, and were unwilling to demand the rate laid down by the union. Shortly

afterwards Tuose, who had been to one of the union's meetings, told Wilmott that the union would not allow him to work except at the new rate; but Wilmott declined to make any alteration. Knight seems to have written to Tuose that he must not work on Wilmott's terms, and in the result Tuose left his situation. Phillips had previously been employed by Wilmott, but had left some time before this. Fresh hands were advertised for by Wilmott, and on December 22 four new men came to work, one of them being Holcombe. After they had been at work a few days a circular addressed to them from the union arrived by post, say. ing that the union had resolved to have the rates of pay raised from the first Satur lay in January; but the men, being satisfied with their wages, refused to have anything to do with it. On January 4 a patrol of journeymen bakers was established in front of the premises, and Wilmott, fearing violence might follow, obtained police assistance. None, however, was offered at any time, either to him or any of the men who worked for him. Meanwhile Holcombe left his employment, aud was seen with some of the other prisoners helping to watch the premises, in front of which large crowds assembled from time to time. Wilmott said that he and his men were followed on leaving the premises by a crowd who jeered at them, and on one occasion he and the men took refuge in a police-station. The premises continued to be watched up to January 12. It was said that the union offered 188. a week to each man who would cease working for Wilmott. Neither Wilmott nor his company belonged to any of the master bakers' societies, which were stated to have agreed to the union's terms. A question having arisen as to what had happened when the case was before the magistrates, the magistrates' clerk was told and said that all the prisoners except Drake and Knight appeared before the magistrates on January 20, when their solicitor objected to the matter being dealt with summarily. On the 22nd, however, they were ready to have the charges, which were under the Act of 1875, dealt with summarily; but there was a further adjournment to the 27th, when all ten prisoners were charged with conspiracy. The prisoners were not asked to declare whether they would be sent for trial or not. His lordship held that, the prisoners having waived their objection on the 22nd, a wrong course had been taken in sending the charges under the Act of 1875 for trial, as they could have been dealt with summarily. Accord ingly, these counts were withdrawn from the jury, only the counts for conspiracy being left. Ultimately, however, on his lordship's suggestion, it was agreed that the case as against Drake and Knight should be withdrawn, and they were found Not guilty. The other eight men pleaded "Guilty" to conspiring to take part in a "disorderly following," it being added on their behalf that they had no intention to break the law, and were willing to abide by his lordship's exposition of the law. His lordship, in the course of his next remarks, referred to the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vio., c. 85), s. 7, which enacts that every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority (1) ases violence to or intimidates such other person; . . . (2) persistently follows such other person about from place to place; (3) ; (4) watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides or works or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place; or (5) follows such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road-shell on conviction be subject to the penalties therein mentioned." He also said that, in his opinion, the men before him seemed to have been desirous of availing themselves of their rights under the Act of 1875 without overstepping its limits. Where, however, a considerable amount of feeling was aroused, as in the case of a strike, and men assembled in numbers, it was difficult, if not impossible, to make them restrain their feelings and to prevent

them from becoming disorderly. The object of the Act seemed to be to give the members of a union liberty to dissuade those of their own class from selling their labour below what they thought a fair and reasonable price. It was not an offence to follow a dissentient workman to find out where he lived if it were done without a crowd or disturbance, and if, when it was found out where he lived, nothing more were done; but if he were followed beyond this it became a "disorderly following" within the terms of the Ac. As to whatconstituted "watching" or "besetti g," it was a difficult question, as the language of the Act was somewhat obscure, but he considered it would be an offence if this· were done so as to compel a man to do what he was unwilling to do, or to abstain from doing anything he wished to do. If persons were asked peaceably and quietly not to work, and nothing were done to intimi. date or annoy them, that would not be an offence within the Act; but if a crowd collected at a house when workmen were leaving their work, or if they obstructed the workmen from entering the house to resume work, that would be within the Act. Similarly, if more than two men at a time were employed to watch a house, they must not be surprised if it were held that such a watching was within the Act. He was very glad that there had been no actual violence used in the present case, but there had been a "disorderly" and "persistent following" of Wilmott's men. He was, however, going to treat the offences as one in regard to the eight men who had now pleaded guilty, and, in the circumstances, he allowed them to be released on entering into their own recognisances in £10 each to come up for judgment when required.

COUNTRY SOLICITORS AND TOWN AGENTS.

A somewhat new phase of the vexed country solicitor and London agent question was lately discussed by the Court of Appeal, and the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty thereupon reversed, in the case of Ward v. Lawson (62. L. T. Rep. N. S. 158). The point arose on the taking of certain accounts in an action brought for discovery and account, and was whether a London agent is entitled to participate in interest obtained by the country solicitor vu his bills of costs rolating to the agonoy businone. In 1859 the parties agreed that the defendant should act as London agent of the plaintiff on the usual agency terms, and subsequently a further arrangement was come to that the bills of costs of the London agent should not be payable until the country solicitor had obtained payment of his bills of costs from a certain railway company, his clients. The railway company did not pay their solicitor's bills of costs for many years after they became due, and then only as the result of litigation, in which judgment was given againt the company in favour of the country solicitor, with interest from the date of delivery of the bills. In this interest the London agent claimed an equal share with the country solicitor, on the ground that a moiety of the profits made by the latter belonged to the former under the expression "usual agency terms." This view was adopted by Mr. Justice Chittv, who held that the meaning of the agreement was that the profit should be divided between the London agent and the principal on the terms of the interest received from the railway The Court of company being brought into account. Appeal, however, after consulting with the taxing official, came to a different conclusion, and determined that all the London agent could properly claim was his out-of-pocket expenses, and half the profit costs, these being charges for professional services, attending the client, rendering advice, and such like matters. The construction put upon "ordinary agency terms was, that the town agent gets no share of the profits of his principal; he has nothing to do with those profits; all he is entitled to get is his disbursements, and half of certain charges called "profit costs," to distinguish them from disbursements. And a remarkable instance was cited in which the country solicitor received £500 from a grateful client, of which the town agent did not