special care, as being a matter of no small moment, and that is, how the Will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections, or no; whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will's solicitor, and Will is Appetite's controller: what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject. Neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and understanding, or the shew of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired. It may be therefore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth action, Reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, or betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men having attained to the use of Reason, are voluntary for as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those things which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not; in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the Will, if it listed, might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressly use our Reason or understanding, and so immediately apply our Wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the Will doth yield her assent, as it were, with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibitions, especially upon advice and consultation going before. Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of man's Will, by discovering in action what is good. For the Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. Children, which are not as yet come

*

* [See Locke on Gov. Treat. II. chap. vi. § 60.]

unto those years whereat they may have; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves; have for their guide the Reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil; and which discovering the same rightly is termed Right. The Will, notwithstanding, doth not incline to have or do that which Reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the Appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible;* yet for such things the reasonable Will of man doth never seek. Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest. There is in the Will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it. Whereupon it followeth, that there is no particular object so good but it may have the shew of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof, the

O mihi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos! VIRG. lib. viii. v. 560.

+["The Church of England professeth this ground of faith, Without the grace of God, which is by Christ, preventing us, that we will; and working together while we will; we are nothing at all able to do the works of piety which are pleasing and acceptable to God: Article X. You, to our understanding, write clean contrary; namely, There is in the will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it:' and a little after, 'There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search it out.' Book I. sect. 7. Here, we pray your help to teach us, How will is apt, as you say, freely to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever; and, that reason by diligence is able to find out any good concerning us: if it be true, that the Church of England professeth, that without the preventing and helping grace of God, we can will, and do nothing pleasing to God. To which belief of England the Scripture accordeth, shewing that without the said grace of God, we are dead in sins and trespasses,' Eph. ii. 1, 5; we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing,' 2 Cor. iii. 5; it is God which worketh in us the will and the deed, even of his good pleasure.' Phil. ii. 13. Shew us, therefore, how your positions agree with our Church and the Scriptures. If you say, you understand reason and will helped by the grace of God; then tell us, how we may perceive it by your writing, which putteth difference betwixt natural and supernatural truth and Laws. If you mean reason, uncorrupted, not respecting how in truth we are by Adam's fall perverted, may we not suspect that your whole discourse is subtile and cunning, because you pretend the natural way of finding out Laws by reason to guide the will unto that which is good (p. 88, et inf. sect. 8.), or at the least, frivolous; seeing man hath no such reason, without the grace of God; if you mean without the grace of God, and in the state of corruption, as indeed all men naturally now are. Here we desire to be taught, how such sayings overthrow not our English Creed and the Holy Scripture, in this matter; and therewithal shew us the true meaning of St. Paul, and how he fitteth your discourse in this place, namely, when he saith, Rom. viii. 7, 'The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, for it is not subject unto the Law of God, neither indeed can be.'"-A Christian Letter, p. 11.]

Will may shrink and decline it; contrariwise (for so things are blended), there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For evil, as evil, cannot be desired;* if that be desired which is evil, the cause is the goodness which is, or seemeth to be, joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present; which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the Will do follow, the one the affirmation, the other the negation of goodness; which the understanding apprehendeth, grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher Reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if Reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the Will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodness whereof Reason in such sort doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at the choice of evil even then when the contrary is probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass, that custom, inuring the mind by long practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the Will of man not incline itself thereunto as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway. Nor let any man think, that this doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity for there was never sin committed wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular disgrace of Nature, and the utter disturbance of that divine Order, whereby the pre-eminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the shew of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us, as it did Eve; sometimes the 2 Cor.

xi. 3.

* Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁρμᾷ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὁρμήσει, ἀλλ ̓ ὡς ἐπ ̓ ἀγαθόν. Paulo post: ̓Αδύνατον γὰρ ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ κακὰ βουλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ, οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε φόβῳ μείζονος κακού. Alcin. de Dog. Plat.

Luke

ix. 54.

Matt.

hastiness of our Wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound Reason, as in the Apostles, when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our Saviour spake weeping, "O Jerusalem, how often, and thou wouldest not!" Still xxiii. 37. therefore that wherewith we stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, in doing evil we prefer a less good before a greater, the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the Will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments* being weakened wherewithal the Soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore, we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew xii.1.12. right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy clog to xvi. 13. the Will, striketh mightily upon this key, "Awake thou that 4. Luke sleepest; cast off all which presseth down; watch; labour; xiii. 24 strive to go forward; and to grow in knowledge.

Eph.

v. 14. Heb.

1 Cor.

Prov. ii.

2 Pet.i.5.

Of the natural

way of

out

Reason

the Will

unto

that

8. Wherefore to return to our former intent of discovering the natural way, whereby Rules have been found out confinding cerning that Goodness wherewith the Will of Man ought to Laws by be moved in human actions; as every thing naturally and to guide necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection, whereof Nature hath made it capable, even so Man. which is Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and covet it. All particular things which are subject unto action, the Will doth so far forth incline unto, as Reason judgeth them the better for us, and consequently the more available to our bliss. If Reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek.

Good.

"A corruptible body is heavy unto the soul, and the earthly mansion keepeth down the mind that is full of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are upon earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who then can seek out the things that are in heaven?" Sap. ix. 15, 16.

γαθία.

Seeing therefore, that for the framing of men's actions the knowledge of good from evil is necessary, it only resteth, that we search how this may be had. Neither must we suppose, that there needeth one rule to know the good, and another the evil by. For he that knoweth what is straight, doth even thereby discern what is crooked, because the absence of straightness in bodies capable thereof is crookedness.* Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is done well, we term right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end; so in action, that which doth lie the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use. Besides which fitness for use, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not only delight as profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the Grecians most divinely have given to the active perfection of men a name expressing Kaλokαboth beauty and goodness; because goodness in ordinary yabía. speech is for the most part applied only to that which is beneficial. But we in the name of Goodness do here imply both. And of discerning Goodness, there are but these two ways; the one, the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other, the observation of those signs and tokens, which, being annexed always unto goodness, argue, that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we know not the cause by force whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure and infallible way, but so hard that all shun it, and had rather walk as men do in the dark by hap-hazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge' sake. As therefore physicians are many times forced to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be the fittest, and being over-ruled by their patients' impatiency are fain to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure which the cured will yield unto; in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we yield to the stream thereof; into the causes of Goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at hand that easily

* Τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών. Arist. de An. lib. i.