1. RATIFICATION OF. -A party who recognizes the validity of a deed made
without his knowledge or consent thereby becomes a party to and is
bound by it. Huffman v. Mulkey, 71.
2 TITLE TO LAND CANNOT BE DIVESTED BY SURRENDER AND CANCELLA-
TION OF GRANTEE'S DEED. Watters v. Wagley, 232.
& DEED CONSTRUED TO CONVEY ESTATE FOR LIFE WIth Remainder IN FER
—A father executed a deed of conveyance of land to his four children,
"and the heirs of their bodies, party of the second part." In the grant-
ing clause and the habendum, the words "heirs and assigns" were used
without the words "of their bodies." Immediately preceding the ha-
bendum was inserted the clause: "Meaning and intending by this con-
veyance to convey to my said children the use and control of said real
estate during their natural lives, and at their death to go to their chil-
dren; should they die without issue, to their legal representatives." It
was held to clearly appear from this clause that the grantor, by the use
of the word "heirs," in other parts of the deed, meant “children,” and
the deed was construed to convey to the grantor's children a life estate
only, with remainder in fee to their children. Griswold v. Hicks, 549.
4. WORD "HEIRS" MAY BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN "CHILDREN' WHEN.
The word "heirs," in a deed, may be construed to mean “children,"
when it clearly appears from other parts of the deed that it is not used
by the grantor in its legal, technical meaning. Id.
5. REGISTRATION AS NOTICE — INDEXING. - A grantee who merely deposits
his deed for record in the auditor's office, or other proper office, where
it is received by the proper officer, does not thereby convey notice to
the public, so that his title cannot be prejudiced through the fault or
negligence of the officer in not recording the deed. In order that the
deed may constitute constructive notice, it must be duly and properly
recorded and indexed, the index being an essential part of the record.
Ritchie v. Griffiths, 155.
· RECORDER AGENT OF GRANTEE. -The recorder to
whom a grantee gives his deed for the purpose of having it recorded
is his agent, and not the agent of a subsequent innocent purchaser. The
recorder is responsible to the grantee only in damages for his refusal or
neglect to record the deed according to law, and it is the duty of the
grantee to see that it is properly recorded, or accept the consequences as
between himself and innocent third parties who are misled. Id.
7. CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY NOT EVIDENCE OF REGISTRATION. A cer-
tificate that a deed is properly recorded, given by the recorder to the
grantee, does not relieve the latter of the responsibility of seeing that
the deed is properly recorded, so as to affect the rights of an innocent
purchaser, although it may aid the grantee in recovering damages from
the recorder. Id.
See ADVERSE POSSESSION; CO-TENancy; Infancy, 2; Mortgage, 1
"Boarders." Moore v. Long Beach D. Co., 265.
"Children." Griswold v. Hicks, 549.
Debt. Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 331.
Eminent domain. Murphy v. Mayor, 345; Gainesville etc. B'y Co. v. Hall, 42.
Gift inter vivos. Williamson v. Johnson, 117.
"Hawker." Emmons v. Lewistown, 540.
"Head of family." Holloway v. Holloway, 484.
"Heirs." Griswold v. Hicks, 549.
"Heirs of their bodies, party of the second part." Id.
House of ill-fame. State v. Webber, 920.
"Inevitable accident." Blythe v. Denver etc. R'y Co., 403.
"Location." McFeters v. Pierson, 388.
"Mining claim." Id.
Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 331.
Non-resident. Carden v. Carden, 876.
"Owner." McFeters v. Pierson, 388.
"Peddler." Emmons v. Lewistown, 540.
Penalties. Harbor Commissioners v. Redwood Co., 321.
"Pool." Cleveland etc. R'y Co. v. Closser, 593.
Postal-clerk. Magoffin v. Missouri P. R'y Co., 798.
"Society." Furnish v. Missouri P. R'y Co., 800.
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 15.
DEPOSITION EXCLUDED FOR INCOMPETENCY SHOULD BE OFFERED ANEW, IF
SUBSEQUENT EVIDENCE REVEALS ITS COMPETENCY. A deposition
which is properly excluded for incompetency in the state of the case
when it is offered should be offered in evidence again, if subsequent
●vidence reveals its competency. And if the party offering it fails to do
this, he cannot complain of the ruling of the court excluding it. Jones
▼. St. Louis etc. R'y Co., 175.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
See WILLS, 3, 4.
DISCRIMINATION.
See CARRIERS.
DISORDERLY HOUSE.
Bee CRIMINAL LAW, 11; LIBEL AND SLANDER, 1.
DITCHES.
See LICENSE, 1, 2.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
See EVIDENCE, 1, 2.
PRESUMPTION. — Devise or Bequest to a widow is presumed to be in ad-
dition to her dower, unless it clearly appears that it was the intention
of the testator that it was to be in lieu thereof. Hatch's Estate, 109.
See EQUITY, 1; Homestead, 2–5; Husband and Wish, 2
PLEADING — Evidence. — DureSS in the execution of a conveyance should
not be permitted to be proved, unless specially pleaded. Nordholt v.
Nordholt, 268.
See ACTIONS, 2; TRESPASS,
LEGAL TITLE TO LAND CANNOT BE PROVED BY PAROL EVIDENCE in
tion of ejectment. Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 531.
2. EQUITABLE TITLE Cannot be Shown in DefensE IN EJECTMENT. — Only
legal titles can be investigated in an action of ejectment, and the equi-
table title of the defendant cannot be shown in defense. Id.
3. MORTGAGOR CANNOT MAINTAIN EJECTMENT AGAINST HIS MORTGAGER UN-
TIL the debt is paid, and it cannot be paid by mere lapse of time. Spect
v. Spect, 314.
See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 1.
ELECTION.
See HOMESTEAD, 2–5.
See OFFICE AND OFFICERS, 1, 2; Taxation, 5.
1. Diversion of SMALL AND PRIVate Watercourse by a city for the pur-
pose of drainage and sewerage, with the consent and approval of the
land-owners through whose land it runs, is not an exercise of the right
of eminent domain. Murphy v. Mayor etc. of Wilmington, 345.
2 DAMAGES-INJURY FROM CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF PUBLIC
WORKS. When by the construction of any works there is a physical
interference with any right, public or private, which the owner or oc-
cupier of property is by law entitled to make use of in connection with
such property, and which gives an additional market value thereto
apart from the uses to which any particular owner or occupier may pat
it, there is a right to compensation, if, by reason of such interference,
the property, as property, is lessened in value. Gainesville etc. R'y Co.
v. Hall, 42.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DAMAGES FOR OPERATION OF PUBLIC WORKS — A
constitutional provision that "no person's property shall be taken, dam-
aged, or destroyed for or applied to a public use without adequate com-
pensation being made" is sufficiently comprehensive to include damages
resulting from the operation of public works, as well as those which are
inflicted by their construction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DAMAGES FOR OPERATION OF RAILROAD. - Under
a constitutional provision that "no person's property shall be taken,
damaged, or destroyed for or applied to a public use, without adequate
compensation being made,” a land-owner whose property is injured by
the construction of a railroad, and the vibration, smoke, noxious vapors,
and noise of passing trains, is entitled to damages, although such road
is not upon his land nor is any of his property taken in its construction.
Id.
1. COURT OF EQUITY CANNOT REFORM DEED OF MARRIED WOMAN. A Court
of chancery cannot reform the deed of a married woman not acting as
a feme sole. And where a husband and wife join in a conveyance of
her land, which by mistake conveys only her dower interest therein,
although she intended to convey her entire estate, acts passed to cure
defectively acknowledged deeds of married women do not apply to such
conveyance. Bowden v. Bland, 179.
2. PARTIES TO SUIT IN EQUITY, WHO ARE PROPER. — The rules of pleading
in equity, while the same in form with those in actions at law, are
broader and more elastic, by reason of the inherent character of the re-
lief which may be sought and given; and it is a general rule in equity
that all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the
subject-matter of a suit are to be m parties to it, so that there may be
a complete decree which shall bi. nem all. Townsend v. Bogert, 835.
3. CLAIMANT MAY BE MADE PARTY AND REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE HIS INTER-
EST WHEN. — Where a plaintiff in a suit in equity knows that a third
person claims an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but does not
know the nature, extent, or merits of the claim, he may state the facts,
call in the claimant as a party, and require him to disclose his alleged
interest.
4. EQUITY WILL NOT ENTERTAIN JURISDICTION when the only object is to ob
tain a consolidation of actions or to save the expense of separate actions,
or where the claim of right rests on a mere question of law, as for as-
certaining the legality of the proceedings of a municipal corporation in
levying a tax. Murphy v. Mayor etc., 345.
5. CLOUD ON TITLE. - A lien or encumbrance, to throw a cloud on title
to real property so as to give the owner a right to relief in equity,
must be one that is regular and valid on its face, though in fact irregu
lar and void from circumstances which must be proved by extrinsic evi
dence. Id.
6. ILLEGAL ASSESSMENT CLOUD ON TITLE. - Where the illegality of a
municipal assessment or tax is apparent on the record of the proceed.
ings, and requires no extrinsic evidence to show it, such assessment
or tax is not a cloud upon title, and the remedy of the owner is by action
at law, and not by suit in equity. Id.
7. CLOUD ON TITLE - ILLEGAL MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENT. Where a city
ordinance imposes certain conditions which must be complied with
in order to make a local municipal assessment or tax valid, a fail-
ure to comply with any one of the conditions renders the tax void; and
when such failure appears from the face of the proceedings, no cloud on
the title is created, and the remedy of the land-owner is by action at
law, and not by suit in equity. Id.
S BANKS AND BANKING, 9; CONTRACTS, 5; EJECTMENT, 2; JUDGMENTS,
4, 5; PENALTY, 3; Set-off, 1, 5.
1. EXECUTOR NOT ESTOPPED BY HIS OWN VOID DEED. · An executor is not estopped by his own void deed of land from suing to dispossess persons claiming under it. Chase v. Cartright, 207.
2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
A judgment creditor who sells an equity of redemption under execution, thereby asserts the validity of the mortgage, and is estopped from afterwards denying its validity by asserting that it was fraudulent as to creditors. Knoop v. Kelsey, 777.
8. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS AGAINST Married WomaN MUST BE SPECIALLY PLEADED as new matter, to be available as a defense, and cannot be proved under a general or specific denial. De Votie v. McGerr, 426.
4. ADVANTAGE TAKEN OF VOID DIVORCE DECREE, WHEN AN ESTOPPEL. When a wife, without cause, deserts her husband and home, lives for years in adultery, and afterwards, learning that a divorce has been procured by her deserted husband, causes a marriage ceremony to be performed with her paramour, and continuously lives and cohabits with him as his wife until the death of her abandoned husband, she cannot take advantage of the fact that the divorce decree is void for want of proper service of process, and successfully assert against the heirs her right, under the statute, to the estate of the deceased husband as his widow, notwithstanding these facts were not brought to the notice of the court at the time that the divorce decree was adjudged invalid. Arthur v. Israel, 381.
6. ESTOPPEL BY TAKING ADVantage of Void Divorce DECREE. — A husband or wife who accepts the benefits and privileges of a void decree of divorce cannot afterwards repudiate his or her action, and urge its invalidity. Id.
6. ESTOPPEL BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF VOID DIVORCE DECREE. - Public policy as well as private interest requires that, so far as is consistent with law, one who has attempted to profit by a supposed divorce, and has exercised the resulting privilege of remarriage, shall not, for the mere purpose of obtaining property, be permitted to repudiate his election. Id. See BANKS AND BANKING, 10; DEPOSITION; INSURANCE, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2, 3; PLEADING, 7.
1. PROOF OF WRITTEN COMMUNICATION. — A witness cannot testify to facts communicated by him by letter to another, when the letter itself can be produced. McDuff v. Detroit etc. Co., 673.
2. RECORDS OF BOARD OF HEALTH NOT EVIDENCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES OF FACTS RECORDED. -The records of a board of health of a city, required by police regulations to be kept for local and specific purposes, are not public records in such sense as makes them evidence in a controversy between private parties of the facts recorded. Buffalo Loan etc. Co. v. Knights Templar etc. Ass'n, 839.
3. LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE. - Though on a hearing on habeas corpus a single section of the criminal code of another state is read in evidence, the court
will look to the whole code, to ascertain what the law of the state is upon the subject before it. Ex parte Spears, 341.
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