facie illegal, and the burden of proof is on the carrier to remove
the presumption by affirmative proof that the object of the combi-
nation was only to prevent ruinous competition, and that it does not
establish unreasonable rates, unjust discriminations, or oppressive reg-
ulations. Until the presumption is thus removed, the combination
must be held to be within the condemnation directed against all con-
tracts which violate public policy. Id.

29. VALIDITY OF CONTRACT DISCRIMINATING IN FAVOR OF ONE SHIPPER. — A
mere discrimination will not invalidate a contract between a carrier and
shipper. To have that effect, other elements must enter into the con-
tract, and when such elements are present in such force as to make
the discrimination unjust or oppressive, the contract will be illegal.
Whether or not the contract is impartial depends upon the circum-
stances of each particular case. ld.

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30. SPECIAL CONTRACT WITH SHipper — ValidiTY OF. — A contract binding
a carrier to transport as many car-loads of grain as the shipper may de-
sire transported is not illegal and ineffective for the reason that the
shipper is under no obligation to ship any definite or designated quantity
of grain. When acts are done in performance of the contract, it is
valid as to those acts, although the contract may be revocable, for until
there is an effective revocation the contract remains in force. Id.
31. VALIDITY OF CONTRACT FOR REBATE TO SHIPPER. A contract between
a common carrier and a grain shipper, by which the carrier agrees to
receive at the time of shipment a designated sum as compensation for
the transportation of grain, and to refund a certain part of the sun re-
ceived when the transportation is completed, is valid and binding. Id.
32. SPECIAL CONTRACT WITH SHIPPER-RIGHT TO REBATE. — Where a
common carrier makes a special contract with a shipper to repay part of
the sum received, he must perform his part of the contract, unless he
overthrows the presumption of fairness and right by countervailing facts.
The shipper need not first prove that the rate charged and paid under
the contract was excessive and unjust, as his right to recover resta
apon the contract stipulating for a rebate. Id.

33. VALIDITY OF CONTRACT FOR REBATE TO SHIPPER. To give an illegal
character to a contract between a common carrier and a shipper by
which the latter is to receive a rebate on freight charged when the
transit is ended, more must be shown than the mere fact that the parties
stipulated for a rebate, as it cannot be presumed that fraud was in-
tended or practiced, nor that there was any wrongful combination to
secure an undue advantage over other shippers, nor that in stipulating
for a rebate the carrier intended to make, in favor of a particular ship-
per, a discrimination forbidden by law. Id.

34. SPECIAL CONTRACT WITH SHIPPER-WAIVER BY AGENT. — Where, un-
der a special contract between a carrier and a shipper, it appears that
the contracting shipper was first prohibited from claiming a rebate on
grain consigned by him to a certain third party, and that subsequently
thereto an authorized agent of the company entered into a contract as
to rebates with the shipper, treating the former interdiction as with-
drawn and ineffective, and inducing the shipper to believe that it had
no force, he is entitled to rebates on grain subsequently shipped by
him to such third party. Id.

35. ACT OF GOD PROXIMATE CAUSE-NEGLIGENCE. A gale of wind of
such violence as to make it impossible for a person to stand or walk

at the time an express-car is derailed by it, and thrown into such posi
tion that the express packages therein are piled in one corner at the top
of the car, after which it is so quickly consumed by fire set by a stove
or lamp therein that the express-messenger only escapes with difficulty,
is such aot of God and proximate cause of the loss of an express pack.
age contained in the car as will excuse the railroad company from lia.
bility for the loss, or for negligence in failing to protect and secure the
goods in the burning car. Blythe v. Denver etc. R'y Co., 403.
36. PROXIMATE AND RESULTING CAUSE. When the immediate resulting
cause of loss by a carrier is fire caused by the overturning of a car by
a violent wind, an instruction that "where one is pursuing a lawful
vocation in a lawful manner, and something occurs which no human
skill or precaution could foresee or prevent, and as a consequence the
accident takes place, this is called 'inevitable accident,' or the 'act of
God,'" is not prejudicial, although not technically correct. Id.
37. LIABILITY FOR GOODS NEGLIGENTLY HELD AND LOST AFTER ARRIVAL
Where goods are directed to be shipped to a certain point, and
instead of sending them direct, the carrier transports them in a round.
about way, thereby causing a delay of eight days in their arrival, and
two days subsequent there to they are destroyed by flood, the carrier
is liable for their loss, especially when the consignee has made daily
demands for the goods at the point of destination from the day when
they should have arrived up to the day of loss. Richmond etc. R. R. Co.
v. Benson, 446.

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38. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE, WHEN WILL NOT EXCUSE LIABILITY.
When goods marked with a certain number have arrived at their
destination, and are afterwards lost by flood while in the hands of
the carrier, and after they have been demanded by the consignee upon
his bill of lading for goods marked with the same number, a contract
of carriage with the shipper exempting the carrier from liability for
wrong carriage or wrong delivery of goods marked with initials, num-
bers, or imperfectly marked" will not excuse the carrier for liability for
the loss.

Id.

39. POWER TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR LOss.

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A stipulation in the contract
of carriage limiting the liability to the carrier by whom the damage
is occasioned is valid and binding as to connecting carriers, and proof
by a carrier that damage did not occur while the goods were in its
charge exonerates it from liability. Texas etc. R'y Co. v. Adams, 56.
40. NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR COUNSEL FEES. - In an action against a
common carrier for loss of goods through negligence, he is not liable for
counsel fees in addition to actual damages, in the absence of evidence
that he has acted in bad faith or has been stubbornly litigious for the
purpose of putting the plaintiff to unnecessary expense. Richmond etc.
R. R. Co. v. Benson, 446.

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41. ATTACHMENT OF GOODS IN TRANSIT - RIGHT OF CARRIER TO HOLD
GOODS. In an action against a common carrier to recover for taking
goods which he has in transit from the possession of a sheriff who has
levied upon them under a writ of attachment, it is a good defense that
the property sought to be attached was not the property of the party
against whom the writ of attachment issued, nor subject to levy and
attachment against him. Simpson v. Dufour, 590.

42. BILLS OF LADING CONCLUSIVE AS TO QUANTITY OF GOODS Received when.
Where a carrier executes and delivers to a consignor bills of lading,

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acknowledging the receipt on board his vessel of a certain number of
bushels of wheat to be transported to a certain place and there delivered
to a consignee, subject to a certain charge for freight, and such bills of
lading contain the provision, "All the deficiency in cargo to be paid
by the carrier and deducted from the freight, and any excess in the
cargo to be paid for to the carrier by the consignee," the carrier must
account for the precise quantity of wheat acknowledged in the bills
of lading, and no other evidence on that point can be received. If, in
such case, there be any deficiency in the quantity of wheat receipted for,
the value of the deficiency must be deducted from the stipulated freight,
and the difference is all that the consignee, who is but the agent of the
consignor, can be held liable to pay. Rhodes v. Newhall, 859.
43. BILL OF LADING IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, if otherwise sufficiently
proved to exist, without proof of its execution, or of the signature
thereto, or of the agency of the person purporting to have signed it.
Richmond etc. R. R. Co. v. Benson, 446.

44. RULE REQUIRING NOTICE OF LOSS - REASONABLENESS OF QUESTION FOR
JURY. Whether or not a stipulation in a bill of lading, that "claims for
loss or damages must be presented to the delivering line within thirty-
six hours after the arrival of the freight," is reasonable is a question for
the jury, under all the circumstances of the case. Texas etc. R'y Co. v.
Adams, 56.

45. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN CARRIAGE OF LIVE-STOCK. — Under sec-
tion 4386, United States Revised Statutes, relating to the carriage of
live-stock by common carriers, it is negligence per se for a railroad com-
pany to keep live-stock upon its cars for more than twenty-eight con-
secutive hours without unloading them for rest, water, and feeding; and
the company is liable not only for the penalty prescribed in the statute,
but also for all damages or injury that may thereby be sustained by the
owner of the stock. Nashville etc. R'y Co. v. Heggie, 453.

46. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN CARRIAGE OF LIVE-STOCK. — In an action
against a railroad for negligence and non-compliance with the statute in
transporting live-stock, by keeping them confined in the cars for more
than twenty-eight consecutive hours, the fact that the company's stock-
yard at its feeding-station was on fire upon the arrival of the train
will not excuse it for not furnishing the person in charge of the stock
all proper facilities for caring for them, in compliance with the contract
of shipment, nor for failing to stop the train at some other station, so
that the stock, after they had been on the cars more than twenty-eight
consecutive hours, might be unloaded, watered, and fed by the person
in charge, notwithstanding his want of diligence in not urging that the
train be so stopped for that purpose. Id.

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47. CONNECTING LINES PRESUMPTION AS TO WHERE Loss OCCURRED. —
Where goods have been transported by successive carriers, and damaged
subsequently to shipment, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence,
that the damage was caused by the last carrier; but he may overcome
this presumption by evidence to the contrary. Texas etc. R'y Co. v.
Adams, 56.

CHARACTER.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3-6.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

1. SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION.

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A chattel mortgage of "three cows or
of "five cows," the mortgagor having at least six cows at the time that

the mortgage was given, or of “two cows delivered to me by" a certain
person, the mortgagor having at that time five cows delivered to him by
the same person, is void for indefiniteness of description. Parker v.
Chase, 99.

2. SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION. While the description of property enu.
merated in a chattel mortgage need not be sufficiently definite to en-
able one to find the property without inquiry, in order to make the
mortgage valid it must be such as to indicate the line of inquiry and
furnish the basis of identification. The instrument must contain some
designation which, when aided by further information, will determine
what property is mortgaged. The number of articles may be sufficient
if the mortgagor owns no more than the number given; but the mere
statement of a number, when the mortgagor owns a larger number, in no
way designates the property, and renders the mortgage void for indefi.
niteness. Id.

3. SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION.

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A chattel mortgage which leaves the des-
ignation of the specific property mentioned therein resting exclusively
in the minds of the parties fails to meet the purposes and requirements
of the law, and is void for indefiniteness. Id.

4. RECORD AS NOTICE. The recording of a chattel mortgage in one state
has no extraterritorial force in another state as notice of a lien. Cor
bett v. Littlefield, 681.

5. REMOVAL TO ANOTHER STATE of mortgaged chattels by the mortgagor in
whose possession they were left subjects them to attachment by his
creditors in the state to which they were removed, though the mortgage
was duly recorded in the state where it was given, and the chattels were
removed without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent. Id.
6. LIEN ON AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY-STOPPAGE IN TRANSIT. —A chat-
tel mortgage covering additions to and substitutes for the mortgaged
property will not constitute a lien on goods ordered by the mortgagor
before the execution of the mortgage, and which were never actually de-
livered to him as owner, nor will the seller's right of stoppage in transit,
in case of the insolvency of the mortgagor, be divested by a purchase
of the goods so ordered, by the mortgagee at the mortgage sale. - King-
man v. Denison, 711.

CHECKS.

See BANKS AND BANKING.

CLOUD ON TITLE.

See EQUITY, 5–7.

COMMISSIONS.

See SHIPPING, 4.

COMMON CARRIERS.

See CARRIERS.

COMPLAINT.

See PLEADING, 1-4.

CONDITIONAL SALE

See SALES, L

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Bee CORPORATIONS, 14; NEGLIGENCE, 11-12

CONNECTING CARRIERS.

See CARRIERS, 47.

CONSIDERATION.

See SALES, 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See EMINENT DOMAIN, 3, 4; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 6; STATUTES, 2

CONTEMPT.

1. FOUNDATION FOR. A verified information may properly be allowed to
perform the office of the affidavit made necessary by statute as the foun-
dation of a proceeding for constructive contempt. Mullin v. People, 414.
2. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS.-When an affidavit is presented as the basis
for a proceeding for contempt, the court must, in the first instance, ex-
amine the same, and if the facts presented do not show that a contempt
has been committed, the court is without jurisdiction to proceed; if,
however, the facts are sufficient, the court may take jurisdiction, and its
subsequent orders will not be reviewed for mere error. Id.

& PETITION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE may allege matter not per se contemp-
tuous, without subjecting the petitioner to punishment for contempt. Id.

CONTRACTS.

1. STATUTE-WHAT IMPLIED in. - Whatever the law necessarily implies
in a contract or in a statute is as much a part thereof as if expressly
stated therein. State v. Laclede G. Co., 789.

2 STATUTE ATTEMPTING TO WITHDRAW AN APPROPRIATION BY ANNULLING
A CONTRACT cannot accomplish such purpose, because the legislature has
no power to annul contracts. Carr v. State, 624.

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3. ENFORCEMENT OF, BY THIRD PARTY. A contract may be enforced
when entered into for the benefit of a third party, although he is not
named. State v. Laclede G. Co., 789.

CONTRACT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-An agreement between manufacturers
of wooden-ware, located in different states, by which one of them agrees
to sell to the other, and not engage in the same business in eight speci-
fied states for five years thereafter, nor to allow the premises formerly
occupied by him to be used for the purpose of manufacturing wooden-
ware, nor to sell them to be used for that purpose, without the consent
of the purchaser, is void, and unenforceable, as being in restraint of trade
and contrary to public policy. Western Wooden-ware Ass'n v. Starkey,
686.

PARTIES IN PARI DELICTO LEFT WITHOUT REMEDY AGAINST EACH OTHER. —
The law leaves without remedy against each other parties concerned in
illegal agreements, provided they are in pari delicto. And this rule is
applied to executed transactions as well as to those that are executory,
and is enforced by courts of law as well as by courts of equity. Where,
therefore, a fraudulent transaction has been consummated between the
parties to an action of ejectment to the extent of vesting the title to the
land in the plaintiff, and leaving the possession in the defendant, the law