interests of the stockholders, the law authorizes it to be established there, and no contract between the board of directors and individuals can be allowed to prohibit it." And in the very recent case of People v. Chicago and Alton R. R. Co., 130 Ill. 175, where we awarded a mandamus commanding the location and maintaining of a station at a point where no station had before been located and maintained, we said: "It is undoubtedly the rule that railway companies, in the absence of statutory provisions limiting and restricting their powers, are vested with a very broad discretion in the matter of locating, constructing, and operating their railways, and of locating and maintaining their freight and passenger stations. This discretion, however, is not absolute, but is subject to the condition that it must be exercised in good faith, and with a due regard to the necessities of the public." The rule has been so often announced by this court that it is unnecessary to cite the cases that a mandamus will never be awarded unless the right to have the thing done which is sought is clearly established. If the right is doubtful, the writ will be refused. The burden was on the relator to prove a case authorizing the issuing of the writ, and, in our opinion, that proof has not been made. The evidence does show that there are, of all ages and sexes, 182 persons residing in Hodges Park, who are, by the change of the station, a little beyond a half a mile farther from the station; but the evidence not only fails to show that they are a majority of the people resorting to that station for business or travel, or that they furnish the majority of the freight received or shipped at that station, but it shows directly the reverse. It is not shown that there are either mining or manufacturing interests that would be accommodated by retaining the station at Hodges. Park, and so far as appears from the evidence, the business there is only that incident to the ordinary railway station in an agricultural community. The evidence shows that, with a few unimportant exceptions, the entire farming interests of the country accessible either to Unity or to Hodges Park are best subserved by the change made of the station. Thus John Hodges, a native of Unity, who was sheriff of the county for ten years, and who also at one time filled the office of the county treasurer, and who was thoroughly acquainted with the country in the vicinity of Unity and Hodges Park, testified: "The new station is more convenient for the great majority of the people. The distance between the two depot AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXII-36 buildings is 2,850 feet. I know of none to whom Hodges Park is more convenient than Unity, besides the people of Hodges Park. In going to Hodges Park to transact business, nine tenths of the people have to pass by Unity, and so in returning." M. Easterday, who resided in Cairo, but who was a real estate agent, and thoroughly familiar with the country and people in the vicinity of Unity and Hodges Park, testified to the effect that the chief part of the farming country was nearer to Unity than to Hodges Park, and that the roads and bridges favored travel to the former place; and he said: "Unity is as much nearer the greater portion of the improved surrounding country as the distance from Unity to Hodges Park. I know of no one, beside the people of Hodges Park, to whom the present station is less convenient than the former one. Unity is more convenient to the farmers of the community." As we understand the record, this evidence is not contradicted. Charles Hamilton, the superintendent of respondent's road, testified, among other things: "There were two or three reasons for the removal of the station at Hodges Part to the other location. There was but a little side-track at Hodges Park, and there is one half a mile long at Unity. At Hodges Park the right of way is only fifty feet on each side of the track, and there was no room to build a side-track, for the reason that the village street is on one side and a slough on the other; and besides, there was not business enough to sustain a station at both points." This evidence is unimpeached and uncontradicted in any respect, and must therefore be accepted as true. In People v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co., 120 Ill. 48, and People v. Chicago and Alton R. R. Co., 130 Ill. 175, the facts were settled by the pleadings, and left no question but that the public welfare required stations to be maintained at the points where we held they should be maintained, and there is therefore nothing in either of those cases that militates against our conclusion here. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court, with direction to enter judgment for the respondent. RAILROADS LOCATION OF STATIONS. The refusal of a railroad to designate as a station an unincorporated town situated within three miles of a regular station is a reasonable regulation: Railway v. Adcock, 52 Ark. 406; People v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 130 Ill. 175. RAILROADS CANNOT BIND THEMSELVES BY CONTRACT TO MAINTAIN A STATION AT ANY PARTICULAR POINT: See Williamson v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 53 Iowa, 126; 36 Am. Rep. 206, and extended note 214–216. MANDAMUS RIGHT TO, MUST BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. Mandamus is not a writ of right, but a prerogative writ which issues only upon a proper case clearly proven to the court: State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278; 95 Am. Dec. 314, and note; Reading v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St. 196; 51 Am. Dec. 534; extended note to Freon v. Carriage Co., 51 Am. Rep. 798-801. A writ of mandamus will not issue in case of a doubtful right: People v. New York I. Asylum, 122 N. Y. 190. Mandamus can only be invoked in cases where a clear legal right is invaded: State v. Bonnell, 119 Ind. 494; Swigert v. County of Hamilton, 130 Ill. 539; Commonwealth v. Fitler, 136 Pa. St. 129; Port Royal etc. Co. v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519. MOORE V. WILLIAMS. [132 ILLINOIS, 589.] FORMER ADJUDICATION OPERATES AS ESTOPPEL WHEN. A prior adjudi. cation of the same subject-matter between the same parties, although in a different mode of proceeding, operates as an estoppel upon the parties against subsequent litigation, as to all matters that were actually in controversy and decided in that adjudication. Therefore a party who has established his title to land by a decree in chancery, under which he has been put into possession, will be estopped from prosecuting to judgment an action of ejectment to recover possession of the same land. APPEAL FROM DECREE DOES NOT DESTROY ITS EFFECT AS FORMER ADJUDICA. TION. An appeal from a decree does not vacate or set it aside, but simply suspends its operation, leaving it in full force as a merger of the cause of action, and a bar to its further prosecution. EJECTMENT. The opinion states the case. W. H. Williams, for the appellants. George C. Ross and C. H. Layman, for the appellees. SCHOLFIELD, J. This was ejectment by appellants against appellees. The court below held that appellants were estopped from prosecuting the suit to judgment in their behalf, by a decree in chancery in that court, between the same parties and in regard to the same subject-matter, the court of chancery having jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and that ruling presents the only question that it is necessary to decide upon this record. The doctrine is of familiar application in this court that a prior adjudication of the same subject-matters between the same parties, although in a different mode of proceeding, operates as an estoppel upon the parties against subsequent litigation, at least as to all matters that were actually in controversy and decided in that adjudication: Garrick v. Chamberlain, 97 Ill. 620; Hawley v. Simons, 102 Ill. 115; Hamilton v. Quimby, 46 Ill. 98; Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596; 40 Am. Rep. 608. But it seems to be thought by counsel for appellants that the fact that an appeal has been prosecuted from the decree destroys it as a former adjudication. This is a misapprehension. The appeal does not vacate or set aside the decree; it simply suspends its execution, and leaves it in full force as a merger of the cause of action and a bar to its further prosecution: Curtis v. Root, 28 Ill. 367; Oakes v. Williams, 107 Ill. 154; Nill v. Comparet, 16 Ind. 107; 79 Am. Dec. 411; Burton v. Burton, 28 Ind. 342; Bank of North America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 328. Moreover, the evidence shows that appellants, notwithstanding their appeal, have had that part of the decree which is in their favor executed. They were awarded a writ of possession, which they have had issued, and by virtue of it they have been placed in the actual possession of the property here sued for, and it is therefore impossible that they could, in any view, recover, by a judgment in this suit, anything they do not already have without a judgment. The judgment is affirmed. JUDGMENTS FORMER ADJUDICATION ACTS AS ESTOPPEL WHEN. 1 The estoppel of a former judgment extends to every material matter within the issues which was expressly litigated and determined: Huntley v. Holt, 59 Conn. 102; 21 Am. St. Rep. 71, and note; Peterson v. Weissbein, 80 Cal. 38. Title to real estate assailed by a party, and determined against him, cannot again be questioned by him: Foster v. Hinson, 76 Iowa, 714. An action against an executor for conversion is barred by a previous action against him by the same parties, in which they recovered the proceeds of the sale of the property alleged as having been the subject of his conversion: Bradley v. Brigham, 149 Mass. 141. JUDGMENTS, CONCLUSIVENESS OF APPEAL. An appeal from a judgment does not affect the application of the doctrine of res judicata: Peters v. Banta, 120 Ind. 416. Recitals in judgments are conclusive until reversed upon appeal, or set aside in a direct proceeding: Note to Gould v. Steinburg, 15 Am. St. Rep. 143; a bill to review a judgment is such an attack: Herf v. Griggs, 121 Ind. 471. An appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a complaint having been dismissed on the ground that the right to appeal was waived by filing an amended complaint, the plaintiffs cannot question the correctness of such an order upon an appeal from the judgment obtained on such amended complaint: Hooker v. Village of Brandon, 75 Wis. 8. Where a cause is submitted to a court without a jury, the judgment of the court is equivalent to the verdict of a jury, and the appellate court cannot question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment: Quillman v. Gurley, 85 Ala. 594. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT ОР INDIANA. DAVIS V. STOUT. [126 INDIANA, 12.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT OF NOT -WANT OF CONSIDERATION. - A contract between the payor and payee of a promissory note, entered into after principal and interest are due, and reciting that, in consideration of certain payments at certain times, to avoid litigation, and for other considerations, the time is to be ex tended to a date mentioned therein, and a pending suit on the note dismissed, is void, as being without consideration, in the absence of extrinsic allegations showing a valid consideration for the contract of forbearance. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - VOID EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT OF NOTE WILL NOT RELEASE SURETY. - A contract for an extension of time in which to pay a promissory note, void for want of consideration, will not release the surety thereon. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS RATE OF INTEREST ON NOTE CANNOT BE VA- F. T. Hord and M. D. Emig, for the appellants. ELLIOTT, J. The promissory note upon which the appellee's complaint is founded was executed by Jacob Davis as principal, and by Eliza J. Davis as surety. It was executed in April, 1878, and became due May 4, 1878. The principal debtor sets forth in his answer this contract with the payee: "November 29th, 1886. "In consideration of the payment of three hundred dollars, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and three hundred on or before May the 1st, 1887, and three hundred dollars August 1st, 1887, and balance on or before Decem |