Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78. It is not his contract with the principal which exposes him to or protects him from liability to third persons, but his common-law obligation to so use that which he controls as not to injure another. That obligation is neither increased nor diminished by his entrance upon the duties of agency, nor can its breach be excused by the plea that his principal is chargeable: Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123; 44 Am. Rep. 456.

"If the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in the manner of executing it, so as not to cause any injury to third persons which may be the natural consequence of his acts; and he cannot by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving things in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to any person who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them without proper safeguards: Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102; 39 Am. Rep. 437.

"A number of authorities charge the agent, in such cases, on the ground of misfeasance, as distinguished from non-feasance. Mechem, in his work on agency (sec. 572), says: Some confusion has crept into certain cases from failure to observe clearly the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance. As has been seen, the agent is not liable to strangers for injuries sustained by them because he did not undertake the performance of some duty which he owed to his principal and imposed upon him by his relation, which is non-feasance. Misfeasance may involve also, to some extent, the idea of not doing; as where the agent, while engaged in the performance of his undertaking, does not do something which it was his duty to do under the circumstances, - does not take that precaution, does not exercise that care, which a due regard for the rights of others requires. All this is not doing, but it is not the not doing of that which is imposed upon the agent merely by virtue of his relation, but of that which is imposed upon him by law as a responsible individual, in common with all other members of society. It is the same not doing which constitutes actionable negligence in any relation.' To the same effect are Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159; Martin v. Benoist, 20 Mo. App. 263; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; and Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray, 309; 63 Am. Dec. 741.

"A case parallel to that now in hand is Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503, where agents of the

Portland Sugar Company had the charge and management of a wharf belonging to the company, and rented the same to tenants, agreeing to keep it in repair. They allowed the covering to become old, worn, and insecure, by means of which the plaintiff was injured. The court held the agents were equally responsible to the injured person with their principals.

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Wharton, in his work on negligence (sec. 535), insists that the distinction in this class of cases, between non-feasance and misfeasance, can no longer be sustained; that the true doctrine is, that when an agent is employed to work on a particular thing, and has surrendered the thing in question into the principal's hands, then the agent ceases to be liable to third persons for hurt received by them from such thing, though the hurt is remotely due to the agent's negligence, the reason being that the causal relation between the agent and the person hurt is broken by the interposition of the principal as a distinct center of legal responsibilities and duties, but that wherever there is no such interruption of causal connection, and the agent's negligence directly injures a stranger, the agent having liberty of action in respect to the injury, then such stranger can recover from the agent damages for the injury. The rule, whether as stated by Mechem or Wharton, is sufficient to charge appellants with damages, under the circumstances disclosed in this record. They had the same control of the premises in question as the owner would have had if he had resided in Chicago and attended to his own leasing and repairing. In that respect, appellants remained in control of the premises until the door fell upon the deceased. There was no interruption of the causal relation between them and the injured man. They were in fact, for the time being, substituted in the place of the owner, so far as the control and management of the property was concerned. The principle that makes an independent contractor, to whose control premises upon which he is working are surrendered, liable for damages to strangers, caused by his negligence, although he is at the time doing the work under contract with the owner (Wharton on Negligence, sec. 440), would seem to be sufficient to hold appellants. The owner of cattle who places them in the hands of an agister is not liable for damages committed by them while they are under the control of the agister. It is the possession and control of the cattle which fix the liability, and the law imposes upon the agister the duty to protect

strangers from injury by them: Ward v. Brown, 64 Ill. 307; 16 Am. Rep. 561; Ozburn v. Adams, 70 Ill. 291.

"When appellants rented the premises to Mrs. Wheeler, in the dangerous condition shown by the evidence, they voluntarily set in motion an agency which, in the ordinary and natural course of events, would expose persons entering the barn to personal injury. Use of the barn for the purpose for which it was used when the deceased came to his death was one of its ordinary and appropriate uses, and might, by ordinary foresight, have been anticipated. If the insecure condition of the door fastenings had arisen after the letting to Mrs. Wheeler, a different question would be presented; but as it existed before and at the time of the letting, the owner or persons in control are chargeable with the consequences: Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47; Tomle v. Hampton, 129 Ill. 379. "Neither error is well assigned, and the judgment is affirmed."

L. H. Boutell, for the appellants.

Cameron and Hughes, for the appellee.

Per CURIAM. We fully concur in the legal proposition asserted in the foregoing opinion, and deem it unnecessary to add to what is therein said in support of that proposition. The judgment is affirmed.

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. In discussing the question of the liability of agents to third persons, it will be convenient to consider such liability, -1. In contract; and 2. In tort.

1. IN CONTRACT. — The primary object in view in the creation of an agency is to authorize the agent to act for and in behalf of his principal. It is therefore the duty of the agent to so act as to bind his principal, and not himself, to third persons, and to bind third persons to the principal, and not to himself: Mechem on Agency, sec. 408.

WHERE AGENT CONTRACTS PERSONALLY, OR CONCEALS HIS AGENCY. Although an agent is presumed to intend to bind his principal, it is undoubtedly competent for him to make himself personally responsible if he desires to do so, even when he has authority to bind his principal. And if he conceals the fact of his agency, and contracts as the ostensible principal, he will be held liable in the same manner and to the same extent as though he were the real principal: Mechem on Agency, secs. 554, 558; Story on Agency, sec. 269; Ewell's Evans on Agency, 409; Brent v. Miller, 81 Ala. 309; Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567; 89 Am. Dec. 64; Murphy v. Helmrich, 66 Cal. 69; Hewes v. Andrews, 12 Col. 161; Mackey v. Briggs, Sup. Ct. Col., Feb., 1891; Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627; Pierce v. Johnson, 34 Conn. 274; Garrard v. Moody, 48 Ga. 96; Wheeler v. Reed, 36 Ill. 82; Bickford v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Ill. 238; 89 Am. Dec. 436; Merrill v. Wilson, 6 Ind. 426; Nixon v. Downey, 49 Iowa, 166; York County Bank v. Stein, 24 Md. 447; Guernsey v.

Cook, 117 Mass. 548; Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71; 25 Am. Rep. 24; Bartlett v. Raymond, 139 Mass. 275; McClellan v. Parker, 27 Mo. 162; Bridges v. Bidwell, 20 Neb. 185; Batchelder v. Libbey, Sup. Ct. N. H., March, 1890; McComb v. Wright, 4 Johns. Ch. 659; Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend. 431; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348; 27 Am. Rep. 51; Argersinger v. Macnaughton, 114 N. Y. 535; 11 Am. St. Rep. 687; Forney v. Shipp, 4 Jones, 527; Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. St. 298; Davenport v. O'Hear, 2 McCord, 198; Conyers v. Magrath, 4 McCord, 392; Royce v. Allen, 28 Vt. 234; Baldwin v. Leonard, 39 Vt. 260; 94 Am. Dec. 324; Button v. Winslow, 53 Vt. 430; Poole v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 73; Ye Seng Co. v. Corbitt, 9 Fed. Rep. 423; Magee v. Atkinson, 2 Mees. & W. 440; Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 834. And where an agent has thus made himself liable as a principal, the fact that he has added to his signature the word "agent" will not relieve him from personal liability. Such word will be treated as merely a descriptio persona: Bickford v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Ill. 238; 89 Am. Dec. 436; Bryson v. Lucas, 84 N. C. 680; 37 Am. Rep. 634; Mechem on Agency, sec. 558. The duty is upon an agent who would avoid personal liability to disclose his agency, and not upon others to discover it; and if he fails to do so, and deals with persons unaware of his agency, he must answer personally for the debts he contracts: Baldwin v. Leonard, 39 Vt. 260; 94 Am. Dec. 324; Mechem on Agency, sec. 554. In delivering the opinion of the court in Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348, Church, C. J., said: "It is not sufficient that the seller may have the means of ascertaining the name of the principal. If so, the neglect to inquire might be deemed sufficient. He must have actual knowledge. There is no hardship in the rule of liability against agents. They always have it in their power to relieve themselves, and when they do not, it must be presumed that they intend to be liable." WHEN AGENT, BELIEVING HIMSELF TO BE AUTHORIZED, ACTS UNDER INnocent MISTAKE. — Where an agent, believing in good faith that he has authority to act in the given matter for his principal, expressly represents to the person with whom he deals that he has such authority, he will be per sonally responsible to such person for any damages which the latter may sustain because of such want of authority. And he is not relieved from such liability by the fact that he acted in good faith. However innocent his intention may have been, he has done a wrong to another from which injury has resulted, and it is but just that he should be personally responsible for the consequences of his act, rather than that the injury should be borne by the other party, who has been misled by his assertion of authority: Mechem on Agency, sec. 542; Story on Agency, sec. 264; Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & W. 1; Godwin v. Francis, L. R. 4 Com. P. 295; Jefts v. York, 10 Cush. 392; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; 6 Am. Rep. 240; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; 47 Am. Rep. 718; Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87; 51 Am. Dec. 659. And the same rule is applied although the agent makes no express representation as to his authority; for by undertaking to act as agent for another, he impliedly represents himself to be authorized to so act, and is personally liable to persons who may suffer injury from his assuming as true what he did not know to be true: Mechem on Agency, sec. 545.

WHERE AGENT MAKES FALSE REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY WITH INTENT TO DECEIVE. If an agent, knowing that he has no authority to act for a principal, falsely represents that he has such authority, with intent to deceive and mislead the person with whom he deals, and such person is thereby deceived and misled to his injury, the agent will be personally liable for such

injury: Mechem on Agency, sec. 543; Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & W. 1; Godwin v. Francis, L. R. 4 Com. P. 295; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; 47 Am. Rep. 718; Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. 87; 51 Am. Dec. 659. AGENT DISCLOSING ALL FACTS NOT LIABLE. — An agent who, at the time of the transaction, fully discloses to the party with whom he is dealing all the facts and circumstances relating to the authority under which he assumes to act for his principal, so that such party has full knowledge of the facts, will not be personally liable: Ware v. Morgan, 67 Ala. 461; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379; 58 Am. Dec. 429; Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 112; Murray v. Carothers, 1 Met. (Ky.) 71; Humphrey v. Jones, 71 Mo. 62; Michael v. Jones, 84 Mo. 578; Western Cement Co. v. Jones, 8 Mo. App. 373; Hall v. Lauderdale, 46 N. Y. 70; Chase v. Pattberg, 12 Daly, 171; McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197; 91 Am. Dec. 468. Where all the facts are known to both parties, and the mistake is one of law as to the liability of the principal, the fact that the principal cannot be held is no ground for charging the agent with liability: Michael v. Jones, 84 Mo. 578.

PUBLIC AGENT DISCLOSING HIS AUTHORITY NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE. — An agent contracting on behalf of government is not liable to third persons, even though he would have been liable under the terms of his contract had he been acting as agent of a private person. The presumption is, that he is acting officially, not personally. A person dealing with a public agent, knowing him to be such, is presumed to know the nature and extent of his authority. A public agent is not personally liable on a contract made by him for the public, unless his intention to bind himself is clearly apparent. A very strong case is required to hold such an agent personally liable: Mechem on Agency, sec. 547; Story on Agency, sec. 302; New York etc. Co. v. Harbison, 16 Fed. Rep. 688; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379; 58 Am. Dec. 429; Murray v. Carothers, 1 Met. (Ky.) 71; Stinchfield v. Little, 1 Greenl. 231; 10 Am. Dec. 65; Simonds v. Heard, 23 Pick. 120; 34 Am. Dec. 41; Sanborn v. Neal, 4 Minn. 126; 77 Am. Dec. 502; Woodbridge v. Hall, 47 N. J. L. 388; Walker v. Swartwout, 12 Johns. 444; 7 Am. Dec. 334; Belknap v. Reinhart, 2 Wend. 375; 20 Am. Dec. 621; Miller v. Ford, 4 Rich. 376; 55 Am. Dec. 687; McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197; 91 Am. Dec. 468. But if such an agent denies

to the government that he has made a contract on its behalf, and thereby deprives the party with whom he contracted of his remedy against the gov ernment, he will be held personally liable, for he has disavowed his character of public agent: Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. 272; 6 Am. Dec. 66.

WHETHER AGENT FAILING TO BIND HIS PRINCIPAL BINDS HIMSELF. — In some early New York cases the rule was laid down that if an agent does not bind his principal he binds himself personally; and this rule has been followed in a few instances in other states: Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70; 2 Am. Dec. 144; White v. Skinner, 13 Johns. 307; 7 Am. Dec. 381; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 513; 13 Am. Dec. 550; Stone v. Wood, 7 Cow. 453; 17 Am. Dec. 529; Rossiter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494; 24 Am. Dec. 62; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271; 25 Am. Dec. 558; Collins v. Allen, 12 Wend. 356; 27 Am. Dec. 130; Gillaspie v. Wesson, 7 Port. 454; 31 Am. Dec. 715; Dale v. Donaldson L. Co., 48 Ark. 188; 3 Am. St. Rep. 224; McClenticks v. Bryant, 1 Mo. 598; 14 Am. Dec. 310; Underhill v. Gibson, 2 N. H. 352; 9 Am. Dec. 88. But these early cases in New York have been very much modified, if not entirely overruled, by the later decisions of the court of appeals: Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467. Mechem says, on this subject: "The rule, sometimes asserted, that wherever the agent fails to create