intention of a married woman, not expressed in her deed, tc convey the fee in her lands should be enforced. Do the curative acts of 1883 and 1885 make this deed of Mrs. Bowden effective? The first was passed in March, 1883, and was substantially re-enacted in 1885 (Acts of 1885, p. 191) as "An act for the better quieting of titles," and is as follows: "All deeds and other conveyances recorded prior to the first day of January, 1883, purporting to have been acknowledged be fore any officer, and which have not heretofore been invalidated by any judicial proceeding, shall be held valid to pass the estate which such conveyances purport to transfer, although such acknowledgment may have been on any account defective."

The second of these acts, passed on the 14th of March, 1883, is entitled "An act to cure defective acknowledgments," and is as follows: "All conveyances and other instruments of writing authorized by law to be recorded, or which have been heretofore recorded in any county in this state, the proof of the execution whereof is insufficient because the officer certifying such execution omitted any words in his certificate, . shall be valid and binding as though the certificate of acknowledgment or proof of execution was in due form." In Johnson v. Parker, 51 Ark. 421, Chief Justice Cockrill, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In the case of Johnson v. Richardson, 44 Ark. 365, we ruled that these provisions of the statute validated a previously defective acknowledgment of a relinquishment of dower, and that no vested right was disturbed thereby. In that case, however, the certificate of the officer showed that the wife had made an ineffectual effort to relinquish dower, and the curative acts were permitted to supply the defect in the certificate. . . . . But when the acknowledgment is in form for that purpose, the fact that the wife joins in the deed with her husband as grantor is sufficient to bar her dower, even though there is no clause in the deed expressly relinquishing it: Dutton v. Stuart, 41 Ark. 101.

.. If she joins with her husband in the conveyance, as a grantor, her estate passes. The deed is sufficient to pass her title, right, or interest, whatever it may be, provided, only, the requirements of the statute as to acknowledgments are observed. A deed of general warranty purports to convey a perfect title or estate. . . . . Our statutes are designed to operate upon the ceremony of the execution of conveyances, a subject wholly within the control of the legislature; and as was said

in Mrs. Richardson's case, supra, the power which prescribed the form to be observed in the execution of a conveyance has said that a non-compliance with it shall be excused, in order that the contract made by the parties shall have effect according to its purport."

But as the deed does not purport to convey the fee, but only a dower interest, and is not defective either in execution or acknowledgment, the curative acts do not apply. There is nothing for them to operate upon. It therefore follows that the chancellor erred in overruling appellants' demurrer to the cross-complaint of the appellees.

The decree is reversed, and as there seems to be an agreement of counsel, implied from their briefs in the case, that the appellees are entitled to betterments, the clerk of this court is directed to ascertain and state the value of same.

MARRIED WOMEN - DEEDS. A married woman can only pass her title to land in the manner provided by statute; and the burden is upon the party claiming under her deed to show that such deed was executed and acknowl edged as required by law: Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St. 588; 20 Am. St. Rep. 939, and note; Hayden v. Moffatt, 74 Tex. 647; 15 Am. St. Rep. 866, and note; Franklin v. Pollard Mill Co., 88 Ala. 318; Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 585; Danglarde v. Elias, 80 Cal. 65; Gage v. Wheeler, 129 Ill. 197; Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 631; Thompson v. Smith, 106 N. C. 357; Rorer v. Roanoke Nat. Bank, 83 Va. 589. A court of equity will not reform a deed, defectively executed by a husband and wife, purporting to convey the wife's land, on the ground of mistake: Connor v. Armstrong, 86 Ala. 262; nor will it specifically enforce such a deed: Wynn v. Louthan, 86 Va. 946; nor give any equitable relief whatever with respect thereto: Cox v. Holcomb, 87 Ala. 589; 13 Am. St. Rep. 79. But see Gardner v. Moore, 75 Ala. 394; 51 Am. Rep. 454, and note 458-462, as to what defects in the deeds of married women may be reformed in equity.

GRIFFITH V. LANGSDALE.

[53 ARKANSAS, 71.]

ATTACHMENT OF DEBTOR'S PROPERTY NOT ENJOINED WHEN. — When a debtor and his creditor are domiciled in different states, and the creditor in the courts of his own domicile proceeds to attach the property of the debtor which is exempt by the law of the latter's domicile, the courts of the debtor's domicile will not enjoin the creditor from proceeding, even though he is temporarily found within their jurisdiction; and if in such a case an injunction is improvidently granted, and the creditor violates it by taking judgment in a court of his domicile, and appropriating to its payment the property attached, the court that issued the injunction will not render judgment against the creditor for the value of the property so appropriated.

Surt for injunction. Langsdale, a resident of Texas, sued Griffith, a resident of Arkansas, in a court in Texas. A nonresident citation was returned as served on Griffith in Arkan.

sas.

A writ of garnishment was issued against a debtor of Griffith resident in Texas, and returned served. A personal judgment was rendered against Griffith for the amount of the plaintiff's claim, and the debtor garnished in Texas answered admitting indebtedness to Griffith for personal services. Thereupon Griffith sued Langsdale in Arkansas to restrain him from prosecuting the garnishment proceeding in the Texas court, claiming that the latter was endeavoring to defraud him of his constitutional exemptions. A temporary injunction was granted. Pending this suit, the money garnished was paid by the garnishee; and these facts were set up in a supplemental complaint. After hearing, the complaint was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed.

Arnold and Cook, for the appellant.

F. D. Cook, for the appellee.

COCKRILL, C. J. A creditor who attempts to evade the exemption laws of his state by resort to attachment proceedings in the court of another state against the property of a debtor who is a resident of the state of the creditor's domicile may be enjoined by the courts of the latter state from prosecuting his suit in the foreign jurisdiction: Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203; 28 Am. Rep. 448; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516; Wilson v. Joseph, 107 Ind. 490; Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 746.

In restraining the proceeding, the court acts, not upon the court of foreign jurisdiction, but upon the person of the creditor: Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177; 55 Am. Rep. 545. The equitable jurisdiction in this class of cases arises from the creditor's effort to evade the law of the state of his domicile. When, therefore, the debtor and creditor are domiciled in different states, and the creditor proceeds by attachment in the courts of the state of his domicile against the property of his debtor, there is no cause for the interference by injunction on the part of the courts of the debtor's domicile, even though. the creditor be temporarily found within their jurisdiction. That was the state of the case presented by the appellant in this cause. There was no error, therefore, in refusing the in

junction.

But the creditor collected through his Texas attachment a

debt due the appellant after the complaint in this cause was filed. That fact was set up in an amendment to the complaint, and it is argued that the court erred in not rendering judgment in personam against him for the amount so collected. If it had been collected in disobedience of a rightful injunction, the plaintiff might have been entitled to that relief: Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 746. But he was not entitled to that measure of relief for the disobedience of the provisional restraining order which had been improvidently issued. Nor does he show any other cause for the recovery from the appellee of the money collected by him under the Texas judg ment. The effort of the Texas court to render a binding judgment in personam against the appellant, upon service of process had in Arkansas was futile; but a writ of garnishment was sued out at the institution of the suit and served upon the appellant's debtor, who paid the amount in suit to the appellee under the order of the Texas court.

The appellant's compla int contained no allegation that the Texas court was withou jurisdiction to attach and condemn the debt. It admits the jurisdiction of the court, and seeks to avoid the effect of the judgment upon other grounds. But the jurisdiction to seize and condemn the debt being admitted, no ground for recovery is shown.

Affirm.

INJUNCTIONS, JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO. While the courts of equity of one state may by injunction prevent its citizens from prosecuting suits in another state: Pickett v. Ferguson, 45 Ark. 177; 55 Am. Rep. 545; Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 206; 2 Am. Rep. 573; such as suits so instituted for the purpose of evading exemption laws: Note to Mumper v. Wilson, 2 Am. St. Rep. 242; yet after such a suit has been commenced by one in the courts of another state, a court of equity will not interfere with its prosecution: Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20; 25 Am. Rep. 416.

EXECUTION, EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY FROM. Exemption laws have no extraterritorial effect, but are restricted in their operation to the state in which they are enacted: Carson v. Railway Co., 88 Tenn. 646; 17 Am. St. Rep. 921, and note; note to Mumper v. Wilson, 2 Am. St. Rep. 240-242. Exemp tion laws cannot avail a debtor in a suit commenced against him in another state: East Tennessee etc. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 83 Ala. 462; 3 Am. St. Rep. 755, and note; Harwell v. Sharp, 85 Ga. 124; 21 Am. St. Rep. 149, and note. But see Drake v. Lake Shore etc. R'y Co., 69 Mich. 168; 13 Am. St. Rep. 382, and note; Stark v. Bare, 39 Kan. 100; 7 Am. St. Rep. 537.

STATE NATIONAL BANK V. NEEL.

[53 ARKANSAS, 110.]

JUDICIAL SALE, CONFIRMATION OF, IN DISCRETION OF COURT. — In judicial sales the court is the vendor, and it may confirm or refuse to confirm a sale made under its order, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. The court may confirm such sale upon the condition that the purchaser shall increase his bid to a certain amount. ORDER CONFIRMING JUDICIAL SALE IS FINAL JUDGMENT. An order confirming a judicial sale is a final judgment, and the court has no power to set it aside at a term subsequent to that at which it is rendered. PETITION. The opinion states the case.

N. T. White, for the appellants.

M. L. Bell, for the appellee.

HUGHES, J. In the suit of appellants, attaching creditors of C. M. Neel, John M. Clayton was appointed receiver, and was ordered by the court to sell part of the property that came to his hands; and on the 14th of February, 1887, the receiver filed his report of the sale. Exceptions were filed to his report of the sale of eighty-two mules, purchased by C. M. Neel, Jr., by the creditors, who alleged that the price at which they were bid off was inadequate, being an average of $63.72 per head, and they offered, if a resale should be ordered, to make them bring $90 per head. The court ordered that unless C. M. Neel, Jr., would pay the sum of twenty dollars per head more than his bid for the mules, the sale should be set aside, and a resale ordered, but that if he would accept the terms proposed, and give his note for the increased price, the sale should be confirmed. Neel accepted the terms, and gave his note accordingly. This was at the March term (tenth day of March), 1887, of the Jefferson circuit court. At the same term of court, on the 17th of June, 1887, C. M. Neel, Jr., filed his petition to be relieved of the $1,640, the increased price of the mules as fixed by the court. On the 13th of July, 1887, after the attachments of appellants had been sustained, the court ordered the receiver to disburse the funds amongst the various creditors. At the September term of the court in 1887, on the tenth day of January, 1888, the court appointed the receiver and two other persons a committee to ascertain and report to the court the value of the eighty-two mules purchased by C. M. Neel, Jr., and the reasonableness of the bid therefor. The receiver reported that the mules were worth from eighty to one hundred dollars, and one of the other