ter for her dower, and the balance were released by her; and after a recital that the lands of which the deceased died seised were subject to certain unpaid taxes, assessments, &c., each party covenanted to pay "his or her fair, equitable and legal proportion thereof;" Held, 1. That the instrument imposed upon the widow the obligation to pay her fair and equitable proportion of unpaid taxes and assessments to which the premises were subject at the time of her marriage with the decedent; and that in legal contemplation there was no proportion for her to assume. 2. That the taxes assessed and unpaid before the assignment of dower was made, could not be charged upon the estate assigned to her, when there was personal estate sufficient to pay them. That the burdens assumed with the enjoyment of the life estate related to the future, only. ib
See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 3.
DRAINAGE. See ASSESSMENT, 1.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1 to 5.
1. As well before as since the Code, a party was at liberty to commence a suit in equity, and in the same action to claim not only an ultimate and complete redress for the injury alleged, but also the damages which he had sustained; not merely to the time of the commencement of the action, as at law, but down to the trial and disposition of the case. Per FOSTER, J. Davis v. Lambertson,
2. A court of equity has cognizance of an action brought to restrain the commission of a nuisance, whereby an individual is injured, and to compel the discontinuance of it,
where it has been committed; and to a considerable extent the suppression of it is in the discretion of the court, in view of all the circumstances of the case. And in such cases the court has not only jurisdiction in regard to prohibiting or preventing the continuance of it, but it can award damages in the meantime; and the trial of the question of damages can be had at the same time when the other questions involved in the case are litigated. it
The discretion to be exercised in such cases is not however an unregulated discretion, but is to be exercised according to the rules of law applicable to each particular case. ib
A court of equity has jurisdiction, and should grant a perpetual injunc tion, when it is established by a trial that the defendant has created a private nuisance, to the serious injury of the plaintiff, where that nuisance is permanent in its character, so that the injury continues; where complete and ample remuneration cannot be awarded in damages; or where the court can see that to obtain complete and ultimate redress at law several suits may become necessary; or where the injury is otherwise irreparable. ib
5. It is enough that it be such an injury as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by damages at law; or such as from its continuance, or permanent mischief, must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise prevented but by injunction.
6. An action by the owner of land upon which there is a durable stream of water, to restrain the owners of a cheese factory, situated higher up on the stream, from polluting the water and rendering it unfit for use, by filth from their hogpens, &c., and from causing an offensive stench in the air, which renders the occupation of the plaintiff's dwelling house uncomfortable, and for damages, is an equitable action, where it appears clearly that the acts of the defendants created and continued a nuisance which in its character was a continuing nuisance, and was intended to be, and was, permanent;
1. On the trial of an indictment for erecting and maintaining a powder- house, and for keeping therein a large quantity of powder, near a city, a witness who had been in the infantry and artillery service of the United States for three years, was asked, "What is the ordinary mode of constructing powder magazines ?" The question was objected to, by the accused, as incompetent and irrele- vant, and not the proper manner of proving that the building in question was improperly constructed. objection was overruled, and the witness proceeded to state how pow- der magazines were constructed. Held that the testimony was incom- petent. MULLIN, J., dissented. Brad- ley v. The People,
2. In an action brought against hus- band and wife, by a judgment cred- itor of the husband, to have his judgments declared a lien upon land purchased by the husband for which a conveyance had been taken in the name of his wife, the examination of the husband upon supplementary proceedings instituted against him after third persons had gone into possession of the premises under an agreement with the wife, was offered in evidence against both defendants. Held that the ruling of the referee
that such examination was compe- tent evidence against the husband only, and not against the wife, was clearly right. Gillespie v. Walker, 185
Held, also, that a similar ruling as to a declaration of the husband that he had put his property out of his hands, and got it fixed so that neither the plaintiff nor any other creditor could reach it, came within the same principle; as it related to a declaration made after the title to the land was vested in the wife; and such title could not be divested by the subsequent declarations of the husband.
1. The defendant, on transferring to the plaintiff the note of a third per- son, then past due, guarantied its collection, provided due diligence should be used. Subsequently, he requested the plaintiff to give time, and forbear to sue the maker; which request was never withdrawn, or countermanded. The maker ab- sconded, and went to Canada, where he remained, leaving property in this State, liable to the payment of the debt. Held that the plaintiff, be- fore he could recover upon the guar- ranty, was bound to exhaust his remedy against the maker, by suing him to judgment, in this State, and collecting what he could upon the execution. Mosier v. Waful,
2. The plaintiff, after the maker of the note absconded, issued a summons for the purpose of commencing a suit against him, and obtained an order of the court directing service thereof by publication, and that a copy of the summons and complaint be deposited in the postoffice, di-
1. In an action against a husband, after his wife's death, to recover money deposited in a savings bank, and the value of promissory notes, claimed to have been owned by the wife in her lifetime, and to have been given to the plaintiff by her in anticipation of death, proof of the declarations of the wife are not com- petent evidence against the defend- ant, to show that she was the owner of the demands; where the answer denies that the wife ever was the owner of the property, and claims that it at all times belonged to the defendant in his own right; and where he had the actual control and possession of it, at the time.
2. Under section 399 of the Code of Procedure, the plaintiff in such an action cannot be allowed to testify as to all the circumstances of the transaction going to show property in the deceased, and a gift thereof to the plaintiff. ib
3. The husband is included in the words "next of kin" of his de- ceased wife, as they are used in sec- tion 399 of the Code; he having the right to administer her estate, and to collect the debts due to her; and
4. The rule is general, that he who knowingly assists the wife in the violation of her duty as such, is guilty of a wrong, for which an action will lie, by the husband, where injury is thereby inflicted upon him. Per FOSTER, J. Hoard 202 v. Peck,
5. An action can be maintained by a husband against a druggist to re- cover damages for selling to the plaintiff's wife, secretly, from day to day, large quantities of laudanum to be used by her as a beverage, and which are so used by her to the de- fendant's knowledge, without the knowledge or consent of the hus- band; the defendant well knowing that the same was injuring and impairing her health, and concealing the fact of such sales and use thereof from the plaintiff; in consequence of which use by her the wife became sick and emaciated, and her mind was affected, so that she was unable to perform her duties as such wife, and her affections became alienated from her husband, and he lost her society and was compelled to ex- pend divers sums of money in med- ical and other attendance upon her. MORGAN, J., dissented.
7. In such an action a physician may be asked "what would the natural result of three of these bottles of opium, called laudanum, be upon the plaintiff's wife, as you know the woman, and her situation and con- ib stitution," &c. ?
See EQUITY, 2, 4, 6. MORTGAGE.
1. Where, upon a sale by one of the members of a firm, of all his inter- est in the partnership property and effects, there was no assignment or transfer, of any kind, of a policy of insurance upon the partnership prop- erty, to the purchaser, or any delivery of the policy, or of a certificate of re- newal, to him; Held that although the language of the instrument of sale, taken by itself, was broad enough to include the policy as one of the choses in action of the firm, yet as it was manifest from the whole
transaction and its surroundings that no such thing was intended, the policy did not pass by the instru- ment. Kitts v. The Massasoit Insur- ance Company, 177
1. Where a quantity of whisky was sold by the plaintiff's assignor to the defendant, for $1.45 a gallon, at a time when the tax imposed upon that article, by the government, was $2 per gallon, the bill of sale stating the price to be $2.45 per gallon; Held that the sale at a price less than the amount of the tax was, under section 21 of the act of congress of 1867, (14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 471,) prima facie evidence that the tax had not been paid; and that the intent to avoid the tax was inferred from the price at which it was sold, and the statement, in the bill of sale, of a price greater than the amount of the government duties. Kessel v. Albetis,
The court is bound to take judicial notice of the statutes relating to in- ternal revenue, and not to suffer the collection of any debt prohibited. And if a vendor has apparently vio- lated them in the particular above mentioned, it is incumbent on him to show either that the tax has been paid, or that he did not intend to avoid the payment. ib
Independently of the statute making it prima facie evidence thereof, (14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 471, ý 21.) no other conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the sale of an article for less than the tax imposed by law, upon it, in the absence of proof of the payment of such tax, than an in- tention to evade such payment.
4. This conclusion is strengthened where it appears that in the bill of sale the price of the thing sold is stated at a sum larger than the amount of the tax, although the actual price was less. it
A judgment entered upon the report of a referee will not be reversed for an error in admitting improper testi. mony, where it appears that such testimony could not have influenced the referee in any of his findings of
« PreviousContinue » |