ment made by him with the superin-
tendents of the poor, to pay them a
specified sum per week, for her
board; Held that this was a valid
contract; and that the father was
liable thereon. Alger v. Miller, 227

6. Such a contract, made by superin-
tendents of the poor of a county in
which the poor are not a county but
a town charge, is not against public
policy, or contrary to any positive
statute; and although it is in excess
of the superintendents' authority, is
neither criminal nor corrupt. ib

7. A father having left his lunatic
daughter at the poorhouse, under
such an agreement, the superintend-
ents of the poor have a right to keep
her, until he shall take her away, or
it becomes proper to discharge her.
A mere notice from him to the super-
intendents that he will be no longer
responsible for her support, given at
a time when she is in a condition
rendering it dangerous to set her at
large, will not relieve him from
liability.
ib

8. Under the provisions of the act of
1813, chapter 86, authorizing the
mayor &c. of the city of New York
to direct the paving of streets, and
to assess the expense upon the own-
ers or occupants of the houses and
lots benefited, the owners could have
been compelled to pay the expense
of a pavement laid down in 1824;
and therefore a promise of the cor-
poration to bear the expense of
future repairs and pavements is
without consideration. Tilden v. The
Mayor &c. of New York,

ANIMALS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

APPEAL.

340

See COMMISSIONERS OF HIGHWAYS, 1, 2.
STAMPS, 1, 4.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

1. An equitable action to correct a
mistake in an award may be main-
tained, although the submission pro-
vides that judgment in the Supreme

2. Although the statute confers upon
the court designated in the submis-
sion the power, within a certain time,
to modify or correct the award,
where there is an evident miscalcu-
lation of figures, or a mistake in
the description of any person, thing
or property referred to in the award,
still the exercise of the power is
not exclusively confined to that
court. The subsequent provision in
the statute, that nothing therein con-
tained "shall be construed to im-
pair, diminish or in any way affect
the power and authority of the Court
of Chancery, over arbitrators, awards
or the parties thereto," is sufficiently
comprehensive to restore the original
equitable jurisdiction over this class
of cases.

4. An award directed one of the par-
ties to convey to the other a farm
called the "Morgan farm," the same
to be described in the deed in the
manner particularly specified in
such award. The description there
given excluded a small piece of land
lying between that specifically de-
scribed and the highway. The gate
to the farm opened on this land, and
the entrance to the buildings was
across it. It was fenced in with the
rest of the premises, formed a part
of the door-yard, and a portion of
the orchard was on it. It had formed
a part of the farm for twenty-five
years, and, together with that de-
scribed in the award, had, during
that time, been known as the "Mor-
gan farm." Held that the award
itself, considered in connection with
the surrounding circumstances, ren-
dered the mistake sufficiently obvi-
ous for the interposition of the cor-
recting powers of the court; the case
being brought within the equitable
rule requiring the mistake to be ap-
parent on the face of the award.

ib

ASSESSMENT.

1. By an act of the legislature, passed
in 1864, (Laws of 1864, ch. 577,) the
relators were appointed commission-
ers to drain certain lands lying on
Black lake, in the county of St. Law-
rence, and its tributaries, who were
to have the necessary work perform-
ed, and to assess the expense upon
the lands which should, in the judg-
ment of the commissioners, be bene-
fited by the improvement, and as
they should adjudge in proportion
to the benefits and improvements re-
ceived thereby; such assessments to
be made pro rata, according to the
value of such lands, as they should
be appraised by the commissioners.
The act was amended by chapter
730 of the laws of 1865, which au-
thorized any person owning land in
either of two towns therein men-
tioned, which had been or should be
assessed under the act of 1864, to
appeal to the county court of the
county in which such land was sit-
uated; and authorized and directed
such court to review the assessment,
on such appeal, upon such proofs as
might be presented, at the hearing; and
empowered it to affirm, reverse, set
aside or modify such assessment, in
any particular wherein it was au-
thorized by the act of 1864. It de-
clared that the decision of the county
court should be final, upon the rights
of the parties, except that if the
assessment was set aside because the
method or rule of assessment adopted
by the commissioners was erroneous,
the commissioners should proceed to
make a new assessment, as required
by the judgment. The commission-
ers caused the surveys and estimates
to be made; entered upon the ex-
ecution of the improvement, and
assessed the amount of such estimate
upon the lands of divers individuals
in the towns specified in the statute;
all of whom united in an appeal from
the assessment, to the county court
of Jefferson county, asking that it
should be set aside or modified, &c.
That court adjudged that the assess-
ment upon the lands of, and against
the persons of, all and each of the
appellants be set aside and vacated,
with costs of the appeal, to the appel-
lants, on the ground that each and
all of said assessments were unau-
thorized by the statutes under which
they were made. Held, 1. That so
VOL. LVI.

43

far as the powers of the commission-
ers were concerned, the whole pro-
ceeding being in derogation of the
common law rights of the appellants.
the act of 1864 was to be construed
most liberally in their behalf, for the
preservation of their rights, and was
to be taken strictly against the com-
missioners; and that in cases of
doubt, arising from its phraseology,
every proper intendment was to be
taken most strongly in favor of the
appellants, and against the commis-
sioners. 2. That when to this was
added the fact that no opportunity
was given, by the act, for the appel-
lants to be heard before the com-
missioners, either by witnesses, by
counsel or in person, it must be ab-
solutely clear that the legislature
intended there should be no review
upon the merits, except in the case
of an erroneous method or rule of as-
sessment, before the court could so
construe the statute. 3. That it not
being clear, from the act, whether
the legislature intended that the ex-
pense should be assessed upon the
lands in proportion to the amount of
benefit to be received, without regard
to the value of the respective pieces
of land, or pro rata, in proportion to
the value of the lands to be assessed,
without regard to benefits, the court,
if necessary, would adopt the con-
struction which would be most con-
sistent with justice, between the
parties. 4. That although the com-
missioners had assessed the cost and
expenses pro rata upon the value of
the lands to be benefited, such an
error would not call upon the court
to set aside the assessment entirely;
but would require a reassessment to
be made, in proportion to benefits.
5. That it was clear that the legisla-
ture intended the costs, damages and
expenses of the improvement shouid
be borne and paid by those only who
were to be benefited. That it was
the lands to be benefited, that were
to be assessed; and not the lands
overflowed. 6. That although the
discretion given to the commission-
ers was liberal, yet it was not an ar-
bitrary one; and it was a discretion
in determining what lands were ben-
efited, and the extent of the benefit.
That it was not intended they should
assess lands which could not be beu-
efited; nor was any such authority
given to them; and if they included
lands in their assessment which