together again, residing at Williamstown, although no physical or personal vioNew Jersey, Coshocton, Ohio, and Terre lence may be inflicted or even threatened Haute, Indiana, during which period the or reasonably apprehended:" Russell v. libellant left the respondent several Russell, 37 Pa. Superior Ct., 348. In times, coming back to her at intervals, at the present case, both mental suffering the same time corresponding and asso- and physical violence were inflicted on ciating with other women; that the libel- the respondent. It is true the wife in lant spent most of his money foolishly this case did not actually withdraw from and criminally, while his wife and child her husband's house on account of his were sadly in need of better support and conduct toward her. The fact is that he maintenance; that during most of the left her, at the time of their final separatime the libellant and respondent lived tion, at the home of her mother, where together, the libellant was abusive to his the libellant and respondent had gone bewife in language and conduct, and at cause they had nothing to live on elsetimes inflicted on vital parts of her body where, and the respondent refused aftersevere blows with his hands and fists; wards to live with her husband again bethat, finally the libellant contaminated cause of his cruel treatment of her. At his wife with a loathsome disease, from the time of their separation, the libellant the effects of which it took her a long actually had no home in which he and time, by constant care and at great ex- his wife were living, and, therefore, it pense, to free herself; that on account was impossible for the respondent to of the continued course of cruel treat-withdraw from his house and family." ment of her by her husband, the respon- | But it was because of her husband's cruel dent, after her husband had left her treatment of her theretofore that the reagain in the latter part of June, 1908, refused to go back and live with him again, although requested by him to do so; and that the respondent since that time has made her own living, and a living for her daughter, mostly by teaching school, first in Philadelphia and later in Montana, where she went for the benefit of her daughter's health. spondent refused to go and live with him again, which was equivalent to a withdrawal from his house and family, and the case is within the true spirit and meaning of the provision of the statute quoted. When a husband, by his cruel conduct, compels his wife to leave him, or to live apart from him, he is not entitled to a divorce from her on the ground of desertion. We shall sign a decree of divorce in this case, but we shall sign a decree in favor of this wife instead of in favor of a her husband. Carrier-Loss of Baggage-Delay in Claim ing-Inability to Procure Sleeping Car Accommodations. The course of conduct maintained by this husband toward his wife constitutes just ground for a divorce under the Act of March 13, 1815, 6 Sm. Laws, 286, which authorizes the granting of a divorce" when any husband shall have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, endangered his wife's life, or offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and life burdensome, A passenger who does not claim his and thereby forcer her to withdraw from baggage at destination until forty-eight his house and family." "It has always hours after its arrival is held in the been the rule in Pennsylvania that any Colorado case of Denver & R. G. R. Co. unjustifiable conduct on the part of. Doyle, L.R.A.1915D, 113, not entitled either the husband or the wife which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as seriously to impair the bodily health or endanger the life of the other, or which utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes cruelty, to hold the carrier liable as insurer for Tegal Miscellany. of the true name of the writer, it must have been written either without, or with the intent to appear to identify itself with some other particular person than the Logical Analysis of Subscribed Signatures. writer. BY DR. BENNETT F. DAVENPORT. Every signature, which is subscribed, must be either of the true name, or not of the true name of the writer. If the signature is of the true name of the writer it must have been written either with, or not with the intent to thereby identify the writer. If the signature is of the true name, written with the intent to identify the writer, it will have no conscious or voluntary variation from the usual and customary manner or style of signature, automatically natural to the writer under the conditions under which the signature is written. To make it otherwise would be but to surely defeat the very intent of the signer. If the signature is not that of the true name of the writer, and has not been written with the intent to be made to appear to be the true signature of some other particular person, the writer will usually deem it to be quite unnecessary to attempt to conceal his own conscious automatic habits, as he must do when he seeks to disguise his own true name signature. He very naturally deems the altered name will be of itself, a sufficiently good disguise for his self-concealment. ine signatures of the person simulated. This is a task well-nigh never quite wholly possible of successful accomplishment when subjected to the careful analytical examination of an experienced expert, who has been provided with the proper amount of standard writings whereby to determine the various writing habits of the purported signer. If the signature is not that of the true name of the writer, and has been written with the intent that it shall appear to be the true name signature of some other particular person, then there are involved in this endeavor all the cumulative diffiIf the signature is that of the true culties, not only of the concealment of name, but is not written with the intent all of the conscious and unconscious authat it shall identify the writer, it may tomatic habits of the true writer, but of be written in one of the three following the assumption of those of the same ways: Firstly, if there be simply an ab-classes of habits which exist in the genusence of any active intent that it shall identify the writer, the signature will be automatically written in the usual and customary style natural under the circumstances under which the writing is made. Secondly, if there be but a moderately active intent that the signature shall not identify the writer, he will seek to modify his conscious habits, which he recognizes as affecting the general pictorial appearances of his signature, in so far as he can control them, and deems it necessary to accomplish his object. Thirdly, if there is a strong, positive intent that the written signature shall not identify the writer, he will, to the best of his ability and understanding, not only endeavor to write the signature so dissimilar to that of his own usual and accustomary automatic hand, that it shall not only be not taken to be his signature, but will even, from its marked similarity to the usual style of signature of another particular person, be taken to have been written by that person. If the signature is however not that A competent expert learns through experience to know what variations of any writer's conscious voluntary, or automatic unconscious habits he may reasonably expect to meet with under any one of the above-mentioned possible varying conditions of signature writing. What are the habits exhibited by any writer may be learned only through a careful analytical examination of a number of authentic genuine samples, sufficiently large and varied to furnish examples of them all, and to establish the fact that they are truly habits, as distinct from merely accidental occurrences. Any writing consciously made for the purpose of comparison is of but inferior value, except to refute some claim of the writer. The | fer very greatly. All writing in order only standards of full value are such as to be readable, must conform in many were not made at all for that special pur- respects to the commonly accepted conpose, but were made under as similar con- ventional type. ditions as possible as to time, manner and purpose as is presumed to have been that of the questioned writing. If in a questioned writing there is a persistent reappearance of very many of the habits of the standards, especially if they are of the involuntary automatic variety, which do not materially affect the general pictorial appearance, or is a singular habit of this standard, if such there be, and if also these are supplemented by a like persistent absence of other habits, very common to writers in As the proper and legitimate purpose of a signature subscribed to a document is to authenticate it, and to identify the writer, it is not to be expected that any one other than a person signing his own true name will willfully venture to materially alter the usual and accustomary general pictorial appearance of that sig-general, or which are incongruous with nature, for that one alone would be competent to successfully establish the fact that the signature was indeed genuine. For any one else to thus willfully raise the doubt would be but to surely defeat the very purpose of making the sig nature. those of the standards, then the cumulative evidence of such a series of coincidences will fully warrant the opinion that they, taken together, cannot be due to any accidental chance, but, beyond any reasonable doubt, must be due only to the one cause of having had the same origin, that is of having been written by one and the same hand. -From Chicago Legal News. Explicit. "Now, Rastus," asked the Judge. A well-grounded valid opinion of the genuineness of any questioned signature may be based upon the following axioms. Every one who has practiced writing long enough to do so automatically, having the mind intent upon the subject matter, and not at all upon the writing itself, has inevitably acquired certain writing" what was the reason that you and habits. Many of these will be common your wife couldn't live together? Was to other writers. A few will be uncom- it incompatibility?" mon, and perchance some special habit No, yo' Honor," said the old negro may ever be peculiar to the individual slowly, "It worn't nothin' lik' dat. Yo alone. Many of the habits being volun-jes' couldn't get along wid her onless yo tary and conscious ones, are subject to wuz somewhars else.' more or less immediate control of the will. There will however be many other habits, which do not materially affect the general pictorial appearance of the writing, and are quite involuntary and un-called him a scoundrel. The prisoner A judge, in remanding a criminal, conscious. They cannot therefore be modified immediately at will. They can be changed only gradually, through the formation of new habits which displace the former ones. No two samples of genuine freehand writing are ever exactly facsimile of each other in all respects. They may appear as much alike on casual inspection, as any two peas grown in the same pod, but, like the peas, they can always be differentiated from each other on careful examination. The relative value of points of similarity or dissimilarity dif Too Deliberate. replied, as he was leaving the courtroom: your Honor "-here the culprit stopped. "Sir. I am not as big a scoundrel as but finally added—" takes me to be. "Put your words closer together." said the judge. LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. VOL. XXXII.] FRIDAY, SEPT. 17, 1915. [No. 46 July 3, 1915. Opinion by HASSLer, J. We find the following facts from the bill, answer and testimony. The competency of a number of witnesses was objected to when the testimony was taken. We have considered the testi Common Pleas--Equity. mony of Hon. Charles I. Landis and George Schwebel, called by the plaintiffs, and that of Anna S. Wohlsen, called by the defendant. Hon. Charles I. Landis was objected to as incompetent because he was attorney for both Maria Schwebel and Peter N. Wohlsen, both of whom are dead, in the transaction in volved here. Even though this were a fact, it would not render him incompetent. Good v. Good, 31 L. L. R., 170. George Schwebel has no interest whatever in the result of these proceedings. Anna S. Wohlsen was called by the plaintiff in cross examination, which ren A testator's will gave all of his property to his widow for life, with power to sell the real estate and use the proceeds, if she considered it necessary for her comfortable support, with remainder, if any, to his children. The widowdered her competent; Danley v. Danley, having conveyed the property to her son-inlaw, after the death of both of them on suit by heirs and legatees averring that the conveyance was intended as a trust for the better management and preservation of the property for the widow and heirs, which the answer denied, Held, That the plaintiffs' averments not being supported by more than one witness, could not be sustained and no trust by operation of law was shown. Held, further, That the widow as administratrix could have no interest and was not properly a party and the other plaintiffs were interested only through the will of their de cedent and the decedent's administrator c. t. a. was the only proper party to recover. An attorney at law who represented both parties to the original transaction out of which a suit grew, both of whom are dead, can testify as to the transaction, in a suit by the heirs of one against the executor of the other. A defendant called as on cross-examination as to matters occurring prior to the death of the plaintiffs' decedent becomes a competent witness as to all relevant transactions with the decedent. Where a wife would be incompetent to testify, the husband is also incompetent. Bill in Equity. C. P. of Lancaster County, Equity Docket No. 5, page 449. W. 179 Pa., 170; Watkins v. Hughes, 206 Pa., 526; Assigned Estate of E. K. Smith, 22 L. L. R. 137. In addition, in testifying against the estate of Maria Schwebel, she was testifying against her own interMaria Schwebel. As a matter of fact, est, as she is a daughter and heir of Maria Schwebel has no interest in the result of this litigation, as her interest in the land in question ended when she died, which was in 1906. We have disregarded the testimony of Philip Bolbach, who is the husband of a daughter of Maria and Charles Schwebel, who is interested in the result of this litigation; Bitner v. Boone, 128 Pa., 567. We have also disregarded the testimony of Charles Schwebel, who was called in rebuttal, though his testimony was not rebuttal, and who is one of the plaintiffs in this case, Peter N. Wohlsen, the defendant, being dead. FINDINGS OF FACT. 1. Charles Schwebel died June 6, 1890, leaving a will and testament dated September 9, 1885, which has been duly proven. The second item of the will is as follows: "Second. I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife. Maria, S. R. Zimmerman and E. M. Gilbert, all my estate, real, personal and mixed, for defendant. she to use the same and receive the rents F. Lyman Windolph and J. IV. Brown, for plaintiff. and profits thereof, during the term of her natural life, and in case she desires. or deems it expedient, she may sell any or all of my real estate and make a title in fee simple to the purchaser or purchasers and the purchase money so received she may apply to her own use, if she thinks the same necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance." The third item of the will is as follows: "Third. At the death of my said wife, if any part of my Estate shall still remain, I order that it shall be immediately converted into money, and the whole of said residue I direct shall then be divided amongst all my children and the children of any that may be dead, per stirpes, in equal shares." 2. The said Charles Schwebel, at the time of his decease, left a widow, the said Maria Schwebel, and the following children, to wit: 1. Katie Snyder, wife of Philip Snyder, who died after the death of her father and before the death of her mother, leaving the following children: a. Charles P. Snyder, b. Anna, wife of Harry Gochnauer, d. May, wife of Walter Kendig, f. Philip Snyder, minor, of whom Charles P. Snyder is Guardian. 2. Elizabeth Bolbach, wife of Philip Bolbach, 3. Charles W. Schwebel, Charles P. Snyder, a grandson of the said Charles Schwebel, are the plaintiffs in this suit, and are legatees under the will of said decedent; and the said Charles W. Schwebel, as Administrator of the estate of Maria Schwebel, also joins as a party Plaintiff in this suit. 5. The said Charles Schwebel died seized of four purparts of real estate and certain tracts of land situated in the Southeastern part of the City of Lancaster, of great value, a full description of which is contained in the deed, marked Exhibit "B", annexed hereto and made a part thereof. 6. Maria Schwebel, widow and executrix of Charles Schwebel, deceased, on May 28, 1895, made a deed, in which she conveyed in fee simple all of the premises of which Charles Schwebel died seized unto her 'son-in-law, Peter N. Wohlsen, which deed has been duly recorded. The consideration mentioned in the deed is $10,000, and Anna S. Wohlsen testified that that amount was paid. We find as a fact that the consideration mentioned in the deed, viz.: $10,000, was the real consideration. $5,000 of it was used to pay the debts of Charles and Maria Schwebel. This $5,000 was borrowed by Peter N. Wohlsen on a mortgage from the Peoples Trust Company of this city, and has since been paid by him. The only testimony that the consideration was not as mentioned in the deed is that of Hon. 4. Anna Wohlsen, wife of Peter N. Charles I. Landis, who said it was not Wohlsen, the defendant, 5. Daniel Schwebel, 6. Mary Bolbach, 7. Frederick S. Schwebel, 8. William G. Schwebel, 9. Philip Schwebel. 3. The said Maria Schwebel died intestate on November 2, 1906, and letters of administration were duly granted on her estate by the Register of Wills of Lancaster County, on April 5, 1913, to the said Charles W. Schwebel, the oldest son. 4. Charles W. Schwebel, a son. Daniel Schwebel, a son, William G. Schwebel, a son, Philip Schwebel, a son, Charles P. Snyder, a grandson, and Philip Snyder, a minor, by his guardian. paid in his presence, and that he had no knowledge of what was done by the parties except what occurred in his presence. If he had testified positively that the full consideration had not been paid it would not have been sufficient to over come the averment in the answer, as it would have been the testimony of but a single witness, without corroboration, and this is an attempt to alter or overthrow a written instrument. 7. As we cannot find as facts the material allegations of the plaintiffs' bill which are vital to their case and which are contained in the seventh, eighth and tenth paragraphs, we think it proper to explain our inability to do so. The seventh paragraph is in substance |