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circumstances as to enable him to know the exact charge against him and to make proper defense. In a case against this same company some years ago (now cited by the defendant), Com. v. The Columbia and Washington Turnpike Company, 12 L. L. R., 92, this Court, Judge Livingston delivering the opinion, decided that an indictment should be quashed if it did not set forth where and in what respect the turnpike was defective. Judge Livingston based his opinion on a form of indictment contained in Wharton's precedents of " Indictments and Pleas," which he approved and which is quoted in full in his opinion. This form, he said, is used in all cases where an ordinary common highway is out of repairs and return is made by a constable or complaint by a citizen. In it, the part of the road which is complained of as not being in proper repair is designated as a certain part of the said highway, situate, lying and being in the township of," etc. This, according to the opinion of Judge Livingston, is a sufficient designation of the place or portion of the road which is out of repair.

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In the present indictment, the portion of the road charged with being out of repair is "at Washington Borough." is, therefore, designated with as much certainty as the case cited by the defendant requires; or, as the area of Washington Borough is small compared with that of an average township, we should say the place is designated with even more certainty.

We do not think, as argued by the defendant, that the fact that only a few feet of the whole width of the road as it now exists in Washington Borough is actually turnpike, makes it necessary for the indictment to allege that the want of repair is in those few feet. As a matter of fact, the indictment does charge it within those few feet; for, if it is outside of the turnpike, the company is not maintaining it in the condition complained of. All that it is required to defend against is, the charge that the actual line of the turnpike in Washington Borough is out of repair as designated in the indictment.

If the indictment does not set forth

the alleged offence with all the particularity which the defendant thinks necessary to enable it to properly defend against it, it can apply for a bill of particulars. We think, however, that the indictment does designate with sufficient particularity the portion of the road which is defective and out of repair.

The second and third reasons were not pressed on the argument. We are convinced that they are without merit and require no discussion.

The motion to quash the indictment is refused.

Motion refused.

Commonwealth v. Weber.

Veterinarians-Failure to report transmissible disease-Acts of March 30, 1905, P. L. 78 and July 22, 1913, P. L. 928.

A veterinarian who procured from a glue factory tuberculous organs of cattle and exhibited the same in a store window, but was liable to prosecution for failure to report the not professionally employed in the case, is not case to the State Live Stock Sanitary Board.

missible disease of live stock. Rule for Indictment for failure to report transa new trial. Q. S. of Lancaster County, January Term 1914, No. 43.

E. M. Gilbert and B. F. Davis, for rule. Coyle & Keller and John M. Groff, contra.

July 3, 1915. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. On November 29, 1913, the defendant exhibited in a window on North Queen Street, this city, the organs of a cow, which were infected by tuberculosis. He placed upon them a card containing the words, "This meat is being sold today." There is no evidence that he ever saw the carcass from which the organs were taken, nor knew to whom they belonged. He was not professionally employed concerning the same, but he procured the organs from a glue works, carried on by one, Lamparter, and he testified that he was then told that they came from the place of a man named Isecovitz, who kept a butcher shop in the western

part of the city. It appears that the de- | fessional work or because the informafendant wanted the city to employ a meat inspector, and he pursued this plan in order to bring the matter to the attention of the public. He did not make report to the State Livestock Sanitary Board, and, on account of this, he was prosecuted for a violation of section 9 of the Act of July 22, 1913, P. L. 928. The case was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict of guilty.

tion may have been incidentally given to them. I do not think that this is the real meaning of the Acts. I believe that, like all other Acts relating to the protection of public health, it is intended that the physician to whom, in a professional way, the case comes, shall make a report of it. This certainly is the general view held concerning the reports from physicians of all contagious cases under the various Acts of Assembly. It may have been a very foolish thing for Dr. Weber to have acted as he did, and it no doubt was; but that he made himself liable to prosecution thereby for not mak

It has been decided, in Commonwealth v. Weber, 59 Sup., 223, [31 LAW REVIEW 189] that the Act above referred to, relating to diseases of domestic animals, is constitutional, and that an indictment charging a person with failure to reporting a report to the state authorities does

a diseased animal is good under the Act of March 30, 1905, P. L., 78, even if the Act of 1913 were unconstitutional. That phase of the controversy is, therefore, eliminated. The only question now to be considered is, whether the offense committed falls within either of the said Acts.

Section 1 of the Act of 1905 provides "that all practitioners of veterinary medicine in Pennsylvania shall, immediately upon gaining information thereof, report to the secretary of the State Livestock Sanitary Board the occurrence among animals of any one of the following diseases," * * here follow a number of diseases, among which is advanced or generalized tuberculosis or tuberculosis of the udder. The 9th section of the Act of July 22, 1913, declares that it shall be the duty of every practitioner of veterinary medicine in Pennsylvania, immediately upon receiving information thereof, to report to the Secretary of the State Livestock Sanitary Board each case of any of the following diseases," and among these diseases is also advanced or generalized tuberculosis or tuberculosis of the udder. But would every veterinary, who happened casually to learn of any of the diseases enumerated in these statutes, be bound to report to the Secretary of the State Livestock Sanitary Board? It seems to me that, if this were so, many veterinaries might perhaps be required to report the same case, because of their personal observation outside of their pro

not seem to me to be within the purview of the law. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this rule should be made absolute. Rule made absolute.

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An indictment for adultery will not be quashed because the information was made by the defendant's wife. This question should have been raised on a proceeding for discharge before the indictment was found.

Where, on an indictment for adultery, the defendant's wife testified before the grand jury, it is presumed that she testified only wherein she was competent, namely, as to her marriage, in the absence of evidence that she testified generally.

Indictment for adultery. Motion to

quash indictment. Q. S. of Lancaster County. April Sessions 1915, No. 45.

B. F. Davis, for motion.

E. M. Gilbert and John M. Groff, Dist. Att'y., contra.

June 26, 1915. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J.

The reasons given in this case for the motion to quash the indictment found against the defendant are, that it was based on a complaint made by Gertrude E. King, the defendant's wife, and that she appeared before the Grand Jury as

a witness. It seems clear that neither | of them ought to be sustained. In commonwealth v. McNew, 31 LANC. LAW REVIEW, 85, it was held by this Court that "an indictment for adultery will not be quashed on motion because the information was made by the husband of the defendant," as "this question should have been raised on a proceeding for discharge before the indictment was found." Of course, the same principle applies when the information is made by the wife.

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It was also held, in the same case, that, where a husband testifies before Grand Jury, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence that he testified generally, that he testified only to what he was competent to prove, namely, the marriage. In like manner here, Mrs. King was a competent witness for the same purpose, and there being no evidence that she testified before the Grand Jury to anything else, the objection must fall.

The motion to quash is, therefore, overruled and dismissed.

Motion to quash dismissed.

Legal Miscellany.

International Law Notes on the War. THE DEFENSE OF THE SUEZ CANAL. The validity of the measures which the Egyptian government recently took to clear the ports of the Suez Canal of the German merchantmen which were lying up there for refuge and impeding the ordinary commercial use of the waterway has received a further justification this week by the grave development of the affairs in the Near East. The Ottoman Empire is now at war with England, and the safety of the international canal is threatened by the power which was originally designated as its protector. Turkey's place, however, as the territorial sovereign of the country through which the canal is cut, has been taken by England in virtue of her protecting function in Egypt; and it is to the English fleet and the English army now, as in 1883, at the time of the Arab

rising, that the defense of the highway of nations is entrusted. Had the German ships been left in port, it is not at all unlikely that they would have chosen this moment for working mischief; and, by sinking themselves in the narrow channel, have struck a terrible blow at the world's and especially at England's commerce. But as the agents of the powers in Cairo, who are the chosen council for the protection of the canal in times of emergency, confirmed England's right to take exceptional steps against the danger that lay in the ports, so now, doubtless, they will confirm our right to ward off by all possible means the danger that moves from the desert. According to the stipulations of the ConGreat Britain adhered in 1904. (1) no vention of Constantinople, 1888, to which the canal or within three miles of its act of hostility is allowed either inside ports; (2) belligerents' men-of-war and hours, except in case of absolute necestheir prizes may not stay longer than 24 sity, within the harbors of Port Said and Suez; and (3) belligerents may not station men-of-war in these harbors. These provisions are declared to apply even if Turkey is a belligerent, and so, too, if Egypt is at war; but the most authoritative of English jurists, the late Professor Westlake, suggested that they do not prevent the power which is best able to safeguard the freedom of the canal from taking any measures necessary to that end, even if they are not in accordance with the provisions. At the time of the Arabi revolt England found it necessary to land troops at Ismailia to check any attempt at wrecking, and she may now have to keep her warships in the waterway and its ports and to fortify the banks. We have not protested. against the American claim to fortify the entrance to the Panama Canal, because in the present weakness of treaty sanctions we recognize the need for some. effective guardianship of neutralized waterways, as well as of neutralized countries. In taking whatever steps are necessary in the Suez Canal, England will be upholding public law as fully as when she went to the help of Belgium.

REVISION OF THE DECLARATION OF
LONDON.

The Order in Council issued at the end of last week, which promulgates two fresh lists of absolute and conditional contraband and makes certain new modifications in the Declaration of London in place of those adopted by the Order in Council of August 20th, is a bold declaration of belligerent rights which may possibly be challenged by some neutral powers, but which may be justified on principle, in view of the special character of the present conflict.

that, when it is proved that the enemy government is drawing supplies from or through a neutral country, a direction may be given that Article 30 of the declaration shall not apply in respect of ships bound for a port of that country; or, in other words, any contraband cargoes, whether of the absolute or conditional category, bound for that country chants doing contraband trade to-day are will be liable to seizure. Whilst merskillful enough not to make the enemy destination apparent, the belligerent can only protect himself by a more rigorous

control of neutral trade on the seas which has not a clearly innocent destination, and by requiring neutral states to assist in checking the noxious trade by their subjects. A minor change is intro

vessel liable to condemnation on her return voyage if she has sailed to an enemy port when her papers indicated a neutral destination. Presumably this is only to be applied when the vessel has

The list of absolute contraband con tained in the declaration (which was drawn up five years ago) did not meet the actual needs of a belligerent to-day because it failed to take note of the vital part which motor traffic could play induced by a rule which renders a neutral military operations, and it likewise failed to prohibit the trade in articles which, though not immediately munitions of war, are essentially required for the manufacture of munitions. The new list violated a blockade or carried contraremedies these defects by the inclusion of iron ore, nickle ore, unwrought cop-vice-London Law Journal. band or performed some unneutral serper and other metals which are compounded into explosives on the one hand, and of motor tires, rubber and mineral oils and motor spirit on the other. The only important additions to the list of conditional contraband are hides, pigskin and leather suitable for saddlery, harness or military boots. The reasonableness of this is obvious. More striking and novel are the new rules as to destination of contraband cargo. Condi- 66 tional contraband, it is said (but no

Often too True.

Examiner " What is after-discovered evidence?" Student-" Evidence that did not exist at the time of the trial.”

Last Laugh.

Sure, Oi'll write me name on the

doubt the rule is intended to apply like-back o' your note, guaranteein' ye'll pay wise to absolute, and an amending order ut," said Pat, smiling pleasantly as he indorsed Billup's note, "but Oi know doomed well ye won't pay ut. have a laugh at th' ixpinse of the bank." -Life.

seems called for to secure this interpretation), shall be liable to capture on board a vessel "to order." or if the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee, or if they show the consignee to be in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. In these cases the burden of proof is on the owners of the goods to show an innocent destination. This is a new application of the doctrine of "continuous voyage", empowering a belligerent to seize cargoes on suspicion of further transport. It is also provided

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superintendent of this turnpike for the

LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. Traction Company, its lessee the undis

puted evidence being that, under the lease

VOL. XXXII.] FRIDAY, AUG. 27, 1915. [No. 43 recorded in Book T, Vol. 14, page 363,

Superior Court.

Buckwalter, Appellant, v. Lancaster &

Lititz Turnpike Road Company.

Turnpikes - Lease of to traction company-Liability for trespass.

Where a turnpike company has leased its turnpike road to an electric railway company which has under the terms of the lease built its railway along the side of the turnpike and assumed the control and maintenance of the entire turnpike, the turnpike company is not liable in trespass for the flooding of adjacent

land.

Whether a turnpike company violated its charter obligations in leasing its entire road to an electric railway company is by no means clear, but this question can not be properly raised or determined in a collateral action of trespass.

Appeal No. 21 of October Term 1914 from judgment of C. P. of Lancaster County on verdict for defendant to September Term 1912, No. 7. Affirmed.

The action was for damages for the flooding of plaintiff's land. The Court below, LANDIS, P. J. directed a verdict for the defendant.

(For the opinion of Court below discharging the rule for a new trial see 31 LAW REVIEW, 100).

the Turnpike Company had been leased to the Lancaster and Lititz Electric Railway Company, which in turn had been placed in the hands of the Conestoga Traction Company, and said latter company was in possession, occupation and supervision of the maintenance of said road, and the said lease providing that the lessee should keep all the estate and premises demised in good order and repair at all times during the said term, maintaining and keeping up said turnpike road, &c., there can be no recovery in this case against the defendants, and the verdict of the jury must be for the defendants."

Answer. "The defendants' point is affirmed." [2]

The Court below overruled the plaintiffs' point, as follows:

"Under the evidence submitted, the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of their damages."

Answer. "The plaintiffs' point is refused." [3]

1. The Court below charged the jury inter alia as follows:

"The plaintiffs' point is refused. The defendants' point is affirmed. The jury are instructed to find a verdict in favor of the defendants. (Before verdict renOn the trial, the Court below over-dered, plaintiffs except to the Charge of ruled the following question in the direct examination of Daniel Buckwalter, a witness called on behalf of the plaintiffs.

"Q-State whether, since that, there has been a larger pipe laid across the pike. (Objected to by the defendants.) (Disallowed.)

MR. DAVIS: For the purpose of showing that, because they did not have proper culverts and so forth, the water was not carried away, and by laying another pipe, it carries it away.

(Objected to by the defendants.) THE COURT: What they did since can not be introduced. [4]

the Court and Answers to Points, and ask that the same be reduced to writing and filed of record.) (Exception noted for the plaintiffs)." [1]

On appeal error was assigned [1-4] as above.

B. F. Davis, for appellant.

The turnpike company could not divest. itself of its duties by leasing its road.

"I. When certain powers and privileges have been specially conferred by the public upon an individual or corporation for private emolument, in consideration of which certain duties affecting the public health or the safety of public travel have been expressly assumed, the "1. The plaintiffs having proved, by individual or corporation in the receipt Edward P. Brinton, that he was acting-of the emolument can not be relieved

The Court below sustained the defendants' point, as follows:

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