LETTERS-PATENT (continued).
wash-boards," on the surrender of original letters-patent No. 111,585,
granted to Westly Todd, as inventor, Feb. 7, 1871, are not infringed
by a wash-board constructed in accordance with the description con-
tained in letters-patent No. 171,568, granted to Aaron J. Hull, Dec.
28, 1875. Duff v. Sterling Pump Company, 636.
15. In view of prior inventions, the claims of the letters-patent granted
to Todd must be limited to the form which he shows and describes,
namely, projections bounded by crossing horizontal and vertical
grooves. They do not cover diamond-shaped projections bounded by
crossing diagonal grooves. Id.
16. In the field of wash-boards made of sheet metal, with the surface
broken into protuberances formed of the body of the metal so as to
make a rasping surface, and to strengthen the metal by its shape,
and to provide channels for the water to run off, Todd was not a
pioneer. He merely devised a new form to accomplish those results;
and his letters-patent do not cover a form which is a substantial
departure from his. Id.
17. Claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 19 of reissued letters-patent No.
2224, granted April 10, 1866, to Reuben Hoffheins, for an improve-
ment in harvesters," the original, No. 35,315, having been granted
to him May 20, 1862; and claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 of reissued letters-
patent No. 2490, granted Feb. 19, 1867, to him, for an " improve-
ment in harvesters," the original, No. 40,481, having been granted
to him Nov. 3, 1863, and reissued in two divisions, one, No. 1888,
Feb. 28, 1865, and the other, No. 2102, Nov. 7, 1865; and No. 2490
having been issued on the surrender of No. 2102, - considered; and
the difference between the specifications and the drawings of No.
35,315 and those of No. 2224, and that between the raking apparatus
and rake-support of No. 2224 and those of the defendants, pointed
out. Hoffheins v. Russell, 132.
18. There is no warrant in No. 35,315, for locating the rake-support, or
any part of it, on the finger-beam, and as each of the above-named
claims of No. 2224 has, as an element, either a rake, or a rake
and reel, mounted on, or attached to, the cutting apparatus or the
finger-beam, No. 35,315 could not lawfully be reissued with those
claims. Id.
19. The defendants devised a new arrangement of rake, which made it
possible to mount a rake-support on the heel of the finger-beam,
where the rake-support of No. 2224 could not be mounted. The
difference between the yielding belt-tightener of No. 2224 and their
arrangement for driving the raking apparatus pointed out, and the
latter held not to be a mechanical equivalent for the former. Id.
20. No. 40,481 negatives the idea of mounting the rake-post on the fin-
ger-beam, while an element in claim 1 of No. 2490 is the mounting
of the raking mechanism on the finger-beam. In No. 2490, a dri-
ver's seat mounted on the main frame, so as to enable the driver to
ride on the machine while the rake is in operation, is an element in
claims 1 and 9, while the driver's seat in No. 40,481 is not, and
LETTERS-PATENT (continued).
cannot be, in such a position that the driver can ride on the seat
while the rake is in operation. Id.
21. The raking apparatus is an element in claims 2, 7, and 9 of No.
2490, and, in view of the differences between the two machines, in
the construction of the raking mechanism and the arrangement and
location of the rake-post, the rake of claims 2, 7, and 9 is to be con-
strued to be such a rake, and one so arranged, on a rake-post so
mounted, as is shown and described in the specification, and thus
does not include the defendants' raking mechanism or rake-post. Id.
22. The driving device in claims 6 and 7 of No. 2490 held not to include
the defendants' driving device, the former being an extensible tum-
bling shaft and the latter a chain belt with open links, and paten-
tability or invention inhering only in the device, and not in its
location.
23. No cause of action is established against the defendants on either of
the patents sued on. Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See County; Court of Claims, 2, 3.
LOUISIANA.
1. By force of the act of the legislature of Louisiana, known as Act No. 3
of 1874, and the constitutional amendment adopted in that year,
which provided that bonds should be issued under that act in ex-
change for valid outstanding bonds and warrants at the rate of sixty
cents in the new bonds for one dollar of the old bonds and warrants,
the State entered into a formal contract, the obligation of which it
was forbidden by the Constitution of the United States to impair,
and thereby stipulated with each holder of the new bonds so issued
that an annual tax of five and one-half mills on the dollar of the
assessed value of all the real and personal property in the State should
be levied and collected, and the income therefrom applied solely to
the payment of the bonds and coupons; that the tax levied by the
act and confirmed by the Constitution should be a continuing annual
tax until the bonds, principal and interest, were paid in full; that
the appropriation of the revenue derived therefrom should be a con-
tinuing annual appropriation; and that no further authority than
that contained in the act should be required to enable the taxing
officers to levy and collect the tax, or the disbursing officers to pay
out the money as collected in discharge of the coupons and bonds.
Louisiana v. Jumel, 711.
2. After the said act of 1874 was passed, and the constitutional amend-
ment sanctioning it was adopted, sundry parties, citizens of another
State, exchanged their old bonds for new coupon bonds executed
pursuant to the requirements of that act, and demanded of the
proper State officers payment of the coupons which fell due Jan. 1,
1880, and the application thereto of the funds collected under the
levy imposed by the act. Payment was refused solely on the ground
that it was forbidden by the third article of the State Debt Ordi-
nance of the new Constitution adopted July 23, 1879, ante, p. 715;
and the treasurer claimed to hold the funds only for the purposes
for which they were appropriated by the terms of that Constitution.
The parties then brought in the State court of Louisiana a suit for a
mandamus against the auditor and treasurer of state and the other
members of the board of liquidation, requiring them to apply the
funds in the treasury derived from the taxes levied or to be levied to
the retirement of the bonds, and to execute the said act according to
its intent and purpose. They also brought in the Circuit Court
against the same defendants a suit praying for an injunction forbid
ding them to recognize as valid said ordinance, and to oppose the full
execution of said act and the constitutional amendment. The suit
for mandamus was removed to the Circuit Court. Held, 1. That the
ordinance forbade the payment of the interest due January, 1880,
and withdrew from the officers of the State the means of carrying
her contract into effect. 2. That the execution of the contract can-
not be enforced, nor the relief sought be awarded, in a suit to which
she is not a party, but which is brought against officers, who are
merely obeying the positive orders of the supreme political power of
the State. 3. That at the time the bonds were issued or since no
statute or judicial decision authorized a suit against Louisiana in
her own courts, nor can she be sued in the courts of the United
States by a citizen of another State. 4. That the money in her
treasury is her property, held by her officers, not in trust for her
creditors nor as their agents, but as her servants, and that the
courts cannot control them in the administration of her finances,
and thus oust the jurisdiction of the political power of the State. Id.
MAIL. See Customs Duties, 1, 2.
MANDAMUS. See Attorney; Virginia, 2, 3.
MARITIME LAW. See Admiralty; Prize; Wharves and Wharfage.
1. The master of a vessel can neither sell nor hypothecate the cargo, ex-
cept in case of urgent necessity; and he can only lawfully do what is
directly or indirectly for its benefit, considering the situation in
which it has been placed by the accidents of the voyage. The "Julia
Blake," 418.
2. The necessity under which he acts is a question of fact, to be deter-
mined in each case by its circumstances; and upon his hypotheca-
tion of the cargo under his implied authority the lenders are
chargeable with notice of the facts on which he appears to rely as his
justification, and they must make inquiries and judge for them-
selves and at their own risk whether the owner, if present, would do
or ought to do what, in his absence, the master is undertaking to do
for him. Before there can be a recovery against the owner, it must
be shown that the circumstances were such as to make it apparently
proper for the master to do what he has done. To this extent the
burden of proof is clearly on the lenders. Id.
MARITIME LAW (continued).
3. Where it appears that from the port where the vessel entered in dis-
tress the cargo could be forwarded by another vessel, and that it was
for the interest of the shipper that it should be so forwarded, instead
of being hypothecated to pay for the repairs of the vessel, and that
they could not have been effected without an expense to him of
very much more than it would cost to reclaim his property, pay all
lawful charges on it, and forward it by another vessel, Held, that
the master had no authority to pledge the cargo without the consent
of the shipper or the consignee. Id.
4. Although the bottomry bond cannot be enforced against the cargo,
the latter will not be held in that suit for any charges which the
vessel may have thereon, where a claim for them is not made in the
libel. Id.
MARRIAGE. See Jurisdiction, 2.
MARYLAND. See Inspection Laws.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Railroad, 1.
MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD COMPANY. See
Causes, Removal of, 3.
MINERAL LANDS. See Patent for Land, 2, 3.
MISSIONARY STATION. See Oregon, 1, 2.
MISSOURI. See Constitutional Law, 5.
1. By a statute of Missouri, stockholders of a corporation at its dissolu-
tion are liable for its debts; but it is provided that no person holding
stock as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, and no person
holding stock as collateral security, shall be personally subject to
such liability, but the persons pledging such stock shall be con-
sidered as holding the same, and liable; and the estates and funds
in the hands of executors, &c., shall be liable. Held, 1. That per-
sons to whom a corporation pledges its stock as collateral security
are within the exemption of the statute. 2. That certificates of the
stock absolute on their face, issued in trust or as collateral security
to a creditor, may be shown to be so held by evidence in pais.
3. That the person holding such stock in trust, or as collateral secu-
rity, is not, by his voting thereon, estopped from showing that it
belongs to the company, and that he holds it as collateral security.
Burgess v. Seligman, 20.
2. The Supreme Court of Missouri, after the Circuit Court had decided
this case, made a contrary decision against the same stockholders,
at the suit of another plaintiff, holding that the clause of exemption
in the statute does not extend to persons receiving from the corpora-
tion itself stock as collateral security. Held, that this court is not
bound to follow the decision. Id.
See Appeal Bond; County; Equity, 4; Jurisdiction, 12;
Receiver; Trust Deed.
1. The township of Montclair in the county of Essex, New Jersey, had
authority to issue bonds to be exchanged for bonds of the Montclair
Railway Company. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 147.
2. The Constitution of New Jersey provides: "To avoid improper in-
fluences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act.
such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall
embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."
Held, 1. That this provision does not require the title of an act to
set forth a detailed statement, or an index or abstract, of its con-
tents; nor does it prevent uniting in the same act numerous pro-
visions having one general object fairly indicated by its title.
2. That the powers, however varied and extended, which a township
may exercise, constitute but one object, which is fairly expressed in
a title showing nothing more than the legislative purpose to estab-
lish such township. Id.
3. The conflict between the Constitution and a statute must be palpable,
to justify the judiciary in disregarding the latter upon the sole
ground that it embraces more than one object, or that, if there be
but one, it is not sufficiently expressed in the title. Id.
4. The holder of the bonds is presumed to have acquired them in good
faith and for value. But if, in a suit upon them, the defence be
such as to require him to show that value was paid, it is not, in
every case, essential to prove that he paid it; for his title will be
sustained if any previous holder gave value. Id.
5. The General Assembly of Illinois enacted, March 27, 1869, a statute
as follows: "The acts of the city council of the city of Quincy,
from June 2, 1868, to August 28, 1868, in ordering an election on
the proposition to subscribe $100,000 to the capital stock of the
Mississippi and Missouri River Air Line Railroad Company, and
the subscription of said stock, and all other acts of said council in
connection therewith, are hereby legalized and confirmed." In con-
formity with the vote of the citizens of Quincy cast at such an elec-
tion, the council had, by an ordinance of Aug. 7, 1868, subscribed
for that amount of said capital stock; but neither the election nor
the subscription was authorized by law. After the statute took
effect, negotiable coupon bonds were, by virtue of it and the ordi-
nance, issued in the sum of $100,000 to the company, by the city,
and the latter received therefore an equal amount of said stock. In
a suit by A., a bona fide holder of coupons detached from the bonds,
- Held, that they are valid obligations of the city. Quincy v. Cooke,
549.
6. The act of the General Assembly of Illinois, approved Feb. 24, 1869,
amendatory of an act entitled "An Act to incorporate the Illinois
Southeastern Railway Company," approved Feb. 25, 1867, removed
the limitation of $30,000 imposed upon the amount which, by the
latter act," any town in any county under township organization is
authorized and empowered to donate to said company." Pana v.
Bowler, 529.
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