CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued).
is enacted after the offence was committed, and which, in relation to
it or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his dis-
advantage. Id.
CONTRACT. See Appeal Bond; Insurance; Railroad, 2–6.
1. In construing contracts, a court may look not only to their terms, but
to their subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, and avail
itself of the same light which at the time of making them the parties
possessed. Merriam v. United States, 437.
2. Under the contract sued on in this case, dnte, p. 437, the United States
was not bound to receive a greater quantity of oats than that which
is therein specifically mentioned.
3. A. made a contract with B. to deliver a specified number of matched
barrel-headings, to be properly piled on the land of B., who was to
furnish a man to count them, as they were from time to time piled,
in order to obtain an approximate estimate of the quantity piled,
and thus to determine the amount of advances to A. under his con-
tract; but the inspection and final count was to be made by an in-
spector appointed by B. at a point to which the latter shipped them.
The property in the headings was to pass to B. on the delivery of
them on his land. In a suit to recover the contract price of them,
Held, 1. That no error was committed by the trial court in admitting
evidence of the counts by both parties of the whole number of single
pieces of heading, and submitting to the jury the comparison be-
tween them, the court having ruled that the inspector's final count,
which formed the basis of an estimate and average from which the
number of matched headings was deduced, was, if made fairly and
in the exercise of his best judgment, binding on the parties, unless
its variance from the actual truth was too great to be accounted for
by mere error of judgment in the matter of matching. 2. That
although there was no evidence to show that all the pieces of head-
ing shipped were in fact delivered at the point to which they had
been sent, the jury were not bound to assume a loss in transporta-
tion in order to account for the discrepancy between the two counts.
Oil Company v. Van Etten, 325.
CORPORATION. See Causes, Removal of, 3; Charitable Gifts and De-
vises; Missouri; National Banks; Railroad; Will, 6-8, 11.
1. Restrictions imposed by the charter of a corporation upon the amount
of property that it may hold cannot be taken advantage of collater-
ally by private persons, but only in a direct proceeding by the State.
Jones v. Habersham, 174.
2. The provision of the Constitution of Georgia of 1868, which declares
that the General Assembly shall have no power to grant corporate
powers and privileges to private companies" (with certain excep-
tions), "but it shall prescribe by law the manner in which such
powers shall be exercised by the courts," does not take away from
the General Assembly the power to amend the charters of existing
corporations by modifying or enlarging their powers. Id.
3. A cemetery company was incorporated in 1854 by an act of Congress
which authorized it to purchase and hold ninety acres of land in the
District of Columbia, and to receive gifts and bequests for the pur-
pose of ornamenting and improving the cemetery; enacted that its
affairs should be conducted by a president and three other managers,
to be elected annually by the votes of the proprietors, and to have
power to lay out and ornament the grounds, to sell or dispose of
burial lots, and to make by-laws for the conduct of its affairs and
the government of lot-holders and visitors; fixed the amount of the
capital stock, to be divided among the proprietors according to their
respective interests; and provided that the land dedicated to the
purposes of a cemetery should not be subject to taxation of any kind,
and no highways should be opened through it, and that it should be
lawful for Congress thereafter to alter, amend, modify, or repeal the
act. Presently afterwards thirty of the ninety acres were laid out
as a cemetery, the cemetery was dedicated by public religious ser-
vices, and a pamphlet was published, containing a copy of the char-
ter, a list of the officers, an account of the proceedings at the
dedication, describing the cemetery as "altogether comprising
ninety acres, thirty of which are now fully prepared for inter-
ments," and the by-laws of the corporation, which declared that
all lots should be held in pursuance of the charter. No stock was
ever issued. But the owner of the whole tract, named in the charter
as one of the original associates, and in the list published in the
pamphlet as the president and a manager of the corporation, know-
ing all the above facts, and never objecting to the appropriation of
the property as appearing thereby, for more than twenty years man-
aged the cemetery, sold about two thousand burial lots, and gave to
each purchaser a copy of the pamphlet, and a deed of the lot, signed
by himself as president, bearing the seal of the corporation, and
having the by-laws printed thereon. In 1877 Congress passed an
act, amending the charter of the corporation, providing that its
property and affairs should be managed, so as to secure the equita-
ble rights of all persons having any vested interest in the cemetery,
by a board of five trustees to be elected annually, three by the pro-
prietors of lots owned in good faith upon which a burial had been
made, and two by the original proprietors; and that of the gross
receipts arising from the future sale of lots oue-fourth should be
annually paid by the trustees to the original proprietors and the rest
be devoted to the improvement and maintenance of the cemetery.
Held, that the act of 1877 was a constitutional exercise of the power
of amendment reserved in the act of 1854; that the owner of the
land was estopped to deny the existence of the corporation, the set-
ting apart of the whole ninety acres as a cemetery, and the right
of the lot-holders to elect a majority of the trustees; and that he
was in equity bound to convey the whole tract to the corporation
in fee, and to account to the corporation for three-fourths of the
sums received by him from sales of lots since the act of 1877; and
the corporation to pay him one-fourth of the gross receipts from
future sales of lots. Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 466.
COSTS. See Appeal Bond, 1, 2.
COTTON LACES AND INSERTINGS. See Customs Duties, 6, 7.
COUNTY. See Swamp and Overflowed Lands, 3.
A. conveyed, March 5, 1859, to a county in Nebraska certain lands for
a "poor-farm," and they were thereafter used as such. The county,
pursuant to its agreement, made one cash payment, and for the
remainder of the stipulated consideration gave its notes secured by
mortgage, and payable respectively in one, two, three, and four
years. A. assigned the notes to B. Some time thereafter, the Su-
preme Court of the State decided that, by the purchase of lands for
such a purpose, a county could not be bound to pay at any specified
time the purchase-money, or to secure it by mortgage upon them,
but was limited to a payment in cash and to the levy of an annual
tax to create a fund wherewith to pay the residue. A. and B., the
notes remaining unpaid, filed, Sept. 10, 1877, a bill praying for a
reconveyance and an accounting, or, should the county elect to re-
tain the lands, then for a decree for the value of them. Held,
1. That in view of that decision, the contract being unauthorized
only so far as it relates to the time and mode of paying the purchase-
money, and the title to the lands having passed by the conveyance,
the county holds that title as a trustee for the benefit of B., and that
he is entitled to the relief prayed for. 2. That unless the sum due
on account of the purchase-money, after a proper allowance shall be
made as a compensation for a failure of A.'s title to a small part of
the lands, be paid within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court
below, having reference to the necessity of raising the same by tax-
ation, as prescribed and limited by the statute, the county be re-
quired to execute and deliver a deed, releasing to A. all the title
acquired under his deed, and that he convey the same to B. 3. That
the suit is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Chapman v.
County of Douglas, 348.
COUPONS. See Louisiana; Municipal Bonds, 5, 8-11; Virginia.
COURT OF CLAIMS. See Customs, Surveyor of
1. A party who, under sect. 4 of the act of Aug. 5, 1861, c. 45, is entitled
to the drawback there mentioned may, when payment thereof has
been refused, maintain a suit therefor in the Court of Claims against
the United States. Campbell v. United States, 407.
2. In computing the six years after his claim against the United States
first accrues within which it may be filed in the Court of Claims,
the period must be included when the claimant was unable to sue in
that court by reason of the aid he gave to the rebellion. Kendall v.
United States, 123.
3. The petition is bad on demurrer when it appears therefrom that the
claimant's right of action against the United States is barred by the
lapse of time. Id.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See Court of Claims; Dis-
trict of Columbia, 1; Equity, 3; Jurisdiction; Louisiana, 2.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Attorney; Civil Rights; Constitutional Law, 5–8;
1. The counts of an indictment against the president of a national
banking association for making such a false entry on its books
as is punishable under sect. 5209 of the Revised Statutes are
sufficient if they are in the form hereinafter set forth, ante, p.
656, as the offence is thereby alleged in apt terms, and with the
requisite averments of time and place. United States v. Britton,
655.
2. The counts which charge his fraudulent purchase of shares of the
capital stock of the association are bad if they either fail to state for
whose use the purchase was made, or if they state that it was made
for the use of the association, or if they do not aver that it was
not made in order to prevent loss on some previously contracted
debt. Id.
3. The counts which charge him with having wilfully misapplied the
funds of the association should aver that he did so for the benefit of
himself or some person or body other than the association, and with
intent to injure or defraud the association or some other person or
body corporate. Id.
4. The counts which charge his fraudulent purchase of the shares of
stock, and allege that they were by him held "in trust for the use
of said association, and that said shares were not purchased as afore-
said in order to prevent loss upon any debts theretofore contracted
with said association in good faith," do not allege with sufficient
certainty an offence under said sect. 5209. Id.
5. The purchase of stock in violation of sect. 5201, if made with intent
to defraud, and by one or more of the officers of the bank named
in said sect. 5209, is not a crime punishable under the latter
section. Id.
6. An indictment for perjury against an officer of a national bank,
for a wilfully false declaration or statement in a report made
under sect. 5211 of the Revised Statutes is bad, if, prior to the
passage of the act of Feb. 26, 1881, c. 82, his oath verifying
the report was taken before a notary public appointed by a State,
as such a notary had at that time no authority under a law of the
United States to administer the oath. United States v. Curtis,
671.
CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF. See Customs Duties, 8.
1. Where a collector of customs brings a writ of error to revicw a judg-
ment recovered against him for moneys exacted by and paid to him
on entries, this court will, if it affirms the judgment, allow interest
on it, under rule 23. Schell v. Cochran, 625.
2. In such a case, the "final judgment," the amount whereof is payable
under sect. 989 of the Revised Statutes, is that rendered by the
court below pursuant to the mandate of this court. Id.
A. was surveyor of customs from June 13, 1872, to May, 1876, at Troy,
N. Y., which was a port of delivery, but not of entry, in the collec-
tion district of the city of New York. At various times during the
period from June 13, 1872, to June 22, 1874, there was a surveyor
of customs at the port of New York, which was a port of entry, and
there were surveyors of customs at two other ports in that district,
which were ports of delivery and not ports of entry. In accordance
with the uniform practice of the Treasury Department, under
sect. 1 of the act of March 2, 1867, c. 188, repealed by sect. 2 of the
act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, the Secretary of the Treasury distrib-
uted to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New
York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, one-
fourth part of the proceeds of the fines, penalties, and forfeitures
incurred at the port of New York between June 13, 1872, and June
22, 1874.
A. made no question in regard to this practice until
March, 1874, and when informed, in June of that year, that the
department adhered to its construction of the act, he made no fur-
ther complaint until March, 1877. He sued the United States in
the Court of Claims in May, 1877, claiming that under said first
section he was entitled to share in said one-fourth equally with the
collector and the naval officer at the port of New York, and all the
surveyors in the district. The court rejected the claim. Held, that
the judgment was not erroneous. Hahn v. United States, 402.
CUSTOMS DUTIES. See Court of Claims, 1; Inspection Laws.
1. Dutiable goods cannot lawfully be imported in the foreign mail under
the International Postal Treaty of Berne of Oct. 9, 1874. 19 Stat.
577. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 215.
2. Such goods are, in the hands of the receiver of them from the post-
office, subject to seizure; and the fact that there was no intent on
the part of the sender or the receiver of them to defraud the United
States of the duty, does not render the customs officer liable to an
action for making the seizure. Id.
3. A claim for the appraisement of goods and the reduction of the duty
thereon, by reason of the damage which they sustained during the
voyage of importation, may be allowed, although not made until
after they were entered at the custom-house at their full invoice
value and the estimated duties thereon paid. Shelton v. The Col-
lector, 5 Wall. 113, so far as it conflicts with this ruling, is over-
ruled. United States v. Phelps, 320.
4. Section 2928, Rev. Stat., has exclusive reference to goods taken from
a wreck. ld.
5. Under schedules B and D of sect. 2504 of the Revised Statutes, ale
and beer imported in bottles are subject to a duty of thirty-five
cents per gallon, and a further duty of thirty per cent ad valorem is
imposed on the bottles. Schmidt v. Badger, 85.
6. By schedule D of the act of July 30, 1846, c. 74, a duty of twenty-five
per cent ad valorem was imposed on "cotton laces, cotton insertings,"
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