the same rules and regulations that govern actions between private parties. In 1865 this act was repealed. The creditor, when the contract was made, acquired, therefore, no right to the writ of mandamus, for it was not then an existing remedy; and so Mr. Justice Hunt, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The question discussed by Mr. Justice Swayne in Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314, of the preservation of the laws in existence at the time of the making of the contract, is not before us. The claim is of a subsequent injury to the contract." And the court, after referring to the numerous cases of a change of remedies, says: "The rule seems to be that in modes of proceeding and of forms to enforce the contract, the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with restrictions and conditions as seriously to impair the value of the right."

Here the original remedy possessed by the coupon-holder is abolished, and that which is given as a substitute is so embarrassed with conditions as to destroy the value of the contract.

In Louisiana v. Pilsbury, which was before us at the last term, the legislature of that State had passed a law prohibiting its courts from issuing a mandamus to compel the levy of a tax for the payment of bonds other than those issued under what was known as the premium-bond plan, thus cutting off the means of enforcing certain bonds held by the relator; and this court unanimously held that "the inhibition upon the courts of the State to issue a mandamus for the levy of a tax for the payment of interest or principal of any bonds except those issued under the premium-bond plan was a clear impairment of the means for the enforcement of the contract with the holders of the consolidated bonds. When the contract was made, the writ was the usual and the only effective means to compel the city authorities to do their duty in the premises, in case of their failure to provide in other ways the required funds. There was no other complete and adequate remedy. The only ground on which a change of remedy existing when a contract was made is permissible without impairment of the contract is, that a new and adequate and efficacious remedy be substituted for that which is superseded." 105 U. S. 278, 301.

That there is any adequate and efficacious remedy substituted for the one in existence when the Funding Act was adopted, cannot, it seems to me, be seriously affirmed. The remedy originally existing was effective. No officer could refuse to receive the coupon without subjecting himself to personal liability. After a tender no valid sale could be made for the taxes. And the creditor could invoke the compulsory process of the courts to secure a specific performance. Now all is changed. A law which practically destroys the value of the coupon is sustained. The officer is not bound to receive it, in the sense that he cannot be compelled to take it. He can enforce the payment of taxes in money; he can sell property, if necessary, to collect them; he can wholly ignore the coupon, unless the holder should foolishly consent to incur double the amount in costs to establish by a jury trial its genuineness and legal receivability for taxes.

I find myself bewildered by the opinion of the majority of the court. I confess that I cannot comprehend it, so foreign does it appear to be from what I have heretofore supposed to be established and settled law. And I fear that it will be appealed to as an excuse, if not justification, for legislation amounting practically to the repudiation of the obligations of States, and of their subordinate municipalities, their cities and counties. It will only be necessary to insert in their statutes a false recital of the existence of forged and spurious bonds and coupons, -as a plausible pretext for such legislation, -and their schemes of plunder will be accomplished. No greater calamity could, in my judgment, befall the country than the general adoption of the doctrine that it is not a constitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts, to embarrass their enforcement with onerous and destructive conditions, and thus to evade the performance of them.

I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia should be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to award the mandamus prayed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN. I understand my brethren of the majority, in the opinion read by the Chief Justice, to declare : That the bonds and coupons issued by Virginia, under the

Funding Act of March 30, 1871, constitute contracts within the meaning of that clause of the Federal Constitution which forbids a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts;

That the holder of a coupon, so issued, against whom State taxes are assessed, is entitled under his contract to have it applied in payment of them, when it is offered for that purpose;

That the act of Jan. 14, 1882, in so far as it prevents the tax-collector from receiving it, when so offered, for any purposes except that of identification and verification, is in conflict with the Federal Constitution, and, therefore, void;

That, as a general rule, the laws applicable to the case, in force at the time and place of making a contract, including those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement, enter into and form a part of the contract itself; and that while the State may alter or change existing remedies, it may not make such alterations and changes in the forms of action or the modes of proceeding as will impair substantial rights, or leave the party without an adequate and efficacious remedy for their enforcement;

I understand them, also, to reaffirm Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, where, among other things, this court, spering by Chief Justice Taney, said: "It is difficult, perhaps, t, draw a line that would be applicable in all cases between legitimate alterations of the remedy, and provisions which, in the form of remedy, impair the right. But it is manifest that the obligation of the contract, and the rights of a party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by denying a remedy altogether; or may be seriously impaired by burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions, so as to make the remedy hardly worth pursuing. And no one, we presume, would say that there is any substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract or class of contracts to be abrogated and void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or incumbered it with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it." p. 317.

I do not understand the court to throw any doubt upon, or in any degree to qualify the decision in, State of New Jer

sey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, 166, where it is declared that the contract clause of the Constitution "extends to contracts to which a State is a party, as well as to contracts between individuals;" or in Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 560, where this court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, said that it had been settled that a contract entered into between a State and an individual is as fully protected by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, as a contract between two individuals;" or in Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 84, where it was said, through Mr. Justice Washington, "that the Constitution of the United States embraces all contracts, executed or executory, whether between individuals, or between a State and individuals; and that a State has no more power to impair an obligation into which she herself has entered than she can the contracts of individuals;" or in Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 207, where, speaking by Mr. Justice McLean, the court declared that "a State can no more impair, by legislation, the obligation of its own contracts, than it can impair the obligation of the contracts of individuals;" or in Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 367, where, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, this court unanimously held "that the prohibition of the Constitution against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts applies to the contracts of States, and to those of its agents under its authority, as well as to contracts between individuals."

These propositions meet my hearty approval, as well because they rest upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution, as because they have been long established by the decisions of this court. But the difficulty I have is to reconcile the judgment in this case with these admitted propositions, and, therefore, I am, with my brother Field, constrained to dissent from so much of the opinion as maintains that the remedy provided by the act of Jan. 14, 1882, is adequate and efficacious for the protection and enforcement of the rights of the holders of the bonds and coupons, and substantially equivalent to that given when they were issued. On the contrary, the act, especially as subsequently modified, is, I take leave to say, a palpable and flagrant impairment of the obligation of the contract of Virginia, and, consequently, is unconstitutional and void. If it be

upheld in its application to the bonds and coupons issued under the Funding Act, it is difficult to perceive that the contract clause of the Constitution is of the slightest practical value for the preservation of the rights of parties dealing with a State. Indeed, the act, in its necessary operation, as directly and effectually impairs the commercial value of the bonds and the taxpaying power of the coupons thereunto annexed, as would a statute which in terms repudiated them, and forbade the receipt of the coupons, under any circumstances, for taxes or demands due to the Commonwealth.

What were the rights of the bondholder under the funding act, and other laws of Virginia in force when it was passed? This inquiry is fundamental, since those rights are entitled to judicial protection, either by the remedies existing when they accrued, or by such, if any, subsequently given, as may be adequate and efficacious to that end. Under the contract, Antoni was entitled, as all agree, to have his coupon received, when offered, in payment of his taxes. If, when so offered, it was refused, those laws provided him with the remedy of a mandamus from the Supreme Court of Appeals to compel the collector to accept it and cancel the taxes. This is conceded by my brethren of the majority, and no one claims that there was then any other remedy for the direct enforcement of the contract. And that remedy, it cannot be denied, was of value, since the taxes, until paid, constituted an incumbrance upon the taxpayer's property which he could not prudently overlook, and which he was entitled to have removed. It should be observed, in this connection, that section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution of Virginia, adopted in 1870, gave in express terms original jurisdiction to that court in cases of mandamus. Such were his contract rights under the act of 1871, and such was the remedy then given for their enforcement.

I proceed to inquire whether those rights have been impaired by the act of Jan. 14, 1882. The first section declares that the officer to whom coupons, issued under the act of 1871, are tendered in payment of taxes, debts, or demands due the State," shall receive the same for the purpose of identification and verification." The second section provides that he shall, at the same time, require the taxpayer to pay his taxes