The Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Iowa, Jan. 23, 1852, for the purpose of constructing a railroad from Burlington to the most eligible point on the Missouri River. The act of Congress of May 15, 1856, c. 28, under which the company claimed the lands, granted to the State of Iowa, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of railroads "from Burlington, on the Mississippi River, to a point on the Missouri River, near the mouth of the Platte River," &c., "every alternate section of land, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width on each side of said roads; " but it was provided that if any sections should be sold, or become subject to pre-emption, before the lines of the roads should be definitely fixed, other lands might be selected in lieu thereof, nearest to the tiers designated, but not to exceed fifteen miles from the lines of the roads. It was further provided, that the lands thus granted to the State should be subject to the disposal of the legislature thereof, for the purpose aforesaid, and no other.

The General Assembly of Iowa, by an act dated June 3, 1856, accepted this grant, and enacted (sect. 2)" that so much of the lands, interest, rights, powers, and privileges as are or may be granted and conferred, in pursuance of the act of Congress aforesaid, to aid in the construction of a railroad from Burlington, on the Mississippi River, to a point on the Missouri, near the mouth of Platte River, are hereby disposed of, granted, and conferred upon the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, a body corporate, created and existing under the laws of the State of Iowa."

The acts and clauses of acts referred to are sufficient to show the general nature of the litigation which sprang up between the parties now before the court.

The railroad company having claimed the right to appropriate certain of the lands in Mills County, which the county authorities claimed to be swamp and overflowed lands, the county, in December, 1863, commenced a suit in chancery against the railroad company to establish its title to the lands in question between them. The county court and the Supreme Court of the State decided in favor of the county, and

the railroad company brought the case to this court by writ of error, where it was pending when the compromise agreement in question was entered into. That agreement consisted of a proposition made by the county authorities to the railroad company, which was accepted by the latter. The following is a copy of the papers which passed between them:

Proposition of the County.

"In order to settle and finally adjust the lawsuit now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, wherein Mills County, in the State of Iowa, is plaintiff, and the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company is defendant, and secure the completion of said road through Mills County, via Glenwood, in said county, we, the undersigned, agents of said county, submit the following proposition to the board of directors of said railroad company, to wit:

"There are in dispute between the parties to the said lawsuit twenty-three thousand three hundred and sixteen acres. For the purpose of having our proposition understood, we acknowledge that we owe you acres of land to the amount of 23,316; to pay which we have and offer you odd sections, vacant (most of which is a part of the 23,316 acres), and even sections patented to the county and unsold, in the aggregate 9,080 acres; balance of the land due you, 14,236 acres. For further payment we have and offer to you of the odd sections (about all of which is of the 23,316 claimed by you), subject to pre-emption made through the county, acres to the amount of (on which nothing has been paid to the county) 4,660. Of these pre-empted lands we estimate that about one-half of the pre-emptions are fraudulent, and ought not to be recognized, but the county must ask that where bona fide improvements have been made on the same, the pre-emptors must be secured in their right to the same, and have the privilege of purchasing at $1.25 per acre of the county or company, which amount shall, in any event,

go to the railroad company. Now you will have land for land, subject only to the pre-emptor's claims, until there will be due you in acres 9,576.

"The remainder, 9,576 acres, belong to bona fide settlers and purchasers, who, we must insist, shall be protected by the county. And as we have paid you all the land we have, we offer you for this balance ten thousand dollars in money.

"The company should understand that the balance of 9,576 acres

is the land, portions of which it has been settling with our individual citizens for, and there is included in the 9,576 acres all the lands the company has sold to citizen settlers at $1.25 per acre. With this understanding, the $10,000 balance we offer you will be just as much less than 9,576 acres as the company has thus sold, and, therefore, our pay would perhaps amount to $1.50 or more.

"It is understood that the said suit now pending shall be continued, by agreement of the parties, from term to term, until the conditions of this contract or proposition shall be complied with.

"It is also further understood that the foregoing proposition shall not be binding on the county of Mills, unless said railroad company shall complete said railroad through Mills County via Glenwood and build a depot at Glenwood, in said county, and in case said railroad company shall fail or neglect to build said railroad through Mills County via Glenwood, and also to build and establish a depot at Glenwood, in said county, then, and in that event, the said lawsuit shall stand for final hearing in the Supreme Court of the United States, the same as if this proposition had never been made. In case the suit shall be settled on the basis of this proposition, each party shall pay their own costs. The manner of transferring the land, whether the county shall deal with the purchasers and preemptors, or whether the railroad company under the restrictions indicated, the county is not particular about, but will agree to what may seem most practicable.

"The amount in acres, as stated above, may not be exactly correct, and probably is not, but it is believed to be nearly so; but we wish it understood that the company shall have all the swamp lands the county now hold or are entitled to in Mills County, Iowa, subject only to the conditions indicated in the foregoing. Witness our hands this July 13, 1868. (Signed) Wm. Hale; E. C. Bosbyshell; D. H. Solomon; L. W. Tubbs: majority of the committee."

Acceptance.

"BURLINGTON, Iowa, October 27, 1868. "This proposition is hereby accepted, and the terms and stipulations and ccaditions are agreed to by the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company. (Signed) Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company: By C. E. Perkins, Supt."

This proposition and acceptance being reported by the committee to the board of supervisors of Mills County, the said board passed the following resolution: —

"After giving the report due consideration, it is resolved by the board of supervisors of Mills County, Iowa, at their regular session in November, 1868, that the proposition submitted to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Co., by our special railroad committee, and the acceptance of the same by the said company be, and the same is hereby, confirmed and ratified, and that the same be spread upon the records of this board.

"The ayes and nays being called for, the vote stands as follows: :

"Ayes - Allis, Forrester, Haynie, Lamb, Utterback, Wing, Ward, Russell, Summers, and Mr. Chairman. Nays - None."

Several deeds of conveyance were executed by the board of supervisors of Mills County to the company in the years 1869, 1870, and 1871, in pursuance of this compromise agreement, conveying altogether 13,720-55 acres of land.

The suit of Mills County (one of the consolidated suits now before us) was brought in January, 1874, against that company, and others, in the Mills County District Court, by petition seeking to have the said compromise agreement and the said deeds of conveyance declared void, on the ground that the said agreement was not authorized by a vote of the people of the county, but was obtained by fraud; that it involved a diversion of a trust fund, and a surrender by agents of the whole subjectmatter in controversy in a suit of their principal; that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, in the original suit, was duly affirmed by this court in February, 1870; and that, at an election held in October, 1871, for affirming or disaffirming said agreement, the people of Mills County disaffirmed the same by a vote of 1,031 against 357.

The suit of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company (successor to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company) against Mills County (the other of the consolidated suits now before us), was brought in May, 1875, to recover the sum of $10,000, which by the said compromise agreement was to be paid by Mills County to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company; and as the answer of the county set up the matters alleged in the petition in the other suit, the two suits were consolidated.

The Mills County District Court decided against the county

in both suits, and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decrees of the District Court. The decrees of the Supreme Court are brought here for review upon the allegation that they are repugnant to the laws and authority of the United States.

The principal Federal question which arises in these cases is, whether the compromise agreement made between Mills County and the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company was in violation of the act of Congress by which the swamp and overflowed lands in the State of Iowa were granted to that State. It is alleged that this grant was made for a special purpose, and upon express trust; viz., to be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to the purpose of reclaiming said lands by means of levees and drains, as declared in the act of 1850. It is not our province, on these writs of error, to inquire whether the compromise in question was or was not in violation of the State laws. That question was for the State court to determine; and it has been determined in the negative. Nor is it our province to inquire whether any fraud or excess of authority was committed by the agents of the county in making the compromise. That was also a question for the State court to determine; and it has been determined in the negative. We are only to inquire whether the State laws themselves, by virtue of which the said transaction was allowed and sanctioned, was such a violation of the act of Congress as to require a reversal of the decrees of the Supreme Court of Iowa.

The statutes in question have already received some consideration at the hands of this court in the cases of Emigrant Company v. County of Wright, 97 U. S. 339, and Emigrant Company v. County of Adams, 100 id. 61. Those cases came before us on appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. In both of them, certain contracts for the purchase of swamp and overflowed lands from the county authorities were assailed by charges of fraud, and as not being in conformity with the statutes of Iowa; and those questions were necessarily discussed. It was also contended that the disposition of the lands operated as a diversion of the fund, in violation of the original grant. In the first case, the contract was declared to be void for actual fraud of the grossest char