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Borcherling to be stricken from the files, with leave to him to apply for leave to file a cross-bill. He never applied for such leave. But the corporation filed a general replication to the answers of Close, Clendenin and Borcherling, proofs were taken, and the case was heard and decided upon the merits.

By the final decree of the court below, it was adjudged that Close convey the whole tract of ninety acres to the plaintiff corporation in fee-simple; that Close and Clendenin deliver to the plaintiff all books, plans, records and personal property, belonging to or used in connection with its business, and be perpetually enjoined from interfering with or obstructing the plaintiff in the possession and management of the cemetery; and the court being further of opinion that Close was entitled to be compensated for the transfer of his title in the land as the original proprietor thereof, and that the provision made for this object by the act of Congress of 1877 was an equitable adjustment of the rights of Close, and a reasonable compensation for his title and interest in the property, both in amount and in mode of payment, regard being had to the needs of the cemetery, it was further adjudged that the plaintiff annually hereafter account for and pay to him or his assigns one-fourth of the gross receipts from sales to be made of lots in the cemetery; and that an account be taken of his receipts from the cemetery since the act of 1877 took effect, and that he be charged in favor of the plaintiff with all sums, over and above one-fourth of the gross receipts from sales of lots, which had been applied to his own use and not properly disbursed on account of the cemetery, and that he pay the costs of suit; and that this decree be without prejudice to the claims of Borcherling as receiver as aforesaid.

From that decree appeals have been taken and argued by Close and Clendenin and by Borcherling.

The appeal of Borcherling may be briefly disposed of. The order striking his cross-bill from the files reserved leave to him to apply to the court for leave to file a cross-bill. He never made any such application, but, after replication filed to the answers of himself and of the other defendant, suffered proofs to be taken upon the issues so made up, and the case to proceed

to a final decree; and the final decree is expressed to be made without prejudice to his rights as receiver. Under these circumstances, there is nothing in the proceedings of the court below prejudicial to those rights, or which entitles him to a reversal of the final decree and to a reopening of the whole


Upon the merits of the case, as presented by the appeal of Close and Clendenin, it will be convenient to consider first the question whether, assuming that the charter granted by Congress in 1854 must be held to have been duly accepted by the corporation, and the corporation to have been legally organized under it, the act of 1877 is within the power of alteration, amendment and repeal, reserved to Congress in the original charter.

The terms of that charter show that it was not intended to create a mere land company, for the exclusive benefit of the original associates and their successors holding shares in the stock of the corporation; but that the ultimate and principal object was to establish and permanently maintain a cemetery for the burial of the dead, which, if not a strictly charitable use, is in some aspects a pious and public use, and was evidently so regarded by Congress. If the corporation were to be exclusively a private business corporation, created for the sole benefit of the original associates and their successors as holders of shares, Congress would hardly have inserted in the charter the provision authorizing the corporation to receive gifts and bequests for the purpose of ornamenting and improving the cemetery, or the provisions exempting the property from all taxation, and prohibiting the future laying out of any public ways through it.

At first, indeed, the whole immediate benefit derived from the property would be that resulting to the shareholders from the sale of lots, by way of dividend out of so much of the moneys received as might not be needed to be expended or reserved for the laying out, ornamenting and maintenance of the cemetery. But as fast as lots were sold, the property and interest of those purchasing and holding the land for its ultimate use of the permanent burial of the dead would increase, and the interest of the original associates would diminish. The

profits to be derived from the sale of the land would cease, as to each parcel, as soon as it was sold for a burial lot. When the lots were all sold, the pecuniary interest of the associates or shareholders would disappear; but the duty to keep up the cemetery would remain, and the owners of lots would be the only persons having a peculiar interest in keeping it up. The corporation, in short, was established to secure and maintain, not merely the right of sale, but the right of burial, and was the representative, not only of the original proprietors of the land, but also of the subsequent purchasers of lots therein.

At the beginning, before any lots were sold, the owners of shares, divided among the proprietors according to their respective interests, would necessarily be the only persons concerned, or who could elect the officers of the corporation and managers of the cemetery. But with the gradual change of interest, resulting from the sale of lots, it was in full accord with the provisions of the charter, and best tended to carry out the main purpose of permanently maintaining a cemetery for the burial of the dead, that the holders of lots should take part in the election and so have a voice in the management.

After the cemetery had been laid out, improved and used for the burial of the dead for more than twenty years, and two thousand burial lots had been sold, it was a reasonable exercise of the reserved power of Congress to authorize the owners in good faith of lots upon which burials had been made, to elect a majority of the trustees, in whom should be vested the control and management of the cemetery, with a due regard to the equitable rights of all persons having any vested interest therein; and to provide that a portion only of the receipts arising from the future sale of lots should be paid to the original proprietors, and the rest be devoted to the improvement and maintenance of the cemetery. Every legislative act is to be presumed to be a constitutional exercise of legislative power until the contrary is clearly established; and there is nothing in the record before us to show that the proportion of one-fourth of the gross receipts from future sales of lots, which is fixed by the act of Congress of 1877 and by the decree of the court below, as a compensation for the title and interest of the original proprietors and associates, is not a reasonable one.

It follows that the act of Congress of 1877 must be deemed constitutional and valid, within the principle affirmed by this court in the case of The Holyoke Dam, that a power reserved to the legislature to alter, amend or repeal a charter authorizes it to make any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject to it, which will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any rights vested under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure either that object or any public right. Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 451; Holyoke Company v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 522. In the exercise of such a power by the United States, as was observed by the Chief Justice in delivering the opinion of the court in the Sinking Fund Cases, "it is not only their right, but their duty, as sovereign, to see to it that the current stockholders do not, in the administration of the affairs of the corporation, appropriate to their own use that which in equity belongs to others." 99 U. S. 700, 725.

The question then recurs whether, as against Close, the corporation must be held to have been duly organized under the act of Congress of 1854.

Upon this question the facts are these: Close knew that the act of incorporation had been granted by Congress, in which he was named as one of the original associates; that the cemetery had been dedicated and set apart by public religious ceremonies for the burial of the dead; that a pamphlet had been published, containing a full account of those ceremonies, the names of a full board of officers, including himself as president and one of the managers, and Clendenin as superintendent, and a code of by-laws, by the very first of which all lots were to be held in pursuance of the act of incorporation and to be used for the purposes of sepulture alone. With full knowledge of these facts, Close, for more than twenty years, exercised through Clendenin the sole management of the cemetery, and issued deeds and certificates of burial lots to the number of more than two thousand, bearing the corporate seal, and his own signature as president of the corporation, and having the by-laws printed on them. Being himself the owner of the whole land, he dealt with it in all respects as if it belonged to

the corporation, and so represented it to the purchasers of lots. As no other person owned any part of the land or was entitled to a share in the corporation, the fact that no stock has been issued or divided is immaterial.

One who deals with a corporation as existing in fact is estopped to deny as against the corporation that it has been legally organized. And in a court of equity, at least, the owner of land, who stands by and sees it conveyed as belonging to another, cannot afterwards set up his own title against the grantee. The present case is yet stronger. Close did not merely deal with the corporation, and permit the corporation to convey parts of his land to purchasers of lots. But he himself assumed to act as the corporation, and himself made the conveyance, and the accompanying representations, to every purchaser.

By his acts he represented to the purchasers of lots that the cemetery had been created and the land was owned by the corporation under the charter of 1854, and, as a necessary consequence, that the corporation, and all rights derived from it, were subject to the provisions of that charter, including the reservation to Congress of the power of alteration, amendment or repeal. It is upon these representations that the purchasers of lots have acquired their title and have parted with their money; and the corporation, whose existence he, at least, cannot deny, has the right and the duty, as the representative and in behalf of all the purchasers of lots, to enforce against him the obligation which he has thereby assumed. He holds the fee of the cemetery in trust for the corporation, and is entitled to nothing, as against the corporation and those whom it represents, but such compensation for his interest as original proprietor or stockholder, as is consistent with the state of things which he has represented to exist.

It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the estoppel and the obligation of Close cannot extend beyond the thirty acres which had been actually laid out. This argument appears to us to be fully met and answered in the able and thorough opinion of the court below, delivered by Mr. Justice Cox, who says: "It was held out to the lot-holders, not only that the ground immediately available for burial

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