same collection district; 3, that the Secretary of the Treasury actually distributed one-fourth part of the distributable sums to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York, as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, and paid no part to the claimant; and, 4, that such distribution was made in accordance with the uniform practice of the Treasury Department, under the said act of 1867. From these findings it is to be understood that it was the uniform practice of the Treasury Department, under the act of 1867, to distribute one-fourth part of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York (such as the proceeds in this case were) to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at that port, as such collector, naval officer, and surveyor, such one-fourth part not including any part of any share which under said statute goes to the informer or to the officer making the seizure.. The demand made by the claimant in this case in his petition has no reference to the one-fourth part which the statute awards to the informer or the seizing officer.

The controversy arises over the meaning of these words in the act of 1867: "The remaining one-fourth to be equally divided between the collector, naval officer, an' surveyor, or such of them as are appointed for the district in which the seizure has been made, or the fine or penalty incurred." It is said, in substance, in the opinion of the Court of Claims in this case, reported in 14 Ct. of Claims Rep. 305, that the Secretary of the Treasury, in the practice spoken of, proceeded on the view that the port of New York was the only port of entry in said collection district; that the ports of Albany, Troy, and Port Jefferson, though ports in said collection district and ports of delivery, were not ports of entry; that the statute spoke only of "the collector, naval officer, and surveyor;" that the words "or such of them as are appointed for the district in which the seizure has been made, or the fine or penalty incurred," could not enlarge the meaning of the word "surveyor" to the plural sense, because it could not so enlarge the meaning of the word "collector" or the words "naval officer," as there was but one of each of them in any district; and that the surveyor intended, in reference to cases like the present, was the surveyor of the port where the fines, penalties, and forfeitures

were incurred. The court observed that, as the provisions of the act of 1867 awarding shares of forfeitures had been repealed by sect. 2 of the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, and as Congress had not interfered with such construction by the Secretary of the Treasury while the act was in force, and as the claimant had raised no question in regard to such construction until March, 1874, and had been informed by the Treasury Department in June, 1874, that it adhered to such construction, and had not complained again until March, 1877, but had permitted moneys to be distributed under such view, until he brought this suit in May, 1877 (facts which appear in the findings of the court below), the construction adopted had become the one which must govern all distributions under the act. The court added, that such construction did not appear to it unreasonable, and might well have been reached in the exercise of a sound judgment, and that, regarding the statute as ambiguous, all the circumstances of the case were such as to justify the application of the principle of interpretation sanctioned by this court in United States v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265, that, "in the case of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who have been called upon to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect, Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 210," and where this court refused to interfere with such construction after it had been acted upon for a long time. See also United States v. Alexander, 12 Wall. 177; Peabody v. Stark, 16 id. 240; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 id. 374; United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760.

We are satisfied with the decision of the Court of Claims, and with the grounds above stated as assigned by it therefor, and its judgment is

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL v. UNITED STATES.

A party who, under sect. 4 of the act of Aug. 5, 1861, c. 45, is entitled to the drawback there mentioned may, when payment thereof has been refused, maintain a suit therefor in the Court of Claims against the United States.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Joseph H. Choate and Mr. William M. Evarts for the appellants.

Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Maury for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The fourth section of the act of Aug. 5, 1861, c. 45, reads as follows: "That from and after the passage of this act there shall be allowed, on all articles wholly manufactured of materials imported, on which duties have been paid, when exported, a drawback equal in amount to the duty paid on such materials, and no more, to be ascertained under such regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury: Provided, that ten per centum on the amount of all drawbacks so allowed shall be retained for the use of the United States by the collectors paying such drawbacks respectively."

On the 22d of January, 1862, the Secretary established such regulations as he deemed appropriate, the first of which is this:

"To entitle the exporter to such allowance of drawback, he must, at least six hours previous to the putting or lading any of the articles intended to be exported by him for benefit of drawback on board any vessel or other conveyance for exportation, lodge with the collector of customs for the district from which such exportation is to be made, an entry setting forth his intention to export such articles, and the marks, numbers, and a particular description of the same, with their quantity and value, and designating the manufacturer thereof, the place where deposited, the name of the vessel or other conveyance in or by which, and the port or place to which the same are intended to be exported, and also describing in such entry the material or materials severally from which he claims the arti

cles to have been manufactured, designating when, where, whence, by whom, and in what vessel or other conveyance the same was or were imported, and specifying the quantity and value thereof used in the manufacture. This entry shall, upon presentation, be verified by the oath or affirmation of the proprietor and the foreman of the manufactory in which such articles were made."

Other regulations require the collector and the surveyor to make the necessary examination to ascertain if the articles described in this entry be as stated, and to mark and designate them accordingly, and to verify the weight, gauge, measure, or amount, and to superintend the lading for export, &c.

All this having been done, and the oath of the exporter and his bond, with condition prescribed by the rules, being given, the collector is to give a certificate of the amount to which the party is entitled as drawback, on which he is to receive the money.

George W. Campbell and George A. Thayer, survivors of Ludlow D. Campbell, deceased, sued in the Court of Claims for a drawback on account of large amounts of linseed cake made by them out of linseed imported from a foreign country, and which cake they exported to London.

Their petition was dismissed by that court, on the ground, as stated in their opinion, that it was not a case of which they had jurisdiction.

The court, however, did entertain jurisdiction of the case; an answer was filed on behalf of the United States denying the allegations of the petition, testimony was taken, and a full and elaborate finding of facts was made, and on this, the court, as a conclusion of law, find that for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter the petition is dismissed.

This finding of facts shows that in the months of September, October, November, and December, 1870, claimants imported from Calcutta large quantities of linseed, for which they paid the duty of sixteen cents per hundred pounds according to law, which was by them, without intermixture with any other linseed or other material, manufactured into linseed oil and linseed cake, of the latter of which article there was produced therefrom 5,156,585 pounds.

It was for the exportation of part of this latter product that the drawback is claimed in this suit. As, however, this was done by several shipments at different times, and as the finding of facts is precisely the same in the case of each shipment, except as to date, quantity, and the name of the vessel, we give here verbatim the finding as to the first:

"On the nineteenth day of January, 1871, the claimants and said Ludlow D. Campbell were the owners of and had in their possession 447,712 pounds of linseed cake, being parcel of the aforesaid 5,156,585 pounds, and desiring and intending to export the same from New York to London for the benefit of the drawback authorized by the fourth section of the Act to provide increased revenue from imports to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes,' approved August 5, 1861, duly presented to and lodged with the collector of customs for the port of New York, before putting or lading any of the said cake on board any vessel for exportation, an entry of said linseed cake for export by the ship Sterling Castle,' which was accompanied with the certificate and oath required by, and was in all respects in conformity with, the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance of the requirement of the fourth section of said act, and the said claimants and said Ludlow D. Campbell in all respects conformed to such regulations in respect to drawback, which allowance had been by said regulations fixed at seventeen cents per one hundred pounds, and made payable by the United States thirty days after clearance of the vessel by which exportation was made, but the said collector, acting under instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, given on the fifth day of December, 1870, wholly refused to perform or cause to be performed in any manner any other act than the receipt of said entry prescribed by said regulations to be done, or caused to be done, by a collector of customs under the said fourth section of said act.

"Thereafter, in the month of January, 1871, the said 447,712 pounds of linseed cake were shipped by the claimants and said Ludlow D. Campbell, on the said ship Sterling Castle,' which vessel, with said linseed cake on board, cleared at the customhouse at the port of New York for London on the thirtieth day of January, 1871, and said cake was thereupon exported and