clerk to a firm of attorneys, in completing the sale of certain property, received the balance of the purchase-money and appropriated it to his own use. On affidavits stating the facts, a

motion was made to strike him off the rolls. He admitted the misappropriation, and was accordingly suspended for twelve months. Said Chief Justice Cockburn: "In this case, if the delinquent had been proceeded against criminally upon the facts admitted by him, it is plain that he would have been convicted of embezzlement, and upon that conviction being brought before us, we should have been bound to act. If there had been a conflict of evidence upon the affidavits, that might be a very sufficient reason why the court should not interfere until the conviction had taken place; but here we have the person against whom the application is made admitting the facts." It is difficult to see the pertinency of this decision to the position taken by my brethren. These two cases are, in the language used, the strongest to be found in the reports on that side; but their facts give it no strength what

ever.

In Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, the attorney had been convicted of forging a deposition used by him in a suit against his wife for a divorce; and though pardoned for the crime, the fraud upon the court remained, and for that and for other disreputable practices and professional misconduct, rendering him "unfit and unsafe to be intrusted with the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the legal profession," he was disbarred.

In Delano's Case, 58 N. H. 5, where an attorney was disbarred by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for wrongfully appropriating to his own use money of a town received by him as a collector of taxes, the commission of the offence was admitted. This is evident from the statement of the court in its opinion that "he and his wife and family did what they could to make good the loss to the town, but with only partial

In Perry v. The State, 3 Greene (Iowa), 550, the false swearing charged as one of the grounds of complaint against the attorney was committed in a cause managed by him, in which he voluntarily appeared as a witness, thus practising a

fraud upon the court by employing to sustain his cause means inconsistent with truth and honor.

In Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461, the attorney had forged an affidavit to obtain a change of venue, and had thus grossly imposed upon the court. For this imposition, independently of the crime committed, he was properly disbarred.

In Ex parte Burr, 2 Cranch C. C. 379, the charges against the attorney were for malpractice in his profession, in advising a person in jail, who was either a recognized witness or a defendant for whom some person was special bail, to run away; instituting suits against parties, and appearing for parties without authority; bringing vexatious and frivolous suits, many of them for persons utterly insolvent; purchasing a lot at a trustee's sale of an insolvent's estate under unfair circumstances; making fictitious claims and bringing suits with a view to extort money; and taking a bill of sale from one about to be distrained for rent to prevent such distress. These charges having been sustained, the attorney was rightly suspended from practice for one year.

In Re John Percy, 36 N. Y. 651, there were several charges against the attorney, such as that his general reputation was bad; that he had been several times indicted for perjury, one or more of which indictments were pending; that he was a common mover and maintainer of suits on slight and frivolous pretexts; and that his personal and professional reputation had been otherwise impeached in a trial at the circuit. But the court appears to have based its action upon the character of the attorney as a vexatious mover of suits on frivolous grounds. "He was crowding the calendar," said the court, "with vast numbers of libel suits in his own favor, and in the habit of indicating additional libel suits upon the answers to those previously brought by him. In one instance, at least, he had sued his client in a justice's court, and when beaten upon trial, instead of appealing from the judgment he commenced numerous other suits against him in different forms for the same cause, when he must have known that the demand was barred by the first judgment rendered. The only inquiry is whether, in such a case, the court has the power to protect the public by preventing such persons from practising as attorneys and counsellors

in the courts of the State, and by that means harass its citizens." And the court held that it had the power under a special statute of the State authorizing the removal or suspension of attorneys and counsellors, when guilty of any deceit, malpractice, or misdemeanor; and that its power was not limited to cases where such deceit, malpractice, or misdemeanor was practised or committed in the exercise of the profession only, but under the statute extended to cases where there was general bad character or misconduct.

None of these cases, as is manifest from the statement I have made, covers that of an indictable offence, wholly distinct from the attorney's professional conduct. None of them countenances the extraordinary authority of the courts over attorneys and counsellors asserted by my brethren. And, indeed, if the law be that a Circuit Court of the United States, upon whisperings in the ear of one of its judges on the streets, or upon information derived from rumor, or in some other irregular way, that an attorney has committed a public offence, having no relation to the discharge of his professional duties, can summon him to answer for the offence in advance of trial or conviction and summarily punish him, it is time the law was changed by statute. Such a power cannot be safely intrusted to any tribunal. It might be exercised under the excitement of passion and prejudice, as the records of courts abundantly show. Its maintenance would tend to repress all independence on the part of the bar. Men of high honor would hesitate to join a profession in which their conduct might be subjected to investigation, censure, and punishment from imputations and charges thus secretly made.

Seeing that this must be the inevitable result of such an unlimited power of the court over its attorneys, my brethren are careful to express the opinion that it should seldom be exercised, when the offence charged against the attorney is indictable, until after trial and conviction, unless its commission is admitted.

But the possession of the power being conceded, and its exercise being discretionary, there is in the hands of an unscrupulous, vindictive, or passionate judge, means of oppression and cruelty which should not be allowed in any free government.

To disbar an attorney is to inflict upon him a punishment of the severest character. He is admitted to the bar only after years of study. The profession may be to him the source of great emolument. If possessed of fair learning and ability, he may reasonably expect to receive from his practice an income of several thousand dollars a year,-equal to that derived from a capital of one or more hundred thousand dollars. To disbar him having such a practice is equivalent to depriving him of this capital. It would often entail poverty upon himself, and destitution upon his family. Surely the tremendous power of inflicting such a punishment should never be permitted to be exercised unless absolutely necessary to protect the court and the public from one shown by the clearest legal proof to be unfit to be a member of an honorable profession.

To disbar an attorney for an indictable offence not connected with his professional conduct, before trial and conviction, is also to inflict an additional wrong upon him. It is to give the moral weight of the court's judgment against him upon the trial on an indictment for that offence.

I am of opinion, therefore, that the prayer of the petitioner should be granted, and a peremptory mandamus directed to the Circuit Court to vacate the order of expulsion and restore him to the bar. The writ is the appropriate remedy in a case where the court below, in disbarring an attorney, has exceeded its jurisdiction. Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Ex parte Robinson, 19 id. 505.

ROTH V. EHMAN.

This court has no jurisdiction to re-examine the judgment of a State court recognizing as valid the decree of a foreign court annulling a marriage.

MOTION to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Julius Rosenthal and Mr. A. M. Pence in support of the motion.

Mr. C. M. Harris in opposition thereto.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the

court.

The only question in this case controverted below was whether Madelaine Roth, the plaintiff in error, was the widow of John George Roth, deceased, and that depended entirely on the validity of the decree of the Royal Matrimonial Court of Elwangen, in the Kingdom of Wurtemburg, annulling the marriage of the parties. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided in favor of the validity of the Wurtemburg decree, and consequently that she was not his widow and not entitled to dower in his estate, or to inheritance under the laws of Illinois. This presents no question of which we can take cognizance under sect. 709 of the Revised Statutes. No right, title, privilege, or immunity which could be claimed under the authority of the United States was involved, and the validity of no treaty or statute of, or any authority exercised under, the United States was drawn in question. Neither was there any statute or authority of the State relied on which was in conflict with the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.

Motion granted.