plosion took place without any apparent cause. The court, at trial, charged the jury that they must find for defendant, unless they found that the defendant carelessly and negligently kept the gunpowder upon his premises. Held error. Negligence alone in the keeping of gunpowder is not the controlling test of liability. The dangers arising from the locality where it is kept are to be taken into consideration. While a man may prosecute such a business as he chooses on his own premises, he has no right to erect and maintain a nuisance to the injury of an adjoining proprietor, even in a lawful trade. The cases which are regarded as private nuisances are numerous. Aldred's case, 9 Coke, 58; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 159; Dubois v. Budlong, 15 Abb. 445; Wier's Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 230. One class of reported cases refers to acts done on the premises of the owner which are of themselves dangerous to the property and the persons of others who may reside in the vicinity or who may by chance be passing in the neighborhood. It is not necessary that the noxious trade endangers the health of the neighborhood. The use of premises in a manner which causes a noise so continuous and excessive as to produce serious annoyance, or vapor, or noxious smells. Tipping v. St. Helens, etc., Co., 4 B. & S. 608. Bull v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354; Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 444. The burning of brick kilns from which gases escape, injuring trees, Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568; and blasting of rocks with gunpowder, are nuisances when dangerous or annoying to neighbors. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. 42; S. C., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain v. Cohoes Co., id. 163; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 523. The last cited cases rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo, etc., and that it is better as a matter of public policy that a single individual should surrender the use of his land for particular purposes, injurious to his neighbors, than that they should be deprived of the use of their property altogether, or be subjected to great danger. The keeping of gunpowder or other materials in a place or under circumstances where it would be liable, in case of explosion, to injure the dwelling-houses or the persons of those residing in close proximity, rests upon the same principle. An individual has no more right to keep a magazine of powder upon his premises, which is dangerous, to the detriment of his neighbor, than he is authorized to engage in any other business which may occasion serious consequences. The case of People v. Sands, 1 Johns. 78, and Fillo v. Jones, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 121, distinguished. Judgment reversed. Heeg, appellant, v. Licht. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided April 6, 1880.]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

ABSTRACT.

was

BANK DEPOSIT -MADE WHEN CHECK HANDED INSURETYSHIP -USAGE. - Defendant agreed on the afternoon of the 23d of February, "to guarantee and make good to plaintiff, a bank, any sum or sums which may hereafter be held against C., to an amount not exceeding $50,000," and notice "from time to time of the amount and extent of such indebtedness" waived. This agreement was not to apply to past indebtedness. Before its execution on the same day a check for $10,000, drawn by C. on the bank, was presented by the payee, who was a depositor, and received by the bank. The pass-book of the depositor was not presented at the time. Evidence was given by the bank to show that there existed a usage in the place where the bank was located and it existed in the bank and was known to its customers, by which checks left in the bank in the morning by depositors were held until after close of the bank, subject to be returned in the afternoon if found, upon balancing the accounts, not to be good. Evidence was given to contradict the

existence of such usage, and also that the depositor of the check had no knowledge or understanding in regard to said check, except that it was received on deposit and as a deposit when it was left with the bank. Held, that if the check was handed in and received as a deposit the defendant was not liable for the amount on his guarantee, and it was for the jury to say whether it was a consummated deposit and the usage shown would not affect the matter if not known to the depositor. When a check on itself is offered to a bank as a deposit, the bank has the option to accept or reject it, or to receive it upon such conditions as may be agreed upon. If it be rejected, there is no room for any doubt or question between the parties. If on the other hand, the check is offered as a deposit and received as a deposit, there being no fraud, and the check genuine, the parties are no less bound and concluded than in the former case. Neither can disavow or repudiate what has been done. The case is simply one of an executed contract. There are the requisite parties, the requisite consideration, and the requisite concurrence and assent of the minds of those concerned. It was well said by an eminent chief justice: "If there has ever been a doubt on this point, there should be none hereafter." Oddie v. Nat. City Bank of New York, 45 N. Y. 742. A general usage may be proved in proper cases, to remove ambiguities and uncertainties in a contract, or to annex incidents, but it cannot destroy, contradict, or modify what is otherwise manifest. Where the intent and meaning of the parties are clear, evidence of a usage to the contrary is irrelevant and unavailing. Usage cannot make a contract where there is none, nor prevent the effect of the settled rules of law. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 390; Bliven v. New Eng. Screw Co., 23 How. 433; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 208; Adams v. Morse, 51 Me. 499; Thompson v. Riggs, 5 Wall. 674; Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill, 497. Judgment of U. S. Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio, affirmed. First National Bank of Cincinnati, plaintiff in error, v. Burkhardt. Opinion by Swayne, J.

EVIDENCE-WHERE PAROL ADMISSIBLE TO EXPLAIN WRITING. In an action on a contract with the United States to furnish hay, etc., to a military post, located among the Indians, where deductions for failure to fulfill the contract were claimed by the United States, held, that parol evidence was admissible to explain the surrounding circumstances of the contract, that the hay could be cut only in one neighborhood, which fact was known to the government officers making the contract; that the conduct of the government agents led the contractor to rely upon a particular means of fulfilling the contract, until it was too late to perform it in any other way; that the government agents prevented him from employing those means, and that the supply of hay upon which the contractor depended was taken away by those agents themselves, etc. That the subject-matter of a contract may be shown by parol evidence of the surrounding circumstances, see Bradley v. Washington Steam Packet Co., 13 Pet. 99; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 12; Maryland v. R. R. Co., 22 id. 113; Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 30; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 277; Taylor's Ev., § 1082. And that the conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other from performing his part is an excuse for nonperformance, see Addison on Contracts, § 326; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528. In the case last cited, the defendant was sued on a bond obliging him by a certain time to procure and cancel a mortgage of the plaintiff and deliver the same to him. The defendant was allowed to prove by parol that he procured the mortgage, and having inquired of the plaintiff what he should do with it, was directed to place it in the hands of a third person. This was held to be an excuse for not having fully performed the condition. Judge

Thompson said: "It is a sound principle that he who prevents a thing being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. Had not the plaintiff dispensed with a further compliance with the condition of the bond, it is probable that the defendant would have taken measures to ascertain what steps were requisite to get the mortgage discharged of record, and would have literally complied with the condition of the bond." So when A gave to B a bond to convey certain premises, but they subsequently agreed by parol to rescind the contract, and A thereupon sold the premises to a third person, it was held that though the bond was not cancelled or given up, nor any of the papers changed, yet by the parol agreement and the acts of the parties under it, the bond was discharged. Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. 48; and see 2 Cow. & H.'s Notes to Phill. on Ev. 605. The principle involved in these cases is applicable to the present. Judgment of Court of Claims affirmed. United States, appellant, v. Peck. Opinion by Bradley, J.

FORMER ADJUDICATION- EQUITABLE ACTION TO SET

ASIDE CONVEYANCE WHEN MAINTAINABLE WITHOUT

EXHAUSTING LEGAL REMEDY. — In an equitable action to follow and subject to the payment of a debt due by the firm of M. & B. to the First National Bank, certain property, formerly belonging to the firm, which had been transferred to defendant, the bill charged that the transfer was fraudulent; that the bank had a lien on the property, etc., and averred that the firm and its members were insolvent; that a suit at law and judgment would be fruitless, as the firm or its members, since the transfer, had no property whatever, on which an execution could be levied, etc. It was not alleged that any judgment at law had been recovered and execution returned unsatisfied. The complaint was dismissed. Held, a bar to a subsequent action for the same purpose in which the bill set up the same allegations as to transfer and lien, etc., and also that a judgment at law had been recovered against the firm and its members after the decree dismissing the first bill and that execution thereon had been returned unsatisfied. While the rule is a familiar one, that a court of equity will not entertain a case for relief where the complainant has an adequate legal remedy, the complaining party must, therefore, show that he has done all that he could do at law to obtain his rights. But, after all, the judgment and fruitless execution are only evidence that his legal remedies have been exhausted, or that he is without remedy at law. They are not the only possible means of proof. The necessity of resort to a court of equity may be made otherwise to appear. Neither law nor equity requires a meaningless form, "Bona seu impossibilia non cogit lex." It has been decided that where it appears by the bill that the debtor is insolvent and that

the issuing of an execution would be of no practical utility, the issue of an execution is not a necessary prerequisite to equitable interference. Turner v. Adams, 46 Mo. 95; Postlethwait v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 365; Bank v. Harvey, 16 id. 148; Botsford v. Beers, 11 Coun. 369; Payne v. Sheldon, 63 Barb. 169. So it has been held that a creditor, without having first obtained a judgment at law, may come into a court of equity to set aside fraudulent conveyances of his debtor, made for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors, and to subject the property to the payment of the debt due him. Thurmond v. Reese, 3 Ga. 449; Cornell v. Radway, 22 Wis. 260; Sanderson v. Stockdale, 11 Md. 563. In Brisay v. Hogan, 53 Me. 554, it was ruled that when a creditor seeks by his bill to obtain payment of his debt from land paid for by the debtor, but conveyed to his wife, a levy of an execution is unnecessary, if the debtor never had legal title to the land. See, also, Day v. Washburne, 24 How. 352. The foundation upon which these and many other similar cases rest is that

judgments and fruitless executions are not necessary to show that the creditor has no adequate legal remedy. When the debtor's estate is a mere equitable one, which cannot be reached by any proceeding at law, there is no reason for requiring attempts to reach it by legal processes. And it may be said that whenever a creditor has a trust in his favor, or a lien upon property for the debt due him, he may go into equity without exhausting legal processes or remedies. Tappan v. Evans, 11 N. H. 311; Holt v. Bancroft, 30 Ala. 193. Decree of U. S. Circuit Court, Louisiana, affirmed, Case, receiver, appellant, v. New Orleans & Carrolton Railroad Co. et al. Opinion by Strong, J.

NATIONAL BANKS-ACTIONS AGAINST STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. The provision in relation to suits against National banks of U. S. Revised Statutes, section 5198, that "suits, actions and proceedings against any association under this title, may be had in any Circuit, District or Territorial Court of the United States, held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases," held, to apply to transitory actions only, and not to such actions as are by law local in their character. Section 5136 subjects the banks to suits at law or in equity as fully as natural persons, and there is nowhere in the Banking Act any evidence of an intention on the part of Congress to exempt banks from the ordinary rules of law affecting the locality of actions founded on local things. The distinction between local and transitory actions is as old as actions themselves, and no one has ever supposed that laws, which prescribed generally where one should be sued, included such suits as were local in their character, either by statute or the common law, unless it was expressly so declared. Local actions are in the nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded is situated. To give the act of Congress a different construction would be in effect to declare that a National bank could not be sued at all in a local action where the thing about which the suit was brought was not in the judicial district of the United States within which the bank was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress. Judgment of Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. Casey, receiver, plaintiff in error, v. Adams et al. Opinion by Waite, C. J.

NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT

ABSTRACT.*

CONTRACT ASSUMPSIT-WHEN IT LIES FOR WORK DONE ON INCOMPLETED. — A contractor may maintain

general assumpsit for services rendered in part execu

tion of the contract, when he has been discharged by the other party without right, before the completion of the work. Moulton v. Trask, 9 Metc. 577; Canada v. Canada, 6 Cush. 15; Derby v. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17; Planche v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14; Goodman v. Pocock, 15 A. & E. (N. S.) 576. Carroll v. Giddings. Opinion by Bingham, J.

DAMAGES -BOND-PENALTY OR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.-The question whether the amount of a bond is a penalty or liquidated damages is a question of the intention of the parties, to be determined like a question of fact, by the weight of competent evidence, and not by any technical rule of construction. Cases cited, Rice v. Society, 56 N. H. 191; Chamberlain v. Bagley, 11 id. 234; Brewster v. Edgerley, 13 id. 275; Mead v. Wheeler, id 351; Blaisdell v. Blaisdell, 14 id. 78; Davis v. Gillett, 52 id. 126; Noyes v. Phillips, GO

* To appear in 58 New Hampshire Reports.

N. Y. 408; Chase v. Allen, 13 Gray, 42. Houghton v. Pattee. Opinion by Doe, C. J.

NEGLIGENCE-EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIAN BY INJURED PERSON-RULE AS TO CARE-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. In an action against a town for personal injuries from a defective highway, the rule as to the degree of care required to be exercised by the plaintiff in the employment of a physician and surgeon, and in procuring and submitting to proper medical treatment, is not changed by the fact that the plaintiff was himself a physician and surgeon. The degree of prudence he must exercise in selecting a physician and the means to cure his injuries, is the same as a traveller on a highway is required to use in selecting his horse, harness, etc. Tuttle v. Farmington, 58 N. H. 13; such care and prudence as mankind in general use. Collins v. City of Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; 7 Am. Rep. 200; Lyons v. Erie Ry. Co., 57 N. Y. 489; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197; Baldwin v. Turnpike Co., 40 Conn. 238. If the vices of the horse or the defects in the carriage, unknown to the traveller without fault, contribute, the town is still liable. Clark v. Barrington, 41 N. H. 44; Tucker v. Henniker, id. 317; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411. Boynton v. Somersworth. Opinion by Clark, J.

PAYMENT-ACCEPTANCE OF SUM LESS THAN DUE. The payment and acceptance of a sum less than the amount due on an unliquidated claim, in discharge of the whole claim, is a liquidation and payment of it. When a creditor relinquishes the residue of his claim upon being paid a part thereof, there must be some consideration for the relinquishment, or something to show the possibility of a benefit to the creditor; otherwise the agreement is only nudum pactum. Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East, 230. But this rule is confined to a case of debt, or to a claim for a liquidated amount. Donohue v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 148, 150; and not to an agreement made in compromise of a doubtful claim on sufficient consideration. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Metc. 551; nor where the claim is for unliquidated damages. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 28; Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 A. & E. 106. Hilliard v. Noyes. Opinion by Smith, J.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT ABSTRACT.
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1880.

ACTION FOR TORT— JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE TORTFEASOR SATISFIED DISCONTINUES OTHER ACTION

AGAINST OTHERS FOR SAME TORT.-Plaintiff brought three separate actions of tort against three defendants severally to recover for the same cause of action. One of the three actions was tried and a verdict for $500 and costs rendered in favor of plaintiff, and execution issued thereon and satisfied. Thereafter the other two defendants in their respective cases filed supplemental answers setting forth that the action being for one and the same cause of action, and a judgment against one of the wrong-doers having been satisfied, plaintiff could not maintain action against the others. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment for nominal damages and costs against said two defendants. When an injury is done to one man by the wrongful act of several, the law allows him to proceed against them either jointly or severally, and if he sues them severally, he may prosecute all the actions to judgment, although he can have but one satisfaction for the same injury. By our law, judgment against one without satisfaction does not bar an action against the others. Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1; Elliott v. Hayden, 104 Mass. 180. But after judgment is satisfied against one no action can be commenced against the others. And here the plaintiff, after having submitted the effect of the defeuse, pleaded in the supplemental

answers to the judgment of the court, cannot object that these answers were not duly filed; and the judgment and satisfaction against a joint wrong-doer, having been pleaded by the defendants and admitted by the plaintiff, is a bar to these actions for the same injury. See Gilmore v. Carr, 2 Mass. 171; Simonds v. Center, 6 id. 18; Porter v. Ingraham, 10 id. 88; Whipple v. Newton, 17 Pick. 168; Farwell v. Hilliard, 3 N. H. 318; Maine Bank v. Osborne, 13 Me. 49. Savage v. Stevens. Opinion by Gray, C. J.

"FAMILY"-IN WILL DOES NOT INCLUDE STEP-SON.A testator in his will directed a house to be purchased, at a cost not exceeding $1,000, to be held in trust for the benefit of A. D., during his life, and to be conveyed to his family at his death. A. D. died during the life-time of testator. At testator's death there survived the widow of A. D., his son, and W., his step-son, who had lived in his family and was supported by him at the time of his death. Held, that the gift in remainder to "his family " did not lapse by the death of A. D. in the life-time of the testator. "His family," in the absence of words manifesting a different intention, must be taken to mean his widow and child, and not to include his step-son. Bates v. Dewson. Opinion by Gray, C. J.

FIRE INSURANCE-CONDITION AS TO OWNERSHIPMORTGAGE-LEASE. — A fire policy on a building contained this provision: "If the interest of the assured in the property be other than the entire, unconditional and sole ownership of the property, for the use and benefit of the assured, or if the building insured stands on leased ground, it must be so represented to the company, and so expressed in the written part of this policy, otherwise the policy shall be void." The insured property was in the possession of assured and was subject to mortgages and to a lease for five years, and these facts were not expressed in the policy. Held, that the policy was not avoided. This clause was inserted for the benefit of the insurance company. It is to be construed strictly against it, and liberally in behalf of the assured. In this Commonwealth as to all the world except the mortgagee, a mortgagor is the owner of the mortgaged land, at least until the mortgagee has entered for possession. This being tho law, and the mortgagee not being in possession of the premises, the assured might well be described in a policy of insurance as the owner of the property insured; and where his estate is in fee simple, not an estate for life, and not a base, qualified or conditional fee, it might well be described as the entire and unconditional ownership; and, if he had no joint tenant or tenant in common, his estate would be well described as the sole ownership. As between him and the insurance company, the mortgages and the lease were mere incumbrances on his title, not affecting its character as entire, and not changing it from an absolute to a conditional estate or ownership. The lease for years created only a chattel interest in the premises, not affecting the ownership of the fee. It was merely an incumbrance. See Insurance Co. v. Haven, 95 U. S. 242; Taylor v. Etna Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 254; Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Barker, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 503. Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co. Opinion by Soule, J.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

MORTGAGE- -MORTGAGEE MAY PAY TAXES THOUGH LEGAL FORMALITIES IN ASSESSMENT NOT COMPLIED WITH, AND ADD TO MORTGAGE.-A mortgagee of lands to protect his security paid the taxes assessed thereon. Held, that he might have the amount paid added to his mortgage debt and that an objection by the mortgagor that the taxes were not assessed as required by

law by reason of the facts that the assessor did not take the oath required by law, or any oath that no tax list and duplicate were made as required, and no warrant issued to the treasurer as required, would not lie, there being no allegation that the lands were not taxable, nor that the taxes, if properly levied, were not justly chargeable against the lands. Where the payment of taxes assessed on real estate is necessary to protect the security, the mortgagee may pay the same and have the amount paid added to the mortgage debt as expenses necessarily incurred in protecting the security. Godfrey v. Watson, 3 Atk. 517; Mix v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn. 32; Williams v. Hilton, 35 Me. 547; Page v. Foster, 7 N. H. 392; Kortright v. Cady, 23 Barb. 497; Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H. 475. And where the land is liable to taxation, and taxes, if legally assessed, would be a legal charge upon the same, and there are no special circumstances showing the tax to be unjust or inequitable, a court of equity will not declare such tax void because some of the formalities necessary to make a tax deed valid had not been complied with. Southard v. Dorrington. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

[Decided March 18, 1880.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - LIABLE ON IMPLIED CONTRACT FOR BENEFITS SECURED MISTAKE OF FACT. The Legislature of Nebraska donated to the county of S. 1,000 acres, which were conveyed to the county by the State to aid in the construction of a bridge across the B. river. The county conveyed the land, which was valued at $5,000, to plaintiff's assignor, H., in consideration of which and an additional sum H. agreed to build the bridge. After the bridge was built it was discovered that the title to the lands con-veyed to H. was bad, neither the State nor the county of S. having any title thereto. Held, in an action against the county for the price of the bridge, that plaintiff was entitled to be paid for the value of the bridge at the time of its completion. In Pimental v. City of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 362, certain real estate belonging to the city had been sold under a void ordinance, and the proceeds paid into the city treasury, the title having failed, the court held the city liable to refund the proceeds, saying, "The liability of the city arises from the use of the moneys, or her refusal to refund them after their receipt. The city is not exempted from the common obligation to do justice which binds individuals. Such obligations rest upon all persons, whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain the money of another by mistake, or without authority of the law, it is her duty to refund it, from this general obligation. If she obtain other property which does not belong to her it is her duty to restore it; or if used, to render an equivalent therefor, from the like obligation. Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 282. The legal liability springs from the moral duty to make restitution. See, also, Paul v. City of Kenosha, 22 Wis. 266; Bridge Co. v. Frankfort, 18 B. Monr. 41; Dillon on Mun. Corp. 750; Clark v. Commissioners of Saline County. Opiniou by Maxwell, C. J.

[Decided Jan. 15, 1880.]

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROVISO STATUTE DEPENDENT UPON FUTURE CONDITION.- An act of the Legislature of Nebraska authorized the payment to relator of $3,000, but contained this proviso: "That said $3,000 remain in the treasury of the State and not be paid or drawn out until the general government shall reimburse the said amount to this State." Held, that the proviso was valid. It was competent for the Legislature to pass an act depending for its execution, either in whole or in part, upon the happening of such a contingency, and such an act is not to be confounded with those acts of legislation which have generally been held void by reason of their being made to depend for their vitality upon their ratification by the voters

at a popular election. In Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 490, Ruggles, C. J., says: "The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such as, in the judgment of the Legislature, affects the question of the expediency of the law, an event on which the expediency of the law, in the opinion of the law-makers, depends. On this question of expediency the Legislature must exercise its own judgment definitely and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon the happening of such an event, the Legislature in effect declares the law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient if it should happen." This case is followed in Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279-313, and is quoted with approval by Cooley on Const. Lim. 146. See, also, Cargo of Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382. State ex rel. Pearman v. Liedke, Auditor. Opinion by Cobb, J. [Decided Jan. 10, 1880.]

HEARD'S CIVIL PLEADINGS.

The Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions. By Franklin Fiske Heard. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1880. Pp. xix, 352. 12mo.

This is one of the Students' Series, and is a companion to the same author's Criminal Pleading. The author has in the principal chapter, on the principal rules of pleading, adopted Stephens' arrangement of rules and exceptions, the most excellent ever drawn up, omitting those that are obsolete or inapplicable. The work will be useful in all States, no matter what the system of pleading, for the essential principles are every where the same. To the experienced lawyer practicing under the system introduced by the New York Code, this little volume will afford amusing or rather vexatious reminiscences of the fictions, subtleties, inconsistencies, and absurdities which he has outlived.

WOOD ON MANDAMUS, ETC.

A Treatise on the Legal remedies of Mandamus and Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Certiorari, and Quo Warranto, by Horace G. Wood. Albany: W. C. Little & Company, 1880. Pp. 278.

Mr. Wood's name is usually a warrant for the excellence of any work to which he puts it. His works on Nuisance, Master and Servant, and Fire Insurance, are the very best, and among the most excellent of all legal treatises. The present is a mere monograph, but apparently embraces every thing necessary to the outline understanding of the subject. It is prepared with especial reference to the laws of this State. It hardly rises to the dignity of a treatise, but is more correctly described as a collection of notes on the subjects. Mr. Wood's foot references are only to volume and page of reports, without the title of cases-a lazy aud vexatious manner of citation in anybody, whether textwriter or judge. There are tables of contents and cases, and an index. The printing is rather padded, thirty pages of a table of cases being out of proportion to 220 of text. So far as the particular subject of mandamus is concerned it will hardly supplant, with its 134 pages, Mr. Moses' treatise of 240. But the other matter will undoubtedly be of practical use.