Bachman. Appeal dismissed with costs - Wiley v. Brigham; Brown v. Gallaudet. Motion for reargument denied with costs. - Bennett v. Garlock. night, and it will not be a good night for sheep killing | judgment on verdict affirmed, with costs - Lawson v. either. Besides killing fifty, the dog will scare the sheep so badly that they will run over each other and immense numbers will be trampled to death. If there are canons or deep chasms in the neighborhood, the sheep will tumble over their steep sides like rats into a tub of water. Now, let a mad dog get into a flock of sheep and but few will survive his ravenous onslaught. Then fine cattle are bitten by mad dogs, and they too go mad. Now, can you see why and how mad dogs endanger people and their property? THE HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, April 6, 1880: Judgment affirmed, with costs - Raubitscheck v. Blank; Whipple v. Christian; Judson v. Phillips; Coffin v. McLean; Giraudat v. Korn; Reilly v. Demestre; Erie County Savings Bank v. Whitney; Leonard v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.; Tenth National Bank of New York v. Mayor, etc.; Denike v. New York and Rosendale Lime and Cement Co.; Knox v. Baldwin; Schile v. Brokhakne; White v. Duryea. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event - Jessup v. Carnegie; Kain v. Smith; Heeg v. Litcht; Jones v. Kent. Judgment af firmed - Balbo v. The People; Cox v. The People.. Judgment of General Term reversed and decree of surrogate affirmed, with costs of all parties in this court and Supreme Court to be paid out of the estate -Young v. Young. Judgment of General Term reversed, and judgment on report of referee affirmed with costs. -Brown v. Gallaudet. Judgment affirmed without costs to either party in this courtBensel v. Gray. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event as to all defendants but Park, and as to him judgment affirmed with costsBarnes v. Brown. Judgment of General Term and orders of General and Special Term reversed, and proceedings remitted for reassessment by the tax commissioners - The People ex rel. Van Nest v. The Tax Commissioners, etc. Judgment affirmed with costs as to appellants, appeal dismissed with costs as to plaintiffs Davidson v. Alfaro. Judgment of Special and General Term reversed, and judgment ordered for defendant with costs The People ex rel. Kenyon v. Sutherland. Judgment and orders affirmed with costs-Kelly v. Christal. Order of General Term affirmed and judgment absolute for defendants, on stipulation with costs- The People v. Belden and ors. Order affirmed and judgment absolute for defendants, on stipulation with costs Bradley v. Bigler. Order of General Term reversed and new trial denied with costs-Reitz v. Reitz. Order affirmed with costs - - Phinney v. Broschell in re De Puyster. NOTES. THE HE current number of the Journal du Droit International Privé contains a commendatory notice of Spear's Law of Extradition, originally published in this JOURNAL. The Journal says: "Mr. Spear shows that the person extradited cannot be tried for a crime committed anterior to the extradition other than the crime for which the extradition has been demanded and accorded. This theory, very learnedly and very ingeniously elaborated, ought to be extended, he thinks, to extradition between the different States of the Union." The Journal also speaks well of Bliss on Pleading, saying: "It is interesting to note the progress accomplished in the matter of procedure in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon race, and the treatise of Mr. Bliss affords excellent aids to jurisconsults desirous of devoting themselves to that study, which cannot fail to be fruitful in practical results." We have received a pamphlet on the Laws of Negotiable Sureties, a condensed Manual, in which Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Checks are not dealt with, by Mr. H. D. Jencken, honorary general secretary of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations. This negative title perhaps might have been better expressed as the law of negotiable bonds, shares, and coupons. This subject was discussed by the author at the last meeting of the association in London, and the present pamphlet seems to be substantially his report on that occasion, and states very succinctly the existing law, with excellent suggestions for improvement and uniformity. The bankrupt bill, prepared by Judge Lowell for and approved by the Boston Board of Trade, to which we alluded last week, was introduced in Congress on the 22d ult. We understand it has been approved by some other boards of trade. Our types made us last week attribute this bill to Judge "Sewell." Two colored men have been summoned as jurors for the next term of court at Richmond, Va. This, we believe, is the first instance of this kind in the history of that State. We suppose the smallness of the number is to be accounted for on the principle upon which we were taught, when young, always to leave a morsel on our plate at meals- "for manners." A Boston lawyer told another lawyer, who asked him a question, that he usually received pay for his advice. Then," said lawyer No. 1, extending fifty cents, "tell me all you know and give me back the the change." The American Law Review for April contains a most excellent article, by Chief Justice Campbell, of Michigan, on Materials of Jurisprudence, and the case of Smith v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., Missouri Supreme Court, on contributory negligence of employees respecting defective mechanical appliances, with an extensive note by Seymour D. Thompson. The Hon. John L. T. Sneed, late judge of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, writes us as follows: "The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL is of great value to the bench and bar, not only as a repertory of new and striking Orders of General and Special Terms modified so as to grant the motion to set aside the first attachment and deny the motion as to the second, without costs to either party on this appeal- Mojarietta v. Saenz (No. 1). Order of General Term affirmed, with costs of one appeal only in this and the case next following — Mojarietta v. Saenz (No. 2). Appeal dismissed, with costs of one appeal only in judicial rulings, but as a discriminating record of the this and the case preceding - Mojarietta v. Saenz. Order of County Court modified in accordance with the opinion of Church, C. J., unless either party desires a re-hearing in County Court, which may be had, if desired, in either event, without costs in this court or of Supreme Court to either party- Zabriskie v. Salter. Order of General Term reversed and current progress of the law. Under the editorial management of the late Isaac Grant Thompson it acquired a reputation among lawyers seldom achieved in this country by any law journal. I cannot see any evidences of deterioration since his untimely death. The volumes edited by him constitute a fine monument of his fame." The Albany Law Journal. MR. ALBANY, APRIL 17, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. The R. ISAAC T. WILLIAMS, of Westchester county, has addressed a letter to Senator Robertson, chairman of the Senate judiciary committee on the subject of additional Supreme Court judges for the Second Judicial Department. A bill is pending to increase the number in the three other departments, and Mr. Williams complains of the exclusion of the Second. He gives the following important statistics: "The First Department, with a population of 1,041,886, has five Supreme Court judges, six Superior Court judges, six Common Plea judges, six Marine Court judges (which last named court is a court of record, with a jurisdiction of $2,000). That department has also a recorder and a city judge, who do nearly all the criminal business of the city. There are, therefore, in all, 25 judges in the First Department. That would be at the rate of one judge for every 41,675 inhabitants. In addition to this that department has the U. S. Courts, which do a great deal of business that in the other departments devolve upon the State courts. The Second Department, with a population of 988,053, has five Supreme Court judges (including the judge lately appointed), three city judges in Brooklyn, one city judge in Yonkers, and nine county judges, making in all 18 judges. That would be at the rate of one judge for every 54,892 inhabitants. Third Department, with a population of 1,168,051, has 12 Supreme Court judges, 28 County Court judges, and 4 city judges, to wit: in the cities of Utica, Hudson, Albany, and Troy, making in all 44 judges. That would be at the rate of one judge for every 26,546 inhabitants. The Fourth Department, with a population of 1,373,421, has 12 Supreme Court judges, 22 County Court judges, and 4 city judges, to wit: three in Buffalo and one in Oswego, making in all 38 judges. That would be at the rate of one judge for every 36,143 inhabitants." Mr. Williams insists that the Second Department, to make her equal with the First, needs six additional judges, nineteen to equalize it with the Third, and nine to equalize it with the Fourth. He complains that the present judicial force is unequal to its work, and says: "It is not pleasant to narrate even historically the state of things which now exists in the Second Department, nor would it probably be prudent for a practicing lawyer in that department to do so. It is enough perhaps to present this matter in the light of figures." And he concludes that "while deprived of nearly one-half of her quota of the judges, the Second Department is still required to pay her whole proportion of their salaries in all respects as if she shared equally in their labors." Mr. Williams certainly makes a strong case for his department, which contains the second city of the State, and has also a large rural population. We VOL. 21.- No. 16. | have not yet heard any explanation of the exclusion of the Second Department from the benefits of this bill, and can imagine none unless it may be a desire to cut off facilities for the disposal of any more interminable scandal cases in Brooklyn. In the Senate, an Assembly bill is reported favorably for the establishment of a municipal court in Buffalo, with jurisdiction in actions arising on or out of contract, or for personal rights or injuries, to the extent of three hundred dollars, and on mutual accounts to the extent of six hundred dollars. Mr. McCarthy proposes to authorize holders of mortgages to pay taxes on the mortgaged land after warrant issues, and to redeem from tax sales, and to enforce mortgages for the additional amount.Mr. Schroeder proposes to admit in evidence exemplified copies of wills proved and recorded before January 1, 1840, without the proofs, and whether the proofs have been recorded or not.- -Mr. Fowler proposes to amend the law for the filing of chattel mortgages, by adding to the first section the following: "Whenever any vendor of goods and chattels shall deliver possession thereof to the vendee, upon an agreement, oral or written, that the title to said goods and chattels shall remain in the vendor, notwithstanding such possession of the vendee, until the price of said goods and chattels shall be paid, such agreement shall be deemed to be a mortgage of such goods and chattels by said vendee to said vendor, within the meaning and for the purposes of this act, and also within the meaning and for the purposes of section 5, chapter 7, title 2, part 2 of the Revised Statutes, and of the subsequent sections of said title." This is an excellent suggestion.—Mr. Forster proposes to enact that negotiable paper drawn in and payable in this State, discounted in another State by a resident thereof, at a rate lawful there but unlawful here, shall not be deemed usurious. Mr. Fowler proposes to authorize reversioners and remaindermen to maintain partition. Mr. Robertson proposes an amendment to section 1039 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for supplying town jury lists lost or destroyed after they have been received by the county clerk. Mr. Robertson proposes an act to bind unknown parties having interests in real estate by judicial decrees affecting the same by publication. — Mr. Astor proposes to make Good Friday a holiday, in respect to negotiable paper. A concurrent resolution introduced by Mr. Williams proposes to amend section 12 of article 6 of the Constitution, by authorizing the Legislature to detail judges of the City Court of Brooklyn and of the Superior Court of Buffalo to hold Circuits and Special Terms of the Supreme Court in Kings and Erie counties, respectively. In the Assembly, Mr. Bullock proposes a mechanics' lien law for the protection of well-drivers. Now give us one for the protection of lightning-rod men and plumbers.--Mr. Tuttle proposes to authorize supervisors to designate the number of highway commissioners and overseers of the poor, upon the application of the town. - Mr. Session proposes to amend the statute of mayhem by including slitting of the lip. Why not include ears? The recent West Point outrage seems to indicate this necessity. -Mr. Chickering proposes a bill of similar effect to Senator Fowler's, respecting chattel mortgages. The Nation newspaper is the only journal in this country, we believe, which at the same time affects to know every thing and to admire nothing. It seems to belong to the category of "persons of quality," who, according to Moliere, "know every thing without ever having learned any thing." Just now this oracular journal is amusing itself, if not its readers, at the expense of the Supreme Court of the United States, in respect to the recent civil rights decisions. The Nation, under date of January, 1881, gives an account of an imaginary trial before Mr. Justice Clifford, in the Federal Circuit Court at Boston, in which Chief Justice Gray is defendant. "The Legislature of Massachusetts," says the Nation, "it will be recollected, had passed a statute providing that no persons having constitutional scruples as to death punishment should sit on juries in capital cases. Two respectable sects, the Shakers and the Quakers, hold such scruples; and the question of the constitutionality of the statute excluding them was brought last week before Chief Justice Gray and Judge Morton in the case of Com. v. Jones, the defendant being a Shaker indicted for murder. Notwithstanding a learned argument by the U. S. district attorney, intervening on the part of the United States, to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Shakers a right to be summoned on juries, and that a State statute excluding them was unconstitutional, the chief justice overruled a motion to quash the array made by the defendant, and ordered the case to be placed on the trial list for the next day. A warrant, however, was instantly issued, as is well known, for the arrest of Chief Justice Gray, and he was subsequently bound over by a Federal commissioner for trial. The trial took place yesterday, and occupied but a few hours." Of course, according to the Nation, it resulted in conviction, under the rule of the Strauder on trial for his life, and we get a fair idea of the practical iniquity of the law excluding colored men as such from juries, when colored men are on trial for their lives. The Nation should take warning from the poet, Holmes, and never dare again "to be as funny as it can." Three noticeable decisions have been announced in this State during the last week. In the case of Caro v. Metropolitan Railroad Company, in the city of New York, the General Term of the Superior Court have reversed the decision of the referee sustaining the defendant's demurrer. The action is brought by a resident of Fifty-third street, between Sixth and Ninth avenues, against an elevated railway company, for an injunction against the company's running trains in front of his property, on the ground that such action on their part would result in the deprivation of light and air to the inhabitants, would occasion noise and stench, expose the privacy of his dwelling, and diminish the value of the same. The complainant, like all other residents of that city, has no ownership in the soil of the street. The allegations of the complaint being admitted by the demurrer, the court now hold that they establish a cause of action. Chief Justice Curtis says: "Neither the acts of the Legislature under which the defendant is incorporated, nor the requirements and conditions imposed by the board of commissioners created by the Legislature, confer or attempt to confer any right or power to introduce into the plaintiff's premises, for instance, the stench or noxious gas, of which, among other grievances, the plaintiff complains, and which the demurrer admits will greatly diminish the plaintiff's enjoyment of his dwelling-house. The question is directly raised whether this is a lawful act on the part of the defendant. Conceding that the defendant has full power and right to enter upon the public street to construct and operate an elevated railroad there, from what source does it derive the power to thus diminish the plaintiff's enjoyment of his house? The act of the Legislature authorizes the defendant to operate its road by atmospheric power, compressed air, or other power.' It neither directly, nor by implication, authorizes the infliction of a polThis is the Nation's idea of humor and logic. luted atmosphere, of which the plaintiff complains, To any but an apprentice or amateur lawyer the fal- and which the demurrer admits." The case chiefly lacy is apparent. The statute excluding persons relied on is Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159, where from juries in capital cases who do not believe in the injury complained of was the casting of rocks the infliction of the death penalty is universal, ap- on the plaintiff's land by blasting in the construcplying to all sects, races, and colors, and is an im- tion of a canal authorized by the State. Leave to partial rule necessary to the due administration of answer was given, and the question now will probajustice. It does not apply simply to Shakers and bly be whether the road can be operated without Quakers, as such, whether accused or jurors. If it creating the nuisances complained of. It seems did, and a Shaker or Quaker were on trial, the cases doubtful whether any recovery can be had for injury would be analogous, and it would seem that the Na- to the freehold or diminution of rental value. The tion could then appreciate the justice of the rule of Supreme Court of Michigan, in Grand Rapids, etc., the Strauder case. We can hardly imagine a better R. R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, held that an abutillustration for the defense of the Strauder decision ting owner, who does not own the soil of the street, than this which the Nation has raised to ridicule it. cannot recover for any injury to his freehold resultGiven a law excluding Shakers from juries in cap-ing from the presence of a steam railway in the ital cases, because they are Shakers, and a Shaker street, but only for damages resulting from such case. misconduct in its management as amounts to a nuisance, as leaving cars standing an unreasonable time, unnecessary noises and dangerous speed. the court. It is understood that five of Judge Folger's associates agreed with him that proof of fraud was essential to warrant a recovery under the complaint; Judge Earl alone dissenting from this view, and holding that the referees might without error have treated the action as one ex contractu. Judge Folger held that the State officers had exceeded their powers, that there was no authority to remove slope walls and substitute vertical walls, and that there had been no ratification of such action; in all of which he agreed with the referees. He held further, however, that defendants were entitled to receive whatever the work was worth, and that the People could recover back only what had been paid in excess of its real value, and that therefore the referees erred in giving judgment for the whole amount paid; in which Judges Miller and Earl concurred. Chief Judge Church and Judges Rapallo, ratification. So it seems that the partisan complaint against the attorney-general for not taking a new trial, before going to the Court of Appeals, is not justified by the result. Public legal officials usually know better about these matters than political newspapers. Chief Justice Campbell, in his recent address at Michigan University, thus, much to our delight, alludes to another cause of the protracting of trials: In Malony v. Steam Canal-boats "City of Milwaukee" and "City of Syracuse," an action for damages by a collision on the Erie canal, Judge Choate, in the Federal District Court, has held that the subjectmatter is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. He says: "The first question is one of very great importance to the commercial interests of the country. It has never been expressly declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, but the weight of authority is in favor of the jurisdiction. In the case of the 'Monitor,' the District Court for the Eastern District of New York entertained jurisdiction of a collision upon the Delaware and Raritan canal, which, like the Erie canal, is an artificial water way over the land, but communicat- | Andrews, and Danforth, held that there had been ing between what are admitted to be navigable waters of the United States. Upon an application to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition, that court refused a writ. It is understood, however, that the eight justices who heard the case were equally divided in opinion, but no written opinions were delivered." "Without going at large into a discussion of the reasons for or against the jurisdiction, it is enough for the disposition of the point and this case to say that upon a careful perusal of the opinions delivered by the Supreme Court which touch upon the question, it seems to me that the test established for determining the jurisdiction in admiralty in a case of alleged maritime tort not on tide water, is whether the place in which it was committed is upon the navigable waters of the United States;' and that an artificial water way or canal, opened by a State to public use for purposes of commerce, and while in fact used as a highway of commerce between the States of the Union, and between foreign countries and the United States, is navigable waters of the United States,' within the meaning of that term, as used to define and limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. does not seem to me that there is any force in the suggestion that the proposition trenches upon the rightful power and jurisdiction of the State through whose territory, and by whose law in force for the time being, the canal is so opened and used. At any rate, considering the present state of authority and practice in the courts inferior to the Supreme Court, I do not feel at liberty to decline the jurisdiction. The question is one of National import ance, and must, doubtless, soon receive full consideration and a final determination in the Supreme Court." It In the case of the People v. Dennison, the Court of Appeals have affirmed the order of the General Term which granted a new trial, and in accordance with the law provided for such appeals, and the stipulation entered into, have awarded judgment absolute for defendants. A very long opinion was written by Judge Folger, but his views were not adopted as a whole by a majority of the members of Courts "This generation has also met with another infliction unknown to former ones. The unreasonable extension of sensational cases was once due mainly to the ambition of counsel and the vindictiveness of clients, in whose behalf counsel sometimes allowed themselves to become ministers of wrath and agents to do work that might have been cleaner. vagaries, but courts are comparatively helpless unwere more or less to blame for not checking these less counsel second them, and a judge cannot safely assume in advance that a mass of rubbish is to be put in the case. We now have frequent instances of controversies where court, counsel and parties lose their importance for the time in presence of that remarkable phenomenon, the expert. There are quiet and modest men of science in all departments who frankly, and who throw upon the case all the light say what they have to say clearly, concisely, and in their power. But there are others who hold themselves out as standing experts, whose chief occupation is not in improving themselves by the honest practice of an art of profession, but in special preparation for the functions of witnesses, and who seldom correct their crude and extreme theories by against the wildest extravagance. that practical experience which is the only safeguard These persons, having first qualified themselves for impartial witnesses by accepting employment to aid counsel in working up their case, and acting as their prompters, are too often allowed to turn the witness box into an exhibition stage and display their acquirements very liberally. In patent cases and poisoning cases and will cases it is altogether too common to let such men wander from the issue and use their off their knowledge and opinions. They are not own choice in determining how far they will show usually lacking in self-esteem, and are treated in such a way as to make them feel as if they were the heroes of the occasion. It is every day's experience that any suit in which such witnesses appear will without fail be needlessly protracted, and almost as surely be muddled." This is most excellent and timely. The "expert" business is a dangerous and growing abuse; but why does not the judge put his foot down on it after this fashion in court? NOTES OF CASES. In Court, February 21, 1930, 7 Spofford v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., Massa Rep. 407, a railroad company charged A, a student, for a season ticket between certain stations, a reasonable price, and then sold to B, C and D, also students, season tickets, between the same stations, for half the price charged A, for special reasons which did not appear. A statute required every railroad to give to all persons * * * reasonable and equal terms, and provided that reduced rates for a specific distance might be charged. Held, that this was not a violation of the statute, and A had no cause of action. The court: "The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant the sum of sixteen dollars, being half the amount paid for a season ticket for three months, which entitled the plaintiff during that period to ride daily, Sundays excepted, on the defendant's cars, from Haverhill to Boston and back to Haverhill. It appears that the sum paid for the ticket was the regular price for a season ticket, established by the directors. It is not contended that the price was unreasonably large for the service to which it entitled the purchaser. The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to recover because certain other persons obtained season tickets for the same term, between the same stations, for one-half the price which he paid. These persons, it appears, were, like the plaintiff, students, twenty years old, who, for reasons which do not appear, were permitted by the president of the defendant corporation, in the exercise of a discretion given him by the directors, to buy their tickets for the sum of sixteen dollars each, which was half the regular price of such tickets to students less than twenty years old. The plaintiff's position is that although the defendant had established a price for a season ticket, not unreasonable in itself, and had sold him a ticket at the regularly established price, it violated the provisions of the Statute of 1874, ch. 372, § 138, by selling like tickets to certain other persons for a less sum. The statute referred to requires every railroad corporation to give to all persons or companies reasonable or equal terms, facilities and accommodations for the transportation of themselves, their agents and servants, and of any merchandise and other property upon any railroad owned or operated by such corporation. Section 135 of the same chapter provides that any railroad corporation may make contracts for the conveyance of passengers on designated trains for a specific distance, at fixed times, at such reduced rates of fare as the parties may agree upon. Section 179 provides that any railroad corporation may estab lish for its sole profit, fares, tolls and charges upon all passengers and property conveyed or transported on its railroad, at such rates as may be determined by the directors thereof, subject to revision by the Legislature. We do not purpose to put the decision of the case on any refinement of construction of section 135. We prefer to place it on what seems to us to be the reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the statute relating to fares of passengers taken together, and in view of the law as it stood before the statute was enacted. Statutes of 1867, ch. 339; R. R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393. We are of opinion that as the defendant exacted from the plaintiff only the regularly established price for the season ticket which he bought, and as there is no evidence that the price was unreasonable, the fact that for special reasons, which do not appear, the president of the defendant permitted certain individuals, students like the plaintiff more than twenty years old, to buy like tickets for half that price, did not constitute a violation of the statute, nor give the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant." A similar conclusion is reached in Johnson v. Pensa cola, etc., R. Co., 16 Fla. 623; S. C., 26 Am. Rep. 731, in which is a learned review of authorities. See, also, Messenger v. Penn. R. R. Co., 37 N. J. 531; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 754; 36 N. J. 407; 13 Am. Rep. 457; N. E. Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 57 Me. 188; S. C., 2 Am. Rep. 31; McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester R. R., 52 N. H. 430; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 72. In Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405, it is held that a mere promise to pay a forged note, when such promise is given by the supposed maker of the note without any new consideration and after the promisee has acquired the note, is not binding. The court distinguish the case from cases of a voidable act, and hold that where an act is void, as a forgery, there can be no ratification. The element of estoppel is wanting in this case, because the plaintiff did not act upon and was not prejudiced by the promise, as he had already acquired the note when the promise was made. This holding is to some extent warranted by Brook v. Hook, 24 L. T. (N. S.) 34; S. C., 3 Alb. L. J. 255, and Williams v. Bayley, L. R., 1 App. H. L. 200, but in both those cases the element of compounding the felony entered. It is also supported by Woodruff v. Monroe, 33 Md. 147. Opposed to it are Bank v. Crofts, 4 Allen, 447, and Howard v. Duncan, 3 Lans. 175, both of which are disapproved in the principal case. The latter case is also criticised in Alb. L. J. 331. Opposed to it is also Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Ill. 483; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 108. The court there say: "We apprehend nothing more is necessary to be shown here than that Hefner adopted and ratified his forged signature upon the note." "Such subsequent assent and ratification would be equivalent to an original authority, and confirm what was originally an unauthorized and illegal act." "An act wholly unauthorized may be made valid by subsequent ratification." We much prefer the doctrine of the principal case, and cannot conceive how such a |