appear to be plainly the duty of the agent to give just such information as that upon which the holder of the spurious stock has relied, since one of the chief purposes for which a corporation is organized is to enable the shares to be transferred freely. The very essence of such a certificate is an assurance to the world that it will be transferred on the books of the company upon the surrender of the certificate. If a bill of lading is to be regarded simply as a receipt to enable the consignor to trace and receive his goods as an incident of transportation, a representation by the agent to third persons would be outside the scope of the employment and would not bind the principal. See C. N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' National Bank, 56 Oh. St. 351. But in view of the widespread use of the bill of lading as a symbol of property, it seems better to regard it as analogous to a negotiable instrument, relied upon by third parties in much the same way as stock certificates. Professor Vance's conclusions that the principal should be liable in both classes of cases seem, accordingly, correct. One limitation must, however, be made to the theory that the rules governing the principal's liability for deceit by the agent are the same as those which govern liability for any other tort. It should be noticed that deceit is an anomalous tort, since the situation created resembles that created when the agent makes a contract with a third party in that the latter acts upon a representation of the agent, and thus in a sense co-operates to cause the damage. See HUFfcut, AGENCY, 2d ed., 12, 13. Consequently, though the question of the principal's liability for the agent's deceit does not depend primarily upon authority conferred as in contract, yet if it appears that the third party knew that the principal had forbidden such a representation, he should not be allowed to hold the principal, because he is not dealing with the agent as agent, and hence is not deceived. See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519. NATURALIZATION. An article by Henry Stockbridge is called forth by the recent Act of Congress denying citizenship to aliens of anarchistic inclinations, 32 U. S. Stat. at L. 1222 (March, 1903), and by the rulings of two state courts, one in New York, which declared that it would naturalize nobody unable to speak English, and one in Pennsylvania refusing to admit to citizenship anybody who could not prove that he had abstained from participation in the coal-strike riots. The Law of Naturalization, by Henry Stockbridge, 17 Green Bag 644 (Nov. 1905); 13 Am. Lawyer 419 (Oct. 1905). The author summarizes the history and present state of the law of naturalization, comments on its lax enforcement, and concludes that neither the statute nor the rulings above referred to were really extensions of the pre-existing law. Congress, under the clause of the Constitution giving it power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, has enacted that every applicant for admission should prove that during the five years of his probation "he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the peace and happiness of the same." U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2165. It is to be noticed that the test in the revised statutes is objective. The applicant must prove that he has behaved as one possessing the attributes mentioned. Mr. Stockbridge is, therefore, not strictly accurate when he says that the statute requires the applicant actually to possess such attributes. It is true that in a Texas state court an applicant was rejected because his socialistic views as to the ownership of property were thought inconsistent with the Constitution, though no objection was raised to his behavior. See Ex parte Sauer, 81 Fed. Rep. 355 (note). This case is, however, inconsistent with the result of a later case in a United States district court in the same state. See Re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. Rep. 337. There an honest, industrious, and well-behaved Mexican was naturalized, though he could neither read nor write, and was "lamentably ignorant." The court said of him that "by his daily walk . . . he . . . emphasized his attachment to the principles of the Constitution," thus plainly abandoning the subjective test. The statute of 1903 made the distinct advance of forbidding admission to those disbelieving in all organized government, whatever their behavior might be. So also in the case where the applicant was required to prove non-participation in a coal riot, it is questionable whether an extension of the law has not been made. A man guilty of committing a felony has been held not a person of good moral character and attached to the Constitution. Re Spencer, 52 Saw. (U. S. C. C.) 195. In the same case there was a dictum that repeated lesser breaches of the law would have the same effect; but a single misdemeanor has apparently never before excluded a man from citizenship. Surely one instance of yielding to the common propensity for doing what the crowd does, is not necessarily behavior incompatible with good character and a belief in the Constitution. Still more doubtful is the ruling that no one shall be naturalized unless he can speak English. That such persons would, as a rule, be undesirable citizens is true, but that they should be excluded under the statute is not clear. Obviously such a person may have "behaved" as required by the statute, may even be of good moral character, and may have, in fact, a greater knowledge of and belief in the principles of the Constitution in French or Hebrew than most successful English-speaking applicants. Why not, then, let him prove it if he can, and enjoy the privileges which the statute offers him, till the law is changed? "AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL a Reply. Walter Wheeler Cook. 6 Columbia L. Rev. 34. See 18 HARV. L. REV. 400. ARE DEFECTIVELY INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS PARTNERSHIPS? Francis M. Burdick. 6 Columbia L. Rev. 1. See supra. CASE OF NORTHERN ASSURANCE COMPANY v. GRAND VIEW BUILDING ASSOCIATION, 183 UNITED STATES REPORTS, THE. Ashley Cockrill. Containing a good collection of authorities on the question of whether or not an insurance company is bound by provisions not in the policy. 13 Am. Law. 524. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AGAINST FORCING SELF-INCRIMINATION. Henry T. Terry. 15 Yale L. J. 127. DIVORCE IN THE TRANSVAAL. C. F. Rorke. Analyzing the rulings of the South African courts in regard to the law of domicile in divorce proceedings, and discussing malicious desertion as a ground for divorce. 22 S. African L. J. 399. ENLARGEMENT OF A LIFE ESTATE BY AN ACCOMPANYING POWER OF DISPOSITION IN FEE. Anon. Full collection of authorities. 62 Cent. L. J. 25. FEDERAL REGULATION OF QUARANTINE. W. E. Walz. Maintaining that Congress has control over quarantine, so far as interstate and foreign relations are concerned, under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 4 Mich. L. Rev. 189. INTERESTS DETERMINABLE ON BANKRUPTCY. Anon. Discussing how far clause determining debtor's interest in the event of bankruptcy shall be good against creditors. An extensive review of English cases. 28 L. Stud. J. 8. ISSUE OF CORPORATE STOCK FOR PROPERTY PURCHASED M. Wallstein. 15 Yale L. J. 111. A NEW PHASE. Leonard LACK OF UNIFORM CONSTRUCTION OF SIMILAR LANGUAGE IN STATE AND FED- LAW AS A CULTURE STUDY. Edson R. Sunderland. 4 Mich. L. Rev. 181. 4 Mich. L. Rev. 199. See supra. MOST NOTEWORTHY CHANGES IN STATUTE LAW ON POINTS OF GENERAL INTER- PREPARATION FOR THE BAR. Lawrence Maxwell. 38 Am. L. Rev. 822. REVIEW OF LEGISLATION OF YEAR 1904-1905. Henry St. George Tucker. 39 Am. L. Rev. 801. RIGHT OF ALIENS UNDER AMERICAN STATUTES GIVING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEATH. Anon. Discussing the conflict of authority as to whether the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act confer a right of action on aliens, and contending that they should. 1 (The) Law 358. SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW. Roscoe Pound. 18 Green Bag 17. SYSTEM OF PROBATE COURTS IN CONNECTICUT, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT, THE. James Kingsley Blake. 15 Yale L. J. 131. II. BOOK REVIEWS. STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW, and its Relations to the Jurisprudence of England and America, with References to the Law of our Insular Possessions. By William Wirt Howe. Second edition. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1905. pp. xii, 390. 8vo. Judge Howe begins by saying: "The American Lawyer of to-morrow should study the Civil Law for four reasons: (1) Because modifications of that law obtain at present in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines; in Louisiana, California, and New Mexico; in Lower Canada, Mexico, Central America, and South America. All of these are newly opened fields, as to the laws and customs in which capitalists from the older states seeking investment need advice. (2) Because one never knows one's own system thoroughly until one places it in the parallel column and compares it line by line with another system. (3) Because the Common Law owes large debts to Justinian, and, as he knows best the value of words who knows their Latin origin, their history, and their component parts, so he knows best the meaning and value of law who knows its foundation and is familiar with its growth. (4) Because, by studying the old Civil Law, we lose something of our American arrogance. The discovery that not we but Gracchus first declared that a statute should contain but one object; that Paul wrestled with the subject of Contributory Negligence and evolved something very similar to the "last-clear-chance "doctrine; that the Hadley v. Baxendale ruling was evolved and boiled down into the terse phrases of a codal article some centuries before that case this is striking evidence of our debt to the jurisconsults. Judge Howe's book presents the cullings made from a broad and thoughtful reading of the history of Rome and of its laws. Beginning with Pius Aeneas, it traces the development from the individual into the family, from the family into the gens, and from the gens into the city, showing the growth of the law as co-equal with that of the population. The city was at first governed by the Jus Civile, a law which the original gentes, who at first constituted the entire free population, created to apply to themselves alone. As the city's commerce increased, and foreign merchants immigrated thither, the Praetor Peregrinus was appointed and the Jus Gentium evolved to govern them. Then, as the old families or gentes gradually died away and were replaced by strangers, so the Jus Civile gradually died away and was replaced by the Jus Gentium, which the author traces into the Amalfian Tables, and the Consolato del Mare, and then through Oleron, Wisby, and the Hanseatic Code into the famous Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV and the Code du Commerce of Napoleon. A discussion of the history of the Civil Law in England is followed by an account of its development to date in France, Germany, and the Americas. Our new insular possessions are governed by the Codes of Spain, which consist, at present, of a Civil Code enacted in 1889, a Commercial Code enacted in 1886, and a Code of Procedure enacted in 1881. Coming from history and generalities to questions of substantive law, Judge Howe deals rapidly with Persons, Property, Contracts, Successions, and Remedies, stress being laid, as it should be laid, upon Marital Rights, Contracts, and Descent and Distribution. It is to be regretted that the author, who is peculiarly fitted for such a labor, did not, in the pursuit of this discussion, make use of parallel columns. These subjects are those regarding which the common law attorney is most likely to require information, and had this book laid down the Common Law on these subjects, point by point, and beside it placed the Civil Law on the same subject, point by point, and supplemented these comparisons by notes showing the importance of the differences, it would have rendered a very valuable service to the profession. As it is, the differences are in some cases pointed out, in others left to be discovered by the reader. Only a few of the many that are suggestive and important can be remarked upon here. A contract is called by its proper name, to wit, a conventional obligation; an offer and acceptance, both duly communicated, are essential in both systems. At Common Law a gratuitous contract must be under seal, while at Civil Law a donation inter vivos must be by notarial act. In England the doctrine of consideration arose gradually and silently, and continued to grow, though repudiated by Lord Mansfield; while in Louisiana, though the Code of 1808 did not consider a consideration necessary to support a parol promise, and Eustis, C. J., expressly repudiated the doctrine of consideration, it is still a healthy, hearty doctrine at present. Minors and infants are both without capacity to contract at Civil Law, but minors have the advantage over infants in that they can rid themselves of this disability in some cases by what is called emancipation. Duress of goods is expressly recognized as vitiating consent in Louisiana, a rule which does not seem to obtain at Common Law. (Anson, Contracts, 214.) Under Descent and Distribution or "Succession," attention is called to the fact that in both systems of law an intestate succession falls to the descendants, or, in default of them, to the ascendants, or collaterals, in substantial accordance with the rule laid down by Justinian. But the Civil Law limits the power of the testator by providing that a man leaving three or more children can dispose of only one-third of his estate. This provision, if enforced in the common law states, would in large measure prevent the amassing of colossal fortunes in the hands of a few by compelling their distribution at the passing away of each generation. These differences and the differences between prescription and the statute of limitations; the law of Privileges; the conception of a partnership as an entity; the absence of distinctions between realty and personalty in Descent and Distribution; the differences in the law of Mortgages, and the radically different land tenure; the theory of immovables by destination, and the prohibition against trust estates, while they are in some cases referred to, are not collated and presented in concise form readily accessible for future use. In this respect the author has wasted an opportunity. For practical utility, therefore, the value of the book is small. It is a book of a student and not of a practitioner. Yet in that very fact lies much of its charm. The style is quiet and uninterrupted by lists of cases stabbed into the text in support of each proposition. The book is an essay breathing the calm of the library on a still night rather than a brief or a text-book exhaling the bustle of the office. J. B. M. CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW. SCIENTIFIC LEGAL EDUCATION. An Illustration. With an Introduction by Melville M. Bigelow. Boston. Little, Brown and Company. 1906. pp. xvii, 296. 8vo. This book is a mosaic; composed principally of lectures recently delivered at the Boston University Law School by Messrs. Brooks Adams, Melville M. Bigelow, Edward A. Harriman, and Henry S. Haines. By far the larger part is contributed by Mr. Adams and Professor Bigelow. Whether the reader adopts or rejects the final conclusions of the writers, he must admit that their discussions are, as Sir Henry Maine said of the Analytical Jurists, useful "for the purpose of clearing the head." They present important issues with great distinctness. Unique, radical, stimulating, - these are terms which may well be applied to large portions of this book. The main features of the book are clearly and forcibly outlined by Professor Bigelow in the Preface and Introduction: "These lectures turn on three words, Equality, Inequality, and Administration; the first as the dominant force in American life during the late 'classical' period of the law; the second as representing the present condition of society; the third as the supreme aim of legal and of all education intended to fit men to engage in the affairs of the day. law is the expression, more or less deflected by opposition, of the dominant force in society. . . It follows from the view that law is the resultant of actual, conflicting forces in society, that the notion of abstract, eternal principles as a governing power, with their author the external sovereign, must go. Inequality appears in two aspects, namely, between capital and the public, and between capital and labor." While there is a "growing conception of the public as a distinct entity having rights," yet the public, as standing for equality, is at a great disadvantage in fighting the capitalist. The weapons furnished by the old legal doctrines are "powerless" "against the skilful equipment of inequality." The existing law has been largely made for us "by other men, living under conditions differing from those under which we live." The law "is handicapped in all its branches with historical survivals." In the second aspect of inequality, presented by capital and labor, "the latter as well as the former in combinations is in effect an agency in monopoly. . . . Here is inequality against inequality." In Herbert Paul's recent biography of Froude, it is said that the historian's besetting sin was a love of paradox. Mr. Brooks Adams may, perhaps, be accused of an occasional tendency to extravagance in statement. But that his essays are readable no one can question. While not disputing the familiar saying that the movement hitherto has been "from status to contract," Mr. Adams thinks we are now witnessing "the passage from contract to servitude." Some of his views may be summarized as follows, mostly in his own words : Society broke with its past by the introduction of steam. Within seventy-five years social conditions have changed more profoundly than they had done before since civilization emerged from barbarism. There must be a corresponding change in the law. A new civilization has arisen, based on scientific discoveries and undreamed of mechanical processes, which, besides generating the trade union, develop the monopoly. This new birth must be swathed in a new envelop of law. Excessive competition leads to monopoly. Suppose competition be forced to the end, it must result in monopoly by survival. Suppose competition be checked to protect the weak, combination to control prices must result. Two grim alternatives confront us: on the one hand, despotism, either by capitalists or trade unionists; on the other hand, the establishment of State Socialism (or at least State regulation of prices.) Mr. Adams gives a graphic historical sketch of the decline of feudalism; the rise and decay of the merchants' guilds; and the creation of monopolies, formerly by governmental grants of exclusive privileges, and to-day by combinations of private individuals. It is possible to gather from Mr. Adams' essays the prediction that all existing legal principles, so called, must be discarded, and an entirely new system evolved to meet the present emergencies. But the calm wisdom of Professor Bigelow rejects this theory. In his view, "No working of the dominant spirit is likely to tear out the inner walls of the law," whatever fate may befall the exterior walls built up by logic. Pp. 200, 201. There are passages in the essays of both Professor Bigelow and Mr. Adams which might seem to a casual reader to affirm that judges register, and bow to, the decrees of the populace. See pp. 154 and 132. In the Preface, however, Professor Bigelow expressly disclaims the notion that the courts are influenced by the dominant forces consciously or in any objectionable way. No doubt legislation and enlightened public opinion do have an influence on the minds of judges in shaping and reshaping the common law. This is candidly admitted by Lord Hobhouse in his admirable opinion in Smart v. Smart, L. R. (1892) App. Cas. 425. But judges who are worthy of their place play an efficient part |