will generally find it for their mutual interest, whatever may be the value of the property involved, to decide the question by drawing lots.

There is, however, one class of cases in which it is agreed by all that there will cease to be any equitable conversion, though the actual conversion covenanted or directed to be made has not been made, and though there has been no election not to have it made, namely, where the absolute owner of money which has been converted in equity into land has the money in his own hands, — in which case the money is said to be at home;1 and it seems not to be material whether he has possession of the money in his own right or as executor only. Moreover, it seems not to be indispensably necessary that he should be entitled to have the land conveyed to him in fee simple absolute, for, though he be entitled only to have it conveyed to him for his life, with remainder to him in fee simple absolute, and though these limitations in his favor are liable to open and let in a limitation in tail to any son of his who shall hereafter be born, for, if he get the money into his own. hands, even as executor, it seems that the equitable conversion of the money into land will be suspended until he shall have a son, and, if he die without ever having had a son, the equitable conversion will never revive, and the money will devolve, at his death, as money. Both these points are illustrated by the great case of Pultney v. Darlington,2 in which Sir John Scott, Attorney-General, Mr. Charles Fearne, and Mr. W. Dundas struggled valiantly, but unsuccessfully, to reverse Lord Thurlow. In that case Henry Guy, who died in 1710, directed his executors to lay out the residue of his personal estate in the purchase of land, and to settle the land on William Pultney, afterwards Earl of Bath, for life, remainder to his first and other sons successively in tail male, remainder to Harry Pultney, brother of William, and his first and other sons in like manner, remainder to Daniel Pultney, a cousin of William and Harry, and his first and other sons in like manner, remainder to the father of William and Harry in fee. The father died in 1715, whereupon his right under the will to have the land conveyed to him in remainder in fee passed to William Pultney, his eldest son and heir. In 1731 Daniel Pultney died without issue male. In

1 Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211, 224; In re Gordon, 6 Ch. D. 531, 535, 537, per Sir G. Jessell, M. R.

2 1 Bro. C. C. 223, 7 Bro. P. C., Tomlin's ed. 530.

3 It has always been assumed that this remainder in fee descended, on the deaths

1764 the Earl of Bath died without issue male, whereupon his right to said remainder in fee passed to said Harry Pultney, his brother and heir. On the death of the Earl of Bath, therefore, Harry Pultney was entitled, upon the facts which have been stated, to have the residue of Henry Guy's personal estate laid out in the purchase of land, and to have the land conveyed to him for life, remainder to him in fee. He was not, however, even to the last moment of his life, entitled to have the money paid over to him, for if land had been purchased and settled, the two limitations in his favor, as above, would have been liable to open and let in limitations in favor of his sons; for, though he was about eighty-six years old and a bachelor, yet in legal contemplation it was possible that he should marry and have sons; and, though in fact he did neither, yet, upon the facts thus far stated, the equitable conversion of the money into land remained in force till his death, and on his death his rights under the will of Henry Guy devolved as land. There was, however, another material fact, for the Earl of Bath was executor of Henry Guy, and Harry Pultney was the executor of the Earl of Bath, and by consequence executor of Henry Guy, and therefore, on the death of the Earl of Bath, the money was at home, and so remained till the death of Harry Pultney, when it devolved as money; and yet there had been no election not to have an actual conversion made, and could have been none, Harry Pultney not being the absolute owner of the property.1

How may an equitable conversion of land into money, not caused by a bilateral contract for the purchase and sale of land, be brought to an end without an actual conversion? Such an equitable conversion is generally caused by a direction in a will to sell land and divide the proceeds of the sale among persons designated by the testator; and it is plain that in such a case there will seldom be any unnecessary delay in making a sale, as the interest of each of the persons designated by the testator will be likely to be promoted by a sale. If, however, in any given case all the persons designated by the testator shall be of one mind in preferring the land to

of its respective owners, to their respective heirs, as stated in the text. On principle, however, it seems that the equitable conversion caused by the will of Henry Guy did not extend to the ultimate interest limited to the father of William and Harry Pultney, and therefore that ultimate interest ought to have devolved as money. See supra, PP. 324-325.

The decision of the House of Lords was made in 1796, eighty-six years after the death of Henry Guy, when the residue of his personal estate was still personal estate in fact and had not lost its identity.

the proceeds of its sale, they may, if of full age and sui juris, require the land to be conveyed to them, and thus put an end to the equitable conversion. So if, in any given case, the number of persons entitled to share in the proceeds of a sale of the land shall, by death or otherwise, be reduced to one before any sale of the land is made, a consequence will be that that one will be, in equity, the sole owner of the land in fee simple, and hence if the equitable conversion still exists it will be because he has not elected to take the land instead of the proceeds of its sale, and the courts, as we have seen, say it does still exist, notwithstanding the oddity of saying that land of which one person is the sole and absolute owner must be treated as converted in equity into money until such owner has elected not to have it actually converted into money pursuant to the direction of a deceased person whose direction has ceased to have any force whatever.

Here ends all that I propose to trouble the reader with on the subject of the indirect conversion of money into land and land into money.

CAMBRIDGE, October, 1905.

C. C. Langdell.

IN

STATE AND OFFICIAL LIABILITY.

N the sixth edition 1 of Mr. A. V. Dicey's interesting volume, commonly called "Dicey on the Law of the Constitution," but whose full title is "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution," is found a chapter 2 entitled "The Rule of Law Contrasted with Droit Administratif." This title suggests that the droit administratif, which is in this manner contrasted with the rule of law, must be something lawless and arbitrary; that the words droit administratif cannot be used in the sense in which we employ the term "administrative law," but rather must signify some sort of administrative right or might, the word droit being employed much as in the motto "Dieu et mon droit." Examination of the subject matter of the chapter, however, shows that the term is intended to be used in the same sense as the French legal writers employ it, and that the chapter is devoted to an exposition of the general doctrines of French administrative law, and a statement of Mr. Dicey's view of those doctrines, which is, to say the least, not favorable.

Mr. Dicey is an author of such deservedly high reputation, and his statements naturally carry such weight with both English and American readers, that an unfavorable opinion expressed by him. regarding the doctrines of French administrative law is calculated to exercise material influence on opinion as to the advisability of the study of that law, a study which is attracting more and more attention in this country, especially since the publication of Professor Goodnow's able work on Comparative Administrative Law.

It is therefore important to examine Mr. Dicey's exposition of the doctrines of French administrative law, and to direct attention to those points, if any, wherein that exposition seems imperfect or likely to mislead.

After stating that the words "administrative law," which are the most natural rendering of the term droit administratif, are unknown to English judges and counsel and are in themselves hardly intelligible without further explanation, Mr. Dicey describes the meaning of the term droit administratif as "that portion 4 P. 326.

1 1902.

2 No. XII.

2P 323

of French law which determines (1) the position and liabilities of all state officials, and (2) the civil rights and liabilities of private individuals in their dealings with officials as representatives of the state, and (3) the procedure by which these rights and liabilities are enforced"; and a further paragraph on the same page shows that the rights of an individual in reference to the state, as well as in reference to officials representing the state, are also included in Mr. Dicey's understanding of the term droit administratif.

From this description or definition two things appear: first, that this droit administratif is law- French law, to be sure, but still law - according to which certain rights and liabilities are determined; second, that these rights and liabilities are the same as those which have in this country been considered to be so separate and distinct from ordinary rights as to make desirable their separate treatment and study. The latter appears from the fact that a volume dealing with the rights and liabilities of public officers has been published and is widely used and cited in this country; and this same heading, as a distinct title of the law, is also to be found in the English digest.

Considering these matters, we may, after reading Mr. Dicey's definition of droit administratif, approach that subject with less apprehension than his introductory statements would be likely to create, especially his preliminary statement that "this scheme of so-called administrative law is opposed to all English ideas," and with a feeling that we may find in the droit administratif of France a division of the law which to a certain extent we have already recognized.

After thus defining droit administratif, Mr. Dicey alleges that any one who considers its nature with care, "or the kind of topics to which it applies, will soon discover that it rests at bottom on two leading ideas alien to the conception of modern Englishmen."

"The first of these notions is that the government, and every servant of the government, possesses, as representative of the nation, a whole body of special rights, privileges, or prerogatives as against private citizens, and that the extent of these rights, privileges, or prerogatives is to be determined on principles different from the considerations which fix the legal rights and duties of one citizen towards another. An individual in his dealings with the state does not, according to French ideas, stand on anything like the same footing on which he stands in dealings with his neighbors."