decisions of the courts are cited, and the administrative law not only of the federal government, but of practically all the states of the Union, is summarized. Yet the very comprehensiveness which is one of the work's chief merits, contributes to make parts of it dry and technical, notwithstanding the author's efforts to the contrary. Concrete illustrations of the principles expounded are almost totally lacking. If these could have been inserted, the book would have been longer, but would have seemed shorter. It should be added, however, that the author in his preface promises an additional volume, which will be wholly devoted to the cases or concrete instances. Mr. A. V. Dicey, the English jurist, having denied the possibility of the existence of administrative law, Professor Goodnow gives in his first chapter a forceful essay on the raison d'être of the title he employs. There follows a definition of administrative law as "that part of the law which fixes the organization, and determines the competence of the authorities which execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his rights." Having thus fixed the scope of his work, the author takes up the federal, state, and local administration and discusses it with reference to the decisions of the courts. The book is specially luminous in the explanation of the actual and theoretical relations to one another of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; in the account of the increasing power of the President; and in the exposition of the relations of municipal corporations to the state governments. The discussion of local government brings out clearly the amazing variety of administrative laws, and serves to demonstrate that this broad land has been a fruitful field for political experiment such as the old world could never furnish. Dr. Goodnow has wisely adopted the historical method wherever it was possible. He explains, for instance, the status of the English borough from mediæval times to the colonial period, thus accounting for the form it assumed in the United States. Again, he points out the interesting fact that while Montesquieu laid down his famous trinity as all sufficient for a state, the American states have added a fourth division, the administrative department. The passages criticising the tenure of office act (p. 115) and demonstrating the unwisdom of presenting a long list of candidates to the confusion of the voter, serve to lighten the severely technical discussion. In two instances, at least, the desire for brevity seems to have excluded explanations which the general reader would properly demand. Thus it is stated that "in 1867 Congress deliberately reversed its decision, and by the tenure of office acts of 1867-9 decided . . . that Congress was the body to decide who possessed the power of removal (p. 76). This so-called deliberate change of front is partly explained by a fact which the author omits, i. e., that Congress was engaged at the beginning of this period in a fierce conflict with the President and had "an axe to grind." So on page 390, where it is stated that “by the original constitution a state might be sued by a citizen of any other state, the proper reference should have been given to the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and the reader should have been told that the decision was rendered by a divided court, and that it was opposed to a wide-spread opinion of jurists at the time the Constitution was ratified. In the light of these facts the adoption of the eleventh amendment is more easily understood. It seems to be a positive error to state that the last case of impeachment in England was that of Warren Hastings (p. 459). Lord Melville was impeached as late as 1806. With the book of cases to follow, the present work should prove as useful a text-book to the practical lawyer as to the student of political science. There is a full table of cases cited, á list of authorities, and an excellent index. J. R. F. ADDRESSES: HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL. By Frederick R. Coudert. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. pp. xviii, 452. The opinions of a distinguished and successful lawyer will seldom be found profitless reading. A proof of this is to be found in the newly published volume of addresses delivered by the late Frederick R. Coudert, formerly among the leaders of the New York bar. The variety of the subjects comprehended testifies to the many interests in which the speaker found time to indulge, despite the demands of his profession. The first section of the book in question, amounting to about one third its length, is that of most interest to lawyers. This is devoted to four addresses upon topics of International Law: I, International Arbitration; II, The AngloAmerican Arbitration Treaty; III, The Rights of Ships; IV, International Law. Upon these subjects Mr. Coudert was entitled to speak with authority. In the first address he discusses the development of civilization and national economy, and their influence towards arbitration, and insists upon the folly of wasting life, and inviting bankruptcy, merely because of loss of temper or injured pride. He commends the course of the United States in this respect, more particularly in its relationship with Great Britain, furnishing a number of examples where arbitration proved a more happy expedient than the dictates of anger. In the second essay he takes up the Arbitration Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, then pending (March, 1897) in the Senate, answering Lord Russell's question "Who will compel the contracting nations to arbitrate?", and refuting the objection that the Monroe Doctrine might be made a matter for arbitration. Address No. III contains a short discussion of the basis of International Law, and a consideration of the question as to what law obtains upon a vessel of one country in the port of another. Barrundia's Case is taken as an example of the situation which may arise, and receives especial attention. The conclusions to which Mr. Coudert comes, with regard to the more vexing points, are not too clear, but the general law is made plain, and the opinions of several distinguished statesmen and judges discussed. The fourth address is upon the nature of International Law, and taken in conjunction with the opening paragraphs of the third furnishes a sound and sensible statement of what that law really is, a statement which should prove helpful to those who, coming new to the subject, have yet to realize that the word "law," as applied to international regulations, is a misnomer. The speaker has no sympathy with fanciful theories based upon "Natural Law," "Primitive Law," or "Divine Law," but says at once that International Law, so called, consists of "certain rules of self-denial, forbearance, and courtesy, which have been found conducive to the mutual interest of men." He defines it as "the result of an implied agreement among civilized nations to abide by those practices which have proved most conducive to the promotion of profitable intercourse in peace, and to the mitigation of suffering and hardship in war." on The remaining two thirds of the book are given to the discussion of subjects so general as to make a brief summary impossible. They contain, in part, addresses on Columbus, Kossuth, Andrew Jackson, Charles O'Connor, and Montesquieu; addresses on moral and social questions; an interesting article "The Bar of New York from 1792-1892," and another on "Young Men in Politics." An address entitled "The Lawyer's Responsibilities" gives Mr. Coudert's views upon codification. This portion of the book is only occasionally of primary interest to lawyers, but the general reader should find little that is uninteresting. In criticising the volume as a whole it must in fairness be said that the subjects lose much from having been presented in comparatively short addresses. Time and occasion did not permit the speaker to go so fully into them as we should often like, and much that was calculated to keep the audience good tempered could be dispensed with by the reader, if only he could have in its place an equal amount of matter written to the point. This, however, is but another way of saying that the questions which Mr. Coudert has raised are of such interest that we can but wish he had had time to give us more than a single volume. A. H. STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By A. Inglis Clark. Second edition. Melbourne: Charles F. Maxwell. 1905. pp. xvi, 447. 8vo. As soon as the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth was framed, lawyers acquainted with its provisions saw clearly enough that there might soon arise in Australia a body of decisions and treatises useful to persons interested in the constitutional law of the United States; for the Australian Constitution creates a federation, divides between the federation and the states the various functions of government, reserves to the states the powers not delegated to the federation, uses many of the expressions found in the Constitution of the United States, and gives to the federal courts the function of deciding, in the course of ordinary litigation, whether the legislative acts of the federal government and of the states are unconstitutional and void. Inevitably American cases and treatises gain a new importance in Australia; and Australian cases and treatises gain a new importance in America. The author of the present treatise, for the last seven years a judge of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which is one of the states of the Australian Commonwealth, was among the first to emphasize the applicability and controlling influence of American constitutional decisions. His first edition appeared in 1901. At that time there were no decisions upon the Australian Constitution, for the instrument went into effect on the first day of January in that year. The first volume of the Australian Commonwealth Law Reports contained at least three constitutional cases, in each of which use was made of American authorities; and two of these Australian cases to quote the words of the author-"have authoritatively declared that the doctrines and principles of federal constitutional law which were enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, as those which should govern the interpretation of the Constitution of that country, are equally applicable to the interpretation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia." As the author's view of the value of American decisions has been upheld, he now offers an enlarged edition, in which he adds a treatment of new topics and gives to American cases still greater prominence. E. W. PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY. A Treatise on the 8vo. BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS. By William M. Lile, Henry S. Redfield, Eugene Wambaugh, Alfred E. Mason, and James E. Wheeler. Edited by Nathan Abbott. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1905. pp. viii, 472. CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW. Scientific Legal Education. An Illustration. With an introduction by Melville M. Bigelow. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1906. pp. xvii, 296. CONDITIONAL AND FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS. By Albert Martin Kales. Chicago: Callaghan and Company. 1905. pp. xliv, 453. 8vo. 8vo. THE LAW OF PASSENGER AND FREIGHT ELEVATORS. Second and revised edition. By J. H. Webb. St. Louis The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1905. pp. xviii, 375. 8vo. PROCEDURE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE. By William T. Hughes. In two volumes. Chicago: Callaghan and Company. 1905. pp. x, 1-390; 4011289. 8vo. SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS. By Edwin H. Woodruff. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1905. pp. xvi, 692. 8vo. DIE LEHRE DER RECHTSSOUVERÄNITÄT. Beitrag zur Staatslehre. Von Dr. H. Krabbe. Groningen: J. B. Wolters. 1906. pp. 254. 8vo. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS. By Joseph R. Long. St. Paul: Keefe-Davidson Company. 1905. pp. xiv, 455. 8vo. TRAITÉ DE LA LOCATION DES COFFRES-FORTS. Par M. Jules Valery. Paris: Albert Foutemoing. pp. vi, 151. 8vo. WHAT is the duration of an indirect equitable conversion of land into money or of money into land? It is the same as that of the contract, trust, or duty which brings it into existence, or, more strictly, it is the same as that of the right, which such contract, trust, or duty creates, to have an actual conversion made, and to receive some portion of the money or land into which the actual conversion is to be made, or some limited interest in such money or land; and the duration of this right is not always the same as that of the contract, trust, or duty which creates it, as the latter may be conditional, i. e., subject to a condition precedent, and in that case the right is not created until the condition is performed or satisfied. A distinction must, however, be made between a contract, trust, or duty which is conditional and one which is not to be performed till a future day, for the mere fact that a contract, trust, or duty is not to be performed till a future day does not prevent or delay the creation of a right, it merely renders the right incapable of being enforced until the time arrives when the contract, trust, or duty is to be performed. If, indeed, an indirect equitable conversion were an equitable substitute for an actual conversion, i. e., if it were an equitable exchange of money for land or land for money, it would follow that a contract, trust, or duty to make an actual conversion at a future day could not cause an equitable conversion before that day arrived; but, as an equitable conversion merely causes the right to have an actual conversion made 1 Continued from 19 HARV. L. REV. 249. |